THE DEPOSITION OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG

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SUMMARY

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition (sometimes called an 'autobiography' or 'confession') is the longest account of the Taiping Rebellion from the rebel side. Its importance is enhanced by the great scarcity of documentation of this nature brought about by the widespread destruction of Taiping documents during and after the suppression of the rebellion.

Because of the circumstances in which it was written, because the original manuscript was withheld from the eyes of historians and the public by Tseng Kuo-fan and his descendants, and in view of the known incompleteness of the published versions, the deposition has for several decades been the subject of speculation and controversy. Only in 1961, with the publication of a facsimile edition in Taiwan, was it possible for historians to examine an accurate reproduction of the original document and form their own judgement on several important questions, including the authenticity of the deposition, its accuracy and reliability. These questions have to be resolved in order to assess the value of the document as an account of the history of the rebellion and the reasons for its failure. Of equal, if not greater value, is the light which it throws upon the character of its author, the most outstanding military leader of the late Taiping period, who subsequently became a great popular hero. Examination of his career as seen through the deposition, his state of mind, and his motivation for writing it, should help to explain the nature of the rebellion itself. Most of these questions are discussed in the pages which follow, and the deposition has been translated and annotated in considerable detail.

This is the first complete translation into English of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition. It is also the first version in any language to show not only the deletions made by Tseng Kuo-fan, but also the other cuts made by members of his staff.

C O N T E N T S

I INTRODUCTION.

Although it is only a century since the end of the Taiping Rebellion,[1] the student of its history is likely to look with envy upon the resources, in terms of contemporary documentation, available, to take a roughly comparable instance, to the historian of the French Revolution. He does not have at his disposal quantities of newspapers or journals in which he may find detailed accounts of this or that event, or different shades of opinion about them. No such newspapers existed in China in the middle of the 19th Century apart from certain China-coast newspapers in English. He cannot examine contemporary police records, which have been used so fruitfully by some European historians to identify the nameless 'mobs' which have from time to time participated in the making of history. No such police records survive from the days of the Taipings and although there are some lists of captured rebels, they usually tell us little more than the name, age and native place of the offenders. Nor can the historian of the Rebellion draw upon the memoirs of ex-Taipings written in the leisure of retirement, because former rebels, even if they survived and had the ability to do so, would hardly have dared to commit to paper the record of such dangerous activities.

Yet at first sight, source material in Chinese on the Rebellion seems quite copious, and in the last fifteen years alone some twenty volumes have been published. In addition there is a substantial quantity of books and articles in western languages.[2] But before 1927, when W.J.Hail's book on Tseng Kuo-fan was published,[3] no western work on the Taiping Rebellion made use of Chinese sources. The writings of foreign observers in China, missionaries, journalists, merchants, diplomatists or adventurers, though many are of considerable value and interest, and sometimes provide unique sources of information, too often give a superficial or misleading impression. A large proportion

of the Chinese material, on the other hand, consists of, or is based upon the memorials of Ch'ing officials engaged in the suppression of the Rebellion, who were frequently mendacious, nearly always ill-informed, and inevitably prejudiced. There are many contemporary accounts and diaries, but the fictional or gossipy nature of many of them, and the invariable hostility of their authors to the Rebellion, often put their reliability in question. Nevertheless, thanks to this material we know a good deal about what the literati thought about the Taiping Rebellion, and even a certain amount about how they behaved. But we know very little about what the rebels themselves thought about their rebellion, and even less about what the Chinese peasants and other inarticulate sections of the population thought about it.

The raw materials of the historian are always subject to a process of pre-selection before they reach his hands, a process in which both accident and consciousness play a part. In the case of Taiping history the sifting was done with a deliberate ruthlessness which severely handicaps the modern historian. Both during the Rebellion and after it, the Ch'ing government attempted to wipe out all trace of the Taipings. With the exception of a very small number of important documents, some of which have been preserved by accident, government commanders and officials destroyed everything which came into their hands. After fourteen years of continuous military activity only a handful of Taiping military despatches has survived, and even fewer private letters. Of the twentynine Taiping printed books which are still extant, mostly in single copies, only a few were discovered in China; the rest came to light in Paris, London and elsewhere. They found their way into foreign museums often because of the interest of missionaries in the Taiping brand of Christianity. The Taipings often handed to foreign missionaries books which they hoped would impress them, which would emphasize the similarities between them

and win their sympathy. Thus a number of Taiping publications of a religious nature have survived but little which has a bearing on social, economic or military matters.[4]

The importance of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition must be seen against this background.[5] It is the longest single document from the Taiping side, the fullest and most detailed statement by a Taiping leader of his own activities and feelings about the Rebellion; as such it has long been the subject of speculation, and remains one of controversy. The circumstances of its origin, the fact that it was written in captivity in the days immediately preceeding the execution of its author, from memory, but not 'recollected in tranquility', the fact that there is much in it which is unexpected, and that Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to have written for the eyes of his captors with a motive which was not not merely a desire to inform posterity, make it necessary to study the deposition in detail; not only to verify the information which it contains but also to understand the motivation of its author. Since Li Hsiu-ch'eng was one of the outstanding leaders of the Taiping movement, an understanding of his behaviour and attitudes may throw light on the nature of the Rebellion as a whole. Before turning to this task however, it is necessary to make some introductory remarks about the history of the Rebellion itself.

The Opium War, the first clash between the old China and the new West, is usually considered to mark the beginning of the modern period of Chinese history. The Taiping Rebellion was the first major internal event of this period, and one which showed how great was to be China's break with tradition, how tenacious were her roots in the past and how violent was to be her entry into the modern world.

By the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Ch'ing rulers hoped that they had put an end, at least temporarily, to 'external troubles'

(外患). But 'internal disorder' (內亂), the other twin in that dreadful concatenation which had haunted Chinese emperors for centuries, began almost at once and reached a point of acute crisis only eight years later. This is not to imply that the Taiping Rebellion was a simple outcome of the Opium War; it was the climax to the steady deterioration of Ch'ing administration and the general decay of Chinese society. Long before the Opium War the Manchu regime had begun to show the characteristic symptoms of dynastic decline; the war greatly speeded up this process and added entirely new disruptive elements. These naturally affected first and most profoundly the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (Liangkuang). No other region of China had quite the same coincidence of favourable circumstances and combustible material: distance from the capital, a kind of proto-nationalism compounded of a long-standing anti-Manchu tradition and 'local xenophobia',[6] economic and social troubles connected with the disruption of trade and catalystic contacts with the West, and in addition, drought, flood, famine or plague, from which Kwangsi in particular was rarely free. The people of Liangkuang were moreover, in the front row, so to speak, to watch the ignoble spectacle of their government's defeat in the first conflict with the West, in which the famous Manchu military machine was shown up as a paper tiger.[7]

As the result of these factors, Liangkuang in the decade which preceeded the Taiping rising, was seething with banditry in all its forms, from the purely destructive to the Robin Hood variety, which spread and flourished under the eyes of a corrupt and pusillanimous local administration.[8] A life of banditry was the only means of survival for the unemployed boatmen and porters thrown out of work by the disruption of the trade routes which followed the war; pirates from the Canton delta, displaced by the policing action of British naval vessels, turned their attention to inland waterways;[9] troops and militiamen, disbanded after the Opium War, found the transition from soldier to bandit an easy and even natural one.

The traditional secret societies of the south, the T'ien Ti Hui (Triads),[10] which functioned as relatively innocuous, though somewhat shady mutual-aid organizations for much of the time, became transformed into something much more dangerous as life became increasingly intolerable for an increasing number of people, and the venality and incompetence of the officials more and more evident. It was then that the dusty, half-forgotten banners of dynastic revolt were unfurled, bearing the somewhat out-dated device 'fan Ch'ing fu Ming!' - 'overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming!' After 1840 the slogan had a new appeal to the people of Liangkuang who were convinced that the hated officials were selling out to the foreigners.

Faced with this widespread lawlessness, the local administration, unable to maintain order itself, permitted and sometimes encouraged the formation of local militia, usually under gentry leadership. These bands naturally attempted to defend local gentry interests, including the maintenance of the rural status quo, which they interpreted fairly narrowly. They saw a threat to their property, but not yet a threat to the society of which they were the pillars. They dared not fight against large rebel groups and considered their work well done if they managed to get them to move into other districts. An increasing proportion of the population was armed, if only with swords and spears; for some assembly was now legal, and not always easily controlled; for others it was illegal and uncontrollable. As the social and economic crisis deepened, especially with the famine of 1846-7 in Kwangsi, antagonistic groups and those with a grievance resorted increasingly to armed force: destitute peasants against landlords, landlords against bandits, the unemployed against the officials, the law-abiding against the outlaws. Famine and local unrest brought latent hostility between pen-ti (the early settlers) and hakka (the later settlers) to the surface, and they too took to arms.[11] As the gentry and officials came to depend more and more on the

militia (t'uan-lien), the secret societies united the disaffected, landless peasants, unemployed silver-miners, boatmen and porters, as life became more difficult to sustain.

The seed of a political movement began to grow in this hotbed of lawlessness as soon as it was whispered that the Mandate of the Dynasty was about to run out. But it could only grow if there was a polarization of the social unrest between political stirring on the one hand and pure banditry on the other. A rebellious organization was unlikely to win the kind of following it needed as long as it was burdened with the stigma of banditry; it had to prove that it could promise something better than the present chaos.

Another side of the polarization process was that the distinctions between the militia and the non-political bandits became fainter. Not only in the sense that in agrarian societies there are often 'landlords' bandits' as well as 'peasant bandits',[12] but also because inevitably in such times, the age-old affinity between soldier and bandit asserted itself. Moreover, by an easy extension of their officially permitted means of raising funds the militia groups could encroach upon the traditional preserves of the bandits, and exact illegal levies upon trade, gambling, prostitution and so on. In 1847 in Kwangsi, wrote a contemporary, 'the militiamen are bandits (tsei) and the local people are bandits too ... they start as militiamen and end up as bandits.'[13] Bandit leaders, on the other hand, not infrequently threw in their lot with the forces of law and order in return for an official post and legal recognition for the very military power which had forced the government to come to terms with them.[14]

In spite of their resounding political slogan calling for the overthrow of the Ch'ing and the restoration of the Ming, the T'ien Ti Hui were never able to curb adequately the indiscipline and destructiveness of their followers, although they undoubtedly made efforts to do so. The only organization which was able to do

this was a new kind of secret society.

The original Taiping organization, the Pai Shang-ti Hui or Association of God-worshippers, was created by Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (1814-1864) and his disciple Feng Yun-shan (1822-1852) in Kwangsi in this period of widespread unrest. The story, which is related in part in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition, is fairly well-known and need not be repeated here.[15] Though neither Hung Hsiu-ch'üan nor Feng Yun-shan are known to have been members of the T'ien Ti Hui, it was inevitable that their association would be profoundly influenced by the traditional secret societies of the south. Like them, the God-worshippers sought recruits among the disaffected sections of the community, and could only attract a following by expressing to some extent their collective aspirations, dreams or complaints; both the secret societies and the God-worshippers emphasized the brotherhood of the oppressed. The Association of God-worshippers, as a newcomer on the social scene, naturally drew upon the long experience of the secret societies in the techniques of clandestine activity. Although little is known about the early relations between the two, partly because the Taipings seem to have been a little ashamed of this connection once they had established their state, it seems reasonable to assume that since the Association of God-worshippers grew up in areas where the T'ien Ti Hui was already strong, they must at least have reached a modus vivendi.[16]

But the Association of God-worshippers was not just another secret society. What distinguished it from the traditional organizations of popular revolt was the particular brand of Christianity which provided so much of its original dynamism.[17] Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was a disappointed intellectual, whose failure in the examinations frustrated his ambition to rise out of rural poverty into a career of honour and wealth. Like many of his predecessors, this personal setback led him to reject the values of the society which seemed to have rejected him. Others had

taken to mystical Taoism or salvationist Buddhism as an expression of their alienation; Hung Hsiu-ch'üan would have perhaps done the same if he had been a native of another province. But he sat his examinations at Canton, and lived only a hundred li from the point of impact in the first collision between China and the West. It was the religion of the West, whose representatives had just humiliated the Confucian empire, which attracted his attention. This was perhaps the first time that Christianity served in Asia to arm a revolutionary movement; it was not to be the last.[18] But before this foreign religion could be harnessed to the service of rebellion it had to be adapted to the psychological needs, not only of frustrated intellectuals, but of all those who had no vested interest in the preservation of the Confucian order. It was the unstable genius of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan which effected this transformation.

The God-worshippers' Association started as a purely religious organization, apparently without political intent. 'Up to this period (the winter of 1850),' wrote Hamberg, 'the worshippers of God had not stood in any connexion whatever with the robbers and outlaws of the province. The mandarin soldiers, during their excursions in search of the robbers, never interfered with the members of the congregations, or suspected the brethren of having any other but religious motives for assembling together.'[19] But the development of the social crisis in Kwangsi, the need for self-defence against bandits, the adherence of persecuted Hakkas to the association, the hostile motions of officials and gentry, and the growing ambitions of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and his friends, led the God-worshippers more and more into political activity.

Such was the vigour of the movement that in the twentyseven months which followed the rising at Chin-t'ien in January 1851, the Taipings had broken out of Kwangsi, passed through Hunan and Kiangsi into Hupeh, and after a rapid descent of the Yangtse had captured Nanking in March 1853 and made it their capital.

In 1853 and at several other moments in the decade which followed, it seemed impossible that the dynasty should survive the combined onslaught of the Taipings and other rebels. There is little doubt that in establishing their capital at Nanking in 1853 at the expense of an all-out effort to seize Peking, the Taipings sacrificed their first and best opportunity of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty.[20]

The temptation of setting up a court with all the trappings of imperial splendour in the second city of the empire was evidently too much for them, and sound strategic counsels were over-ruled.[21] Although two armies, under Li K'ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang were sent north from Nanking in May 1854 to take Peking, a vital year had already been lost; the main Taiping armies were needed for the defence of their capital and only comparatively small armies under junior commanders could be spared for the north. By the time that Northern Expedition reached Chihli its strength had been exhausted by an arduous campaign, relief was sent, but too little and too late. By March the following year the northern armies had been wiped out and their commanders captured.

Another important, and for the Taipings, disastrous result of the deflection of their forward thrust by the acquisition of Nanking, was that it gave time for the transformation of some of the ordinary gentry-led militia from local defence and police organizations into a striking force which could operate against the Taipings on a national scale. Such a development had not been envisaged by the Court early in 1853 when orders were sent to some forty officials in the provinces to raise militia, or by Tseng Kuo-fan himself when he accepted the assignment.[22]

The first major victory for Tseng Kuo-fan's Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün) over the Taipings was at Hsiang-t'an in May 1854.[23] Thereafter, especially after another disastrous defeat for the Taipings

at Yüeh-chou in July 1854, in which they lost a great number of boats, the Hunan Army played an increasingly important role in the fight against the rebellion. In spite of government pressure Tseng Kuo-fan refused to take his army outside the boundaries of the province of Hunan until he thought that it was ready; then in October 1854 he crossed into Hupeh and recovered Wu-ch'ang and Han-yang. In the meantime, regular government armies had established two great camps near Nanking, north and south of the Yangtse, called 'Chiang-pei Ta-ying' (the Chiang-pei Headquarters) and 'Chiang-nan Ta-ying' (the Chiang-nan Headquarters). Though they did not represent a very impressive striking force, their presence was a grave threat to the supply lines of the Taiping capital.[24] In order to deal with this threat it was necessary for the Taipings to withdraw troops from the western front fighting against the Hunan Army. Once this was done, the Taipings had little difficulty in routing the Chiang-pei and Chiang-nan forces.[25]

This was in June 1856. The blockade of their capital was broken, but any hope the Taipings may have had of turning and destroying the Hunan Army vanished when internecine strife broke out in the Taiping leadership.[26] As a result of this savage struggle for power three of the original leaders, including Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, were killed, and another, Shih Ta-k'ai defected with his whole army of some two hundred thousand men. There was an immense loss of life and the damage to Taiping morale was incalculable. With the final breakdown of group leadership, such as it was, government was left in the hands of corrupt and incompetent sycophants, at least until the arrival of Hung Jen-kan in 1859: Hung Hsiu-ch'üan himself was incapable or unwilling to give the movement coherent leadership. The defection of Shih Ta-k'ai, who had recaptured Wu-ch'ang in 1855, allowed Tseng Kuo-fan to consolidate his initial successes and allowed the Imperial Commissioner Ho-ch'un and his assistant commander Chang Kuo-liang to recover from the destruction of the Chiang-nan H.Q. and organize another siege of the Taiping

capital in the following year.

After the bloody struggle for power new commanders had to be found. It was then that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch'eng were appointed to important military commands; later they came to be thought of as the main pillars of the Taiping regime.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was born in T'eng-hsien, Kwangsi Province in 1823.[27] He came of a peasant family, probably hakka, which also burned charcoal as a subsidiary occupation.[28] He did not join the Taipings at Chin-t'ien, where the rising occurred, but did so when the Taipings passed through his village on the way to Yung-an in September 1851. Between this time and the capture of Nanking Li Hsiu-ch'eng served as an ordinary soldier, but subsequently, perhaps because he had received some education, he was appointed to an administrative position. Soon afterwards he was given a command of new recruits defending Nanking, rising to the rank of chien-chün (Army Inspector).[29] He left Nanking in the winter of 1853 and held minor commands under Shih Ta-k'ai in Anhwei Province.

Some time before 1856 - the exact date is not known - he was appointed ti-kuan-fu-ch'eng-hsiang (a junior minister of state),[30] which was the rank he held at the time of the internal strife. For his achievement in enlisting the support of Nien rebels he was promoted, and after the defection of Shih Ta-k'ai in 1857 shared with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng virtual control over Taiping military and civil administration.[31] In the spring of 1859, in circumstances which he describes in his deposition, Li Hsiu-ch'eng was given the title of 'Chung Wang', or Faithful Prince. After the death of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng in 1862 Li Hsiu-ch'eng became the most powerful and famous of the Taiping generals, winning the reputation of an able and cunning commander,[32] and a benevolent and honest administrator.

Both Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch'eng were talented leaders but they were unable to stem the ebbing tide of Taiping fortunes. Neither was strong enough as a leader to give direction to the

whole movement, they did not have the charismatic vitality of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan or Yang Hsiu-ch'ing. When they acted together they achieved impressive military successes, but they were not always able to co-operate. The leadership vacuum at the top and the limited military thinking of these men, left the movement without far-sighted strategy or political direction. In spite of their successes the Taipings remained strategically on the defensive.

Nothing shows this more clearly than the difficulty which they had in dealing both with the siege forces at Nanking and with the Hunan Army in Hunan and Anhwei. The first major campaign under Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was an attempt to break the supply-lines of the Hunan Army in Anhwei and to secure those of the capital. But in December 1857 it was necessary for the Taipings to turn back and deal once more with the Ch'ing forces which were threatening Nanking. No sooner had this operation been completed than the advance of the Hunan Army under Li Hsü-pin brought Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch'eng back into Anhwei in a great pincer movement which culminated in the victory at San-ho in November 1858.[33] Again the victory could not be followed up because the Taiping capital was still under pressure from the Chiang-nan H.Q., the complete destruction of which was not accomplished until after Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remarkable diversionary attack on Hang-chou in 1860.[34] In the campaign which defeated the Chiang-nan H.Q. several Taiping commanders acted in unison and achieved a great victory, which enabled Li Hsiu-ch'eng to extend Taiping territory into the Kiangsu delta.

This expansion was probably intended to stabilize their rear in preparation for a major Taiping thrust up the Yangtse in order to gain control over this key waterway in face of the steady advance of the Hunan Army.[35] It was planned that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng should operate on the north bank of the river and Li Hsiu-ch'eng on the south, and together they would launch a pincer attack on the

Hunan Army in Hupeh. Although Li Hsiu-ch'eng agreed, according to Hung Jen-kan,[36] on the importance of regaining control of the Yangtse, he did not in the end fulfill his part in the plan. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng would have prefered a concentrated effort to relieve An-ch'ing and Li Shih-hsien wanted to campaign in Fukien and Chekiang. Though the plan for a thrust up the Yangtse was eventually set in motion, in the subsequent actions of Li Hsiu-ch'eng and in the expressed opinions of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Li Shih-hsien it is possible to detect the evidence of regional pre-occupations in these commanders which led to their unwillingness in the last phase of the Rebellion to co-ordinate their military actions. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng undoubtedly considered Anhwei as his special sphere of activity, Li Shih-hsien looked on Fukien and Chekiang as his. Though Li Hsiu-ch'eng agreed to the plan, albeit unwillingly, he did not complete his assignment because he already had his own 'empire' in Kiangsu. If Ch'en Yü-ch'eng played the part assigned to him it was perhaps because it did not conflict with his own regional interests; but Li Hsiu-ch'eng's failure to do what he had agreed to do must be considered the main reason for the break-down of the operation.[37]

After the final defeat of the Chiang-nan H.Q. in 1860, Tseng Kuo-fan's military power was at last confirmed by his appointment to a high official position.[38] He then delegated to Tso Tsung-t'ang the formation of another regional army to operate in Chekiang, of which Tso was made Governor, and to Li Hung-chang the formation of the Huai Army, which was transfered from An-ch'ing to Shanghai in 1862 at the urgent appeal of refugee gentry from Su-chou, and began campaigning in Kiangsu.[39]

By this time the second Opium War had won for Britain and France important new commercial and political concessions from the Ch'ing government, and they were anxious to see the end of hostilities and the stabilization of the dynasty. When the Taipings threatened Shanghai in 1862 Britain and France abandoned what had been an

imperfect neutrality and began to co-operate on a local level with the government for the defence of the Treaty Ports.[40] Unofficial western aid against the Taipings started with the formation in Shanghai of a corps of foreign adventurers in 1860, under the American F.T.Ward.[41] On his death in 1862 the British government was sufficiently interested in the potentialities of this corps to allow the release of C.G.Gordon from the army in order to command what was then called the 'Ever-Victorious Army'.[42] This was something of a misnomer, and the role of this force in the suppression of the Taipings has been greatly exaggerated, not only by western writers, but even by Hung Jen-kan, who considered that foreign intervention was 'the cause of all our troubles'.[43] This judgement was based more on disappointment at the behaviour of fellow Christians than on a cool appraisal of reality. In fact the Taiping movement was already beyond recovery before this intervention started.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a low opinion both of the 'Ever-Victorious Army' and of Li Hung-chang as a commander;[44] nevertheless between them, and thanks to treachery in the Taiping camp, they succeeded in capturing Li Hsiu-ch'eng's 'capital', Su-chou, and gradually recovered for the government the rich rice basin of Kiangsu. The key city of An-ch'ing had been taken by the Hunan Army under Tseng Kuo-ch'üan (Tseng Kuo-fan's brother) in September 1861, and by the end of June 1862 the last siege of Nanking had begun. Even the great attack on the Hunan Army by 600,000 troops under Li Hsiu-ch'eng in October could not break the siege, and the Taiping capital fell on July 19th, 1864.

Thus, when the mopping-up operations were completed, ended what has been called the greatest civil war in history. There were few provinces of China which the Taipings had not penetrated at one time or another between 1851 and 1864, and six hundred towns had fallen to their arms.[45] Ten million troops had been involved and probably no less than twenty million people had lost their lives.[46]

II THE CAPTURE OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG AND THE ORIGIN OF THE DEPOSITION

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was taken prisoner on 22 July 1864 (TC3/6/19), on the third day after the fall of Nanking, in circumstances which he describes in his deposition.[1] Reliable reports of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's death had reached the Ch'ing commanders in June,[2] so the fate of his heir Hung Yu-fu, and of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, his most famous general, was a matter of great concern to the court.

Chao Lieh-wen,[3] an important member of Tseng Kuo-fan's secretariat, recorded in his diary the events following Li Hsiu-ch'eng's capture, when he was brought before the commander of the Hunan Army at Nanking Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, Kuo-fan's younger brother.

> I heard that the false Chung Wang [Li Hsiu-ch'eng] was captured and that the Governor [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan][4] was personally interrogating him, having placed an awl and a sword before him, with the intention of mutilating him. When someone informed me of this, I thought of the importance placed on this man by the court, and hastened over to restrain the Governor with discreet words. But he was very angry and jumping up from his seat, shouted, 'He is nothing but a bandit, why should he be spared or presented as a captive?'[5] He cried to the soldiers to slash his shoulder and thigh, and the blood flowed. The rebel Chung remained absolutely motionless. Shortly afterwards the false king's second brother, the Fu Wang Hung Jen-ta,[6] who had been captured, was brought in and was tortured as the rebel Chung had been; he too said nothing. I realized that he [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan] could not be restrained, and left. After a while the Governor seemed to come to his senses suddenly; he ordered [the prisoners] to be locked up, invited me to come back, and asked me what should be done. He said that the execution of this man could well be postponed, and that he feared that there would be a question of

> presenting the captive, and so on, which would only increase the arrogance of the court. I replied that it was not for us to decide whether the captive should be presented or not; but he was an important ringleader, and now that he had been captured alive the correct thing to do was to ask for a decision from above. If, for instance, he had been captured by the civil administration and then executed without authority, would that be permissable? The Governor had no answer, so he ordered a letter to be written to the Grand Secretary [Tseng Kuo-fan],[7] saying that Hsiao Fu-ssu [8] had gone in pursuit and made the capture. In fact it was the local people of Fang-shan who had taken him.[9]

In the evening of 23 July (TC3/6/20) Chao Lieh-wen went to the place where Li Hsiu-ch'eng was imprisoned and had a long talk with him. Chao seems to have been prompted by curiosity, and it was apparently not a formal interrogation. Where Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's brutality had failed to elicit any response from Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Chao Lieh-wen's conciliatory role in that first encounter may have encouraged Li to speak quite freely when they met on the following day.[10]

On 26 July a wooden cage was made and Li Hsiu-ch'eng was locked in it.[11] This was done in order to facilitate the exhibition of the prisoner, a matter of some importance to the Tseng brothers, as we shall see.[12]

Tseng Kuo-fan, who was in An-ch'ing at the time, received the news of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's capture on 26 July (TC3/6/23).[13] He arrived by boat at Nanking on 28 July,[14] and in the evening personally interrogated Li Hsiu-ch'eng.[15] No record survives of what passed between them. On 30 July (TC3/6/27) Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in his diary: 'Very tired this evening: noted a number of points to question Li Hsiu-ch'eng about'.[16] But he did not attend

the interrogation himself, which was conducted by three members of his secretariat, P'ang Chi-yun, Li Hung-i and Chou Yüeh-hsiu. We do not know when this took place, only that the questioning lasted all day.[17] A much abbreviated record of this interrogation[18] shows that the officials had some difficulty in understanding Li's dialect, which may have been one of the reasons why he was told to write the deposition.

But there is another version of how the deposition came to be written, which is given in several sources.[19] According to this account, Li Hsiu-ch'eng turned his back on Tseng Kuo-ch'üan when brought before him for interrogation and said, 'What is the point? Quickly bring me paper and a brush and I will write. You have burned all the records in our Bureau of History and if I do not write how can a truthful account be handed down?' Li Hsiu-ch'eng then wrote 'from the 17th Day [of the 6th Month] to the 27th Day - ten days - after which he was executed.' The fictional character of this version makes it at once suspect, and the impression is strengthened by the mistaken dates: Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not taken prisoner until the 19th Day of the 6th Month (22 July). There is, in addition, no reason to doubt the veracity of Tseng Kuo-fan's statement that Li Hsiu-ch'eng began to write on the 27th Day (30 July).[20]

The extraction of a deposition, preferably a confession, which would neatly round off a case and fix responsibility once and for all for what had occurred, seems to have been a matter of course in Chinese legal procedure, especially perhaps in the case of a rebel, where there was usually no question of having to decide whether the man was guilty or not.[21] The depositions of the majority of rebels consist of their answers to questions during interrogation, written down by an official or clerk. Even literate rebels did not always write their own depositions, presumably in some cases because they did not want to and could not be forced, though often they seem to have been willing to answer questions.[22] The reason why Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not begin to write his deposition

until 30 July was probably connected with a rule or convention that such depositions were part of the interrogation to be conducted by the highest official concerned, in this case Tseng Kuo-fan, who did not arrive at Nanking until 28 July.[23]

Apart from being required for legal purposes, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition was useful to Tseng Kuo-fan in three ways: first, it provided him with a certain amount of military intelligence, though in the event this was of little importance since military operations against the Taipings were almost finished and Li Hsiu-ch'eng was more concerned with the past than with the future; secondly, it helped to prove to a suspicious court that the rebel who had been captured really was Li Hsiu-ch'eng; thirdly, since Tseng Kuo-fan took the trouble to publish a copy of it, we must suppose that he considered it to have some value as propaganda, either against the Taipings or for himself, or both.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng began to write on 30 July, and was seen doing so about this time by Chaloner Alabaster, a British consular interpreter, who wrote in the following terms in his official report:[24]

> I went to see how they treated the Chung Wang. I found him seated on the ground writing his confession. He was clean shaved, simply but cleanly dressed and appeared well cared for. For safety he had on light leg-irons and a sort of open cell, or cage, six feet square had been constructed, in which he was confined. Sentries are kept on him day and night but I do not think he has any reason to complain of extraordinary rigour. I walked in quietly and hoped not to have disturbed him, but someone shouting out to him, he turned round, stood up and greeted me by name. I was therefore compelled to speak and simply asked him if he wished anything of me. To this he replied that his sole hope was now in heaven - speaking almost cheerfully and

causing an involuntary sympathy to be felt for him.

On 7 August 1864 (TC3/7/6) Li Hsiu-ch'eng was executed, and Chao Lieh-wen wrote in his diary:

> The false Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng was executed today. He has written a deposition of fifty or sixty thousand characters, recounting rebel affairs from the 4th or 5th Years of Hsien Feng [1854-5] in some detail. Though it is not literary the facts are well presented. One cannot say that he is not the craftiest and the cruelest amongst the rebels. The Grand Secretary [Tseng Kuo-fan] is very sorry for him and yesterday personally examined him again. He seemed to beg for pardon and the Grand Secretary replied that he awaited the Imperial Decree. For days he had hesitated about this matter, but he would give him an answer as soon as a decision had been reached. Today Li Mei-sheng was sent to tell him that the law cannot be evaded and he could not be acquitted. Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] said, 'The Grand Secretary's kindness will be engraved and not forgotten. I have been at error in this life, but will try to repay in the next one,' and so on. At dusk he was taken to the execution ground. He wrote a valedictory poem of ten lines, without rhyme and ridiculously crude, which he handed to the supervisor of the execution, P'ang Hsing-san,[25] in which he stated that he had been loyal to the end. Then he was executed.[26]

In his memorial to the throne of TC3/7/7 (8 August 1864) Tseng Kuo-fan stated that he had commanded Li Hsiu-ch'eng to write a deposition, which 'does not very well follow the rules of writing, but the facts are true and accurate. It has been copied and sent for the perusal of the Grand Council.'[27] On the same day Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in his diary:

> Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition has been copied by eight

> or nine people. Altogether it amounts to 130 pages, each with 216 characters. It has been bound, punctuated and divided into sections, marked with red paper slips. It has been sent to the Grand Council for examination. Memorial despatched at the Yu Hour [5-7 p.m.].[28]

A few days later, on 11 August (TC3/7/10) Chao Lieh-wen checked the copy to be sent to An-ch'ing to be printed. 'The Grand Secretary asked me to look at Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition again and divide it into sections; it will then be sent to the engraver.'[29]

The imperial edict of TC3/7/14 in reply to Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial of TC3/7/7 giving information about the deposition has caused a certain amount of suspicion among scholars because it contains the words, 'the Commissioner [Tseng Kuo-fan] is moreover ordered to send Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition ... to the Grand Council for inspection.'[30] Because of this, the historian Hsieh Hsing-yao, writing in 1935, assumed that after making up a packet containing his memorial of TC3/7/7 and the copy of the deposition, Tseng Kuo-fan had had second thoughts about the wording of the latter, had recalled the courier and removed the deposition from the packet, letting the memorial only be taken to Peking.[31] This theory would seem to be confirmed to some extent by a subsequent memorial from Tseng Kuo-fan dated TC3/7/29, in answer to the imperial demand for the deposition to be sent. In this memorial Tseng Kuo-fan wrote, 'I do not know how it can have happened that the memorial should have arrived but not the communication and the deposition.'[32]

Lo Erh-kang has pointed out however, that the copy of the deposition must have arrived in Peking, because the Grand Councillor Li T'ang-chieh wrote in his diary on TC3/7/17 (18 August 1864) that he had read it on that day.[33] The edict of TC3/7/14 demanded the original manuscript of the deposition, but since the

arrival of the copy is not mentioned, the wording is somewhat ambiguous. It is clear from a later edict, that of TC3/7/23, that the court wanted an unexpurgated copy 'which need not be shortened.'[34]

It is difficult to believe that Tseng Kuo-fan really thought that the deposition had somehow got separated from the memorial and had never reached the Grand Council. His subsequent unwillingness, indeed his refusal, to send up the original manuscript, in spite of repeated orders from the court, supports Lo Erh-kang's theory; which is that Tseng Kuo-fan took advantage of the ambiguity of the edict to pretend that he did not understand that it was the original which the court wanted. In his memorial of TC3/7/29 Tseng Kuo-fan wrote, after expressing wonder that the copy should have gone astray, 'However, since there are a great number of people who read rebel depositions, your minister has already published [it as] a volume, which I now send with the memorial to the Grand Council for inspection.'[35]

This was not what the court wanted and another edict was sent demanding an accurate copy.[36] To this Tseng Kuo-fan did not reply until TC3/12/13, when he wrote that he was now sending up 'the ten requests, ten errors and other remarks.'[37] We know that this arrived, first, because some sort of document containing the 'ten requests and ten errors' was found in 1951 in the Ming and Ch'ing Archives by Chin Yü-fu,[38] and secondly because the imperial edict of TC3/12/20 (17 January 1865) tells Tseng Kuo-fan to check a point with Li Hung-chang about the the fate of Li Shih-hsien's family, a demand which could only have been provoked by the reading of the third of the 'ten requests.'[39]

III EDITIONS AND AUTHENTICITY

Since 1864 a number of versions of the deposition have appeared, varying to a considerable extent in their content. Although, since the publication of a facsimile of the original manuscript, we now have a reliable version, it is necessary to list the more important editions which have, until now, been key documents in the history of the Taiping Rebellion.

A. The Grand Council Copy.

This was made at Tseng Kuo-fan's order and was probably sent by him to Peking on 8 August 1864; but it has not been found in the Ming-Ch'ing archives. According to Tseng Kuo-fan it amounted to 28,080 characters.[1]

B. The An-ch'ing Edition.

On 12 August 1864 (TC3/7/11) Tseng Kuo-fan sent the draft of the deposition revised by Chao Lieh-wen, to his son Chi-tse in An-ch'ing, who was presumably responsible for its printing and publication at the Hunan Army headquarters.[2] The printing must have been completed in the early part of September because Li Hung-chang wrote from Su-chou to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan on the 16th, (TC3/8/17), saying that he 'had seen yesterday at a friend's a copy of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition.'[3] The An-ch'ing Edition is now extremely rare; I only know of one copy in existence, in Taiwan. According to Yang Chia-lo it contains 27,888 characters.[4]

C. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

The original date and place of publication of this edition is not known. It is based on the An-ch'ing Edition and is almost equally rare. A copy exists in the Library of Peking University, and this was reproduced in facsimile in 1936.[5] Though it is said to be an exact copy of the An-ch'ing Edition, it has 27,810 characters; but this slight discrepancy may be the result of different methods of counting - whether or not blank spaces in the text were counted for instance.

All subsequent editions up until 1933 were based either on the An-ch'ing or on the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition. They are all corrupt to some extent, some being careless copies, some fictionalized versions. In general they are of little value and it is unnecessary to list them here.

D. Lü Chi-i's Hand Copy.

Until 1944 the original manuscript of the deposition was held by Tseng Kuo-fan's descendants at their home in Hunan and was not open to examination by scholars.[6] But in the early 1940's material on Taiping history was being collected for a new provincial gazeteer of Kwangsi, and Tseng Chao-hua, the great grandson of Tseng Kuo-fan, who held a post in the customs administration of Kwangsi at that time, agreed to put the manuscript at the disposal of the historians who were compiling the gazeteer. In 1944 therefore, Lü Chi-i, who was secretary of the gazeteer bureau and an acquaintance of Tseng Chao-hua, was sent to Hsiang-t'an in Hunan to fetch the manuscript.[7]

When he arrived there he was told that the manuscript had been sent away for safety 'because of the military situation in northern Hunan.' He understood from this that the members of the Tseng family had changed their minds about showing him the manuscript, but managed to persuade them to send someone to bring it back by threatening to remain there until they did so. There was now clearly no question of being allowed to take it back with him to Kweilin, and he was obliged to examine it under the watchful eyes of members of the Tseng family who took turns in sitting over him. This must have been very disquieting for Lü Chi-i for, as we shall see, his work was very carelessly done.

He had brought a photographer with him, but there were only fifteen plates for the camera. With these he took a photograph of the outside cover of the deposition, of some representative pages, and of some of the pages which seemed to have been greatly

tampered with. Lü Chi-i then went through the manuscript, copying the parts which Tseng Kuo-fan had deleted in red ink, into the margin of a copy of the 1936 facsimile of the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.[8] He copied, according to his own count, some 5,620 characters which, added to the 27,810 characters of the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition, giving a total of 33,430 characters. Lü Chi-i's work was carelessly and hastily done because, as we now know, the manuscript which he was shown consisted of 36,244 characters; he had therefore overlooked 2,814 characters which were missing from the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition. The main reason for this omission is that Lü Chi-i only copied out the parts in the manuscript which were deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan in red ink (ocassionally missing some), but did not take note of parts which had not been so deleted but which nevertheless had been omitted from the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

When Lü Chi-i returned with his copy to Kweilin, some of his colleagues considered that since the deposition in its new form contained 'so much that was self-deprecatory,' more research should be undertaken before this version be published as the true one. Others, in view of the importance to historians of the newly discovered material, advocated publication as soon as possible. The arrival of the Japanese armies put a stop to the discussion.[9] But Lo Erh-kang, who was a member of the team compiling the gazeteer and had already been working on the deposition, was appointed to study the corrected version and find out if it was genuine.[10]

In spite of the shortcomings of Lü Chi-i's hand copy, it remained the basis for the editions and studies of the deposition done between 1944 and 1961. He was the first historian to examine the manuscript in detail and give his opinion as to its authenticity. His edition remained the most complete one available until the publication of the facsimile of the manuscript in 1961;

it had also restored the highly important 'ten requests and ten errors' which had been omitted from all previous editions.

Lü Chi-i himself did no further work on the deposition and his copy was not published until 1961, when a facsimile and a typeset edition appeared in May and November respectively.[11]

E. Lo Erh-kang's Studies.

The result of Lo Erh-kang's prolonged study of the deposition was first published in 1951 under the title Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-chuan yuan-kao chien-cheng (Commentary on the Autobiography of the Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng) - a rather misleading title, since Lo Erh-kang had never seen the original mansucript (yuan-kao) and was working only with Lü Chi-i's somewhat inaccurate copy and a few photographs. Since then, three other editions of this work have been published, another in 1951, in 1954 and 1957. The fourth edition (1957), of which I have made extensive use in this thesis, is the most complete. This study is based on Lü Chi-i's hand copy, but does not indicate which parts were suppressed by Tseng Kuo-fan and his staff. For the preparation of the first three editions Lo Erh-kang only had access to four of the photographs, including one of the cover of the manuscript, which Lü Chi-i had brought back from Hsiang-t'an; it was not until the publication of Liang Hu-lu's edition in 1954 (see below) that Lo Erh-kang became aware that fifteen, not four, photographs had been taken.

The fourth edition contains a fairly long introduction explaining the necessity for a new edition, followed by a study of the deposition, its origins and editions. Some 53 pages are devoted to the evidence as to the authenticity of the manuscript which was seen by Lü Chi-i. Then follows the text of the deposition, punctuated and annotated in some detail. The record of the interrogation of Li Hsiu-ch'eng is given in the appendix, also punctuated and annotated. Like the Lü Chi-i copy on which it

is based and the errors of which it reproduces, the text of this edition has been superseded by the publication of the original manuscript in facsimile. The annotations however, and much of the introduction, remain of considerable interest and value.[12]

F. Liang Hu-lu's Edition.

Liang Hu-lu, who also worked in the Kwangsi Gazeteer Bureau, obtained from Lü Chi-i a set of the photographs and published them under the title Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-chuan chen-chi in 1954. In 1958 he republished this and added the text of the deposition which he had copied from Lü Chi-i's copy in 1944.[13] There is a short introduction but no notes, and the text does not show which parts had been suppressed.[14]

G. The Taiwan Facsimile.

Although Kuo Mo-jo, in his preface to the published edition of Lü Chi-i's copy, suggested that the original manuscript had probably perished in an air accident,[15] the anxieties of historians were dispelled by the publication in the summer of 1961 in Taiwan of a facsimile edition of the manuscript, which had been taken to Taiwan by Tseng Yueh-nung.[16]

The facsimile shows that the deposition was written in black ink in the vertical-lined account books of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's Chi-tzu (吉字) Battalion; on several pages there are additions in the top margin. Tseng Kuo-fan's delations, corrections and occasional comments or interpolations, were made in red ink. According to a note in the facsimile, in which the margins have been slightly extended, the size of the original pages is 17.3cm by 27 cm. The characters 吉字中營(Chi-tzu Battalion H.Q.) are printed over the leading edges of the folded pages (yeh). The deposition, as it stands, was evidently written in two account books, the first containing 50 yeh and the second 24 yeh.[17] There is no introduction, but a short postscript by Tseng Yueh-nung.

H. Lay's Translation.

An English translation of the An-ch'ing or the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition by W.T. Lay appeared in Shanghai in 1865.[18] Since the translation, which is not very accurate, is of a corrupt edition, its value is limited.

* * *

Ever since the publication of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition for the first time in 1864, doubts have been expressed as to its authenticity.[19] We who have only the facsimile edition to judge by can hardly express an opinion on the authenticity of the deposition without first satisfying ourselves that the Taiwan facsimile is a genuine reproduction of what Lü Chi-i saw at Hsiang-t'an in 1944, since it is against this version that the most serious accusations of forgery have been levelled. Fortunately this is not difficult to do, thanks to the photographs which Lü Chi-i took. The fourteen of these (excluding that of the outer cover of the manuscript) are identical with the corresponding pages of the facsimile. Allowing for the parts overlooked by Lü Chi-i, it is equally clear that it was from the original of the Taiwan facsimile that Lü copied down the passages deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan. This is sufficient to identify beyond all doubt the Taiwan facsimile with the manuscript which Lü Chi-i examined in 1944. It remains to discuss whether this manuscript was written by Li Hsiu-ch'eng or is a forgery.

Before the publication in 1951 of Lo Erh-kang's version of Lü Chi-i's copy, doubts about the authenticity of the deposition in the form in which it was generally known, were justified first by Tseng Kuo-fan's published statement that he had suppressed parts of the manuscript, and secondly by the unwillingness of his descendants to release the original. With the publication of Lo Erh-kang's study, which claimed to be a faithful reconstruction

of as much of the original manuscript as still existed, a new or at least greatly accentuated cause for suspicions appeared: the manifest contradiction between Li Hsiu-ch'eng's reputation as the most heroic, pure and loyal of the later Taiping leaders, and the generally unheroic tone of the deposition now that certain passages had been restored to it.

At least one Chinese historian resolved this apparent contradiction by accusing Tseng Kuo-fan of having forged the deposition. In an article written in 1956, Nien Tzu-min sought to prove a case of forgery first by a comparison of handwriting and secondly, by other evidence. His argument is summarized below.[20]

(I). Handwriting. Nien Tzu-min compared three documents said to be in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's handwriting: A, the manuscript in question; B, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's handwritten answers, see Appendix I page 256, and C, his letter to Li Chao-shou.[21] After consulting handwriting experts at the forensic research department of the Ministry of Justice, Nien Tzu-min concluded that A and B are in the same hand, but that C is not. He claimed that A and B were forged as mutually corroborative evidence in case the court at Peking should demand proof of the identity of the prisoner. Nien Tzu-min also assumed, without presenting any proof, that C, the letter to Li Chao-shou, is in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's hand, because it was written long before Li Hsiu-ch'eng was captured. The handwriting experts were however, unable to give an unqualified opinion because C is written in a more or less 'k'ai-shu' (regular) calligraphic style, while the manuscript (A) is in a mixture of this and the 'hsing-shu' (cursive) style.

(II) Other Evidence. Unlike some protagonists of the forgery theory, who say that Tseng Kuo-fan destroyed the real deposition and forged another, Nien Tzu-min denied that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote a deposition at all. His argument is as follows:-

a. There is a note in Tseng Kuo-fan's diary for 29 July 1864

(TC3/6/26) which reads '取偽忠王詳供',[22] which Nien Tzu-min takes to mean, 'Obtained the false Chung Wang's detailed deposition.' He concludes therefore that the deposition must have been completed before this date, although Tseng Kuo-fan, in the colophon to the printed edition states that Li Hsiu-ch'eng only started writing on 30 July (TC3/6/27).

b. The entry in Chao Lieh-wen's diary for 3 August 1864 (TC3/7/2) contains the words, '...經中堂錄供'('after the Grand Secretary recorded his [Li Hsiu-ch'eng's] testimony').[23] Nien Tzu-min interpreted this to mean that previous to that date there was no deposition, only Tseng Kuo-fan's record of the interrogation.

c. Nien Tzu-min argues that both the fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been wounded or tortured, and his lack of formal education would have made it impossible for him to have written such a document, especially at the speed Tseng Kuo-fan claimed for him, 7000 characters every day.[24]

d. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was a hero and could not have written such ignoble words.

e. Taiping conventions, such as the use of certain abbreviated characters, the elevation of certain characters as a mark of respect, were not always observed.

f. The deposition does not give in detail accounts of the principal battles between the Hunan Army and Taiping units under Li Hsiu-ch'eng's command; but concentrates on secondary engagements or on the period when Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not hold high command.

g. Both Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chen, according to Nien Tzu-min, doubted the authenticity of the deposition.

Lo Erh-kang, the leading Taiping specialist in China, has answered Nien Tzu-min and other protagonists of the forgery theory in considerable detail, and seems to have entirely silenced them.[25] His arguments are divided into two sections, dealing with (I) form, that is, calligraphy, vocabulary and so on, and (II) content.

(I). Of the fifteen surviving documents (excluding the deposition) emanating from Li Hsiu-ch'eng, only one, Lo Erh-kang argues, is known for certain to be in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's own handwriting. This is the page entitled 'Chung Wang's handwritten answers' in the manuscript known as 'Chung Wang ta-tz'u shou chüan'[26] which came to light in 1937 at a literary exhibition at Su-chou. It had been kept by P'ang Chi-yun, one of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's interrogators, and by his descendants until that time; it is now in a museum in Shanghai. It consists of seven sheets comprising the questions put to Li Hsiu-ch'eng and his answers. The first page is in Tseng Kuo-fan's handwriting, the second is 'Chung Wang's handwritten answers.' These are replies written by Li Hsiu-ch'eng to two specific questions about the names of two Taiping leaders when the interrogators had difficulty in understanding his Kwangsi dialect.[27] There are no grounds for supposing that this is a forgery. We know from other sources that P'ang Chi-yun and Li Hung-chü were appointed by Tseng Kuo-fan to interrogate Li Hsiu-ch'eng,[28] and that Tseng prepared some questions to ask him. The first sheet is recognisably in Tseng Kuo-fan's handwriting. Moreover, the authenticity of the manuscript is born out by the fact that certain information given in it by Li Hsiu-ch'eng is included in Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial of TC3/7/7.[29] In addition, as Lo Erh-kang points out, had the manuscript been forged, the contents would have been made to serve the interests of the forgers, instead of which certain of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's answers contradict what Tseng Kuo-fan told the court. For instance, when Li Hsiu-ch'eng was asked, 'How many people remained in the capital when it was taken?' he replied that there were 30,000, but no more than 10,000 rebel troops. But Tseng Kuo-fan had told the court that 100,000 had been killed by his troops in Nanking.[30]

Having established the authenticity of this document, Lo Erh-kang then compared the handwriting with that of the photographs of

the Hsiang-t'an manuscript. In spite of the brevity of the first document it is quite clear that they are both in the same hand.

Lo Erh-kang strengthens his case against the forgery theory by pointing out that several expressions in dialect which appear in the deposition would only be known to someone from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's particular part of Kwangsi. We may well take Lo's word for this since he is himself a native of Kuei-hsien in Kwangsi and speaks the same dialect as Li Hsiu-ch'eng did, that of the Hsün-chou, Wu-chou District.

(II) On the question of content Lo Erh-kang is on much more shaky ground, as can be seen by his later intellectual acrobatics on this subject. In brief, he argues that the deposition was obviously written by a loyal and heroic Taiping leader, who spoke always of 'us' and 'our state', who refuted enemy calumnies and usually observed Taiping literary conventions. If he did not always do so, it was because he was writing under difficult conditions. Lo Erh-kang's attempt to resolve the fundamental contradiction - between an heroic life and an ignoble testament - is dealt with at length in Chapter VII.

Lo Erh-kang points out that had the deposition been a forgery, Tseng Kuo-fan would not have needed to change or falsify what was allegedly Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of certain events, particularly the account of his own capture, and the last of the 'ten errors' which led to the failure of the Rebellion.[31]

Like Nien Tzu-min, Lo Erh-kang uses Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to Li Chao-shou as corroborative proof. He claims that the handwriting of this document, though different from that of the deposition, which is in a more flowing style, is nevertheless of the same person. In this he rebuts in considerable detail, and in my opinion convincingly, the judgement of the handwriting experts consulted by Nien. He accounts for the difference in handwriting by emphasizing the very different circumstances in which the two documents were written,

one in comfort and confidence, the other in discomfort and mental distress.[32] This too would account for the fact that Taiping conventions are not always observed. He compares the style of the two documents, especially the frequent occurrence in both of reduplicated characters (重疊詞) such as '年年', '處處','人人'. There are 66 such examples in the deposition and 6 in the short letter to Li Chao-shou. A similarity can also be found in the in the rather uncertain use in both documents of wen-yen particles. Lo Erh-kang argues that the letter could not have been written by a clerk because it reflects too faithfully the feelings of Li Hsiu-ch'eng about the defection of a 'favourite commander.'

In answer to Nien Tzu-min's second point Lo Erh-kang shows that the notes in Tseng Kuo-fan's diary at the end of a day's entry are in order to remin him to do something. '取偽忠王詳供' is imperative, '[Remember to] obtain Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition.' He similarly challenges Nien Tzu-min's interpretation of the note in Chao Lieh-wen's diary, which like that of TC3/7/21,[33] does refer to the Chung Wang ta-tz'u shou-chüan, the record of the interrogation, but my no means proves that the deposition itself did not exist.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not so seriously injured by torture, Lo Erh-kang argues, to prevent him from having a long conversation with Chao Lieh-wen on the day after his capture.[34] Nor are there any grounds for supposing that Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who had received three years' schooling, was incapable, after years of studying on his own, of writing such a document as the deposition.[35]

Lo Erh-kang answers Nien Tzu-min's points (d), (f) and to a certain extent (e), by formulating the theory that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a 'political motive' in writing the deposition and that these apparent lapses were deliberate. This theory is discussed in Chapter VII.

Against Nien Tzu-min's final point (g), Lo Erh-kang shows that when Li Hung-chang in his letter of TC3/9/6 [36] to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan wrote that the deposition was not '情事確實' (a true record of the

facts), he was referring to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remark in the deposition that Li Hung-chang used the rich revenue from the Customs to hire foreigners to fight the Taipings.[37] Li Hung-chang's remark was intended to show Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, who was asking for money, that he did not have an inexhaustible source of funds, whatever Li Hsiu-ch'eng might say. As to Shen Pao-chen, there is no evidence that he doubted the authenticity of the deposition. We only know that he showed a copy of it to Hung Jen-kan, who was his prisoner, and that Hung wrote a criticism of it.[38] This was sent to the Grand Council but unfortunately it has never come to light.

The publication of the Taiwan facsimile will certainly put an end to whatever doubts remain about the authenticity of the deposition. It is unthinkable that Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan or anyone else should have gone to all the trouble to forge a document of over 37,000 characters, full of realistic literary mistakes, of expressions in authentic Kwangsi dialect, and of detailed inside accounts of battles; that they should have taken the trouble to correct and falsify their own forgery, only to leave it secreted in their family archives for almost a hundred years - unless of course it was a very clumsy forgery, and that it certainly is not.

There is still a case however, though not a strong one, for saying that even now we do not have a reproduction of the complete original manuscript, and that part of it has been destroyed. There are two grounds for this suspicion. First, the manuscript as we know it, both from the facsimile and from Lü Chi-i's copy, breaks off in the middle of a sentence, but at the end of a page. It can reasonably be assumed that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written more, since it is unlikely that he would happen to have been disturbed at the end of a page. But there is nothing to indicate that a great deal is missing at the end; it would have been quite possible to

round off the sentence with four characters. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had anything more to say; on the contrary, he was already repeating himself. It seems likely that there were only a few characters or a few lines on the final page, and that this became detached and lost. The photography of the front cover reproduced in the facsimile shows the manuscript to have been much handled.

The second reason for supposing that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written more than appeared in the Hsiang-t'an manuscript was that there were widely differing estimates of the number of characters he wrote:

(i) In the colophon to the printed edition Tseng Kuo-fan stated that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had started to write on TC3/6/27 and finished on TC3/7/6, the day of his execution;[39] that is to say he had written for eight or nine days. At the same time Tseng Kuo-fan mentioned that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote at the rate of 7,000 a day, which gives us a total of between 56,000 and 63,000 characters.

(ii) At the end of the 50th yeh (double page) of the manuscript Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that he had already written 37,000 or 38,000 characters. He had come to the end of the first account book and now asked for more paper and a new brush.[40] After this point there are 24 yeh before the end of the facsimile.

(iii) Tseng Kuo-fan in his diary wrote that the deposition consisted of about 40,000 characters.[41]

(iv) In a letter to his son Chi-tse, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote that it contained 'as many as 50,000 characters'.[42]

(v) Tseng Kuo-fan in letters to P'eng Yun-ch'in, Ch'iao Ho-chai, Yang Hou-an,[43] and to Shen Yu-tan (Shen Pao-chen)[44] gave 30,000 + (餘) characters as the figure.

(vi) Chao Lieh-wen in his diary wrote that the deposition contained 50-60,000 characters.[45]

It can be seen that a great deal of confusion existed. Two more figures must now be thrown in: the Taiwan facsimile in fact

contains 36,244 characters and the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition Edition contains 27,810 characters. These are the only figures of which I can be absolutely sure, having counted them; the others are all very vague.

To make matters worse, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in his diary for TC3/7/6 (7 August 1864):[46]

> I have been reading Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition; there are about 40,000 characters and I have been editing it character by character. Today I edited only 20,000 + characters. The previous 8 pages I already edited yesterday, the following 10 pages remain to be edited.

In the absence of any other mention in the diary of editing the deposition, this might seem to imply that Tseng Kuo-fan was referring to the whole manuscript. This would therefore consist of 8 yeh, plus about 20,000 characters (at an average of 242 characters per page this would be about 41 yeh), plus the final 10 yeh - a total of 59 yeh. If we subtract the first 8 yeh and the last 10 yeh from the total of 74 yeh in the facsimile, we are left with 56 yeh. These 56 yeh contain a total of 27,395 characters, which could still, at a pinch, be called '20,000 + characters'.

An additional complication is that at the end of page 62 (yeh 31) Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in red ink in the margin '初四日閱' ('read on the 4th Day'); but there is no mention in his diary for that day (TC3/7/4) or in his entry of TC3/7/6 quoted above of his having read any of the deposition on TC3/7/4. Although this is rather curious, it cannot be taken as evidence of further chicanery.

On three different pages in the deposition Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself noted the number of characters he thought he had written to date. On page 62 (yeh 31) he wrote '到此统共一萬八千之數' ('to this point a total of 18,000'). In fact the total to this

point in the facsimile is 16,030. On page 80 (yeh 40) he wrote the figure 28,500, though in the facsimile the count to this point is 20,260. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's last record is on page 100 (yeh 50), at the end of the first account book, he stated that he had written 37,000 or 38,000 characters. The count to this point in the facsimile is 25,156.

In spite of the considerable discrepancy between Li Hsiu-ch'eng's figures and my count of the facsimile, this is by no means a proof that parts of the manuscript were destroyed. The key to the mystery may be in the often repeated statement that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote at a speed of 7,000 characters a day.[47] It seems highly unlikely that in the situation in which he found himself Li Hsiu-ch'eng would have counted his output. The estimate, whether his own or his captors', was probably based on the approximate number of characters he wrote on the first day. If this is the case, when he arrived at page 100 (yeh 50) after writing for five or six days, he obtained the figure of 37-38,000 by assuming that he had been writing 7,000 a day. Chao Lieh-wen's estimate of 50,000 to 60,000 may have been based on the same assumption. Lo Erh-kang argues that Chao Lieh-wen must have been telling the truth because his diary was not intended for publication and he had nothing to hide. This cannot hold water, because if there had been any serious question of concealing the original number of characters, Tseng Kuo-fan would not have publicly announced in the printed edition a figure greatly in excess of what he was publishing.

An entirely different set of figures appears in the margin on various pages of the manuscript, and on the cover.[48] These are written in Chinese commercial figures (碼字). They clearly refer to the number of characters in the text, though it is very difficult to find any correspondence between them because it is not obvious where each count begins and ends. Sometimes it is possible to guess what they mean; for instance, on page 42 (yeh 21) there is

the figure 3,555. Counting back from there one arrives at the end of page 29 (yeh 15), a total of 3,595 characters; but there is no apparent reason why this section should be counted and not others. On the outer cover there is the figure 5,450, which may have something to do with the number of characters Tseng Kuo-fan deleted, 5,594 by my count.[47] If this is so, then these figures were not written by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself, but by some member of Tseng Kuo-fan's staff, which I think is more likely.

It remains to examine the deposition to find out whether there is any internal evidence that parts are still missing. I have only been able to find one place where there is such a possibility. This is after the end of page 68 (yeh 34). The grounds for suspicion are: (i) pages 69 and 70 (yeh 35) were entirely and unaccountably missed by Lü Chi-i when he was copying out the parts cut by Tseng Kuo-fan, and they do not appear in the printed edition. Had these pages not been marked in red ink such an omission would have been understandable, but in fact every line is marked at the beginning and the end with a bold brush-stroke in red, and there are several deletions in the middle of lines. It might be thought that the fact that Tseng Kuo-fan seems to have marked each line for deletion and then to have crossed out his deletion, could be a reason for Lü Chi-i having passed them over. But it is difficult to believe that his attention would not, on the contrary, have been attracted to this passage, if only to find out why Tseng Kuo-fan should have changed his mind about deleting it. (ii) It is not impossible that the two final characters on page 68 (yeh 34) were added by another hand than Li Hsiu-ch'eng's in order to round off the page. A slight difference in the density of the ink can be detected. (See pages 191 and 192). If there is a possibility that this yeh was missing when Lü Chi-i examined the manuscript, then it is also possible that more than one page was missing. (The pages are numbered until page 80 (yeh 40) in Chinese commercial numerals,

but not necessarily in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's hand, and not necessarily done at the time). In spite of this I think that it is unlikely that anything is missing here, no break in continuity can be detected and no hint of a subject which could have been particularly embarrassing to anyone.

We must conclude therefore that in the Taiwan facsimile we have an accurate reproduction of the original manuscript, from which there do not seem to be any substantial or significant omissions.

IV. TSENG KUO-FAN AND LI HSIU-CH'ENG: BACKGROUND.

If the document which Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote in captivity is a 'deposition', in the sense of a testimony presented to a judicial authority, then Tseng Kuo-fan's action in revising it might be called 'falsification of evidence.'[1] However, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's fate did not depend on this testimony; his guilt was not in question, and in any case, he had already been executed before the revision of the deposition was completed. Tseng Kuo-fan did not tamper with the deposition in order to change the judicial verdict on Li Hsiu-ch'eng; he was concerned primarily with his own interests, and sought to win the approbation and avoid the censure of a suspicious court.

In order to understand Tseng Kuo-fan's actions it is necessary to examine some of the considerations which governed his attitude to Li Hsiu-ch'eng and his deposition.

In 1852 Tseng Kuo-fan, a junior Vice-President of the Board of Ceremonies, was at home in Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan, observing the customary period of mourning for his mother, when he received an imperial order to organize a militia force in his province.[2] This was to be done by uniting and reorganizing two existing militia groups, the Ch'u Yung (楚勇) under Chiang Chung-yuan, and the Hsiang Yung (湘勇) under Lo Tse-nan.[3]

The difficulties which Tseng Kuo-fan encountered in getting his army started reflected the hesitations and ambiguous attitude of the Ch'ing court. The Manchu rulers were anxious to harness the energies of the gentry to combat a rebellion which they were incapable of putting down by themselves; but they were not unconscious of the danger of allowing the existence of a substantial armed force which did not fit into the traditional military establishment. Thus, when Tseng Kuo-fan started to organize the Hunan Army, all he had was an imperial warrant; he had no say in

the civil administration of the province and no access to provincial revenue. In spite of this he was able to form an army which, in comparison with the regular banner forces, was a model of organization, discipline and efficiency. He appealed to strong local 'patriotism' rather than to national feeling, to the idea of defending traditional Confucian values against an odious barbarian heterodoxy rather than to loyalty to the Manchu dynasty. All this would have been fruitless if he had not, at the same time, been determined to provide his soldiers with higher pay and better conditions than those of their unfortunate comrades in the banner regiments.

No one could attempt the combination of several semi-private militia units without incurring the unpopularity of many local officials and gentry. In addition, in achieving his first notable victory, he aroused the apprehensive suspicions of the court. On 14 October 1854 the city of Wu-ch'ang, which had been taken by the Taipings during the summer, was recaptured by the Hunan Army as the climax to its first major campaign.[4] When this news was reported to the Emperor he is said to have remarked, 'Who would have thought that a scholar like Tseng Kuo-fan could have achieved such extraordinary merit!' To which the Grand Secretary Ch'i Chün-tsao [5] replied, 'Tseng Kuo-fan, a shih-lang on leave, is no more than a commoner. A commoner in his village makes a call to arms and musters more than ten thousand men: I fear that this is not a happy event for our State.' After this the Emperor is said to have remained for a long time gloomy and troubled.[6]

In spite of Tseng Kuo-fan's power and influence as the commander of a large army and a flotilla of several hundred war-boats, the mistrust of the court left him without a commensurate official position. As a result he had constant difficulty in finding money and supplies for his army, and this prevented its expansion. But the army was much too valuable to be dispensed with, so until

1860 the court continued to urge Tseng Kuo-fan on to greater efforts, but kept the large and somewhat inert force of regulars (the Chiang-nan H.Q.) besieging Nanking, ready to reap the spoils and the glory if the Hunan Army should succeed in cutting the supply arteries of the rebel capital. But in 1860 the Chiang-nan H.Q. was completely destroyed and the Taipings swept into southeast Kiangsu and Chekiang.[7] Tso Tsung-t'ang openly expressed satisfaction at the removal from the scene of a force which was itself incapable of dealing with the rebellion and yet, by its mere existence, prevented its replacement by forces which could.[8] The way was left open for Tseng Kuo-fan. Only then was his immense military power as commander of the most formidable fighting force in the empire matched by equivalent administrative power; he was appointed Governor-General of Liang-chiang and Imperial Commissioner for the suppression of the rebellion in south China. Already he had been permitted to recruit his army, collect funds to support it and appoint his own staff; now, breaking the long-standing rule that an official should not serve in his own province, he was promoted to a position of supreme regional power, and the court was obliged to turn a blind eye to his fiscal vagaries. He immediately set about consolidating his position by removing from office high officials who had already, or were likely in the future, to oppose him.[9]

He had perhaps accepted his new powers with mixed feelings, but the forboding he felt was probably outweighed by the prospect of great successes.[10] Although his military fortunes changed for the better towards the end of 1861, particularly with the recovery of the key city of An-ch'ing,[11] he ended the year in a spirit of some anxiety and apprehension. He owed his position as Governor-General of Liang-chiang to the intervention of Su-shun, an imperial clansman who held several important posts and had the ear of the Hsien Feng Emperor in his declining years.[12]

In 1860, when the Governor-General of Liang-chiang (Ho Kuei-ch'ing) was cashiered after he had abandoned the town of Ch'ang-chou to the Taipings without a fight,[13] Su-shun had urged the appointment of Tseng Kuo-fan to the vacant post in preference to Hu Lin-i.[14] But after the death of the Hsien Feng Emperor, Su-shun, as principal regent to the new sovereign, fell victim on 8 October 1861 to the coup-d'état organized by the two Empresses Dowager and Prince Kung.[15] Tseng Kuo-fan was naturally worried at this rapid turn of events and feared that deprived of his high backing, his enemies would be able to bring about his downfall. On 25 December 1861 (HF11/11/24) he wrote to his brothers:[16]

> Since the Tenth Month the new government in the capital has brought about great changes. The Empresses Dowager listen to reports on state affairs from behind screens and everywhere people are apprehensive. I have received in succession fourteen secret documents and edicts. My responsibilities are too great, my power and position too exhalted and my fame too lofty. It is dreadful and alarming.

The following year on 23 August (TC1/7/28) Tseng Kuo-fan once more expressed in a letter to his brothers the apprehension he felt felt even though victory seemed to be in sight:[17]

> To judge from the peoples' desire for order and the disunity amongst the rebels, it would seem that there is an opportunity for recovering Chin-ling [Nanking]. But from ancient times, those who have achieved great merit and honour, apart from Prince Kuo of Fen-yang,[18] have had as well, many ups and downs, many difficulties. One cannot say that it is easy. You and I should tread very carefully, as if we were on the edge of a precipice, and hope that we may avoid calamity.

In October he attempted to resign on the grounds that his army was decimated by the plague.[19] The following year on 13 June (TC2/4/27) he wrote to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan that he had been most struck by the latter's remark that 'to make a name for oneself in troubled times is most difficult,' and informed him that on the same day he had again asked the court to relieve him either of his governor-generalship or of his position as Imperial Commissioner.[20] 'If you and I are careful,' he continued, 'and take the first opportunity to withdraw and retire from office, may we not avoid calamity?'[21]

In 1864, about two months before the Taiping capital fell, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote to Li Hung-chang complaining of the difficulties of his command and the trouble he had in raising funds:[22]

> For three thousand li along the Yangtse there is no boat which does not fly my flag, so that people elsewhere think that I have too much military power; they think that the likin of four provinces comes to me in an uninterrupted flow, that armies everywhere obey my command. Their suspicions are certainly not unfounded, but no one can be aware of the weakness of our army and the deficiency of our funds. As soon as I have completed my work I intend to petition at once to hand in my seals as Governor-General and Imperial Commissioner. I will not venture to stand aside from affairs, but will command some ten thousand troops and only take charge of one front, on the scale of eight or nine years ago. Perhaps in this way I may avoid disaster.

Chao Lieh-wen, who saw the draft of this letter to Li Hung-chang, commented upon it in his diary. Tseng Kuo-fan, he wrote, had had more than his share of bad luck, of slander and suspicion in the seven or eight years after organizing his army. Only after the setback at Chiang-nan [the destruction of the Chiang-nan H.Q. in

1860], in a difficult and dangerous period, was he given proper command, and only then because the court could find no one else. After his successes in Anhwei there were people at court and elsewhere who wanted to oppose him, but they dared not because of his achievements.[23]

In view of these anxieties, Tseng Kuo-fan's joy cannot have been entirely free from apprehension when the Taiping capital fell to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's army in July 1864. His previous fears that his power might shake the throne cannot have been laid to rest by the prestigious success of recovering the rebel stronghold. He realized that once the rebellion was suppressed the court might consider him more of a liability than an asset and dispose of him for being too successful, especially now that he was not the only powerful regional commander. He was appreciative of his brother's triumph which had brought fame to both of them,[24] but seems to have lacked confidence in Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's ability to avoid mistakes which might transform jealousy into accusation. His hasty departure for Nanking as soon as he received news of its recapture was probably connected with this.[25] If it was, he must have quickly found his worst fears confirmed.

After sixteen consecutive days of bitter attacks on the city, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's army was in a sorry state; the haggard faces of the commanders were almost unrecognisable;[26] disease was rife, pay was in arrears and everyone was asking for leave. After the city wall was breached at about noon on 19 July 1864, the whole of the besieging force engaged in unrestrained looting, as the result of which, and aided by the adoption of Ch'ing army uniform,[27] several hundred Taipings, including the two most 'wanted' rebels in the country, broke out of the same breach in the city wall by which Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's soldiers had entered.[28] Instead of remaining in the city where fighting was still going, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan had returned to his camp and gone to bed 'at the fourth

watch'[between 1 a.m. and 3 a.m.], in spite of being urged by Chao Lieh-wen to go and restore order in the city. In the meantime, the memorial announcing the victory had been despatched to Peking reporting that the rebels had been entirely wiped out. But during the night Tseng Kuo-ch'üan had to be woken up to be told the news that about three hundred Taiping cavalry and some thousand infantry had broken out of the city; later he was reprimanded in a 'very severe' secret letter (t'ing-chi) for his return to camp which had been incautiously mentioned in the memorial.[29]

In his memorial of TC3/6/23 (26 July 1863)[31] Tseng Kuo-fan reported that according to captured rebels:

> ...the rebel chief Hung Hsiu-ch'üan did in fact poison himself in the Fifth Month of this year during the fierce siege by the government troops, and was buried in the courtyard of the rebel palace. The 'Young Sovereign' Hung Fu-chen [31] succeeded him, and he, after the city was breached, filled his palace with firewood and burned himself to death. As soon as the fire in the rebel palace has died down the body of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan should be dug up, and the suicide by burning [of the Young Sovereign] verified.

Once Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been captured it was found that this story was not true, since Li himself had escorted the Young Sovereign out of the city.[32] Perhaps in order to protect him, Li Hsiu-ch'eng emphasized to his captors that the boy did not know how to ride, which was probably quite true, and that he must certainly have perished in the general confusion.[33] Tseng Kuo-fan seems to have been inclined to believe this, perhaps because if it were true it would diminish the gravity of his offence in having passed on an unreliable report.

The matter was obviously a source of considerable embarrassment

to Tseng Kuo-fan. The importance which the court attached to the capture of the Young Sovereign is shown by the volley of edicts full of threats and warnings which came from Peking as soon as news arrived that he had got away.[34] On 10 August (TC3/7/9) Tseng Kuo-fan heard reports that a group of several hundred rebels, including the Young Sovereign, who had escaped from Nanking, had arrived in Kuang-te in southern Anhwei.[35] By this time the editing of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition was already completed, so the fate of the Young Sovereign had no direct bearing on Tseng Kuo-fan's treatment of the document; but the fact that his first report about the young rebel king had been proved wrong did Tseng Kuo-fan no good, and was subsequently used against him by his enemies.[36]

Of more immediate concern to Tseng Kuo-fan on his arrival at Nanking must have been the looting of the rebel capital by his army. From the watch-tower at Yü-hua-t'ai Li Hsiu-ch'eng's magnificent palace had long been visible to the besiegers,[37] who must often have looked down into the vast city in covetous anticipation of rich rewards after months of hardship, especially as their pay was often several months in arrears. When the time came everyone in the camp seized the opportunity. In the breakdown of discipline which followed the breaching of Nanking Li Hsiu-ch'eng and his companions were not the only Taipings to get away; others were able to make their escape with less risk as long as they were able-bodied; the rest were less fortunate.

> After the city was breached, wrote Chao Lieh-wen, I estimate that apart from the vigorous rebels who were killed in the fighting, very few others were killed. Most of them carried stuff out of the city for the soldiers, or helped them find buried treasure, after which they were let go. I do not know how many old [Liang-] Kuang rebels got away over the wall on all sides; but local people who were weak or old and could not serve as porters, or who had

> no treasure to dig up, were all killed. Nine out of ten of the bodies of those killed in the streets were of old people, but children of under two or three were also cut down for fun. Amongst those crawling on all fours in the streets there was not a single woman of under forty. None of the old were without wounds, some with more than ten, some with dozens of wounds; cries and wailing could be heard on all sides. It was enough to make one's hair stand on end. The Governor [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan] made a proclamation throughout the city that innocent people were not to be killed or women carried off. But the various commanders... [he lists them] were only interested in pillage themselves and completely disregarded the order...[38]

The T'ien Wang's palace must have been regarded as the richest plum for looters. It was virtually deserted when first occupied by Hunan Army troops under Chu Hung-chang, who sealed the treasury and posted two battalions to guard it until the arrival of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan.[39] Later, by some means or other, the Fukien Infantry General Hsiao Fu-ssu managed to get control of the palace, and after removing a great quantity of gold and silver, set alight to the buildings 'in order to cover his traces.'[40]

Nothing demoralises an army like pillage. Though discipline had been relaxed deliberately so that the troops could reward themselves, it was far from easy to restore. In this wild frenzy of looting it was inevitable that some got more than others. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan himself, according to Kuo-fan, 'did not obtain very much,'[41] nevertheless, on his return to Hunan he was able to purchase 100 ch'ing, about 1,500 acres, of land.[42] The jealousies which resulted, exacerbated by charges of favouritism in promotions, led to endless trouble and made it impossible to keep the looting a secret.[43] The discontent of the soldiers against

their officers was expressed in posters which soon appeared bearing the words 'their hat-buttons are red but their hearts are black;'[44] within a few months Ke Lao Hui broadsheets were seen in the city.[45]

After being taken prisoner Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been first brought to the camp of Hsiao Fu-ssu who, according to Chao Lieh-wen, had been so anxious to get his hands on the Chung Wang's regalia, that he persecuted the local people who had brought him in.[46] It has been suggested that Tseng Kuo-ch'üan tortured Li Hsiu-ch'eng in order to get information from him about secret caches of treasure in the city. This may be so, though there seems to be no evidence to support the assertion. But assuming that Chao Lieh-wen's version of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's capture is accurate, it would seem very probable that if Hsiao Fu-ssu was ready to go to such lengths to get hold of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's regalia, how much more would he have been eager to get even richer information before handing the prisoner over to his superiors? The interest of the latter in this question is born out by the record of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's interrogation at the hands of Tseng Kuo-fan's secretaries. One of the questions which he was asked was, 'Can you indicate some places in the city where gold and silver is hidden?'[47] This question was crossed out in the manuscript of the record of the interrogation, either by P'ang Chi-yun himself or by his descendants, in preparation for its publication. Nor is Li Hsiu-ch'eng's answer recorded in this document, though in his memorial of TC3/7/7 (8 August 1864) Tseng Kuo-fan quotes Li Hsiu-ch'eng as authority for his claim that there was no treasure in the Taiping capital:[48]

> In the old days there was such a thing as the 'sacred store'[聖庫], but in fact it was the private treasury of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and not that of the rebel capital. Officials and soldiers of the rebel state had no salaries

> and the king's eldest brother and his second brother used extortionate means to obtain money and grain from the various departments. There was slightly more treasure in Su-chou than in Chin-ling, but there was no public treasury. The treasure and goods distributed by Li Hsiu-ch'eng alone were divided amongst his subordinates, that is why their relations were harmonious. Otherwise each had his own private treasury and the state was poor.

In the preceeding section of the same memorial Tseng Kuo-fan protests too much about the surprising absence of treasure in the Taiping capital, which had long been reported to contain 'a sea of gold and silver.' What there was had all been destroyed because 'after the city was taken on the 16th Day [TC3/6/16], killing went on for three days and there was no time to pay attention to other things, so the rebel palaces and offices were reduced to ashes.'[49] This is contradicted by the account of Chu Hung-chang, cited above, and by the diary of Chao Lieh-wen, which notes that the palaces of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not begin to burn until twenty-four hours after the wall of the capital was breached.[50]

Tseng Kuo-fan did not of course attempt to convince the court that there was nothing at all in the city, but he gave a warning against pursuing enquiries too far by emphasising the bad morale in the army and the serious shortage of funds.[51] The court was obliged to let the matter rest.[52]

Although the stories of looting may well have been exaggerated by jealous trouble-makers, there is ample evidence of a serious breakdown of discipline which deprived the court of the legitimate spoils of war, and further undermined the morale of the Hunan Army, reflecting discredit upon its commanders. So serious indeed was the situation that Tseng Kuo-fan took immediate steps to disband the army.

> I have decided to cut the army by half and leave only twenty thousand men or so, because there are no funds. But for those disbanded there is nothing to pay their wages with and they cannot therefore be sent off at once; for those who remain there are no funds for campaigning and therefore they cannot be sent immediately into action elsewhere...[53]

On the credit side there was: first, the fact that the rebel capital had after all been taken, though the merit of this victory was somewhat diminished by the length of time it had needed and the poor returns for the court in terms of material benefit; secondly, the most famous of the Taiping generals, and after the death of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, the most dangerous of the rebel leaders had been taken prisoner. This second achievement took on a new importance for the Tseng brothers now that the chaos following the breaching of the city had left them so vulnerable to accusation and blame. Chao Lieh-wen noted this point in his diary. After expressing his disapproval of Tseng Kuo-fan's indulgence towards his officers which had led to the general looting and 'the escape of a great number of wild beasts from the cage,' Chao Lieh-wen went on,

> Fortunately the Governor [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan] had heaven's own luck: only the fact that local people succeeded in capturing the rebel chief Chung [Wang] enabled him to get away with it [literally, to hand in his answers and leave the examination hall], otherwise the affair would not only have ended without rewards, but blame would have been inevitable.[54]

It was important for the Tseng brothers that this strong card be played properly. It was vital in the first place that there should be no doubt about the identity of the prisoner. For his captors to be sure that he was Li Hsiu-ch'eng was one thing, but

the court was evidently not prepared to take their word for it without making independent enquiries. Not long after the somewhat sudden execution of Li Hsiu-ch'eng therefore, in the words of Chao Lieh-wen,

> The Manchu General Fu-ming-ah arrived here [Nanking] a few days ago on the pretext of inspecting the banner garrison, but in fact he had received a letter from Seng Wang [Seng-ko-lin-ch'in] ordering him to make enquiries as to the authenticity of the rebel chief Chung [Wang], and about the state of affairs in the city... Whoever he encountered he would ask whether the so-called Chung Wang was genuine or not. Fortunately this man had been kept alive for more than two weeks and the Grand Secretary had recorded his verbal testimony - not things which would have been easy to fabricate; moreover, he had been seen both by barbarians and by visitors from different parts, who all seemed agreed. If he had been killed on the same day [as he was taken], and his mutilated body displayed to public view, the matter would not have been cleared up.[55]

Thus more was involved in deciding the fate of Li Hsiu-ch'eng and his deposition than mere considerations of the proper punishment for a rebel chief and the conventional presentation of his evidence.

V. TSENG KUO-FAN AND THE FATE OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG

Tseng Kuo-fan received the news of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's capture at An-ch'ing on 26 July (TC3/6/23)[1] and in the memorial which he wrote on the same day he asked whether Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Jen-ta, who had also been taken prisoner, should be presented as captives or not. At the end of the memorial he stated that he was then about to leave for Nanking (he embarked the same evening and left in the morning) and on arriving there would make investigations and submit his own proposal as to whether they should be sent to Peking or not.[2]

He arrived at Nanking in the morning of 28 July and briefly interrogated Li Hsiu-ch'eng in the afternoon.[3] The following day he wrote to his son Chi-tse in An-ch'ing saying that he had questioned Li Hsiu-ch'eng and had decided that he should be executed at Nanking.[4] This seems to imply that his interview with Li Hsiu-ch'eng was the most important factor in influencing his decision, though he must surely have discussed the matter with his brother. Unfortunately nothing at all is known of what passed between Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Tseng Kuo-fan on this occasion. But however the decision was arrived at Tseng Kuo-fan did not make any proposal to the court as he had promised; nor did he have Li Hsiu-ch'eng executed immediately. The reasons for the delay are not difficult to discern.

First, there was the necessity of forstalling a possible accusation that some captive Taiping had been persuaded to pose as Li Hsiu-ch'eng in order to bring glory to his captors. This was done by putting him on public exhibition where he could be seen by as many independent witnesses as possible. The subsequent visit of the Tartar General Fu-ming-ah showed how wise this precaution had been. Secondly, since they went to

considerable trouble to edit and eventually publish the deposition, one must assume that Li Hsiu-ch'eng's captors thought it worth waiting for, not least as additional proof of their prisoner's identity.[5] Thirdly, although Tseng Kuo-fan told his son and possibly others of his intention to execute Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Nanking, this cannot be taken to mean that he intended to ignore entirely the orders of the court. There is evidence that he hesitated and delayed before taking the final step. In the evening of 3 August Tseng Kuo-fan told Chao Lieh-wen that he proposed executing Li on the spot and asked his opinion. Chao Lieh-wen's reply was that since the prisoner had already been in their hands for more than ten days, during which time he had been seen by many people, no one was likely to doubt his identity, in addition 'this rebel is exceedingly cunning and it is not convenient that he should enter the capital. My opinion agreed with that of the Grand Secretary.'[6]

It is reasonable to assume that the matter was then decided, since on 5 August the memorial announcing Li Hsiu-ch'eng's execution was already drafted, two days before the event.[7] But on the following day Tseng Kuo-fan had a final interview with Li Hsiu-ch'eng. Again we know hardly anything of what was said, but according to Chao Lieh-wen's account, Tseng Kuo-fan told Li Hsiu-ch'eng that his fate was not yet decided and that he was awaiting the edict. Then, with some ambiguity, he said that he had hesitated for days about this and that he would inform him as soon as a decision had been reached.[8] Perhaps this was intentionally ambiguous: if the court's decision did not arrive the decision was Tseng Kuo-fan's. The following day an official was sent to tell Li Hsiu-ch'eng that there was no escaping his punishment, and in the evening he was executed.[9]

What happened in the final interview which Tseng Kuo-fan had with Li Hsiu-ch'eng is one of the mysteries attached to the affair, and is discussed further below, in a slightly different context. If the ultimate decision had already been made, it is difficult to see why Tseng Kuo-fan should have told Li Hsiu-ch'eng that no decision had been reached. One might speculate that Tseng had some last questions he wished to ask, or even that he merely wanted to take leave of a person for whom he seems to have had a certain sympathy. We know from Chao Lieh-wen's diary that 'the Grand Secretary was very sorry for him...' and that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was spared, at his express order, the ghastly punishment of being sliced to death (凌遲). Although his head was sent to various places for public display, his body was buried in a coffin.[10] Privileged treatment indeed.

There is no question that Tseng Kuo-fan did not want Li Hsiu-ch'eng sent to the capital. Although he apparently did not express an opinion to the court until after the execution, it is clear from his letters to his son and to Li Hung-chang, from Chao Lieh-wen's opinion, which agreed with his own, from his action in executing Li Hsiu-ch'eng before the arrival of the edict, from the reasons which he gave to the court afterwards, that he was opposed to having him sent to Peking. We cannot know however, whether or not he would have been prepared to disobey the edict if it had arrived in time. Probably not.[11] His hesitation, had it been confined to the question of the execution alone and had nothing to do with the problem of the dispersal plan (see p.60, below), suggests that he would not have disobeyed, otherwise he might have had Li killed earlier. Even if the captive had set out for Peking this does not necessarily mean that he would have reached there. Ch'en Yü-

ch'eng had been captured and sent to Peking in 1862, but he only got as far as Yen-ching in Honan, where the Mongol General Seng-ko-lin-ch'in apparently took the law into his own hands and had him executed on the pretext that had this rebel been allowed to enter the capital 'it would inevitably have resulted in injury to the honour of the State.'[12] What Tseng Kuo-fan had to decide was: were his reasons for not wanting Li Hsiu-ch'eng to reach Peking sufficiently strong to warrant the risk or rumours and accusation, if not reprimand or punishment, which might result if he disobeyed or forestalled an imperial order? The reasons he later gave to the court were:

> Apart from the usurper Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, there is no need for the others to be presented as captives; the cases of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Shih Ta-k'ai may be taken as precedents. Moreover, in the past, when leading criminals have been sent to the capital, they have invariably beguiled with sweet words to escape death. Li Hsiu-ch'eng knows that he can never be reprieved and may either starve himself to death on the way, or sneak off and escape. If he thus avoids public execution, disastrous consequences might ensue.[13]

This does not sound very convincing, though it is a better effort than that of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. The danger of Li Hsiu-ch'eng starving himself to death on the way to Peking cannot have been more serious than it was in Nanking, and adequate precautions could surely have been taken against the escape of so important a prisoner.[14] The openly stated reasons seem the least credible. But Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, in a moment of anger, let out a chance remark which may bring us nearer to the truth: 'to present Li Hsiu-ch'eng as a captive would only increase the arrogance of the court.'[15] Other reasons were

undoubtedly considered in cooler moments. It can hardly have been a reassuring thought for the Tseng brothers or for many of their subordinates and colleagues, that a man so well-informed as Li Hsiu-ch'eng would in Peking be interrogated again by men who would have no scruples about using his testimony to find fault with their reports or their actions. The care with which Tseng Kuo-fan and his secretaries edited the deposition and expunged parts which were likely to conflict with official reports is evidence of their awareness of this danger. Nor, if it is true that there was much more treasure in the Taiping capital than Tseng Kuo-fan admitted, can it have been desirable that someone who probably knew the truth be questioned by those who may have felt themselves cheated.

There were persistent rumours that Li Hsiu-ch'eng in private interviews with Tseng Kuo-fan attempted to persuade him to turn against the Manchus and even make himself Emperor. The only grounds for these rumours are that Tseng killed Li Hsiu-ch'eng rather than send him to Peking and that his treatment of the deposition showed that he had something to hide. No other evidence has been found. There is nothing in the deposition itself to suggest that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was trying to drive a wedge between Tseng Kuo-fan and his Manchu masters; nor is there any evidence that Tseng Kuo-fan wished to make himself Emperor or turn against the Manchus.[16] Nevertheless Tseng Kuo-fan's position was a delicate one, and even if Li Hsiu-ch'eng had no such intention, Tseng Kuo-fan must have been very conscious of the danger that Li's presence in Peking would greatly increase the court's suspicion of his power and his designs.

If Tseng Kuo-fan hesitated until the 4th or 5th of August before deciding Li Hsiu-ch'eng's fate, the failure of the

imperial edict to arrive was both a reason for his indecision, and something of which he could take advantage once his hesitation came to an end. He had asked for a decision on 26 July (TC3/6/23) but claimed that the answer did not reach him at Nanking until 11 August (TC3/7/10) because the edict had been mistakenly delivered to An-ch'ing and took four extra days to arrive at Nanking.[17] He must have known more or less when the edict should have reached him, since he knew the length of time his memorial would have taken to reach Peking from An-ch'ing and, since an edict dated TC3/6/26 (29 July) had reached Nanking on TC3/7/2 (3 August), he knew how long the postal service was taking to deliver to Nanking.[18] He probably therefore expected the edict on the 6th or 7th of August at the latest.[19] But it did not arrive and in the evening of 7 August he had Li Hsiu-ch'eng executed. This was probably the earliest moment he could take the law into his own hands without blatant disobedience. He may have felt that if he had waited and still the expected edict did not arrive, there would be increasing pressure on him from other officials, and perhaps from foreigners, to have the prisoner sent to Peking. He noted this pressure in his memorial of TC3/7/7 (prepared two days before the execution) probably in order to forestall criticism by mentioning it, and thereby implying that his decision had been taken after giving due consideration to opposing views.[20]

But if the decision to execute was taken in the first instance on these grounds alone, a new factor had presumably to be taken into consideration as soon as Li Hsiu-ch'eng offered to collect together and disband his own and other Taiping troops.

The first expression of this apparent willingness to co-operate in extinguishing the rebellion was, as far as we

know, in the conversation with Chao Lieh-wen on 23 July.[21] Chao asked him, 'Do you hope to get off safely?' and Li Hsiu-ch'eng replied, 'Only by death. But those on the right bank [the north bank of the Yangtse] were all under my command; if I could send letters to disband them they may avoid the fate of plundering each other. Then I could die without regret.' Chao Lieh-wen's comment on this was, 'These words were spoken with the intention of begging for life.' He evidently did not consider the matter of any importance and was unable to imagine that anyone in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's position could think of anything other than saving his own life.

The next mention of the question may have been during Li Hsiu-ch'eng's interrogation by P'ang Chi-yun and his colleagues. We know that he expressed his disapproval of the policy of killing rebels from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but the record is very terse and does not tell us that he specifically referred to the idea of an organized dispersal.[22] Then, as far as we know, the next reference to this matter is on the 70th page of the deposition,[23] although he had made passing references to sparing Liang-kwang men, and 'collecting together rebellious persons.'[24] The first clear offer to co-operate since the conversation with Chao Lieh-wen is made in the following terms,

> I am willing ... to do my utmost to obtain the submission of all the people of the Heavenly Dynasty.

Tseng Kuo-fan did not read this until 5 August or after, since he wrote at the end of the 62nd page 'read on the Fourth Day,'[25] though it is possible that the content of the 'ten requests' was reported to him before he actually read this section of the deposition. He probably read the 'ten requests',[26] which contain Li Hsiu-ch'eng's detailed plan for assembling and dispersing the Taiping remnants on the 5th or 6th of August. If this is the case, it is likely that it was this part of the

deposition which convinced Tseng Kuo-fan that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was serious in a matter to which he had previously referred only in passing. It is possible that it was this which provoked the evening meeting between Tseng Kuo-fan and his prisoner. We know very little about this interview, but it is clear from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's reference to it that his reaction was one of gratitude:

> Last night I received the favour of the Grand Secretary coming to question me, and received his benevolent instructions, and I do not know how to repay him ... now that I have seen the boundless kindness of the Grand Secretary, this guilty general is resolved to restore order in one part [of the country] in repayment. After last night's profound kindness and friendliness I am very contented to die and happy to return to the shades.[27]

If Chao Lieh-wen's account is true, and there is no reason to doubt it, Tseng Kuo-fan told Li Hsiu-ch'eng that his fate was still in the balance; Li's own reference implies that Tseng Kuo-fan also told him that he would accept at least part of the disbanding scheme while he was awaiting the edict.

It is difficult to believe with Lo Erh-kang [28] that Tseng Kuo-fan lied to Li Hsiu-ch'eng on this occasion and told him that his life was to be spared. What had he to gain by such cruel deceit? Did he promise Li his life in order to get him to write the letters with the secret sign to his old commanders which would persuade them to give up the fight, and then have him killed as soon as he got what he wanted? There is no evidence that this is what happened, no mention of such letters in any record and no unexplained surrenders which might point to such a trick. Nor, had this been the case, is

it likely that Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who would have realised that he had been duped as soon as the messenger arrived to tell him that he was to be executed, would have praised Tseng Kuo-fan so highly just before he died.[29]

The likely explanation is that Tseng Kuo-fan, having read the detailed offer of co-operation and realised that it was feasible, wished to have a private meeting with Li Hsiu-ch'eng before coming to any decision. He apparently told Li that his fate had not been decided, (though in fact he had determined to execute if the edict did not arrive on the following day) but that he would in any case allow the dispersal of the Taiping remnants and would abandon the policy of killing the men of Liang-kwang. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was grateful for this and promised to do all he could in the time left to him, not imagining that having been kept alive for so long he was to die on the following day. After further consideration Tseng Kuo-fan probably came to the conclusion that if he was to prevent Li Hsiu-ch'eng from going to Peking he would have to execute him at once before pressure for the adoption of the dispersal plan obliged him to spare Li Hsiu-ch'eng in order to operate it. The feasibility of the plan strengthened his determination to have him killed if the edict did not arrive. When it failed to arrive on 7 August, Li Mei-sheng was sent to inform Li Hsiu-ch'eng that he was to die. Chao Lieh-wen's words imply an ambiguity which means perhaps that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was told that the edict had arrived and that Tseng Kuo-fan had no choice but to obey it. He died convinced that Tseng Kuo-fan was going to exercise clemency towards his former troops, and grateful for being spared torture and for the promise of a decent burial.[30]

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan for bringing the rebellion to an end

is contained in the 'ten requests.' He proposed to achieve the submission of the remaining Taiping armies by aiming at the hard core, the men of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Their submission was to be obtained by a combination of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's personal influence and a well-publicized policy of clemency on the part of Tseng Kuo-fan and his colleagues. Why did Tseng Kuo-fan not accept this apparently tempting offer of co-operation from the most influential surviving rebel, which would undoubtedly have shortened the final mopping-up operations? Unfortunately he did not commit to paper all the considerations which led to his refusal, and we can only speculate as to what they were.

Tseng Kuo-fan seems at first to have been almost disposed to accept. In his memorial of TC3/7/7 (8 August), written two days earlier, he noted that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had 'forcefully urged the unsuitability of government troops killing the men of Liang-kwang because the more these rebels are singled out the more determined would the rebel bands become, and military operations would drag on. His advice might very well be accepted. [其言頗有可采]'[31] On 3 August (TC3/7/2) he wrote to both Li Hung-chang and to Tso Tsung-t'ang repeating Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plea in terms which were not unfavourable, although he did not directly express his own opinion.[32] But in his memorial of TC3/7/20 (21 August) no mention is made of this matter,[33] and in that of TC3/12/13 (10 January 1865) Tseng Kuo-fan stated that he had seen no reason for sparing either Li Hsiu-ch'eng or the men of Liang-kwang in general.[34] The reactions of Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang to his invitation to express their opinions, if that is what it was, did not influence Tseng Kuo-fan's decision, because he could not have received their replies until after Li Hsiu-ch'eng's death.[35] Li Hung-chang, who

had already expressed his opinion more forcibly than in mere words in executing the surrendered wangs at Su-chou,[36] thought that since there were still large numbers of rebels at large, the slightest relaxation of effort would lead to more trouble, there was therefore no reason for not wiping out the men of Liang-kwang.[37]

Tseng Kuo-fan's apparent change of opinion was probably connected with the death of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, after which he was less favourable to the idea of modifying his policy. The fact that the memorial of TC3/7/7 in which he said that the idea was acceptable was written two days before the execution of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, supports this hypothesis. As long as Li Hsiu-ch'eng was alive, the surrender plan in which his role was vital, could still be considered; once he was dead it was impossible to operate it in the same form. Thus one of the reasons why Tseng Kuo-fan rejected the proposal was that it would have meant sparing Li Hsiu-ch'eng from death and making it possible that he would end up in Peking. Having decided that Li must die, Tseng Kuo-fan could not even champion a policy of clemency which did not depend on Li's co-operation without leaving himself vulnerable to the question, 'if you approved of a policy of clemency, and if Li Hsiu-ch'eng would have been of great assistance to it, why did you have him killed?'

But it would be ridiculous to claim that this was Tseng Kuo-fan's only, or even his most important reason for rejecting Li Hsiu-ch'eng's co-operation; his decision was governed by political and practical considerations as well as by his own inclinations and beliefs.

Traditional policy for the pacification of rebellions was theoretically a judicious combination of ruthless severity and discriminating clemency; the former to be applied to the hard

core of ringleaders and the latter to the rank and file rebels, who could be judged, somewhat optimistically, to have been pressed into rebellion against their will.[38] Theoretically there were penalties for indiscriminate killing of these poor rebels, but in fact, as the large-scale massacre of T'ien Ti Hui rebels at Canton in the 1850's shows, they were not always given the benefit of the doubt.[39]

The decision to accept the surrender of rebels was usually left to the commander on the spot, who accepted the possible consequences at his own risk. This was often considerable, since most rebel leaders who were willing to change their allegiance were only willing to do so on condition that they were allowed to retain their troops and their command, and thus their power to cause embarrassment. For every Chang Kuo-liang there was a Miao P'ei-lin and a Li Chao-shou. When Wei Chih-chün surrendered in 1859, government officials congratulated themselves at having neutralized a large enemy force until some of Wei's subordinates revolted against this treachery and inflicted a defeat on the traitors. Hu Lin-i was moved to comment, 'In the extirpation of rebels one cannot rely only on getting them to surrender; if the government forces are strong they will surrender, but if [more] rebels arrive they will go over to the rebels again.'[40] The difficulty was that it was a policy of pis aller which appealed to a commander most when it was most dangerous, that is, when he was in a weak position. Sheng Pao[41] employed this policy more than any other general fighting the Taipings; but he was a bad general who 'lost every engagement he fought and reported each defeat as a victory.'[42] His practice of enticing rebels to change their allegiance achieved momentary success in winning over the two powerful rebels Miao P'ei-lin and Li Chao-shou. But Miao was an inveterate turncoat who eventually had to be extirpated,[43]

and although Li Chao-shou survived longer, his arrogance eventually brought about his downfall. The behaviour of his protégés, especially Miao P'ei-lin, cost Sheng Pao his life; he was impeached in 1863 and permitted to commit suicide.

Tseng Kuo-fan was probably more inclined to severity than to clemency. He warmly approved of Li Hung-chang's massacre of the surrendered wangs at Su-chou,[44] and believed that the more rebels were killed the better.[45] Early in his career he had earned the nickname 'head-shaver Tseng' for his propensity for having heads removed.[46] In the four months before the fall of An-ch'ing over 8,000 surrenderéd Taipings had been slaughtered in spite of government policy.[47] The following year, when over ten thousand Taipings surrendered to Chu Hung-chang, the latter and Tseng Kuo-ch'üan decided that it would be too dangerous to let them live and they were admitted in unsuspecting groups of ten into the Hunan Army camp and massacred as they entered.[48] Two years later however, Tseng Kuo-fan seems to have been ambitious to emulate the achievements of the Eastern Han, when innumerable 'Red-eyebrow Rebels' surrendered and made a mountain with their arms. This burst of optimism was occasioned by the mass surrender of Taipings after the loss of An-ch'ing and at a time when there was a serious shortage of grain. Pao Ch'ao had already incorporated a thousand ex-Taipings into his army and there were two thousand more ready to come over.[49] Tseng Kuo-ch'üan had also taken a first three thousand into his army; but, wrote Tseng Kuo-fan,

> there is such a shortage of funds that I cannot even support my present forces, let alone all these surrendered rebels. When we accept several thousand more I shall be obliged to ask Your Excellency [Kuan Wen] for several thousand liang of gold, apart from the financial

> assistance which I must request for the four thousand already absorbed. The cost of incorporating ten thousand is not more than twenty thousand chin per month, which cannot be compared with the difficulties and risks involved in training soldiers to exterminate an equal number of rebels.[50]

If there were difficulties about accepting the surrender of rebels in 1862, they were even greater and more complex in 1864. To accept Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan would have involved withdrawing a part of the Hunan Army from Nanking back to Anhwei. This might be a hazardous undertaking in itself, given the unhealthy state of morale in the army; it would probably have meant that arrangements would have to be made so that the troops could carry their loot with them. There would have been not only difficulty in supporting the Hunan Army in Anhwei, but even greater difficulty in finding the means to support tens of thousands of rebels until they could be disbanded and sent home. In addition, Tseng Kuo-fan must have considered that to have encouraged large numbers of Taipings to submit to him would have been easily misinterpreted by the court as an unmistakable sign that he was increasing his own force in order to depose the dynasty.

He no doubt felt as well, and we can hardly disagree, that the fall of Nanking marked the real end of the Taiping Rebellion, especially for him, and that the risks involved in so hazardous and costly operation outweighed the advantages. Some of his reasons for rejecting Li Hsiu-ch'eng's proposal were obvious and shared by all, so that it was unnecessary for Tseng Kuo-fan to go to any lengths to justify his decision. The court, on the other hand, felt sufficiently relieved at the end of the rebellion to be inclined to turn a blind eye to the peccadillos of so powerful a figure.[51]

VI TSENG KUO-FAN AND THE DEPOSITION.

After Li Hsiu-ch'eng's execution, his written deposition remained to be dealt with. Its fate was bound up with that of its author; if he could not be sent to Peking neither could it, until rendered harmless. He knew too much, it told too much. It could not be entirely suppressed, not only because it had to serve a purpose in proving the prisoner's identity, but also because too many people knew of its existence; therefore it had to be revised. Tseng Kuo-fan made no secret of the fact that he tampered with the deposition and in the colophon to the printed edition he stated the principles which governed his editing of it:[1]

> The wrongly written characters have been corrected, his flattery of the Ch'u [Hunan] Army has been expunged, idle words and repetitions have been cut, his specious pleading for life and requests to be allowed to expiate his guilt by obtaining the surrender of the various rebel [bands] in Kiangsi and Hupeh, together with the 'ten requests' concerning their surrender and the 'ten failures' leading to the defeat of the rebel Hung, have all been deleted ...

This statement must now be examined in the light of what we now know to have been suppressed.

Since the publication of the Taiwan facsimile and of Chao Lieh-wen's diary we now know that the manuscript of the deposition passed through the hands of more than one editor before it went to the printer. Tseng Kuo-fan's editing can be clearly seen since it was done in red ink on the manuscript. Chao Lieh-wen read through the deposition twice at Tseng Kuo-fan's request,[2] but he did not make any identifiable marks on the manuscript, so we have no means of knowing how much of the

deletion he was responsible for. All we can be sure of is that Tseng Kuo-fan made some cuts himself, and that other cuts were made by someone else before the text was sent to the printer. They did not differ as to the kind of cuts they made except that the second editor (or editors) appears even more cautious than Tseng Kuo-fan, deleting passages which he had left. The second editor evidently deleted all the passages which Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written in the top margins of the notebooks, although most of these passages were punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan; they are all omitted from the printed edition.[3] Whoever the various editors were, there was obviously an identity of interest amongst them and the principles which governed their treatment of the deposition can therefore be considered together.

An analysis of the changes they made show that they were done with five main considerations in mind: (1) to avoid arousing the suspicions of the court, (2) to avoid contradicting previous reports, (3) to emphasize the achievements of the Hunan Army, (4) to eliminate praise for the rebels, including Li Hsiu-ch'eng, (5) to avoid giving grounds for concluding that the dispersal plan should have been accepted.

(1) In order to allay the suspicions of the court about his power and his intentions, Tseng Kuo-fan felt obliged to eliminate all eulogies of himself and his brother Kuo-ch'üan. He did not mention this in the colophon to the printed edition, but there he put 'flattery of the Hunan Army' high on the list for deletion. In fact there is virtually no flattery of the Hunan Army in the deposition. In four places Li Hsiu-ch'eng made complimentary remarks about it: in one place (page 162) he remarks that Chang Kuo-liang's troops were not so good as those of General Tseng - this was allowed to stand, in another (page 180) he praised the Hunan Army, but more or less as an afterthought after praising at some length 'General Tseng's determination and persistence';

this passage was not marked by Tseng Kuo-fan for deletion but was omitted in the printed edition. In another place (page 194) Li Hsiu-ch'eng mentioned the formidable threat that Tseng Kuo-fan's army presented, and said that 'the army is always victorious and has never been defeated.' This was flattery, but it was not deleted. Elsewhere (pages 215 and 218) similar flattery of the Hunan Army was also left untouched.

Flattery of the Tseng brothers on the other hand was assiduously expunged, (see pages 130, 160, 180, 187, 197, 217, 241, 242, 245, 246, 297, 251, 254). It might have added to the rumours that they were not above coming to an arrangement with the Taipings against their Manchu masters. In addition, of course, they may well have felt that the flattery of a rebel was a doubtful compliment.

Connected with this modesty is Tseng Kuo-fan's evident desire to conceal from the court his comparatively lenient treatment of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, which seems to have provoked some of the eulogies. The opening remarks of the deposition (page 130) were presumably deleted for this reason. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was allowed to say (on page 245) that after his capture he had been given food, but Tseng Kuo-fan apparently thought it unnecessary that the court should know that he had also been given 'tea in sufficiency.' The mysterious passage (on page 251) which gives Li Hsiu-ch'eng's reaction to the previous evening's interview with Tseng Kuo-fan, was also cut; it was too open to misunderstanding.

Some passages seem to have been deleted because they might appear applicable to the delicate position of Tseng Kuo-fan himself. Thus, the words 'The Sovereign saw the extent of my military power and wanted to divide my authority,' were deleted (page 211). There is also the highly significant deletion of the words '亦是爭國之成' - this is also the way to win the struggle for the state. This phrase appears on the second side

of the 35th double-page (yeh, page 191). The text on both sides was punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan; but each line is marked with a kind of bracket at beginning and end implying that they were to be deleted, then Tseng Kuo-fan appears to have cancelled these marks. On the second side, in addition to these deletions and cancellations, a number of other characters, including the phrase in question, were separately deleted and the marks not cancelled.[4] In spite of the cancellation of the majority of the deletion marks on this double-page, the whole section was omitted from the printed edition, from Lü Chi-i's copy and consequently from all other editions before the appearance of the facsimile. This suggests that the whole yeh may have been physically removed from the manuscript for a time. If this is the case, the reason was probably because in this passage Li Hsiu-ch'eng emphasised the glory which would accrue to the name of the Tseng brothers if the remaining Taiping troops were to surrender to them, 'their virtue would inspire ten thousand generations,' and because he suggested, although in a somewhat incoherent way, that leniency to these rebels 'is also the way to win the struggle for the state.' If this is what Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant, or even if it was only what people might think he meant, it would be better that this should not be seen by a court which was already suspicious of Tseng Kuo-fan's power.

It seems likely that it was for similar reasons that the phrase (on page 141), '君臣不別' - there was no distinction between ruler and minister - was deleted. But if some words were cut because they might apply to Tseng Kuo-fan himself, one sentence seems to have been allowed to stand for the same reason. One sentence in a long passage which was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan (page 183) was deliberately punctuated and allowed to remain: 'I was his general and served long in the army without a moment of pleasure but with plenty of troubles.' It

is perhaps not too fanciful to suppose that Tseng Kuo-fan was thinking of himself when he left this sentence in.

(2) It was necessary to exercise considerable care in eliminating anything which might contradict previous military reports and thereby stir up a hornets' nest of reproach and investigation. In his memorial of TC3/12/13 Tseng Kuo-fan wrote:[5]

> Li Hsiu-ch'eng's original deposition amounted altogether to several tens of thousand characters, and although it is in the main reliable, the exaggeration of his own military achievements is at variance with the military reports of the various commands.

With this no doubt in mind, Tseng Kuo-fan frequently deleted the details of military events in the deposition (pages 134, 136, 136 , 146 148, 152, 154, 156, 157, 158, 165, 171, 195) and even most references to hours or to the duration of battles, (see pages 155, 156, 168, 181, 184).

In three different places derogatory remarks about Li Hung-chang, of whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a low opinion,[6] or about other officials, were cut. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that the capture of Su-chou and other districts 'cannot be said to be the result of Li Hung-chang's ability; in fact it was because of the efforts of the foreign devils.' This was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan, (page 221). A little later he wrote of Li Hung-chang, 'He used the customs revenue from Shanghai to hire foreign devils',(page 224) - this was not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan but was omitted in the printed edition. And again (page 224), he wrote that the foreign devils had received 'more than 400,000 in silver. Ning-po had a heavy revenue from the customs and there was a lot of money there; the Ch'ing [officials] embezzled military funds, got the foreign devils to do the work, but took the credit themselves. It was the same for the attack on Shao-hsing.' These words were

not marked by Tseng Kuo-fan for deletion but were omitted from the printed edition. A few pages later (on page 228) the words 'the foreign devils took Ch'ang-chou' were omitted, though not marked for deletion, and there is a similar omission on page 226.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remark that Li Shih-hsien's family, captured at Li-yang, were 'leniently treated and well cared-for', was also expunged, probably in case Li Hung-chang should have reported otherwise. As it happened Li Hung-chang had not reported capturing them at all,[7] and when this section of the deposition reached Peking several months later (see p.23 above), the court made an enquiry, in reply to which Li Hung-chang gave a version of the affair which differs from that of Gordon, who was responsible for the lenient treatment the prisoners enjoyed.[8]

Perhaps the most important change, in the sense that it confused the historical record for about a century, is the falsification of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's death.[9] Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that Hung had died of illness brought on by eating 'manna' and accentuated by his refusal of medicine, (see page 240). But Tseng Kuo-fan had already reported a different version to the throne. In his memorial of TC3/6/23 (26 July 1864) he wrote that according to captured rebels, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had taken poison 'during the 5th Month, at a time when the government forces were fiercely attacking [the city].'[10] Again, in his memorial of TC3/7/7 (8 August) Tseng Kuo-fan reported the evidence given by a woman from the T'ien Wang's palace and repeated that he had poisoned himself 'on the 27th Day of the 4th Month because the government troops were furiously attacking,' but that his death had been concealed from the rebels.[11] No alterations were apparently made to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition by Tseng Kuo-fan himself, but the printed edition was made to agree with Tseng Kuo-fan's version by the deletion of some words and the addition of others.[12] This was presumably done

to avoid contradicting official reports, which may well have been made in good faith. The story of suicide was a perfectly plausible one, and is likely to have been one of the many rumours rife in the Taiping capital. But this can hardly have been the only reason for the falsification of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version; perhaps it was considered that more pleasure would be given to the Emperor if he thought that his arch enemy had died by his own hand in a torment of fear and anxiety, than to know that he had merely died in his bed. There was also a pat on the back for the besiegers by emphasising in the two memorials and in the words added to the printed edition of the deposition, that the fierce attack on the city had brought about the suicide of the rebel king.

(3) Tseng Kuo-fan and his staff were, not unnaturally, anxious to get as much credit as possible for the success of their arms. With this in mind, they were not above deleting certain passages and even adding to the deposition. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written in most conciliatory and tactful terms of the occasion in 1861 when Tseng Kuo-fan was isolated at Ch'i-men and came close to a crushing defeat which would undoubtedly have ended with his death or capture, (see page 197). This was deleted, partly by Tseng Kuo-fan himself and partly by the subsequent editor, presumably because it was felt that the incident was best forgotten.

The deletion of remarks about the strength of the Taiping capital at the time of its fall were all made in order to exaggerate the achievement of its capture and confirm Tseng Kuo-fan's claim that in the three days which followed 'more than a hundred thousand rebels had been killed.'[13] Although he did not specify that this figure was made up entirely of fighting men, the implication was that they were so, or at least were die-hard rebels. He also reported the killing of three

thousand rebel leaders, including those who let themselves be burned to death or drowned themselves.[14] For this reason Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remark that there were only 'old people and children but few fighting troops,' (page 222) had to be deleted, and also his comment (page 236) that there was 'panic inside and outside the capital.' In the record of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's interrogation however, which the court did not apparently ask for and which was not released until 1937, there was no need to suppress this kind of evidence. When Li Hsiu-ch'eng was asked, 'How many people were there is the capital when it was taken?' he replied, 'When the city was taken there were no more than thirty thousand in it. Apart from the inhabitants there were no more than ten thousand rebel troops, of these no more than three or four thousand were capable of defending the wall.'[15]

In order to emphasize the Hunan Army's achievement and explain to an impatient court why it had taken so long, an addition was made to the deposition (see page 252). Li Hsiu-ch'eng had listed the disasters which, in his opinion, had led to the downfall of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo;[16] the last of these read, 'There was no system of government.' This was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan in red ink, as usual; in its place, in black ink, was written, '不应傳保天京扯動各處兵馬' - 'we should not have concentrated only on defending T'ien-ching [Nanking] by withdrawing troops from elsewhere'. I do not know who wrote these characters; they do not seem to be in the handwriting either of Tseng Kuo-fan or Chao Lieh-wen; nor are they in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's hand. This can be seen by comparing his writing of the various characters in the interpolated line elsewhere in the deposition - a comparison which is made on the following page. Li Hsiu-ch'eng only once used the expression '扯動' in the deposition; it was on the other hand an expression commonly used by Tseng Kuo-fan,[17] though this of course does not prove anything.



LI HSIU-CH'ENG'S WRITING OF THE SAME CHARACTERS, TAKEN FROM THE FACSIMILE OF HIS MANUSCRIPT. (The numbers refer to the pages from which the characters were taken).

REPRODUCTION OF PAGE 144 (72b) SHOWING THE INTERPOLATED LINE.

四位不應發林紹璋去爾相諱
出對林紹璋於湘譚[illegible]全
軍盡尽
五位因東王北王兩系相李此
是大權
六位翼王兩王君私屈臣忘
翼紅旗心將合朝文武將左右之
疑慮至大
六位王不信外臣用其長先次
元勳輔此人未有才情是能保國而
七位王不問政事
八封王太炅此王大位
九位因不用賢才
十魂魄改無二字位因位命者
(位魂魄不安專保天國言和動各處兵禹
因十位王由而起而位命無遠

Another interpolation in the text was made with the obvious purpose of adding to the prestige of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, and in order to make it conform with information already given to the court. In relating the story of his capture (page 245), Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written that he was 'taken prisoner by two scoundrels.' This was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan and replaced by the words, written this time in red and clearly in his hand, 'then I was captured by government troops under General Tseng.'

(4) Connected with the desire to exaggerate the achievements of his army was Tseng Kuo-fan's natural wish to prevent Li Hsiu-ch'eng from showing the rebels in too favourable a light. Perhaps this side of the editing was done with an eye to the propaganda value of the deposition, but it was also to avoid offending the court by allowing Li Hsiu-ch'eng to claim any virtues for the rebels or for himself. The more obvious examples of this are where his words 'people everywhere respected him [Hung Hsiu-ch'üan]' were deleted (page 133), and where his remarks about the strict discipline amongst the Taipings at Nanking in the early days of the rebellion were also expunged (page 140). Slightly less obvious are such deletions as that of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's words that the Kwangtung troops [secret society members] were 'bandits who harmed the people' (page 200); this and other such references to 'bandits' (on pages 143, 166, 237) were presumably cut because they implied that the Taipings were <u>not</u> bandits who harmed the people. Or again, the words 'our armies entered the town and immediately pacified the people' (page 200) were cut, probably because 'pacification' was something only the government could do. Elsewhere the word 'pacification' was allowed to stand, but not the fact that grain had been distributed to the peasants (page 211). A passage describing how the Taiping garrison of only three thousand troops at T'ung-

ch'eng held out against a much larger government force (not under Tseng Kuo-fan's command) was also entirely deleted (page 146).

Most of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's analysis of the reasons for the failure of the Taipings was also expunged (pages 183, 236, 241, 242 , 251, 252), including the whole section called 'The Ten Failures of the Heavenly Dynasty.'[18] This was partly, no doubt, because Tseng Kuo-fan wanted, at least for publication, a fairly bald statement of facts and did not see the point in passing on Li Hsiu-ch'eng's personal opinion either to the court or to the public. But it may also have been connected with the fact that fundamental to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's approach to this question was his belief that the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo was a rival State, with an administrative apparatus, a real emperor and so on. Such an assumption was obviously distasteful to Tseng Kuo-fan and even more so to the court.

Tseng Kuo-fan deleted several passages which might be considered as showing Li Hsiu-ch'eng in a good light, such as references to his sincerity and diligence (pages 135, 144), to his loyalty (pages 192, 217, 218, 231, 242), his magnanimity towards his enemies (pages 169, 187, 203, 205), to his filial sentiments for his mother (pages 193, 223, 228) and his charity to the poor (pages 230, 236, 242).

(5) Once Tseng Kuo-fan had decided not to accept Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan for the disbanding of the remaining Taiping troops, it was necessary to delete those parts of the deposition which might make him vulnerable to criticism for not having done do. He did not entirely delete Li Hsiu-ch'eng's appeals to spare the men of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and even reported this appeal to the court, as we have seen. But he did not at first report the fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had offered to co-operate in obtaining the submission of the Taiping troops and had made specific proposals

for doing so. In his memorial of Tc3/7/20 (21 August 1864) he merely reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had said that he could 'obtain the submission of the rebel bands in Kiangsi and Hu-chou.'[19] The court did not know about the existence of the 'ten requests' containing the detailed plan until Tseng Kuo-fan sent up a copy of the printed edition. He was at once ordered to send up a copy of the 'ten requests' and 'ten failures' which the colophon to the printed edition stated had been suppressed. In response to this Tseng Kuo-fan sent up a copy of these two items 'and other remarks.'[20]

Had he intended to conceal the existence of the detailed plan altogether he would not have mentioned it in the colophon. He presumably did this because too many people at his headquarters knew about its existence and had been discussing the pros and cons of accepting Li Hsiu-ch'eng's offer; he realised that the court was bound to find out sooner or later. By that time however it would already be too late to have Li Hsiu-ch'eng sent to the capital, and his principal anxiety would already have been removed. But he had thought it necessary to make some changes in the deposition itself in order to forestall a possible reprimand for not having accepted the proposal. In order to do this it was necessary that anything be expunged which might encourage the court to think that a good opportunity had been missed. He therefore deleted all references to the proposal (on pages 159, 176, 191, 192, 231, 246, 247, 253, 254); although he punctuated it, he also deleted the section containing the 'ten requests (pages 248-251). For the same reason he removed from the deposition the many passages in which Li Hsiu-ch'eng protested his passivity, his having been carried along on a wave of rebellion without real enthusiasm for the Taiping cause (pages 144, 159 , 160, 178, 191, 192, 246). If these passages had been allowed to stand, Tseng Kuo-fan could have been open to criticism

for having executed a rebel who was repentant and might seem to fall into the category of those who should be forgiven and spared; they would also make more credible the surprising transformation of a 'fierce and cunning rebel' into a willing collaborator.

This covers the main principles behind the editing of the deposition. Other cuts were made because of prolixity or irrelevance (pages 216 & 217 for instance), or because the words did not make sense (on pages 134, 144, 254, 255 for instance); other deletions were of passages which contained what Tseng Kuo-fan considered to be vulgarly superstitious or heterodox ideas (on pages 131, 132, 159, 160, 181, 196 for instance). In some cases passages were cut for a combination of reasons, in others (pages 136, 184, 250 for instance) it is difficult to see why they were made.

VII A HERO MADE AND OVERTHROWN.

Already in the two or three decades before Lü Chi-i's visit to the Tseng family home in 1944 Li Hsiu-ch'eng had enjoyed the reputation of a national hero. The early Chinese republicans, and especially Sun Yat Sen, tended to look upon the Taipings as their own revolutionary forbears, and attempted to popularise the story of their activities in order to arouse nationalist or anti-Manchu fervour amongst the people. At this time virtually no research had been done into the history of the rebellion, which had provided material for the romancer long before it became a respectable subject for the historian. But about Li Hsiu-ch'eng quite a lot was known, thanks to the existence of his deposition, and the popular stories based on it. It was known that he had joined the Taipings as a poor peasant and had risen from the ranks to achieve the highest command in their armies, with authority over several hundred thousand men. He had won many victories, had fought against the foreigners and attacked their stronghold at Shanghai. He had gained for himself, in spite of the suspicions of a jealous monarch, the title of Faithful Prince, and had proved his right to it in the most emotive possible manner by giving up his horse, and by consequence his life, in order to save that of the young rebel king.

It was known that he had treated his defeated enemies with magnanimity and the people with solicitude and benevolence. Although he took arms against foreigners, he was scrupulous about protecting their lives and property,[1] and consequently enjoyed amongst them a reputation unequalled by any other Taiping commander. Missionaries who visited the areas under his control often came back with favourable reports of his just administration and personal integrity. Gordon, against whom he fought, regretted his death and had a very high opinion of his qualities. He had,

in short, all the makings of a hero.

Most of this could be learned from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's own deposition, in itself, considering the circumstances under which it was written, a remarkable achievement for a self-educated military man. From the versions of it which were current before the Second World War the conclusion seemed justified that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was indeed 'a brave man, brilliant general, considerate foe and loyal leader, who, if he had espoused a worthier movement and had served a better master, might, in another sphere, have done much to restore order and peace to a distracted country.'[2]

It is ironic to reflect that Li Hsiu-ch'eng owed his reputation to a great extent to Tseng Kuo-fan's treatment of his deposition. Tseng Kuo-fan had suppressed most of the flattery of his captors and most important of all he had suppressed the 'ten requests' and all references to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's proposal for helping to bring the rebellion to an end. Although Tseng Kuo-fan had made no secret of this, admirers of Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not believe that their hero had flattered his captors, begged for mercy or offered to collaborate. By tampering with the deposition and suppressing the manuscript Tseng Kuo-fan inevitably threw doubt on the authenticity of the version which he presented to the public. The historian Teng Yin-ch'eng, who saw, though probably did not examine, the manuscript, wrote, 'The refusal of the Tseng family to make public the original of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's autobiography proves that there is something to hide, Tseng Kuo-fan's refusal to send it to the Grand Council proves that there was something to hide, and his destruction of parts of it proves that there was something to hide.'[3]

By 1944, when Lü Chi-i examined the manuscript and made his copy, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's prestige as a hero and the assumption that Tseng Kuo-fan had a secret were so strong that the publication

of revised versions of the deposition based on Lü Chi-i's copy, which should have been enough to encourage a more objective appraisal, in fact did little to undermine Li Hsiu-ch'eng's reputation. His fame as a pre-modern revolutionary hero was even enhanced after 1949 in an atmosphere which encouraged the search for heros in China's past and their canonization.

It was in this intellectual climate that Lo Erh-kang's first version of Lü Chi-i's copy was published. Lo accepted the authenticity of the deposition;[4] but he attempted to solve the apparent contradiction between the Li Hsiu-ch'eng of legend and the man who emerged from the deposition by denying that it represented Li Hsiu-ch'eng's real feelings. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a secret political motive, according to Lo Erh-kang; he was only pretending to surrender. Two things led Lo to this conclusion. First, there was the fact of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's lifetime of devotion and loyalty to the Taiping cause, his courage in the face of death and so on. Secondly, Lo seems to have placed considerable credence in the rumours that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had urged Tseng Kuo-fan to oppose the Ch'ing dynasty and make himself emperor. Unofficial histories[5] emphasise that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was well acquainted, as were many Taipings, with the San-kuo Yen-i (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), and Lo Erh-kang elaborated a theory that Li deliberately imitated Chiang Wei of the state of Shu, who pretended to surrender to Chung Hui of Wei. By flattering Tseng Kuo-fan and emphasising his own lack of committal to the Taiping cause, by offering to co-operate by assembling the remaining Taiping troops, Li Hsiu-ch'eng hoped to obtain his release, after which he would call his troops to his banner and carry on the fight. Lo Erh-kang did not however, claim this as a final answer; he put his theory forward as a tentative hypothesis and invited criticism, corrections and discussion.[6]

By the time that Lo Erh-kang published the fourth, revised edition of his study of the deposition in 1957, he had also revised his opinion, though certainly not to the extent of judging Li Hsiu-ch'eng disloyal. He had abandoned the theory of false surrender on the San-kuo Yen-i model. The 'ten requests' and Li Hsiu-ch'eng's flattery of his captors was designed to persuade them to stop the slaughter of the Taipings, hoping thus to 'preserve the revolutionary forces intact', and to persuade Tseng Kuo-fan to turn his weapons against the foreigners (page 253). Li Hsiu-ch'eng understood that he would not be allowed to live, and accepted this with fortitude. Lo Erh-kang was not entirely uncritical of his hero, but only on the grounds of shameful wishful thinking, in expecting anti-imperialism from a reactionary.

This new theory seems to have been widely accepted by historians in China. Its only serious rival, the forgery theory, had been competently and convincingly demolished by Lo Erh-kang (see Chapter III). Many students of Taiping history were inclined to believe that this was the truth or something very near it, but that a mystery remained, of which the key was either in the Tseng family archives, or else had been destroyed; some historians therefore reserved their judgement. The publication of Lü Chi-i's copy, with his preface describing the suspicious behaviour of Tseng Kuo-fan's descendants, did little to dispel these doubts; but at the same time, with Kuo Mo-jo's surmise that the manuscript had been destroyed in an aeroplane disaster, hope faded that the key would ever be found.[7] But was there a key?

The publication of the facsimile of the manuscript, though it did not really reveal any startling new facts, made it impossible to withhold judgement any longer, or to stick to the old explanations. What in fact did the facsimile tell us? Although it now became clear that Lü Chi-i had missed several passages in his copy, this did not radically alter it. But the facsimile

did provide an opportunity to see the whole of what remained of the manuscript and to judge whether anything had been removed from it, either from the middle as some claimed,[8] or from the end. It also made possible a close examination of the nature of Tseng Kuo-fan's deletions. The publication of the Taiwan facsimile made it possible, indeed essential, to look again at the old prejudices about Li Hsiu-ch'eng. It was this rather than the approach of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's centenary, which sparked off the great controversy about his place in the pantheon of history.[9]

The first blast against Li Hsiu-ch'eng was given in an article by Chi Pen-yü,[10] who charged the Faithful Prince with disloyalty. He did not deny the military and administrative achievements of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, but at the end, he said, Li had lost his revolutionary spirit and surrendered to the class enemy. He ended his life as a traitor and his deposition is a base confession of his 'crimes' against the Manchu rulers. It shows him to have been a man who lacked faith in the Taiping cause, who carried on only because it was 'difficult to dismount from the tiger's back,' who had wavered several times, but had not actually surrendered earlier because the government pursued a policy of dealing severely with men of Liang-kwang. His final shame was that he offered to collaborate with his captors and help to stamp out the revolution. He knew that if Tseng Kuo-fan announced clemency for the men of Liang-kwang, nothing would do more to undermine the revolution. Chi Pen-yü pointed out that there was no evidence, particularly in the deposition itself, of any attempt to drive a wedge between Tseng Kuo-fan and his Manchu masters. Even if Li Hsiu-ch'eng did encourage him to turn his weapons against the foreigners, there is no merit in this because it was unrealistic to expect a member of the landlord class to fight against imperialism. Chi Pen-yü denied that Li Hsiu-ch'eng

could be excused for his behaviour because he was subject to the limitations which history imposes upon the political understanding of the peasantry, without arguing the point at all closely.[11] Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not limited by history but acting against it, since he wanted to suppress the revolution, the manifestation of peasant class struggle against the landlord class, which is the only motive force of history in Chinese feudal society.[12] Chi Pen-yü pointed to the example of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, who died heroically cursing the enemy,[13] and of Hung Jen-kan and Lai Wen-kuang, and asked, Why were they not limited by history in the same way? Li Hsiu-ch'eng was strongly influenced by feudal ideology, he was fatalistic and regretted not having been destined to encounter 'an enlightened ruler' and so on. His surrender to the enemy was the natural outcome of this. Chi Pen-yü also accused him of abandoning peasant simplicity; his palace was very magnificent, and in the end he lost his life because he was unwilling to give up his riches. His unseemly wealth is shown by the payment he was forced to make to the Taiping state and by his ability to buy pardon for a traitor.[14]

Lo Erh-kang's answer to this, published in 1964, covers more than sixty pages.[15] This article by the leading Taiping specialist in China, is so detailed and so much more closely argued than those of the opposition, that it warrants a lengthy summary.

Ever since 1944, when he saw Lü Chi-i's copy of the deposition, Lo Erh-kang had been convinced that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had not given in to his captors; his study of the deposition for over twenty years had increased his conviction. But whereas previously he had elaborated the theory of 'false surrender,' now, in re-editing the deposition, he had 'unexpectedly' discovered that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been employing a stratagem of 'self-immolation in order to hold up the [enemy] troops' (苦肉緩兵計).[16]

Lo Erh-kang started by tackling the self-disparaging passages in the deposition. These, he said, are immediately suspect, and he lists eight reasons:-

(i) Li Hsiu-ch'eng protests too much, insisting on his sincerity as if with a guilty conscience. In fact he was being very cautious. Lo Erh-kang cites a correction Li made in the deposition which he considers highly significant. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written (page 134) that news of the Taiping rising had been brought to his village but he '不及前去' which, by the presence of the character 及 implies that he did not manage to get there, or did not reach Chin-t'ien in time. Then, thinking that this was contrary to the image of himself he wished to create, as someone who had only joined because everyone else did, because there was not enough to eat at home and so on, he had erased the character 及 . Unfortunately what he wrote in its place is not legible, but Lo Erh-kang believed that this shows that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was exercising extreme caution.

(ii) Li Hsiu-ch'eng emphasised his leniency towards traitors, to Li Chao-shou, for example, and says that he did not scold him (page 166). But we know that this is not true because a severe letter from Li Hsiu-ch'eng to Li Chao-shou is still extant.[17]

(iii) Li Hsiu-ch'eng also claimed that he was clement towards the enemy; but Lo Erh-kang detected a lie in his account of the second attack on Hang-chou (page 202), where he said that seven days before the attack he had petitioned the T'ien Wang to be allowed to spare the Manchus in the city; according to his own statement of the time needed to get an answer, he would have had the reply long before attacking the Manchu garrison, but he wrote in the deposition that he had been obliged to attack without waiting for it.

(iv) In the deposition Li Hsiu-ch'eng concealed the fact that he had been given overall command of the Taiping armies and that

he had enjoyed the confidence of the T'ien Wang. He had been promoted to the position of chün-shih, equivalent to prime minister and commander-in-chief, but he had said nothing about this.[18]

(v) In general he had exaggerated or invented stories of bad relations with Hung Hsiu-ch'üan; he had been critical of him but loyal nevertheless. He had emphasised his disobedience in refusing to 'sweep the north' (page 193); but Lo Erh-kang cited Hung Jen-kan's deposition to show that in campaigning south of the Yangtse Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in fact acting in accordance with the plan which had been agreed to by Hung Jen-kan, who was the prime minister. Lo claimed that this is confirmed by captured Taiping documents,[19] and by Li Hsiu-ch'eng's proclamation saying that he had received orders to campaign in the upper reaches of the Yangtse.[20] Again, elsewhere in the deposition (page 218), Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that he was ordered to campaign in the north and had no choice but to obey. Lo Erh-kang argued however that this plan was worked out by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself and cited evidence to support this.[21]

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of the T'ien Wang's order to start all documents with the words 'The Heavenly Father, Heavenly Brother and Heavenly King...' is suspect because it is not true to say (page 232) that he and Li Shih-hsien did not obey.[22]

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's claim that the T'ien Wang refused to let the poor out of Nanking in 1863 and that he himself did this secretly (page 237), is also false. Lo Erh-kang cites the record of one of those who left the city at this time, and who said that it was done by order of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and in response to a petition from Li Hsiu-ch'eng.

(vi) In the deposition Li Hsiu-ch'eng concealed the fact that he had remained loyal to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan. He concealed his real motive for returning to Nanking after the loss of Su-chou

and Wu-hsi, and said that it was merely because his mother was in the capital (page 227). Earlier, he had given the same reason for remaining in Nanking (page 229). But the fact that he could abandon his mother in order to ensure the escape of the Young Sovereign after the fall of the capital proves that he really put loyalty to his monarch before filial duty.

(vii) Li Hsiu-ch'eng also concealed the fact that he was responsible for the defence of Nanking. He wrote (page 223) that he wanted to leave the city but was persuaded not to do so, and later declared that he was not in command at Nanking (page 228). Lo Erh-kang denies the truth of this and cites several government documents which, in the last days of the rebellion, spoke of 'the determined resistance of Hung and Li.'

(viii) Li Hsiu-ch'eng in his deposition pretended that he had for a long time been on the point of surrendering to the government, but that he had not done so because there was nowhere for him to go, he had no guarrantor. But, says Lo Erh-kang, Li Chao-shou had gone over to the government and had been given a special post with responsibility for getting Taipings to surrender, why did Li Hsiu-ch'eng not take the opportunity to change sides when Li Chao-shou had urged him to do so?

The story about Sung Yung-ch'i negotiating Li Hsiu-ch'eng's surrender just before the fall of Nanking (page 239) is also a fabrication in the opinion of Lo Erh-kang. An official with only a blue button was of very low rank and it is unthinkable that such an important rebel as Li Hsiu-ch'eng could have negotiated with someone so insignificant. This is why Tseng Kuo-fan changed 'blue button' to 'red button' and finally, in the printed edition to 'crystal button.' He felt that the original version of the story did not ring true. Moreover, if negotiations of this kind had been going on, why should Tseng Kuo-ch'üan have been so brutal in his treatment of Li Hsiu-ch'eng after his

capture? Had Li Hsiu-ch'eng's story been true Chao Lieh-wen would probably have mentioned it in his diary.

Having thus thrown doubt upon the veracity of these passages in the deposition Lo Erh-kang poses the question, What was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's motive? It can only have been either the desire to persuade his captors of the sincerity of his offer to help, or some other hidden motive. Lo first examines the first of these alternatives.

(i) Did Li Hsiu-ch'eng lack understanding of the revolutionary cause and determination to accomplish it. The answer, of course, is no. He rose in the ranks to high command, and stressed that he 'did not transgress in the slightest' (page 135). His understanding, Lo Erh-kang admits, was limited by the age in which he lived and by his environment. In his youth he was much influenced by certain traditional fatalistic ideas; but in the practical life of struggle this fatalism gradually vanished and Li Hsiu-ch'eng developed an understanding of the necessity and ability of man to decide his own fate superior to that of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, Hung Jen-kan and Lai Wen-kuang, as shown by their depositions. If there are still traces of fatalism in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's, this is deliberate, Lo Erh-kang tells us: he was trying to pull the wool over Tseng Kuo-fan's eyes.

(ii) Lo Erh-kang deals with the accusation that Li Hsiu-ch'eng turned coat and surrendered because of his love of riches and comfort. The building of fine palaces was part of the Taiping system, and Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not the only <u>wang</u> to have one. It is true that he paid out large sums of money, but where did it come from? Mostly from captured goods and birthday tribute. In any case most of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's revenue was sent to the capital or spent on relief of the people, and even amongst his enemies he had the reputation of caring nothing for riches. As to his

jewels, which caused his downfall, these were part of his regalia, the prerogative of high Taiping commanders.

(iii) Did Li Hsiu-ch'eng lose faith in the revolution in the hour of defeat? This, says Lo Erh-kang, is impossible because when he was being interrogated Li said, 'A commander who, after winning victory after victory suffers a defeat and cannot recover, is not much good'.[23] Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not like this; he fought at T'ung-ch'eng, for instance, with determination and against considerable odds (page 146). Even after the loss of Su-chou and the rejection of his plan by the T'ien Wang he continued to obey orders although he disagreed with them and fought on; he broke out of the surrounded capital and even after being taken prisoner, sternly warned the enemy that ... the Taipings could not all be killed - '殺之不盡!' (page 251).

(iv) Was he an individualistic hero who had no confidence in the masses? Did he believe that the revolution was at an end as soon as he himself had been taken prisoner? No, says Lo Erh-kang, he was modest about his ability (page 192). His confidence in the masses is shown by the phrase he had written elsewhere to the effect that victory could only be won by everyone uniting.[24] After capture he asked Chao Lieh-wen, 'Do you think everything is finished now that you have captured me?'[25]

(v) Was he afraid of death or torture? In 1859, when he fell under suspicion he was at P'u-k'ou surrounded by the enemy and with little ammunition; if he had been afraid of death he would have accepted Li Chao-shou's offer and surrendered. If he had been afraid of death he would not have given his good horse to the Young Sovereign, an act which was typical of his generous spirit.[26] His unwillingness to shave his head also shows his fearlessness (page 245). His behaviour at the first interrogation by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan shows him to have been a man of great courage. He spoke of death without fear of it: 'if you fear that I cannot

be trusted, then execute me...' (page 247), and 'I am glad to return to the shades' (page 251). In the face of death he wrote his deposition at a considerable speed, with hardly any corrections, and even counted the number of words he wrote.

(vi) Was he taken in by Tseng Kuo-fan? Is it true that he was silent and uncooperative for the savage Tseng Kuo-ch'üan but succumbed to the soft words of Tseng Kuo-fan? This rumour, according to Lo Erh-kang, is based on an account written by Li Hung-chang's grandson, Li Kuo-huai, which he got from his father. The substance of the story is that for the first interrogation of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Tseng Kuo-ch'üan sat in state in a great hall, surrounded by soldiers, and had the captive brought before him in his prison cage. Li Hsiu-ch'eng answered the questions put to him only by cursing his captors. But Tseng Kuo-fan, on the other hand, interviewed Li Hsiu-ch'eng in a modest back room, attended only by a servant, and said to him, 'You are a good man...What a pity, what a pity!' At this Li Hsiu-ch'eng wept, asked for writing materials, begged for pardon and offered to assemble the remaining rebels.[27] Lo Erh-kang denies the authenticity of this account. In Chao Lieh-wen's interview with Li Hsiu-ch'eng the latter asked him whether he thought that there would be no more trouble, and mentioned the danger from foreign aggression. These questions were the prelude to the deposition; he was feeling his way to see whether it would be possible to trick the enemy. In any case neither Tseng Kuo-fan nor Li himself suggest that this kind of interview took place between them.

Thus Lo Erh-kang denied that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wanted to persuade the enemy of his genuine desire to co-operate. Therefore the second hypothesis must be the correct one, that he had a hidden motive in doing what he did. This, Lo Erh-kang claimed, was his plan to hold up the enemy troops by an act of deception and

self-sacrifice. There were historical precedents. The traditional method of suppressing peasnt rebellion was a combination of force and enticement. The peasants on the other hand, would often take advantage of the opportunities offered by enticement to gain temporary respite, that is to say, they would pretend to surrender. The situation at the fall of Nanking was favourable to such a stratagem. After the T'ien Wang's refusal of his plan for giving up the capital, Li Hsiu-ch'eng obeyed his decision and immediately summoned Ch'en Te-ts'ai back to Nanking from the Northwest; but Ch'en was held up in Ma-ch'eng for lack of grain. The Taipings in the Su-chou and Chekiang region also suffered from the shortage of supplies, so Li Hsiu-ch'eng changed the plan; he ordered Li Shih-hsien to lead the Taiping troops from the Su-chou and Chekiang region into Kiangsi, where there was still grain. Here they were to wait until after the autumn harvest, when they were to come back east. Ch'en Te-ts'ai was to descend on Yang-chou after the harvest, and the two armies would meet and attack the enemy at Nanking. Crack troops would be left in Kuang-te and Hu-chou to protect communications between Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and Kiangsi. When Nanking fell, Lo Erh-kang points out, there were only about 10,000 Taiping troops in the city;[28] therefore their main armies were still intact, and this plan could still be operated. This is why Li Hsiu-ch'eng asked Chao Lieh-wen whether he imagined that it was all finished. He also knew that Nien strength was growing, and this is why he suggested to Tseng Kuo-fan that they could easily be suppressed (page 250) - in order to gain his confidence. Nor can he have been ignorant of the unhealthy condition of the armies of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, the growth of corruption and discontent and the spread of subversive secret society organizations within them. The overall situation therefore, was favourable to the Taipings at the fall of Nanking, in the

the opinion of Lo Erh-kang. The main problem was to keep up Taiping morale and preserve unity. The Young Sovereign would have to be saved in order to act as a rallying point, and the troops in Kuang-te and Hu-chou protected from attack, so that they could cross unhindered into Kiangsi and join up with the Taiping forces on the north bank of the Yangtse.

Next Lo Erh-kang discussed the method which Li Hsiu-ch'eng employed to achieve his ends.

(i) Li Hsiu-ch'eng first 'inebriated Tseng Kuo-fan with flattery.' Although he must have known that when he had been defeated at Ching-kang Tseng Kuo-fan had tried to drown himself, that he had almost been taken prisoner at Chiu-chiang and had felt obliged to write a testament at Ch'i-men, Li Hsiu-ch'eng nevertheless repeatedly praised his determination, calm and so on.

(ii) He put on a mask of candour, falsely confessed to passivity in joining the revolution and said he was nothing but a time-server. He had rescued the Young Sovereign out of a sense of duty alone, and now wished to help to put an end to the rebellion in order to repay his captors for the good treatment which he had enjoyed at their hands. All this, according to Lo Erh-kang, was pretence.

(iii) He turned the weapon of superstition, 'which the landlord class uses to confuse the peasantry' against Tseng Kuo-fan himself; he spoke of fatalism, destiny and so on in order to confuse Tseng Kuo-fan.

(iv) Li Hsiu-ch'eng made use of cunning stratagems, and used his interrogations to further his plans. He was twice questioned by Tseng Kuo-fan. On the first, the main theme was the whereabouts of the Young Sovereign. Two days later, Tseng Kuo-fan listed the questions which his secretaries were to put to the prisoner, and although, when this interrogation took place, the fate of many

individual Taiping leaders was brought up, the Young Sovereign was not one of them. This was sufficient proof for Lo Erh-kang that Tseng Kuo-fan was already satisfied with Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version of what had happened to the boy. In the interviews Li Hsiu-ch'eng had probed Tseng Kuo-fan's hopes and intentions, and had made his plans accordingly. He jumped at the opportunity of writing his deposition in order to further his schemes.

His first aim was to protect the Young Sovereign; this is why he wrote that the boy must certainly have been killed, though he knew that it was not true, according to Lo Erh-kang. When the large group of Taipings, including Li Hsiu-ch'eng, broke out of Nanking, the Hunan Army troops sent in pursuit took prisoner a minor wang called Li Wan-ts'ai, who told his captors that the group had divided into two parts, one to escort the Young Sovereign and the other, under Li Hsiu-ch'eng to hold off the enemy.[29] Lo Erh-kang assumed that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was aware that the first group had got away; but he did not know that they had managed to reach Kuang-te on 24 July (TC3/6/21),[30] and wanted to ensure that no further search was made for the Young Sovereign. Li Hsiu-ch'eng also emphasised in the deposition (page 249) that even if the boy had escaped, he was incapable of planning anything. This was merely part of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's cunning. He knew that the Young Sovereign was accustomed to administration and had told as much to Chao Lieh-wen, who had asked why proclamations had been made in his name before the death of his father.[31] Lo Erh-kang cites, as additional proof of the boy's ability, the fact that he called a military conference after arriving at Hu-chou, and the deposition which he wrote after capture. At the military meeting the plan which was decided on was the same as that which Li Hsiu-ch'eng had drawn up six months earlier. There was a good plan, that is why Li Hsiu-ch'eng told Tseng Kuo-fan that there was not. By telling him that the Taipings

at Kuang-te would scatter without a fight, he was trying to protect them from attack.

The second part of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan was to give time for the concentration of the Taiping troops north of the Yangtse by tempting the enemy into inaction with offers to disperse them. The military situation at this time was as follows: south of the Yangtse there were Li Shih-hsien's troops, already in Kiangsi, and the units at Kuang-te and Hu-chou, who were about to enter Kiangsi; north of the river there was Ch'en Te-ts'ai's army at Ma-ch'eng in Hupeh. Only a short distance separated these three Taiping armies. Opposing them were: Tseng Kuo-fan's Hunan Army, which was the largest force on the government side, but was exhausted after the long siege of Nanking; Tso Tsung-t'ang's army, which was somewhat battered after several defeats, and Li Hung-chang's, which was still dangerous. These three government armies were all south of the Yangtse; only Pao Ch'ao was on the north side, but morale was very low in his army owing to corruption. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was aware, according to Lo Erh-kang, that the enemy had insufficient resources to prevent the Taiping units from joining up, but those south of the Yangtse were not yet ready, and needed time; this Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended to provide them.

He used a very roundabout way, Lo Erh-kang tells us. He humbled himself, proclaimed his dying wish to save the people and so on, and Tseng Kuo-fan was taken in. His warning about the danger of foreign aggression was part of his plot; it was not that he wanted to place the responsibility for resisting imperialism upon the landlord class; he merely wanted to distract attention from the Taipings, who were, he continually told Tseng Kuo-fan, no longer a threat. To the very end Li Hsiu-ch'eng kept up the pretence and treated Tseng Kuo-fan with soft words, praising his kindness even when he was at the point of death.

Lo Erh-kang traces to popular literature, such as the novels Tung Chou lieh-kuo chih, San Kuo yen-i, Feng-shen yen-i and Shui-hu chuan the influences which led his hero to employ such a stratagem. A contemporary had commented that his gentle exterior concealed a determined man; Lo Erh-kang agrees with this and argues that his apparent lenience to certain doubtful characters, and organizations, in the Su-chou region, was a method of putting them off their guard so that he could, in his own time, more easily suppress them.

A proof of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's continuing loyalty and confidence in the revolution is the fact that he kept secret from Tseng Kuo-fan the details of the plan to 'give up the capital and go elsewhere.' This plan was still, after the fall of Nanking, the only way to save the revolution, even though Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had not seen the wisdom of it. The enemy would not have known of the plan had not traitors and unstable Taiping leaders spoken about it. Another proof of his firm stand, according to Lo Erh-kang, and one which shows his methods, is his reaction to Tseng Kuo-fan's 'treasure hunting.' The victors at Nanking were very anxious to get their hands on the vast wealth which the city was reputed to contain; Li Hsiu-ch'eng was determined to foil them. Thus, in his deposition he frequently drew attention to his own generosity, to the large sums of money which he had been obliged to pay out. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not the man to say something without a purpose; he said all this to show that there was no money left and discourage them from searching. If he had been disloyal he would have told them where the treasure was hidden.

His plan for the dispersal of the Taiping troops was entirely pretence. He suggested that Tseng Kuo-fan send men to accompany the messengers which he, Li Hsiu-ch'eng, would chose himself to go to the various commanders to persuade them to give up the

fight; but Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended, Lo Erh-kang assures us, to select men who spoke with a Kwangsi dialect which would not be understood by Tseng Kuo-fan's nominees, and who could therefore secretly tell the Taiping commanders what the real plan was.

The final proof that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was using a cunning stratagem was that Tseng Kuo-fan was taken in. Lo Erh-kang explained that Tseng was not very acute - he admitted as much himself - he liked flattery, and had been dreaming of millions of rebels surrendering to him. Having captured Li Hsiu-ch'eng he was puffed up with pride, despised him, and consequently fell easily into the trap. He believed Li Hsiu-ch'eng's assurance that the Young Sovereign must have been killed and reported in these terms to the court. When news arrived that the boy was not dead he did not believe it. But Tso Tsung-t'ang had already informed the court that the Young Sovereign had reached Kuang-te, and the court celebrations for the death of the rebel king, arranged on the basis of Tseng Kuo-fan's information, had to be cancelled. Urgent commands were then sent to various commanders to get hold of the Young Sovereign as soon as possible. Tseng Kuo-fan received this order on 25 August (TC3/7/25), and was angry with the reproach and at Tso Tsung-t'ang for going behind his back, so to speak, and telling the court that the boy was alive after all. Contemporary opinion blamed Tseng Kuo-fan for having sent in a false report; the truth was, says Lo Erh-kang, that he had fallen into Li Hsiu-ch'eng's trap. But this was not all. Tseng Kuo-fan had previously been well-aware of the importance of Kuang-te and of the fact that the Taipings would certainly advance from there into Kiangsi. On 9 February (TC3/1/2) he had been ordered by the court to attack Kuang-te, but at the time he complained that he did not have sufficient troops. After the fall of Nanking this objection was no longer valid, but he fell into Li Hsiu-ch'eng's trap and allowed himself

to be convinced that the Taiping troops in Kuang-te and Hu-chou were of no importance. On 3 August (TC3/7/2) he repeated to Tso Tsung-t'ang that this was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's opinion and a few days later told the same to the court. Tso Tsung-t'ang had been encountering stiff opposition from the Taipings in this region and Li Hung-chang was moving to his relief. But on 3 August Tseng Kuo-fan ordered Li Hung-chang to halt this operation and move his army into the Huai River valley, since he was now sure that there would be no trouble from the Taipings at Kuang-te and Hu-chou. There were no Taiping troops in the Huai valley at the time, but it would be threatened when Ch'en Te-ts'ai tried to enter Anhwei from Ma-ch'eng. Li Hung-chang replied on 5 August giving news of the Kuang-te front and declining to go to Anhwei. This letter reached Tseng Kuo-fan on 10 August, the day on which news arrived of the Young Sovereign's appearance at Kuang-te. The following day Tseng received an order from the court to launch an attack on Kuang-te; so he countermanded his order to Li Hung-chang and began praparing for an expeditionary force to move on Kuang-te. But although Tso Tsung-t'ang sent urgent appeals this force did not reach its destination until 30 August, three days after the Taipings had evacuated the place. Tseng Kuo-fan had seen no need for urgency, according to Lo Erh-kang, because he still doubted the truth of the story of the Young Sovereign's survival and because he still believed that the Taipings at Kuang-te would disperse without fighting. He had fallen into Li Hsiu-ch'eng's trap. Had Huang Wen-chin not died of illness, and had the Taipings not been beaten at Shih-ch'eng, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan would have succeeded.

Tseng Kuo-fan also swallowed the bait which Li Hsiu-ch'eng offered by pretending that he wished to co-operate. He wrote in a letter to Li Hung-chang on 21 August that Li Shih-hsien's movements were uncertain now that the capital had fallen and that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had urged the sparing of Liang-kwang men. He wrote

in the same terms to Tso Tsung-t'ang. On August 6, Tseng Kuo-fan had his final interview with Li Hsiu-ch'eng and, Lo Erh-kang believes, agreed to his request for a lenient policy towards the Taiping survivors; this is why Li Hsiu-ch'eng expressed gratitude. Two days later, Tseng Kuo-fan despatched to the court his memorial of TC3/7/7, in which he noted Li Hsiu-ch'eng's request and indicated his own approval. He was, according to Lo Erh-kang, merely feeling his way, testing the reaction of the court, and did not report Li Hsiu-ch'eng's detailed proposals; but he had fallen into the trap. He was however, the only one to do so; Li Hung-chang was against a merciful policy and thought that Tseng Kuo-fan had been taken in. Tso Tsung-t'ang's reaction to Tseng's letter is not known, but he seems to have believed that Li Hsiu-ch'eng could not be trusted. The court did not comment.

* * *

Lo Erh-kang's article was a virtuoso demonstration of intellectual acrobatics; he could draw upon an encyclopaedic knowledge of Taiping sources for this last-ditch defence of his hero. He started from the assumption that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was an unwaveringly loyal and heroic revolutionary. Anything in the deposition which seemed to contradict this image had to be explained away; as a result, this respected Taiping specialist had to resort to tortuous and far-fetched arguments more suited to hagiography than to historical research. Few could compete with Lo Erh-kang in wealth of detail and documentation, but commonsense and logic alone lead one to the conclusion that his case is not-proven.

Chi Pen-yü's attack and Lo Erh-kang's elaborate defence sparked off a public discussion in China about Li Hsiu-ch'eng's role in history, in which dozens of articles appeared, not only in historical journals, but also in the daily press.[32] Lo Erh-kang

was soon pushed aside; his arguments apparently convinced no one, and there was no open support for his theory that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had mounted a gigantic deception. All the participants in the discussion were agreed that the Chung Wang had offered to collaborate, the differences between them were primarily concerned with the degree of his guilt, and what sentence should be passed. In this sense it was hardly a controversy, certainly not one between Chi Pen-yü and Lo Erh-kang.[33]

Opinions ranged from utter negation of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's role in the rebellion, to a more balanced assessment of his contribution. Some authors questioned his motives for joining the Taipings and saw evidence of disloyalty all through his career, culminating in a calculated attempt to undermine and destroy the revolution;[34] they saw in his clemency towards the enemy and towards Taiping traitors, a reprehensible lack of class-consciousness; his concern for the people was a sham and his 'anti-imperialism' a treacherous hoax.[35] His final degradation, the offer to collaborate, was a base attempt to save himself because he feared pain and death.[36] In the opinion of these critics Li Hsiu-ch'eng's previous achievements were to be written off, first because of his final capitulation, and secondly because he himself had written them off by expressing regret for his past activities.[37] Therefore he should be thrown down from his hero's pedestal and his deposition removed from the shelf of revolutionary documents.[38]

A more balanced view was taken by other authors, many of whom saw Li Hsiu-ch'eng as a waverer rather than a traitor.[39] He was a man without deep revolutionary conviction, with elements of defeatism and compromise in his character who, in the end, lost faith in the Taiping cause. His life fell into two stages, one of heroism and one of 'confusion;'[40] but the first period was the most important. He was not exceptional; surrender by peasant revolutionaries to the landlord class in periods of revolutionary

ebb-tide is the norm, said one critic; exceptions are due to individual characteristics.[41] Without having read all the articles which appeared, my impression is that such relatively moderate views were distinctly in the minority.

It would be tedious and unneccessary to summarize all the contributions to the discussion or to undertake a point by point examination of all the arguments raised, even those of Lo Erh-kang. In the chapter which follows I will therefore attempt a reappraisal of Li Hsiu-ch'eng and an evaluation of his deposition. In doing so, the most important of these arguments will inevitably come under scrutiny.

VIII LI HSIU-CH'ENG AND HIS DEPOSITION: AN ASSESSMENT.

The main value of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition as an historical document lies in what it tells us, from inside so to speak, about the failure of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, and secondly in what it reveals about the character of Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself.

It is natural, considering the time and circumstances under which Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote, that he should have been preoccupied with the shortcomings of the defeated rebellion rather than with those positive qualities which had brought whatever popular support it had enjoyed. In addition, the deposition deals mainly with the period after the outbreak of internecine strife, when Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in a position of authority, and this coincided with the years of Taiping decline. As a result, Li Hsiu-ch'eng has been accused of giving an unduly pessimistic, even slanderous, account of the rebellion. The fact remains however, that the Taipings had failed, not suddenly but after a long period of increasing, though not unrelieved, weakness and degeneration. So Li Hsiu-ch'eng's criticisms cannot be dismissed as the despairing moans of a disillusioned man who had no loyalty and no confidence in 'revolution', especially since they confirm to a great extent what we already know from other sources.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng summed up his opinion about the weaknesses of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo in the section called 'the ten disasters' (actually he lists eleven, see page 252). This is the only surviving record of the ideas of a Taiping leader about the reasons for the collapse of the rebellion.[1] It is not a profound or closely reasoned analysis, nor should we expect such. Three of the disasters which he listed are concerned with the failure of the Northern Expedition of 1853-1855, confirming the view that this was a vital opportunity lost for overthrowing the Ch'ing Dynasty.

One of the 'disasters' was the defeat of the Western Expedition at Hsiang-t'an in the spring of 1854, in which another opportunity was lost, this time for smashing the Hunan Army when it was still in its infancy. Three of the remaining points are directly concerned with the outbreak of internecine strife in 1856, and another four can be said to deal with the indirect or direct consequences of it. But Li Hsiu-ch'eng does not give us any new information about the details of the event itself. He was not at the time sufficiently senior to be party to the inner intrigues amongst the leadership, and his ignorance or reticence - I am inclined to believe that it was the former - is an indication of the veil of silence which the Taipings, especially perhaps Hung Hsiu-ch'üan himself, drew over an event in which so few of the leaders, including those who survived, showed up at all well. Nevertheless his remarks underline the crucial importance of the incident as a turning point in the fortunes of the Taipings. It is tempting, though idle since we know so little about the aims and ambitions of the man, to speculate about what might have happened if Yang Hsiu-ch'ing had succeeded in deposing Hung Hsiu-ch'üan. In the event the result of his unsuccessful attempt was catastrophic, not only because several thousand of the original Taipings were slaughtered, but also because the rebels lost, in Yang Hsiu-ch'ing a brilliant and resourceful leader. The aftermath was even worse; 'the greatest disaster' was the defection, with some two hundred thousand troops, of Shih Ta-k'ai, whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably believed was the only man who might have held the Taipings together by his popularity and ability. Instead Hung Hsiu-ch'üan thought himself threatened and isolated, put his trust in incompetents merely because they were members of his own family and alienated some of his loyal followers. The deposition emphasizes the profoundly demoralizing effect which the internecine strife and the consequent deterioration of administration

had upon the morale of the rebels. 'All wanted to disperse', and only the uncompromising policy of the government kept them together. Perhaps too subjective a judgement, but nevertheless one which deserves attention.

We see through Li Hsiu-ch'eng's eyes the damaging effect of the breakdown of strong central leadership, after which there was an increasing growth of semi-private spheres of influence, lack of cooperation between commanders, encouraged to a certain extent by the suspicions of the T'ien Wang, who wished to prevent anyone from becoming too powerful. Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself was far from blameless in this respect.

The deposition gives some insight, though again perhaps too negative and too coloured by personal feeling, into the nature of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's leadership, his obstinacy, his fanatical reliance upon heaven and distaste for practical affairs. Yet Li Hsiu-ch'eng also shows that the T'ien Wang was neither a puppet nor an utter recluse, as has often been implied. His authority was still a force to be reckoned with even in the last year of the rebellion, when he could still oblige an unwilling Li Hsiu-ch'eng to obey him. Nor did he cut himself off so entirely from the administration of his kingdom that Li Hsiu-ch'eng, and presumably others, could not obtain an audience with him. The publication of the facsimile of the deposition also clears up the mistaken account of Hung's death, which had been generally accepted until then.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng stresses that good discipline was the rule amongst the Taipings, especially under Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, and that the growth of indiscipline, looting and so on, was due to certain individual commanders and groups of incompletely absorbed and insufficiently indoctrinated soldiery and rebels. He lists (on page 165), some of the commanders whom he considered responsible for this degeneration. Other evidence can be found which tends to confirm this and the damage the Taipings did to their own

movement by the indiscriminate enlistment of allies and mutinous government soldiery.

The deposition also helps us to understand the Taiping conquest of the southeast and the nature of their control over this region. It shows that the Taipings in entering southeast Kiangsu and Chekiang, moved into a military, and to a certain extent, political vacuum. There was no serious military resistance to their advance after the defeat of the Chiang-nan H.Q. And although there was, as we know from other sources, a loyalist underground opposition which played a part in the eventual reconquest of the territory, it is clear that Li Hsiu-ch'eng's hope to be able to enlist Ch'ing officials into his service was not entirey an idle dream.

With respect to the social and economic policies of the Taipings Li Hsiu-ch'eng tells us almost nothing. But it informs us by default. By not mentioning the Taiping land programme, the T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mu chih-tu, he confirms the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from other sources, that this document was long since forgotten as a practical guide to policy. The absence of comment on this and other aspects of economic and social life confirms the conviction that the fundamental Taiping concern, at least in the southeast, was the preservation of the rural status quo; but this was enforced with leniency and solicitude for the livelihood of the people.

A great proportion of the deposition is concerned with military campaigns. But anyone hoping for detailed accounts of operations such as Napier gave for the Peninsular War or Kinglake for the Crimean, will be disappointed. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's accounts of battles are no more detailed than the official Ch'ing reports which are embodied in memorials, though they are possibly more reliable. This may have something to do with Li Hsiu-ch'eng's educational standard, which evidently made it difficult for him to express himself in very precise terms.[2] It is significant of

his preferences in literature that one of the best-written parts of the deposition is the account, semi-fictionalized since based on hearsay, of the conversation between Wang Yu-ling and his secretary, (see page 204), which might have come out of the pages of a Chinese novel.

Nevertheless the deposition does give some valuable military information, and supplementing this with reports of operations from the government side, fairly detailed accounts can be pieced together. In recounting the various Taiping campaigns to raise the sieges of Nanking, Li Hsiu-ch'eng underlines the enormous expenditure of effort the Taipings were obliged to make in order to defend their capital, an effort which reduced their ability to undertake offensive campaigns. The deposition also contains Li Hsiu-ch'eng's assessment of the value to the government campaign of suppression of foreign military intervention. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a poor opinion of Li Hung-chang as a commander and implies that he could have achieved nothing without foreign aid. But he also had a poor opinion of the 'Ever-Victorious Army' as a fighting force, though he did not underestimate the power of their artillery nor the value of their steamers.

The greatest value of the deposition is in what it tells us about Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself, which is of great importance in understanding the nature of the Taiping movement. It is obviously the main source of our knowledge about him, and particularly about what went on in his mind after he had been taken prisoner. It enables us to know more about him than about any other Taiping leader, with the possible exception of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan. This does not mean that one must begin by accepting the deposition without reservation as an authentic account of his career or as an accurate reflection of his character. Just as with any documentary material it is necessary to ask who wrote it and why, so

in the case of the deposition we have to bear in mind the circumstances under which it was written, the fact that its author was a captive after the defeat of the rebellion and that it was written for the eyes of his captors, the fact that he had been ordered to write but could have refused. With these reservations in mind however, we should start by taking the deposition at its face value, and then judge to what extent it fits in with what we know already from other sources. Only if there are manifest contradictions is it necessary to search for hidden meanings and secret intentions.

Taking the deposition at its face value then, what picture can we reconstruct of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's character, and especially of his state of mind when he was in enemy hands?

First, there is no doubt that he was considered by Hung Hsiu-ch'üan as fundamentally loyal, otherwise it is unlikely that he could have risen from the ranks to one of the highest positions and the most powerful military command in the Taiping kingdom. But in the atmosphere which prevailed after the internal dissension and massacres of 1856 it was evidently not easy to wield great military power without arousing the suspicions of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan. In addition, he seems to have had several differences of opinion with the T'ien Wang which had nothing to do with his personal position. He was, according to his own account, continually warning and exhorting his sovereign: 'I did my duty as a minister and memorialized, urging my Sovereign to select and employ men of ability, to establish a system for relieving the people, to promulgate strict laws...' (page 149), 'For a long time I warned to the best of my ability and submitted innumerable documents, but my advice was not heeded' (page 159), 'I argued forcefully with him but was severely reprimanded' (page 177), 'The more I petitioned the more the T'ien Wang mistrusted me' (page 211), Sometimes Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was 'full of righteous anger, and

reprimanded me [in a manner] hard to bear' (page 221). But even when Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's distrust led him to attempt to undermine Li Hsiu-ch'eng's authority by weaning T'ung Jung-hai away from him (see page 212), or by promoting one of his subordinates, Ch'en K'un-shu, to the position of wang (page 211), Li Hsiu-ch'eng certainly felt injured, but he remained loyal.

Lo Erh-kang claimed that Li Hsiu-ch'eng deliberately exaggerated his differences with Hung Hsiu-ch'üan in order to hoodwink Tseng Kuo-fan. He supported his contention by pointing out that although Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that he had refused to obey a new order about the formula with which all documents should begin (see page 232), we know from documents which have survived that this was not entirely true. Li also contradicted himself by stating at one point, in order to exaggerate the T'ien Wang's distrust of him, that his mother was held as a hostage in Nanking (page 175), but later he wrote that she was with him in P'u-k'ou at the time (page 234). He also, according to Lo Erh-kang, fabricated the incident of Sung Yung-ch'i, with its implication that he was on the point of turning coat (page 239). Contradictions and discrepancies there may be, but to build upon them the theory of an elaborate deception is very far-fetched. It may well be that Li Hsiu-ch'eng exaggerated the friction which had occurred between himself and Hung Hsiu-ch'üan. But the simplest and most plausible explanation would be that he wished, without any particular motive other than self-justification, to extol his own role as the man who tried to make Hung Hsiu-ch'üan see reason, to disassociate himself from the shortcomings and failure of the rebellion and emphasize the difficulty of his position. Had he wanted to convince his captors of a pretended disloyalty, this can hardly have been the method he would have chosen.

There is no reason to doubt that there were serious differences between Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, or that the latter

was usually very unreceptive to suggestions; indeed, it would be surprising if he had not been, since he was profoundly convinced that he had the authority of God. In face of this kind of obstinacy and suspicion Li Hsiu-ch'eng's behaviour may be taken as a proof of his fundamental loyalty. He need not have stayed: 'If I had not been loyal I would long ago have gone elsewhere' (page 192), 'I had several myriad of troops outside [the capital] and could have gone free and unconstrained' (page 231). He might have gone over to join his former officer Li Chao-shou, with whom he remained in contact, especially in 1859 when he was in a position of some danger in P'u-k'ou (see page 175). He might have gone off with Li Shih-hsien, who urged him to do so (page 227), to take independent action like Shih Ta-k'ai whom he much admired. When Chao Lieh-wen asked him why he had not surrendered long ago, he replied that since he had been granted honours by Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, he could not betray him (see Appendix II p. 266). In the deposition he wrote, 'a man of feeling and principles, I wanted to show gratitude for past friendship without forgetting' (page 243). Even after the T'ien Wang was dead, Li Hsiu-ch'eng felt that his duty extended to his son: 'Although the T'ien Wang's term was up, although he had fallen on evil days and had lost the state and the country, nevertheless, I had received his favour and could not but remain loyal and do my utmost to save the offspring of the T'ien Wang' (page 243). In doing this he lost his own life, and yet he could probably have made arrangements for his own safety.

His loyalty was not unwavering. We know from his own account that he had wanted to give up. He wrote two or three times that his position was like that of a man riding a tiger; he was not happy with his mount, but the consequences of getting off were worse. As a Kwangsi man he was unlikely to escape execution. Only if he was prepared to make amends by fighting against the Taipings

like Wei Chih-chün, might he have 'won the pleasure of being allowed to return home' (page 164), but there is no reason to suppose that he was. The incident of Sung Yung-ch'i (pp.239-40) is not in itself conclusive, since Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not apparently the prime mover in this matter. Moreover, if there had been any real negotiations about his surrender it is likely that some mention could be found in Ch'ing records. However, we know from Chao Lieh-wen's diary that negotiations were going on about this time with a trusted member of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's staff, though Chao does not hint that they concerned Li himself.[3] There had been rumours for a few years that he might be willing to turn coat. The Na Wang, Kao Yung-k'uan's son, whose father had been executed after surrendering, told Gordon that 'the Chung Wang was willing to come over'.[4] Earlier, in September 1862 Gordon had written to his mother that the Chung Wang was on the worst terms with the T'ien Wang, 'and is said to be negotiating surrender to the Imperialists'.[5] His sense of loyalty was not strong enough to prevent him from keeping in contact with Li Chao-shou, or strong enough to make him take action against Kao Yung-k'uan and the other Su-chou wangs, whose treachery lost him the city.

His loyalty, such as it was, was of a very personal kind, to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and his son; it does not seem to have extended with the same degree of devotion to the Taiping cause. But what was the Taiping cause? This is obviously not the place to attempt to deal with so large and complex a question. But it is necessary to note at least two relatively uncontroversial components of the Taiping ideology to which Li Hsiu-ch'eng does not appear to have been deeply committed: Taiping Christianity, and what we may call for want of a better term, anti-Manchu nationalism.

Of these, Taiping religion had a special importance, because to a certain extent not only anti-Manchu sentiment, but other components, such as peasant animus against landlords and what one might tentatively call their social programme, were expressed

in religious terms and justified by religious authority. It was the Taiping religion above all which supplied that spark of fanaticism essential in rebellious or revolutionary movements of this kind. This heterodox, monotheistic and alien faith, diluted with traditional and popular beliefs, continually sustained the early Taipings in their conviction that they were carrying out a divinely appointed mission. It elevated the God-worshippers, the backbone of the rebellion, above the rest of society and turned them into a united, devoted band of elite. Their discipline and morality, which contributed significantly to their early successes, the strong bonds of brotherhood which attracted great numbers of poor people to their banner, stemmed from popular tradition, but were invigorated and justified by biblical authority. The charismatic appeal of the prophet Hung Hsiu-ch'üan drew more support for the rebellion than the 'Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty'.[6]

In this religion Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to have been no more than a very lukewarm believer. There is little in the deposition about his own understanding of Taiping religious doctrines. 'After I worshipped God,' he wrote, (and this could mean no more than 'after I joined'), 'I never dared to transgress in the slightest, but was a sincere believer...' (page 135), and later, 'When I joined the Heavenly Dynasty I became acquainted with Heavenly writings, thanks to my teacher. I will say no more about this' (page 143). The next mention of anything even faintly resembling religious sentiment is when Li Hsiu-ch'eng referred to his encounter with a mysterious teacher near Hang-chou (page 143); but this initiation has closer affinities with the Feng-shen yen-i than with Gützlaff's Bible.[7] The only other references to religion in the deposition are disparaging remarks about Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's irrational dependence upon God. 'The Soveriegn did not interest himself in affairs of state, but relied entirely upon Heaven,

enquiring neither about military, nor about political matters' (page 175); the T'ien Wang 'relied entirely on Heaven and hardly ever gave orders or instructions to his ministers' (page 177), 'his edicts spoke of Heaven, not of men' (page 183) and so on. When Li Hsiu-ch'eng was asked his opinion of the writings of Hung Jen-kan, who had a more profound and enlightened knowledge of Christianity than any other Taiping leader, he replied that he had not bothered to read them (see Appendix II page 263). In those of his proclamations and letters which survive, with the exception of his reply to the missionary Edkins,[8] there is little reference to religion. Another missionary, who had spoken with Li Hsiu-ch'eng, confirmed his lack of interest in these matters.

> On conversing with the Chung Wang, soon after his interview with respect to the conflicting points between the Bible and the T'ien Wang's doctrines, Mr. Holmes found it impossible to gain his attention to these matters. He confessed carelessly that the two did not agree, but as the T'ien Wang's revelation was more recent than the Bible, it was more authoritative.[9]

Since there is nothing to suggest that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a superior understanding which led him to reject the 'gods of the crowd', his lack of enthusiasm for the religion of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan implies a weak commitment to Taiping ideology as a whole.

This is complemented by the very moderate nature of what we may call his political attitude, especially for a Kwangsi Taiping who must have been nourished on strong doses of anti-Manchu propaganda. He may well have had the sensibilities of his captors in mind when he was writing, but there is no reason to doubt, for instance, that he did offer free pardon to the Manchu garrison at Hang-chou, or that he was sincere when he wrote that the Manchus and their officials could not be blamed for serving a different master - 'Each serves his own Sovereign and you and I have no

choice but to obey' (page 202). Similar sentiments are expressed elsewhere in the deposition, and in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to Chao Ching-hsien.[10] It is clear that he treated Han officials and commanders who served the dynasty with a clemency rare in rebellions of this kind. He sought out the body of Chang Kuo-liang, the renegade rebel who became a determined enemy of the Taipings, and gave him a decent burial (page 184); he spoke of Hsü Yu-jen, the Governor of Kiangsu who drowned himself rather than fall into the hands of the Taipings, as 'a loyal minister'.[11] His courtesy to Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao, Ch'ing officials taken prisoner in Hang-chou, made them respond in a way which cost them their lives (see note 1 to page 206).

Li Hsiu-ch'eng has been criticized by contemporary Chinese historians for attempting to take towns in the Southeast without fighting for them, by bribing the garrisons and offering a free pardon, thus allowing the enemy to preserve his military force intact instead of destroying it. The point is arguable. After all, he might have quoted the authority of Sun Tzu that 'to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill'.[12] But it is probably true that Li Hsiu-ch'eng's policy had a detrimental effect on the chances of Taiping survival in the area, not because towns surrendered without a fight, but because enemy troops were absorbed more or less indiscriminately into the Taiping armies, individuals and groups secretly hostile to the Taipings were employed in their administration, and militia bands, potential 'fifth columns' were allowed to remain in existence. In the early days of the rebellion new troops seem to have been indoctrinated with Taiping ideas and forced to observe their discipline and moral code; but little of this seems to have been done after the Taiping conquest of the Southeast. This was mainly the result of the loss of vigour and morale in the rebellion after 1856, but Li Hsiu-ch'eng's lukewarm attitude to Taiping ideology must also

have had an influence in this respect.

Peasant animus against the landlord class, and that of the under-privileged in general against officialdom, were certainly other elements in the early Taiping movement. The desire for social justice, however vaguely formulated, by those who felt themselves to be victims of the social order, was expressed in some of the Taiping policies and satisfied to a certain extent by some of their reforms. An egalitarian ideal of mixed Chinese and Christian ancestry was the foundation of their land policy, the 'T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mu chih-tu', but even in the early period there is no evidence that it was ever put into practice. In the areas under Li Hsiu-ch'eng's control after 1860, about which a good deal of information exists, there is even less trace of any attempt at agrarian reform. On the contrary, at first sight it seems that the Taiping administration was primarily concerned with the immediate task of collecting revenue from the countryside, and consequently was at pains to disturb the rural status quo as little as possible. This meant confirming landlords in their tenure if they had not run away, and even encouraging them to come back if they had.[13] It seems probable, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that southeast Kiangsu and Chekiang were not exceptional in this respect.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's personal loyalty and his weak commitment to the Taiping 'cause' were the main factors which governed his reactions to the collapse of the rebellion and his behaviour after he had been captured.

The tone of his remarks to Chao Lieh-wen (see Appendix II), of his replies in interrogation (Appendix I), and of the whole deposition, reflects his conviction that the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo was at an end. Now that the T'ien Wang was dead, and probably his son as well, now that the capital was lost, the Taiping armies in

disarray and he himself in enemy hands, Li Hsiu-ch'eng undoubtedly felt that his debt of loyalty to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was paid to the full. Only by recognizing this is it possible to understand his subsequent behaviour.

When he was brutally interrogated by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan he acted with dignity and resignation because he was expecting nothing better; he had nothing to gain by answering questions. But when he was informally examined by Chao Lieh-wen he was clearly more co-operative. If Chao's record is correct, and there is no reason to doubt that it is reasonably accurate, it does a great deal to confirm Li Kuo-huai's version, in essence if not in detail. The interviews with the Tseng brothers may not have taken place exactly as Li Kuo-huai described them, (his story came from his father and grandfather, neither of whem was present), and Li Hsiu-ch'eng's reaction may not have been so simple or so sudden; nevertheless, stripped of its fictional decoration, there is something about the story which rings true. Li Hsiu-ch'eng did respond to the comparative civility of his captors after the initial savagery of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan and he became much less reticent. We know nothing of him between the time of his interview with Chao Lieh-wen on 23 July and his first meeting with Tseng Kuo-fan on the 28th.[14] Nor do we know anything about what passed between them at this meeting. The next record we have is that of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's interrogation by P'ang Chi-yun and Li Hung-i (Appendix I). This took place on 30 July. On the same day he began writing the deposition. It is clear from these accounts that after the first interview with Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, when he said nothing, Li Hsiu-ch'eng became increasingly co-operative and willing to talk, and this culminated in the writing of the deposition. To this extent Li Kuo-huai's story is hardly a slander.

Lo Erh-kang would have us believe that Li Hsiu-ch'eng never lost confidence in the revolution. Did he not say during the

interrogation that 'a commander who, after winning victory after victory, suffers a defeat and cannot recover, is not much good' (Appendix I page 262)? But these words cannot be pressed into Lo Erh-kang's service to support this argument. A defeated commander ought to be able to recover, to be sure; but what if he has no army, no master and no state, and is firmly locked up in an enemy prison? Li Hsiu-ch'eng may have said to Chao Lieh-wen, 'Now that the capital has fallen and I have been made prisoner, do you think that there will be no more trouble in the country?' (Appendix II page 268). But does this really amount to a stern warning that the Taipings were not finished? He may have written in the deposition, 'You cannot kill them all!' (殺之不盡); but was this really a brave cry of defiance? Lo Erh-kang conveniently separated the phrase from its context. What Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote was, 'It is no use to inspire awe by killing - they cannot all be killed; but kindness can win the submission of the people' (page 251).

Lo Erh-kang believes that the overall situation in the summer of 1864 was favourable to the Taipings, in spite of the fall of their capital, and that this was what determined Li Hsiu-ch'eng to attempt a cunning plan. There had been about ten thousand Taiping troops in Nanking at the time, therefore the bulk of the rebel forces were still intact. The Hunan Army was in disarray, Tso Tsung-t'ang had been badly mauled and only Li Hung-chang represented a serious threat. Thus the stage was set for the sort of stratagem which a hero of the San Kuo yen-i might use. But was this really the situation after the fall of Nanking? Even if the government armies were somewhat battered, the Taipings had been in a much worse state for some time. Nothing indicates this more clearly than the epidemic of treachery in which many Taiping commanders went over to the government side with their troops: T'ung Jung-hai in the summer of 1862 (see page 212), Lo

Kuo-chung early in 1863, Ku Lung-hsien in the winter of the same year, the Su-chou wangs in January 1864 (page 227) and Teng Kuang-ming in April. In the winter of 1862, even with the immense force at his command, Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been unable to break the siege of Nanking by a small army of plague-ridden Hsiang-chün (see page 218); his Western Expedition in the summer of 1863 had failed to achieve its object and had ended in the catastrophic debacle at Chiu-fu-chou (page 220). These were already grave symptoms of decline. By the time Li Hsiu-ch'eng began to write Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was dead, the capital had fallen, he was a prisoner and the Young Sovereign and Hung Jen-kan were dead as far as he was to know. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was well aware, Lo Erh-kang stresses, of the importance of maintaining unity and morale: could he have imagined that there was still hope in this respect in August 1864?

Lo Erh-kang claims that Li Hsiu-ch'eng knew that the Young Sovereign would get away, and acting as a rallying point and leader of the movement, would carry out a plan which had already been adopted. So he had at all costs to conceal from Tseng Kuo-fan the fact that the Young Sovereign had made good his escape, and prevent the enemy from sending troops in pursuit. But did Li Hsiu-ch'eng try to deceive Tseng Kuo-fan on this point? It is possible that Tseng asked him about the fate of the Young Sovereign during their first interview on 28 July; but this is by no means certain, since Tseng may have believed the reports which said that all the Taipings who had escaped from the city had subsequently been killed.[15] If Li Hsiu-ch'eng was questioned about the Young Sovereign, there is no reason to suppose that his answer would have been different from what he later wrote in the deposition (page 243).

> Although he got out [of the city] I do not know whether he is still alive today. He was a young boy of sixteen

> and had grown up from childhood without ever having ridden a horse, and moreover, had never had to suffer [such] fright. General Tseng's soldiers pursued from all sides and he must certainly have been killed. If General Tseng's cavalry or infantry killed him on the road they would not have known that he was the Young Sovereign.

Later Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote (page 249):

> The question is being discussed, supposing he did get away, what kind of clever plan the Young Soverign may have? This man certainly cannot have any [such plan].

Is this evidence that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was trying to pull the wool over Tseng Kuo-fan's eyes in order to save the Young Sovereign? There are no grounds for assuming that he was not expressing more or less what he believed to have happened. If he had wished to persuade Tseng Kuo-fan that the boy was dead, he could easily have invented a plausible story, and would have said nothing about exchanging horses with him (page 244). In the circumstances it is not surprising that he should have believed the boy to have perished. The fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself had been obliged to give up his horse implies that very few of the several hundred Taipings who broke out of the city could have stayed with their leaders. Even Li Hsiu-ch'eng was soon separated from the Young Sovereign. The fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself, a popular and distinguished commander, could have apparently been abandoned with his useless horse, shows the extent of the danger, or the degree to which discipline had broken down. No news of the Young Sovereign arrived at Nanking until after Li Hsiu-ch'eng's execution; what could be more natural than his assumption that the boy was dead? It is probable too that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was sincere in saying that the Young Sovereign could not have any clever plans. Lo Erh-kang points

out that when Chao Lieh-wen asked him why for several years there had been edicts signed by the Young Sovereign, Li Hsiu-ch'eng replied that it was in order to accustom him to the management of affairs (see Appendix II page 267). Yet the boy himself, in his deposition, said that even after he had succeeded his father he had only been given drafts to sign, drawn up for him by Li Hsiu-ch'eng or Hung Jen-kan.[16] Moreover, what opinion must we form of the son and heir of the rebel king Hung Hsiu-ch'üan who, after being taken prisoner, had the the astounding naivete, even for a boy of fifteen or sixteen, to tell his captors that now his ambition was to be allowed to study?

> Kwangtung is not a good place; I do not want to go back there. I would just like to go with Mr. T'ang to study in Hunan, and I would like to pass the hsiu-ts'ai degree.[17]

Lo Erh-kang argues that a plan, essentially the previous plan for giving up the capital and going elsewhere (page 221), was to come automatically into operation as soon as the capital fell, and that the first step in this plan was that the Young Sovereign and Hung Jen-kan were to join up with the Taiping forces at Kuang-te and Hu-chou. But if this were so, Hung Jen-kan would not have written in his deposition that they were considering meeting up with Li Shih-hsien, and that this was because there was a shortage of grain in Hu-chou.[18] In fact, when they did try to make contact with Li Shih-hsien, they found that he had already left Kiangsi and had moved into Fukien.[19]

In arguing that Tseng Kuo-fan had fallen into Li Hsiu-ch'eng's trap, Lo Erh-kang placed great emphasis on what he considered Tseng's otherwise inexplicable behaviour in not immediately sending troops to Kuang-te and Hu-chou to mop up the Taipings there, in spite of an imperial order to do so.[20] Tseng Kuo-fan may have been influenced by Li's opinion that the Kuang-te Taipings

could be dispersed without a fight,[21] but this was not the only reason for his delay. First, as we have pointed out, the state of the Hunan Army units at Nanking was far from satisfactory and Tseng Kuo-fan was unwilling to commit them to further action. Secondly, Kuang-te fell between the spheres of influence of Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang, and he did not want to arouse further jealousy on their part by interfering with their campaigns.[22] Finally, and this was perhaps the most important reason, Tseng Kuo-fan probably believed, either on the grounds of what Li Hsiu-ch'eng had told him, or on the basis of military intelligence, that the Taipings at Kuang-te did not in fact represent any serious threat.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was perhaps understandably pessimistic when he told Tseng Kuo-fan this; but no one knew better than he that the Taipings had been dealt a blow from which they could not recover. He may have been a little premature in assuming that the Young Sovereign had perished, but in the absence of information to the contrary this too was very natural.

Thus, when Li Hsiu-ch'eng began writing on 30 July it was in a spirit of resignation and retrospection which gives to the deposition a certain flavour of detachment. There is a tradition, as noted earlier, that he set out to leave behind a true history of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo.[23] This may be based on something he said in interrogation, but no record of such a statement exists. In the deposition itself he wrote, 'it is my sincere desire [to relate] the history of the Kingdom, carefully and in detail from beginning to end, to arrive at the reasons for its failure' (page 184), and again, 'My Sovereign's affairs having already come to such a pass, all I can do is to write for the inspection of the Grand Secretary and the Governor, so that they may know the history of my Sovereign's attempt to establish a dynasty. I relate the sources of its destruction, concealing nothing, but recording everything in detail' (page 160).[24]

There is a strong element of self-justification in the deposition. It is understandable that a man of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's power and ability should not want to go down in history as a vile bandit who ended his life on the execution ground. He did not hint at his own contribution to the breakdown of central control and discipline. He was anxious to present himself as a man of honour and feeling who had, mainly because of destiny, served the wrong cause or the wrong master. Nevertheless, he never, even at his most abject, abandoned the idea that the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo was a rival state, not just a mob of bandits. Failure came from military errors, from the betrayal of good principles, from the lack of unity and discipline, not from anything fundamentally wrong in having challenged the ruling dynasty. That this theme was one of his main motives for writing the deposition is born out by the fact that he devoted a special section to his conclusions (see pp.251-2).

The most controversial part of the deposition is Li Hsiu-ch'eng's offer to collect together his former troops so that they could be disbanded. According to Lo Erh-kang's theory, this was part of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's cunning plot; he proposed it in order to play for time and allow the Taiping troops north and south of the Yangtze to assemble for a counter-attack. If Tseng Kuo-fan agreed, Li Hsiu-ch'eng would chose messengers whose Kwangsi dialect would not be understood by Tseng Kuo-fan's men, and who would be able to convey his secret instructions! Opponents of Lo Erh-kang have roundly condemned Li Hsiu-ch'eng for treachery in seeking to undermine the revolution and buy his own life. One interpretation follows the assumption that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was an heroic and invincible revolutionary, the other that he was a traitor to an heroic and invincible revolution. Neither considered the possibility of judging Li Hsiu-ch'eng in other than purely black and white terms.

Although Li Hsiu-ch'eng had mentioned in conversation with Chao Lieh-wen that he would like to be allowed to disband the remainder of his troops (see Appendix II page 268), the matter was apparently not mentioned again until half way through the deposition (see page 192). This suggests that unless Li Hsiu-ch'eng was exercising great subtlety in gradually working up to the point, the desire to gain acceptance for the dispersal plan was not the first consideration he had in mind when he began writing. It is not an injustice to his undoubted ability to deduce from a close study of the deposition that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not capable of such literary subtlety.[25] It is more likely that the idea of persuading Tseng Kuo-fan to accept some sort of plan for the disbanding of the Taiping troops took on an increasing importance for him, perhaps because of a growing conviction, as no news came of the Young Sovereign and Hung Jen-kan, that the rebellion was really finished.

When he first mentioned the matter to Chao Lieh-wen, the latter believed that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in some way begging for his life (see Appendix II page 268). Tseng Kuo-fan too, in memorials and in the colophon to the printed edition, stated that Li had begged for pardon. The only evidence we have to go on however, is the deposition itself and the records of interrogation. If Chao Lieh-wen recorded Li's remarks accurately we may judge almost as well as he, whether or not the prisoner was begging for his life, and are likely to conclude that the assumption seems unjustified. Tseng Kuo-fan did not produce any evidence, and it is perhaps worth noting that his statements were official, and possibly influenced by considerations of what might give pleasure to the court.

The evidence from the deposition is also inconclusive on this point. Certainly Li Hsiu-ch'eng never directly pleaded for his life. He begged for clemency for Kwangsi men; but he did not

necessarily imagine that this would include himself or other 'ringleaders'; he expressed envy for Wei Chih-chün, who had gone over to the government and had 'won the pleasure of being allowed to return home' (page 164). The strongest arguments to support the contention that he wished to bargain for his life are: first, that he wrote at one point (page 191), 'To be first loyal to Ch'in is the loyalty of an honest man; but if Ch'u can forgive, he will repay even unto death', and secondly, that the plan for the dispersal of the Taiping remnants depended on his being allowed to live, at least until its completion. If successfully accomplished, there would be a good case for sparing him. But this does not mean that the only, or even the main motive for proposing the plan was to save his own life.

Death was never very far away in such days of turmoil, and everyone knew the penalties of rebellion. Nearly everyone fears death, but Li Hsiu-ch'eng's behaviour when stabbed by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, his remark to Chao Lieh-wen that he expected only death (Appendix II page 268), the resignation he expressed to Alabaster (see page 21) and the fact that according to Chao Lieh-wen he died with dignity and calm, do not suggest that he would have descended to bargaining for his life. One wonders whether Tseng Kuo-fan would have felt sorry for him if he had.

If Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not propose the dispersal plan to obtain mercy for himself or in order to hoodwink Tseng Kuo-fan, then he did so in order to save bloodshed, especially of his relatives, friends and former troops. Such motivation is neither out of character nor incompatible with his state of mind at the time. His lenient treatment of captives, his solicitude for the welfare of the poor, are related in the deposition but also confirmed by other sources. This shows him to have been a comparatively humane man. Amongst foreigners in China he was generally recognized as a moderate and popular rebel leader.[26] Gordon regretted his

death (see note 32 to Chapter I). Even contemporary Chinese writers hostile to the Taipings, though usually unwilling to admit that he was genuinely of a kindly disposition, conceded that at least he gave the appearance of being so, and that he was popular with the people.[27] If, as we have shown, his loyalty was of a personal nature, to the T'ien Wang and to his friends, and not to an abstract ideal of revolution, then there is nothing improbable in the suggestion that once he believed the rebellion to be irrevocably lost, he hoped to prevent further bloodshed by arranging for the dispersal of his armies. He was not exceptional in feeling concern for his troops. Shih Ta-k'ai, whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng admired, had given himself up in June 1863, together with his son, in the hope of persuading the government commander to spare his defeated and surrounded army and allow them to disperse.[28]

In order to achieve his aim Li Hsiu-ch'eng was ready to flatter Tseng Kuo-fan in a fulsome manner which many modern Chinese find highly unpalatable. But Li Hsiu-ch'eng was probably not entirely insincere in his praise of Tseng, who was after all, an exceptional and outstanding official for his time, whatever later generations may have said of him. In comparison with the generality of his colleagues he was a man of principle, integrity and resolution, and his reputation remained virtually unchallenged by anyone except jealous impeachers before Chang Ping-lin.[29] It is difficult to think of any Ch'ing official more likely to win Li Hsiu-ch'eng's admiration.

Finally, it is clear that Li Hsiu-ch'eng considered that the threat from foreign aggression was an additional reason for bringing the defeated rebellion to an end as soon as possible. 'The thing to be feared now is that the foreign devils will certainly take action... Now it will not be very difficult to settle the T'ien Ch'ao affair, and the first thing is to guard against the aggression of the foreigners... [the opportunity should

be taken] now, before they make a move...' (page 253). But this theme was not developed; either Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not consider it important enough, or else he did not have the time or the literary ability to emphasize it. His specific proposals for how China should resist were limited to the idea of purchasing and adopting certain foreign weapons, the value of which Tseng Kuo-fan was not entirely unaware. Had Li Hsiu-ch'eng stated in so many words that everyone should unite to resist imperialism, he would still have been criticized in our own day for wishful thinking, but much would have been forgiven him.

If this picture of Li Hsiu-ch'eng is a true one, it would be valuable to determine to what extent he was typical of Taiping leaders in the latter half of the rebellion. How far was he exceptional in the nature of his loyalty, in his weak commitment to the Taiping 'cause', in his moderation, in his tendency to compromise? These questions must be left unanswered for the time being. But if he was not just an exception, it will mean that some common assumptions about the nature of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo will have to be re-examined. So much the better.

THE DEPOSITION OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG

Notes on the Translation

1. This translation is from the Taiwan facsimile edition of the deposition, Li Hsiu-ch'eng ch'in-kung shou-chi (李秀成親供手跡) Taipei, 1961.

2. Passages deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan are typed in capitals.

3. Passages not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan but omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition, are in capitals, between curved brackets.

4. Passages protruding into the left margin are those which Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote in the top margins of the original. All these additions were omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition, though most were not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan.

5. Figures in the left margin refer to the pages of the facsimile, which however are not marked.

6. Reference is made in the notes to omissions by Lü Chi-i in his copy only where such omissions are substantial.

7. As far as possible all omissions and deletions have been restored to the text, whether they were made for grammatical or other reasons, except, in the former case, where they would unduly burden the text with nonsense. Tseng Kuo-fan's cuts were made in such a way as to leave intact or to improve the sense of the passage in question. In the translation it has not always been possible to indicate this.

8. When Tseng Kuo-fan came to a passage which he did not understand, or in which the grammar was hopelessly confused, he usually deleted it. I have had to guess at the meaning and attempt a translation. The results are not always very intelligible.

9. The style of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's writing reveals the low standard

of his formal education and his taste for popular literature. It is neither literary nor colloquial (不文不白); his use of particles is expecially shaky. In order to preserve something of its original savour and ambiguities, I have not attempted to translate it into polished English prose.

THE DEPOSITION

IT WAS IN THE SIXTH MONTH OF THE YEAR CHIA-TZU [1864] THAT THE STATE WAS DESTROYED AND I WAS TAKEN PRISONER AND BROUGHT[1] TO THE CH'ING CAMP, WHERE I WAS TREATED KINDLY AND LENIENTLY AND MY DAILY NEEDS WERE PROVIDED FOR, OWING TO THE LIBERALITY OF THE GOVERNOR.[2] I WAS ALSO HONOURED BY THE SPEEDY ARRIVAL OF THE GRAND SECRETARY,[3] WHO INTERROGATED ME ABOUT WHAT HAD OCCURRED.[4] ON THAT DAY I REPORTED THE SUCCESSION OF EVENTS IN GENERAL, BUT NOT VERY CLEARLY; THEREFORE I WILL AGAIN SORROWFULLY SEARCH MY MEMORY AND STATE EVERYTHING CLEARLY.

HOW MY SOVEREIGN WAS DESTINED TO FOUND THE STATE[5] HAS BEEN RECORDED IN THE '<u>T'IEN-WANG</u>'S DECREE,'[6] WHICH ALSO RELATES HIS ORIGINS AND THE HISTORY OF THE RISING. BECAUSE OF THE FALL OF THE CAPITAL I DID NOT BRING WITH ME A COPY OF THE DECREE, BUT WHAT I CAN REMEMBER IN GENERAL TERMS I WILL WRITE DOWN FOR THE SCRUTINY OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE GRAND SECRETARY. I START WRITING WITH ALL SINCERITY, WITHOUT CONCEALING THE LEAST THING.

First, as to the <u>T'ien Wang</u>'s origins, this is recorded clearly in the book. There were three brothers in his family, the eldest Hung Jen-fa, the second Hung Jen-ta.[7] The <u>T'ien Wang</u>'s name was Hung Hsiu-ch'üan.[8] [They were children of] the same father but different mothers.[9] HIS FATHER'S NAME I DO NOT KNOW.[10] The eldest and second sons were born of the former mother. (HUNG HSIU-CH'ÜAN WAS BORN OF THE LATER MOTHER).[11] THESE FACTS WERE RECORDED BY THE <u>T'IEN WANG</u> IN THE DECREE AND WERE CONTINUALLY TAUGHT AT THE PREACHINGS,[12] SO THAT EVERYONE KNEW. The eldest brother and the second brother worked on the land before they left home, while Hung Hsiu-ch'üan studied.[13] He and Feng Yun-shan were friends and school-fellows.[14]

One day the <u>T'ien Wang</u> suddenly fell ill. This was the illness of the year Ting Yu [1837]. He died and came to life again

after seven days.[1] After he came to life again he spoke mostly in heavenly words and used little of common speech. He exhorted the people to worship God[2] and cultivate virtue SAYING THAT
2 people willing to worship God would avoid disasters and suffering.[3] Those who worshipped God must not worship other deities, for this would be a crime. Therefore, after people began worshipping God none dared worship other deities. People are all afraid of death; being told that snakes and tigers would devour them, who would not be afraid? Therefore they obeyed.

The T'ien Wang was from Hua-hsien in Kwangtung.[4] From Hua-hsien he went to Hsün-chou, Kuei-p'ing, Wu-hsüan, Hsiang-chou, T'eng-hsien,[5] Lu-ch'uan and Po-pai in Kwangsi - scattered over several thousand li.[6] He often hid in the depths of the mountains, where he secretly taught people to worship God. HE TAUGHT PEOPLE ABOUT BEING EATEN BY SNAKES AND TIGERS AND ABOUT AVOIDING DISASTERS, SICKNESS AND SORROW. EACH PERSON PASSED ON THE WORD TO TEN OTHERS, TEN TO A HUNDRED OTHERS, A HUNDRED TO A THOUSAND, A THOUSAND TO TEN THOUSAND. (IN SEVERAL HSIEN SOME FOLLOWED AND THERE WERE SOME WHO DID NOT. IN EACH VILLAGE OF A HUNDRED OR SEVERAL) tens of families, three or five families might join, or eight or ten families. But there were educated and intelligent people - scholars - who did not join. Those who did were all peasants and poor people, and they assembled together and made a host.

Those who were in the know, who wanted to establish a state, who planned deeply and far ahead, were the Tung Wang Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, the Nan Wang Feng Yun-shan, the Pei Wang Wei Ch'ang-hui, the I Wang Shih Ta-k'ai, and the T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Ch'in Jih-ch'ang.[7] These six men were deeply in the know.[8] The others[9] really followed for the
3 sake of food. THIS IS THE TRUTH.

IF YOU WISH TO KNOW ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE FORMER WANGS

I WILL ESPECIALLY GIVE A CLEAR ACCOUNT OF THEM ONE BY ONE. The Tung Wang Yang Hsiu-ch'ing lived in Kuei-p'ing-hsien, THE NAME OF THE MOUNTAIN WHERE HE LIVED IS P'ing-ai-shan; he cultivated hill land and burned charcoal for a living when he was at home.[1] He was not clever,[2] but after he became a God-worshipper he understood everything; I do not know how providence could so transform this man.[3] I REALLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND. The T'ien Wang placed great confidence in him and handed all the affairs of state over to him. His military discipline was strict, his rewards and punishments just.

The Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei came from Lu-lu-t'ung in Wu-i-hsien.[4] At home he made a living by cultivating land and hill land. The younger sister of the T'ien Wang was his wife; he was therefore given much responsibility. He was courageous and resolute and was in front when there was a charge.

The Nan Wang Feng Yun-shan studied when he was at home. He was able and educated. Amongst the original six it was the Nan Wang who planned the setting up of the Kingdom; at first it was he who did everything.[5]

The Pei Wang Wei Ch'ang-hui came from Chin-t'ien in Kuei-p'ing-hsien. At home he was in and out of the yamen on business, and was a chien-sheng. He had a lot of ability to take quick advantage of opportunities.[6]

The I Wang Shih Ta-k'ai also came from Kuei-p'ing, from Pai-sha. His family was wealthy; he had studied and was well versed in literature and military technique.[7]

The T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Ch'in Jih-ch'ang also came from Pai-sha in Kuei-p'ing. At home he worked as a hired labourer. He was without any talent, but was loyal, brave, sincere and righteous, consequently the T'ien Wang placed great trust in him.[8]

At the beginning it was these six men who taught people to

worship God.

4 When I was at home I knew nothing about any 'T'ien Wang,' but in every village and every place people had heard merely of 'Hung hsien-sheng.' PEOPLE EVERYWHERE RESPECTED HIM, SO IN SEVERAL HSIEN THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE WHO WORSHIPPED GOD.

For many years after people were taught to worship God, nothing happened; but about the 27th or 28th year of Tao Kuang [1847, 1848] there were rebel and bandit risings all over Kwangsi, which disturbed the towns. Most communities had militia bands. There were differences between the militia and the God-worshippers; the God-worshippers stuck together as one group and the militia as another group. They vied with each other and threatened each other, and thus forced a rising.[1]

At the time of the rising, [in the struggle between] the militia and the God-worshippers, one village was pitted against another - sometimes they were in the same village[2] - therefore they banded together.

In the 30th year of Tao Kuang, in the 10th Month, [5 October to 3 December 1850] the villages of Chin-t'ien, Hua-chou, Lu-ch'uan, Po-pai and Pai-sha rose (SPONTANEOUSLY) on the same day.[3] THIS WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN. IT WAS NOT PLANNED IN DETAIL, AND THIS FURTHER INCREASED THE FAITH OF THE GOD-WORSHIPPERS.

(IT IS MORE THAN 300 LI FROM CHIN-T'IEN TO TA-LI. SHAN-JEN-TS'UN AND THE PLACE OF THE RISING ARE 70 OR 80 LI FROM MY HOME AT TA-LI).[6]

At the time of the rising the T'ien Wang was hiding in the home of Hu I-huang in Shan-jen-ts'un,[4] and not a single person knew of it.[5] The Tung Wang, the Pei Wang, the I Wang and the T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang were all in Chin-t'ien. Shan-jen-ts'un comes under the administration of P'ing-nan-hsien, which is next to T'eng-hsien.

The place of the rising was 70 or 80 li from my home, by

mountain paths difficult to follow. At this time I was at home
5 and heard the news of the rising at Chin-t'ien WHICH GOD-WORSHIPPERS BROUGHT TO MY HOME; BUT I DID NOT GO, I REMAINED AT HOME.[1] NOT LONG AFTERWARDS I HEARD THAT from Chin-t'ien the Tung Wang sent troops to Hua-chou to take the T'ien Wang to the assembled group at Chin-t'ien.[2]

To Chin-t'ien came Ta-t'ou-yang,[3] Ta-li-yü,[4] and Lo Ta-kang.[5] AT THIS TIME I WAS STILL AT HOME, BUT WHEN I JOINED THE ARMY IT WAS UNDER LO TA-KANG, SO I KNOW ABOUT THIS, AND THAT IS WHY I ADD IT.[6] These men had been active as bandits at Ta-huang-chiang-k'ou.[7] They went to Chin-t'ien to join the army. This Ta-t'ou-yang, when he came to Chin-t'ien, saw that the God-worshippers were not very strong and were unlikely to come to anything, and therefore did not join. Later he went over to the Ch'ing Provincial Commander-in-Chief Hsiang [Jung].[8] Lo Ta-kang was not on good terms with Ta-t'ou-yang. Later Lo Ta-kang joined.

AFTER THE CAMP WAS MOVED FROM WU-HSÜAN TO HSIANG-CHOU THERE WAS A BATTLE IN WHICH THE CH'ING TROOPS AT MIAO-WANG WERE WIPED OUT, AND AT CHUNG-P'ING IN HSIANG-CHOU THERE WAS A BATTLE, AT MA-AN-SHAN. IN THE BATTLE OF MA-AN-SHAN THE CH'ING TROOPS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE LOSSES; MANY OF THE T'IEN CH'AO WERE KILLED TOO. AFTER THE TROOPS MOVED FROM CHIN-T'IEN TO WU-HSÜAN THERE WAS A BATTLE AT SHUANG-CHIEH-TING,[9] WITH MANY KILLED ON BOTH SIDES. (AT THE BATTLE OF HSIN-HSÜ THE CH'ING [TROOPS UNDER] PROVINCIAL COMMANDER-

After the T'ien Wang's arrival at Chin-t'ien the troops were moved to Tung-hsiang and San-li in Wu-hsüan, where the God-worshippers were assembled together. After the people of Wu-hsüan were assembled, they went to Hsiang-chou and mobilized troops of the God-worshippers, and turned back to Chin-t'ien and Hsin-hsü, where they camped for several months.[10] They were surrounded on four sides by Ch'ing troops, but escaped out of the difficult

IN-CHIEH HSIANG [Jung] AND CHANG CHING-HSIU SURROUNDED US).[1] situation by narrow mountain paths.[2] They came out to Ssu-wang and Ssu-hui,[3] and engaged more than ten ying of the Ch'ing Commander-in-Chieh Hsiang [Jung]'s troops, which were destroyed by the Hsi Wang and the Nan Wang.[4] They came out of the encirclement by way of Pa-t'ung-shui[5] to Ta-wang-hsü. Then they divided forces and went on land and by water to Yung-an-chou.[6] At this time I was still[7] at home, and I heard that the troops
6 who were coming by the land route were all to pass through my village from T'eng-hsien in Wu-chou [Prefecture] and Ta-li-li in the 57th Sub-district, up to Yung-an.

My family was poor. My parents had two sons - my younger brother is Li Ming-ch'eng. THERE WERE MANY COUSINS AND UNCLES IN THE FAMILY, BUT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO LIST THEM ALL. I WILL ONLY GIVE A GENERAL ACCOUNT. My family was poor and it was difficult to make ends meet each day; TO GET THROUGH A MONTH WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. We made a living by cultivating some mountain land and working as labourers.

When I was eight, nine and ten, I studied with my uncle, but after the age of ten I was with my parents trying to make a living. At the age of twentysix or twentyseven I heard that there was a 'Hung hsien-sheng' who was teaching people to worship God. AFTER I WORSHIPPED GOD[9] I NEVER DARED TO TRANSGRESS IN THE SLIGHTEST, BUT WAS A SINCERE BELIEVER, ALWAYS FEARING THE SNAKES AND TIGERS.

The T'ien Wang passed through Ssu-wang to Ta-huang-hsü,[10] where he divided up his forces, some to go by water and some by land, up to Yung-an. The road passes through Ta-li, where there are high mountains on all sides, surrounding the plan for several hundred li. THE HSI WANG LEADING the troops going by land, passed through Ta-li, were led by the Hsi Wang [sic], the T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang and Lo Ta-kang.[11] The troops led by the

Hsi Wang and the Pei Wang stayed for five days in Ta-li,[1] SEARCHING FOR grain, foodstuffs and clothing in the villages,
7 taking from whatever village they came to, AND THE GRAIN WHICH THE PEOPLE HAD MOVED INTO THE DEPTHS OF THE MOUNTAINS WAS ALSO TAKEN.

The Hsi Wang stayed in a village near my home and he gave out that the God-worshippers must not be afraid and flee. They could eat together as one family, so why should they flee? My family was very poor, so having no food to eat did not flee. When the army marched, the houses of all those who had joined the God-worshippers were set alight and burned.[2] People followed because they were poor and had nothing to eat. Village people had no sense of distance and would hundreds of li and not know how to get back. When there were soldiers in pursuit, how could they avoid being afraid?

We went from Ta-li straight up to Yung-an. After taking Yung-an, we remained in the town[3] for several months.[4] Then Grand Secretary Tai[5] with Wu-[lan-t'ai][6] and Hsiang [Jung]'s armies surrounded us on all sides so that we were cut off. Then we went by a small road through Ku-su-ch'ung to Chao-p'ing.[7] Ku-su-ch'ung was garrisoned by Ch'ing Shou-ch'un troops.[8] These were smashed by Lo Ta-kang, and this enabled us to get out of the encirclement by a narrow path.[9]

We captured more than ten loads of powder and thus obtained ammunition, without which we would not have been able to get out of this encirclement, because we were besieged in Yung-an without a scrap of powder.[10] IN FACT IT WAS ONLY WITH THE HELP OF THE TEN OR MORE LOADS OF POWDER WHICH WE OBTAINED FROM THE SHOU-CH'UN TROOPS AT KU-SU-CH'UNG THAT WE WERE ABLE TO GET OUT OF THE ENCIRCLEMENT.

The Shui-tou stockade at Yung-an was held by the T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Ch'in Jih-ch'ang; the Ch'ing troops were commanded

8 by Chang Ching-hsiu.

After breaking through the encirclement we moved to Hsien-hui[1] and were pursued by the main force of General Wu-[lan-t'ai], and more than two thousand of the T'ien Ch'ao soldiers, men and women, were killed.[2] So when we saw what a desperate position we were in, on the following day we made an united effort and fought to the death with Wu-[lan-t'ai]'s troops and killed four or five thousand of them.[3] General Wu-[lan-t'ai] was wounded and died at Lu-t'ang-hsü.[4]

After the victory the Tung Wang gave the order not to go to Chao-p'ing and P'ing-lo, but to go by paths across Niu-chiao and Yao-shan[5] to come out at Ma-ling, then go up to Lu-t'ang and Kao-t'ien and lay siege to Kuei-lin.[6] After besieging it for more than a month, the city was not yet taken and the troops were withdrawn to Hsiang-pi-shan and across the river, then on to Ch'üan-chou[7] by way of Hsing-an-hsien.[8]

After the capture of Ch'üan-chou - the Nan Wang was killed in battle here[9] - it was decided to go up to Tao-chou, attack Yung-ming and take Chiang-hua-hsien.[10]

In Tao-chou, Chiang-hua and Yung-ming in Hunan we enlisted some twenty thousand people.[11] At this time the troops in pursuit of us were those of Hsiang [Jung] and Chang [Kuo-liang].[12] Later, the troops moved to Ch'en-chou, and here also enlisted twenty or thirty thousand people, and at Ch'a-ling-chou[13] several thousand.[14]

Then the troops moved again and the Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei took Li K'ai-fang, Lin Feng-hsiang and others to attack Ch'ang-sha.[15] At this time I was an ordinary soldier and held no office.

9 When the Hsi Wang went to attack Ch'ang-sha the T'ien Wang and the Tung Wang were still in Ch'en-chou. The Hsi Wang was killed by a cannon shot outside the south gate of Ch'ang-sha. Li K'ai-fang sent a report back to Ch'en-[chou],[16] and the T'ien

Wang and the Tung Wang moved with the troops to Ch'ang-sha, which was then fiercely attacked for several days without success. The great wall of Ch'ang-sha was mined and knocked down in several places, but the troops could not break in.[1] Outside, the Ch'ing armies of Hsiang [Jung] and Chang [Kuo-liang] were surrounding and attacking us, but at a victorious battle opposite Ch'ang-sha at Sha-chou we killed many of the Ch'ing government troops.[2] Afterwards we attacked the city but still could not take it. The T'ien Ch'ao troops had grain but no oil or salt.[3] THE TROOPS WERE STOUT OF HEART BUT THEIR STRENGTH WAS INSUFFICIENT.[4] Because of this, the attack on the city was not successful.

At the south gate of Ch'ang-sha the T'ien Wang had the Imperial Seal made and was acclaimed Emperor; his wife was acclaimed Empress and the Tung, Hsi, Nan, Pei and I Wangs were given their titles. The wangs were appointed first and the T'ien Wang was proclaimed Emperor afterwards.[5]

After the making of the seal the city was not yet taken, and it was decided to move the army,[6] intending to go by Ch'ang-te, by I-yang-hsien, along the side of Tung-t'ing Lake, with the purpose of making Honan our base.[7] At I-yang we unexpectedly seized several thousand private boats and it was decided to go down stream.[8] We passed through Lin-tzu-k'ou,[9] and leaving Tung-t'ing Lake, came to Yueh-chou and continued into Hupeh by land and water. At the capture of Yueh-chou we obtained Wu San-kuei's arms, which were loaded into boats; then we went straight to Hupeh.[10]

We took Han-yang and Hankow and besieged Wu-ch'ang.[11] We then took the city by mining [the wall].[12] At this time the Tung Wang gave the orders, while Li K'ai-fang, Lin Feng-hsiang and Lo Ta-kang commanded the troops. After a siege of more than twenty days Wu-ch'ang was taken, but it was not held.[13] [The

army went] straight to Yang-lo, took Huang-chou, Ch'i-shui, Ch'i-chou, Chiu-chiang and An-ch'ing.[1] This was all done by a simultaneous advance by water and on land.[2]

At this time Hu I-huang, Li K'ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang commanded the troops of the land route. The Tung, Pei and I Wangs, with the T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang, Lo Ta-kang, Lai Han-ying[3] and others, were in command of the armies on the water.

We took An-ch'ing but did not hold it. We hastened down river and surrounded Chiang-nan [Nanking], attacked the city for seven days and took it by mining [the wall] and breaking in at the I-feng Gate.[4] In the river there were more than ten thousand boats loaded with grain and other things.

At this time the T'ien Wang and the Tung Wang still intended to detail troops to hold Chiang-nan, THE T'IEN WANG wanting to go on to Honan, to take Honan as our territory. But an old Hunan boatman loudly raised his voice and personally petitioned the Tung Wang not to go to Honan, saying, "In Honan the rivers are small and there is little grain; if the enemy surround us we will not be able to survive. Having taken Chiang-nan we have the strategic advantage of the Yangtse, and we have myriads of
11 boats; why go to Honan? Nanking is the home of emperors, the wall is high and the moat deep, the people are rich and there is a superabundance of everything. You have not yet established your capital, then why go to Honan? Although Honan is the centre of the country, there are many strategic advantages too, it is not to be compared with Chiang-nan. I beg the Tung Wang to consider this." The Tung Wang reconsidered the matter in the light of this old boatman's words, and we did not go [to Honan]. This boatman was the man who piloted the Tung Wang's boat. He was convinced by this boatman and changed [his plans] accordingly; so in the end we did not go [to Honan].[5] Instead the T'ien Wang was carried into Nanking,[6] and its name was changed to T'ien-ching.

Armies were set up and the military regulations put in order. The Tung Wang was in charge of the government and everything was strictly regulated. Laws were promulgated and the people pacified.[1] In the city of Chiang-nan [Nanking] men and women were separated, the men into the men's section and the women into the women's section.[2] The various trades were also formed into sections.[3] Those who wished to join the army could do so, those who did not could [return] home.[4] People leaving the city were allowed to carry [things] in their hands, but were not permitted to use carrying poles,[5] WOMEN ALSO.[6] Men and women were not allowed to speak to each other; mothers and children were not allowed to talk together. It was very strict and won the people's respect.

A strict command was issued for the pacification of the people, in EVERY FAMILY BEING PACIFIED, every area being pacified, [that if anyone] whether officer or soldier, dared to enter people's homes WITHOUT ORDER he would be punished without
12 mercy. THOSE WHO STEPPED WITH THE LEFT FOOT OVER THE THRESHOLD OF A PRIVATE HOUSE WOULD HAVE THE LEFT FOOT CUT OFF, THOSE WHO STEPPED OVER THE THRESHOLD OF A PRIVATE HOUSE WITH THE RIGHT FOOT WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT FOOT CUT OFF. The laws were strict, therefore in the year Kuei Ch'ou [1853] we were everywhere victorious and the people were well-disposed to us.

The Tung Wang's discipline was strict and respected by soldiers and people. The Tung Wang himself was overbearing and ruthless. He was the first man in the whole state. Wei Ch'ang-hui, Shih Ta-k'ai and Ch'in Jih-ch'ang had been very intimate at home, planning the rising, and when the Tung Wang became too domineering these men nurtured a grudge against him; they obeyed with their tongues but their hearts were [enraged][7] NOT APPEASED. SMALL GRUDGES MULTIPLIED AND GREW INTO A DISASTER; THEIR GRUDGES ACCUMULATED AND THE ENMITY BECAME DEEP. THE TUNG,

PEI AND I WANGS WERE NOT ON GOOD TERMS. The Pei Wang and the I Wang were united by their hatred of the Tung Wang.

Then the Tung Wang was killed by the Pei Wang. Originally the Pei Wang and the I Wang had secretly decided to kill only the Tung Wang, because the T'ien Wang had great faith in him and had delegated too much power to him, and he demanded that the T'ien Wang accord him the title of 'wan sui.'[1] At that time all the power was in the hands of the Tung Wang and he [the T'ien Wang] had no choice but to acclaim him ['wan sui']. He forced the T'ien Wang to come in person to his palace to acclaim him 'wan sui'. The Pei Wang and the I Wang would not accept this. THERE WAS TO BE NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRINCE AND MINISTER; THE TUNG WANG WANTED TO BE SUPREME. THEN THE PEI AND I WANGS PLOTTED TO KILL THE TUNG WANG. THE PEI WANG AND THE I WANG secretly planned to kill the Tung Wang, and to kill his three brothers,
13 THAT IS, YUAN-CH'ING AND FU-CH'ING;[2] but apart from them, few others were to be killed. Then, after the Pei Wang killed the Tung Wang, he killed all the Tung Wang's relatives and all his staff, civil and military, young and old, men and women - all were wiped out. Because of this the I Wang was angry with him. The I Wang was at Hung-shan in Hupeh when he heard that many people had been killed in the capital. From his camp at Hung-shan in Hupeh he hastened back to the capital with Tseng Chin-lien and Chang Sui-mo, intending to stop the killing. To his surprise the Pei Wang had evil intentions and wanted to kill the I Wang as well. When the I Wang heard about this he escaped over the city wall by the small south gate and went off. He went to An-ch'ing to plan his revenge. At this time the Pei Wang killed the whole of the I Wang's family.[4] The army at

(THE NAME OF THE CH'ING OFFICER WHO BESIEGED NING-KUO WAS CHOU; I DO NOT KNOW HIS GIVEN NAME. THIS MAN WAS LATER KILLED WITH (sic) LI SHIH-HSIEN IN BATTLE AT WAN-CH'IH, WU-HU).[3]

Hung-shan was brought to the relief of Ning-kuo.

In the capital the Pei Wang was killing civilians and military, old and young, men and women, without distinction. This became unbearable; everyone inside [the capital] and out, and the whole court, were agreed, so the Pei Wang was killed and the people's minds were set at ease.[1]

Later the Pei Wang's head was sent to Ning-kuo so that the I Wang could see for himself that there was no mistake. Then the I Wang returned to the capital. The whole court wanted him to take over the government and the people welcomed this;[2] but the Sovereign was not pleased and would only employ the An Wang and the Fu Wang. The An Wang was the Sovereign's eldest brother Hung Jen-fa and the Fu Wang was his second brother Hung Jen-ta.
14 The people at court were very displeased at the Sovereign for using these two men. They had neither ability nor foresight; but they were versed in the Heavenly Doctrines and in no way disagreed with the T'ien Wang's ideas. The I Wang was obstructed by them, and because of this there was ill-feeling between the I Wang and the An and Fu Wangs. Their suspicions and obstruction forced him to leave the capital. It was because of this that he then went on a long expedition and did not return to the capital.[3]

I have already recorded how the T'ien Wang started the rising, and the former position of the Tung Wang Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, the Nan Wang Feng Yun-shan, the Pei Wang Wei Ch'ang-hui, the I Wang Shih Ta-k'ai, the T'ien-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Ch'in Jih-ch'ang, the Ti-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Li K'ai-fang, the T'ien-kuan-fu-ch'eng-hsiang Lin Feng-hsiang, the Tung-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Lo Ta-kang and the Hsia-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Lai Han-ying. [I have spoken about] the T'ien Wang's origins,[4] of the way in which the Tung, Hsi, Nan, Pei and I Wangs planned together and started the rising and how these people later killed

each other, which was the source of disorder. This has been clearly recorded.

I have already [sic] clearly related all the facts about how Li Hsiu-ch'eng became an officer of the T'ien Ch'ao and the campaigns which he undertook every year under orders, without concealing anything. I RESPECTFULLY PRESENT EVERYTHING IN DETAIL FOR THE INSPECTION OF THE GRAND SECRETARY, SO THAT HE MAY IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTAND AND THERE BE NO QUESTION OF ERROR.[1]

I was born at Hsin-wang-ts'un in Ch'ang-kung-li in the 57th sub-district of Ning-feng-hsiang, in T'eng-hsien, Wu-chou Prefecture, Kwangsi.[2] My father, Li Shih-kao, HAD ONLY TWO OFFSPRING, LI HSIU-CH'ENG AND MY YOUNGER BROTHER LI MING-CH'ENG.[3] My mother's name was Lu. MY FAMILY WAS POOR AND HAD NOT ENOUGH TO EAT. WE MADE A LIVING TILLING THE LAND AND CULTIVATING MOUNTAIN [slopes][4] AND HIRING OUT AS LABOURERS,[5] KEEPING TO OUR STATION AND ACCEPTING OUR POVERTY. AT THE AGE OF EIGHT, NINE AND TEN I STUDIED WITH MY UNCLE, BUT MY FAMILY WAS POOR AND I COULD NOT STUDY LONGER.[6] BUT I USED TO WORK AS A LABOURER IN THE SCHOOLS AND KNEW THEM ALL WELL. WHEN I JOINED THE T'IEN CH'AO I BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH HEAVENLY WRITINGS, THANKS TO MY TEACHER. I WILL SAY NO MORE ABOUT THIS.

(I BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH HEAVENLY WRITINGS AT HANG-CHOU, BEHIND THE HILLS AT WEST LAKE, WHERE THERE WAS A TEACHER MORE THAN NINETY YEARS OLD, WHO TAUGHT ME FOR SEVEN DAYS AND SEVEN NIGHTS. AFTERWARDS THIS MAN WENT AWAY WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING AND I COULD FIND NO TRACE OF HIM. NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND CANNOT AVOID MY DESTINY I SPEAK OF THIS).[7]

WHEN I WAS YOUNG AT HOME, IN THE 26TH, 27TH AND 28TH YEARS OF TAO KUANG [1846-8], THE T'IEN WANG CAME FROM HUA-HSIEN IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE TO P'ING-NAN, WU-CHOU, WU-HSÜAN AND OTHER HSIEN IN KWANGSI, AND WAS EXHORTING

PEOPLE TO WORSHIP GOD. I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OF THIS.

AFTER PEOPLE JOINED THE GOD-WORSHIPPERS, REBEL RISINGS FLARED UP EVERYWHERE IN KWANGSI.[1] EVERY YEAR BANDITRY SPREAD;[2] BANDIT CHIEFS APPEARED: CH'EN YA-KUEI, CHANG CHIA-HSIANG,[3] TA-T'OU-YANG,[4] SHAN-CHU-CHIEN,[5] LO-MI-SSU AND LIU SSU.[6] THESE BANDIT CHIEFS CARRIED ON THEIR EVIL DEPREDATIONS YEAR AFTER YEAR, ROBBING PAWNSHOPS AND INCESSANTLY RAIDING TOWNS.[7] THE VILLAGERS WERE USED TO SEEING BANDS AND HAD CEASED TO BE AFRAID, SO WHEN THEY SAW THE TROOPS OF THE GOD-WORSHIPPERS ARRIVE THE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY DID NOT FLEE ELSEWHERE. BECAUSE OF THIS THEY WERE
16 OPPRESSED BY THE MILITIA AND THEREFORE JOINED US IN BEWILDERMENT.

All the way from Kwangsi I was an ordinary soldier; I had no hand in internal administration at this time. After the taking of Nanking I had an administrative position under the Ch'un-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Hu I-huang.[8] Then the Tung Wang gave an order that from each ya[9] an officer be appointed to take charge of new recruits. The Tung Wang appointed me to the post of Commandant of the 4th REAR Army of the Right, commanding a new ying to hold the T'ai-p'ing Gate.[10] This was in the year Kuei Ch'ou [1853].

In the 8th Month of the same year I was appointed Chien-chün[11] of the 4th Army of the Rear to garrison Kao-ch'iao, outside the I-feng Gate.[12] In the 10th Month I went with the I Wang to An-ch'ing to pacify the people.[13] At this time my position was low and I merely did what I was told.

IN THE ARMY I WAS DILIGENT AT STUDY AND PRACTICE, CORRECT IN MY BEHAVIOUR AND DID NOT SHIRK HARD WORK, SO ALL MY SUPERIORS LIKED ME. I NEVER REFUSED WORK, EITHER LIGHT OR HARD. IN ANHWEI I WAS SUPERVISING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND WAS ALSO IN COMMAND OF TROOPS CONSTRUCTING DEFENCES. I PUT MY HEART INTO EVERYTHING.

Then Ch'un-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Hu I-huang led troops to take

Lu-chou-fu.[1] After the prefecture had been taken, a despatch arrived [transfering me][2] to garrison Lu-chou-fu and pacify the people.[3] This was in the 4th Year [1854]. At this time I was appointed to a position of command. AT THIS TIME MY RANK WAS LOW AND I HAD LITTLE RESPONSIBILITY.

(WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THIS I WILL LEAVE FOR THE MOMENT AND RELATE THE AFFAIR OF THE I WANG AND THE AN AND FU WANGS; I WILL CONTINUE SPEAKING ABOUT THIS LATER). 17

The I Wang had quarrelled with the An and Fu Wangs and had gone elsewhere.[4] The Tung and Pei Wangs were dead and Ch'in Jih-ch'ang, because of the mutual slaughter of Wei Ch'ang-hui and the Tung Wang, was also killed. CH'IN JIH-CH'ANG IS THE SAME AS CH'IN JIH-KANG.[5] Because there was a shortage of men in the state [administration], the court ministers selected 18th Chih-hui Ch'en Yü-ch'eng,[6] 20th Chih-hui Li Hsiu-ch'eng, the Ts'an-t'ien-an Meng Te-en,[7] and the Shih-t'ien-fu Li Shih-hsien[8] to help [in the administration of] the Kingdom.[9]

At this time the I Wang left An-ch'ing to go far away.[10] Fortunately I enlisted the troops of Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te-shu, who claimed to have an army of a million.[11] Consequently the T'ien Wang issued a decree and promoted me to Ti-kuan-fu-ch'eng-hsiang, to garrison T'ung-ch'eng and protect An-ch'ing.

Because of the ill-feeling between him and the An and Fu Wangs, the I Wang left the capital and went away and the morale of the soldiers and people was damaged.[12]

Lu-chou was taken by General Ho [Ch'un] of the Ch'ing and the whole garrison was wiped out.[13] Then General Ho himself came down to Chen-chiang and with Chang Kuo-liang attacked Chen-chiang,[14] sending part of his army to attack T'ung-ch'eng-hsien, led by the Ch'ing Provincial Commander Ch'in Chiu-t'ai, to mount the siege.[15] There were more than a hundred stockades of various

sizes under the Ch'ing commander, at San-ho, Shu-ch'eng, Liu-an, Lu-chiang, Ch'ao-hsien, Wu-wei and other hsien in the Lu-[chou] prefecture, all joined up in a tight ring.[1] At the time of the
18 siege of T'ung-ch'eng I was a ch'eng-hsiang. I HAD ONLY SIX OR SEVEN THOUSAND TROOPS WHO, WEAK AND USELESS, HAD BEEN LEFT BEHIND FOR ME WHEN THE I WANG RAN OFF AND ENTICED THE TROOPS TO GO WITH HIM.[2] We fought hard at T'ung-ch'eng in order to protect An-ch'ing. At this time Chang Lo-hsieng and Kung Te-shu had already rebelled at San-ho-chien.[3] Li Chao-shou was then serving in my force; he was in contact with Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te-shu and sent a special letter asking Chang Lo-hsing to come over. Chang Lo-hsing on receiving the letter immediately replied that he was willing to come over.[4] Then we fought with even greater determination at T'ung-ch'eng. EVERY DAY THERE WAS AN ENGAGEMENT AND THERE WAS CEASELESS FIRING. MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND CH'ING TROOPS DID BATTLE WITH US EVERY DAY. THE T'IEN CH'AO HAD LESS THAN THREE THOUSAND TROOPS. THE ENEMY HAD MORE THAN A HUNDRED STOCKADES; WE HAD ONLY THE ISOLATED CITY WITH THREE STOCKADES OUTSIDE IT. WE FOUGHT AND RESISTED WITH DETERMINATION IN ORDER TO DEFEND T'UNG-CH'ENG. That An-ch'ing was secured was due to my fighting.

(AS REGARDS CHANG LO-HSING, I HAVE SAID SOMETHING EARLIER, AND NOW ADD A LITTLE SO AS TO MAKE HIS HISTORY CLEAR. THAT IS WHY I REVERT TO HIM).

Then, seeing that the situation was not good after the I Wang had left the capital, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was given command of the troops which were attacking Ning-kuo.[5]

At home Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was a good friend of mine; our homes
19 were not far apart and we had long been intimate. On joining the T'ien Ch'ao we became even closer friends. At that time I sent a special messenger to Ning-kuo to ask help of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng. He

(I HAVE MENTIONED ABOVE THAT

THE SIEGE OF NING-KUO HAD NOT BEEN LIFTED).

immediately agreed to my request, although the siege of Ning-kuo had not been lifted, and detailed forces to come to the relief of T'ung-ch'eng.[1] The troops crossed the [Yangtse] river at Ts'ung-yang[2] and assembled.[3] I myself went with a cavalry escort to Ts'ung-yang, drew a plan for the attack and discussed all the details with the Ch'eng-t'ien-yü [Ch'en Yü-ch'eng].[4] The enemy troops at T'ung-ch'eng had calculated that we were sure to make a direct attack, so the Ch'ing commanders prepared a frontal defence.[5] I and the Ch'eng-t'ien-yü planned to send out special troops. I went back to T'ung-ch'eng and carefully prepared a force to fight the enemy. In the meantime the Ch'eng-t'ien-yü's picked troops advanced victoriously from Ts'ung-yang,[6] took Wu-wei-chou,[7] and went on to T'ang-t'ou-chen,[8] (THIS IS THE T'ANG-T'OU OF WU-WEI, NOT THE T'ANG-T'OU OF CHEN-CHIANG).[9] and Yun-ts'ao and joined up with the troops of the Ya-t'ien-hou Ch'en Shih-chang,[10] and fiercely attacked the Ch'ing stockades at T'ang-t'ou. AFTER TAKING THEM they went by the Huang-lo River to take Ta-kuan and Ch'ao-hsien.[11] Troops were detailed to hold it AND THE ARMY WAS MOVED. The Ch'eng-t'ien-yü took infantry and cavalry up to attack Lu-chiang and again took Lu-chou. Troops were sent to hold Lu-chiang and the army was brought on to Chieh-ho and attacked Ta-kuan.[13] After surrounding T'ung-ch'eng we cut the supply lines of the Ch'ing army.[14] The countryside around T'ung-ch'eng consists of high mountains on one side and a plain on the other. After the Ch'ing army's communications were cut the Ch'eng-t'ien-yü surrounded them from outside, while I led

I DO NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE CH'ING COMMANDER OF THE REGION FROM WU-WEI, T'ANG-T'OU TO CH'AO-HSIEN.[12] THIS WAS CH'EN YÜ-CH'ENG'S AFFAIR - I WAS IN T'UNG-CH'ENG.

troops to break out from the town. The two forces meeting, the Ch'ing army was severely defeated.[1] We divided into three columns to give chase and took Shu-ch'eng and Liu-an.[2] In these two places several tens of thousands of people gave us their allegiance.[3]

After passing Liu-an we went towards San-ho-chien to enlist Chang Lo-hsing, who unexpectedly sent Kung Te-shu and Su Lao-t'ien to meet us half way.[4] We immediately decided to take Ho-ch'iu-hsien, and after taking the town, handed it over to Chang Lo-hsing as his domain.[5] In the meantime the Ch'eng-t'ien-yü took troops and seized Cheng-yang-kuan, attacked Shou-chou, but failed to take it.[6] So he withdrew and went straight to Huang[-mei] and Su[-sung],[7] where he came up against General Tseng [Kuo-fan] and did battle with the Ch'ing commander Li Hsü-pin.[8] After suffering a setback at Sung-tzu-p'ai, [his] battles with the Ch'ing troops were indecisive.[9]

(AT THIS TIME THE CH'ENG-T'IEN-YÜ WAS TUNG-KUAN-CH'ENG-HSIANG, AND I WAS APPOINTED TI-KUAN-CH'ENG-HSIANG WITH THE RANK OF HO-T'IEN-HOU).[10] IN ORDER THAT THERE BE NO CONFUSION I RECORD THIS HERE, SO THAT IT MAY BE MADE CLEAR.

At this time there was no one in charge at court; in the field there were no capable commanders. Both the Ch'eng-t'ien-yü and I had troops, so we were appointed by the court to command the troops in the field. Later, when they saw that my cousin Li Shih-hsien was young, bold and determined, he also was appointed. The Kingdom thus obtained a commander. Shih-hsien was [appointed] later. Meng Te-en had
21 long been at court; he was a favourite minister of the T'ien Wang and never left the capital. He was later made Cheng-chang-shuai-ta-ch'en,[11] in control of all matters inside and outside of the capital. Even Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and I were under his command.

After the I Wang left the capital, after the killing of the Tung Wang and the Pei Wang, the administration was in the hands of Meng Te-en; morale fell and there was no unified policy, each went his own way. The Sovereign did not place complete confidence in anyone. He had been frightened by [the affair of] the Tung, Pei and I Wangs. He dared not trust other ministers, but placed all his trust in members of his own clan.

At this time all wanted to disperse, but no one dared to do so because they had heard that all Kwangsi men captured by the Ch'ing armies were killed without mercy. For this reason we remained united and did not disperse. If the Ch'ing government had been willing to spare Kwangsi men in the early days, there would long since have been a break-up. Someone reported to the T'ien Wang AND HE KNEW ABOUT THIS MATTER [1] that everyone wanted to disperse, and he increasingly bestowed favours so that all were encouraged and united. This one encouragement was enough to keep people steady for several years.

(THE T'IEN WANG'S APPOINTMENT OF MANY WANGS STARTED FROM THIS TIME. IT WAS TO REWARD PEOPLE FOR PLUCKING UP THEIR COURAGE).[2]

At this time Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was encamped at T'ai-hu and Ch'ien-shan and I was at Liu-an and Ho-shan. I went with a cavalry escort to An-ch'ing for a meeting with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng to discuss how to put an end to the disorders in the government. Just at this time, AT THE TIME OF THE MEETING, the T'ien Wang promoted me and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng. He was appointed Yu-cheng-chang-
22 shuai, still having the real rank of Ch'eng-t'ien-yü; at that time I was Ho-t'ien-hou and was made Fu-chang-shuai, with a military command. I started off as a soldier and [now] had heavy responsibilities. Seeing that the Kingdom was in disorder and the Sovereign was discredited, I did my duty as a minister and memorialised, urging my Sovereign to select and

employ men of ability, to establish a system for relieving the people, to promulgate strict laws, to respect the principles of the Kingdom, to [give] just rewards and punishments, to adhere to the ancient system and [govern] everywhere with benevolence. I begged the Sovereign to observe the proper principles and assist the people; to be lenient in punishments and liberal in all things; to reduce the grain tax on the people, to employ the I Wang again and not the An and Fu Wangs.

Because of this admonitary memorial the Sovereign issued a decree depriving me of my title. Again I submitted a document exposing the state of the empire and relating the facts about the admonitary memorial. This document passed through the hands of a court official who saw that what I said was reasonable and therefore himself presented an admonitary memorial at the palace, and my rank was restored to me.

At that time General Ho [Ch'un] was besieging Chen-chiang, and its communications were cut.[1] There was no grain in the town and no relief came from outside. The I Wang had gone off and at that time there were no outstanding men in the government. Only Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and I had great forces. Therefore I WAS PUT FORWARD and sent to the relief of Chen-chiang. I hurried up to Liu-an from An-ch'ing and the whole army was brought down to rescue the troops from Chen-chiang. The town of Chen-chiang was then lost.

23 At this time the two Ch'ing generals, Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang], led their troops to attack Chü-jung. The T'ien Ch'ao garrison commander at Chü-jung was Chou Sheng-fu, who had the hereditary rank of Hsia-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang. After several months of fighting, the town of Chü-jung was taken by Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]'s troops,

CHOU SHENG-FU, GARRISON COMMANDER of CHÜ-JUNG, WAS THE ELDER BROTHER OF CHOU SHENG-K'UN, WHO WAS KILLED WHEN HIS STOCKADE AT T'ANG-T'OU

WAS TAKEN BY CHANG KUO-LIANG.[1] CHOU SHENG-FU INHERITED HIS RANK AND TOOK OVER THE GARRISON AT CHÜ-JUNG. THESE ARE THE FACTS ABOUT HIM.

after which they came to besiege T'ien-ching. This was the second siege of T'ien-ching. I leave this matter now and relate General Hsiang [Jung]'s first siege of T'ien-ching.

At the first siege of T'ien-ching,[2] Generals Hsiang [Jung] and Chang Kuo-liang commanded several thousand Manchu soldiers and twenty or thirty thousand Han troops.[3] They fortified positions from Hsiao-ling-wei to this side of the tomb of Chu Hung-wu,[4] and to the southeast as far as Ch'i-weng-ch'iao.[5] When General Hsiang [Jung] was laying siege to T'ien-ching, Chen-chiang was being besieged at the same time.[6] The Ch'ing general attacking Chen-chiang was called Chi[-erh-hang-ah], a Manchu.[7] His stockades were in the Chiu-hua-shan, Tang-t'u, Chin-shan region.[8] I do not know the name of the Ch'ing commander at I-cheng. The T'ien Ch'ao commander at Chen-chiang was Wu Ju-hsiao. THE COMMAND OF ALL THE TROOPS IN THE I-CHENG AND CHEN-CHIANG REGION ALL CAME UNDER THE COMMAND OF WU JU-HSIAO.

(ON SECOND THOUGHTS, THE COMMANDER HOLDING T'U-CH'IAO AND SAN-CHA-HO[9] WAS A CH'ING COMMANDER CALLED TE).[10]

At that time I was still[11] Ti-kuan-fu-ch'eng-hsiang, and I went to the relief of Chen-chiang together with Tung-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, Ch'un-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang T'u Chen-hsing, Hsia-kuan-fu-ch'eng-hsiang Ch'en Shih-chang, (THE CH'EN SHIH-CHANG WHO WAS LATER PIEN-T'IEN-HOU)[12] and Hsia-yu-cheng-ch'eng-hsiang Chou Sheng-k'un. This was the relief army for the first siege.[13]

24 We entered T'ang-t'ou[14] in Chen-chiang [Prefecture] and fought for several days indecisively against Chang Kuo-liang.[15] Then from Chiu-hua-shan the Ch'ing commander Chi-[erh-hang-ah]

sent troops to help Chang Kuo-liang. We also selected our best troops and the two sides met in a great battle at T'ang-t'ou.[1] But neither side could make any progress. We wanted to relieve Chen-chiang, but could not do so, nor could Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang] defeat us; the two sides were encamped in stockades facing each other, not giving battle but talking.[2] WE WANTED TO RELIEVE CHEN-CHIANG BUT COULD NOT.

I discussed with the other Ch'eng-hsiang and the Ch'eng-hsiang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was sent in a small boat to dash down river to Chen-chiang.[3] The river was entirely under the control of the Ch'ing gunboats, and though[4] [the control] was tight, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng braved death and made a dash to Chen-chiang. There he and Wu Ju-hsiao made their plans and selected troops to make a break out, while I commanded a force to fight its way in from the outside.

Meanwhile we had discovered that at T'ang-t'ou there was a small river which branched off the great [Yangtse] river and led to the hills.[5] The Ch'ing troops had stockades along this river, [protected] on one side by the hills and on the other side by the river, so that approach from either side was difficult. Our troops went down to T'ang-t'ou by way of the T'ang-shui-shan-pien, keeping close to the river, to a place where it was difficult for either side to advance. The Ch'ing detachments were then all moved to T'ang-shui-shan-pien to block our advance.[6] Chen-chiang was not destined to be lost this time.
25 Wu Ju-hsiao and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had already broken out. I was on a hill watching, and saw infantry and cavalry come out of Chen-[chiang]. I COULD SEE THE FLAGS CLEARLY AND KNEW THEY WERE OUR TROOPS. That evening I personally selected three thousand of the best soldiers and led them myself by way of THE PLACE WHERE BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN BALKED, WHERE THE CH'ING TROOPS HAD BLOCKED OUR ADVANCE ALONG THE T'ANG RIVER. THERE WERE NO TROOPS

DEFENDING THIS PLACE, WHICH IS CALLED T'ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho. WE CAME BY THIS WAY AND repaired and occupied the former Ch'ing stockades.[1] When it was light, Ch'eng-hsiangs Ch'en Shih-chang, T'u Chen-hsing and Chou Sheng-k'un, who had been camped at T'ang-shui-shan-pien, came out and fought with Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang], who did not know that I had made a surprise raid with special troops across by way of T'ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho. Only at noon did they receive news that I had surprised them in the rear. T'ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho is about twenty li from T'ang-shui-shan-pien.[2] By that time Wu Ju-hsiao and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's troops had also arrived from Chen-chiang, and we met. We were wild with joy, and the troops from inside and outside [the city] joined up as one and with renewed valour engaged Generals Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang]. The following day,[3] when the armies met, Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang] were defeated and lost sixteen stockades. The same day we withdrew and went down to Chen-chiang and camped at the foot of Chin-shan, Chin-chi-ling and at the foot of Chiu-hua-shan, opposite the Headquarters of General Chi-[erh-hang-ah]. He was prepared
26 for our attack and his Headquarters was closely defended at all points. Then during the night we assembled all the boats of Chen-chiang and throughout the night crossed from Chin-shan to Kua-chou.[4]

At dawn the following day I led troops, and with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, T'u Chen-hsing, Ch'en Shih-chang and Wu Ju-hsiao, fiercely attacked T'u-ch'iao and broke into the Ch'ing cavalry camp there. The Ch'ing army was badly defeated and their emplacements at Hung-ch'iao, Pu-shu-wan,[5] and San-ch'a-ho were all destroyed - a hundred and twenty Ch'ing stockades of all sizes. IN THE CH'ING CAMPS AT THAT TIME[6] they heard the news and fled.[7] Then we took Yang-chou, and afterwards transported grain and fodder from the Yang-chou region to Chen-chiang.[8] I DO NOT KNOW THE NAME OF

THE CH'ING COMMANDER AT T'U-CH'IAO - IT IS A LONG TIME AGO.

[Our] commanders at T'ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho and T'ang-shui-shan-pien then came down together to Chen-chiang and crossed over to Yang-chou, leaving only Hsia-yu-cheng-ch'eng-hsiang Chou Sheng-k'un and his troops to hold the former stockades of Chang [Kuo-liang] and Chi-[erh-hangah], with the purpose of protecting our rear.

After taking T'u-ch'iao and capturing Yang-chou, we took supplies back to Chen-chiang. When this was finished we wanted to take our armies back to the capital. Hsia-kuan-yu-cheng-ch'eng-hsiang Chou Sheng-k'un was holding T'ang-t'ou with six of the former stockades of Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang]. After I and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, T'u Chen-hsing and Ch'en Shih-chang had taken T'u-ch'iao, these six stockades held by Chou Sheng-k'un, were again taken by Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang], after the defeat of Chou Sheng-k'un's troops.[1] Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang] strongly
27 fortified, strengthened and repaired them, and cut off our return to the capital.[2]

At this time there was no alternative but for the whole army to leave Yang-chou and I-cheng and make for Liu-ho-hsien, hoping to reach T'ien-ching by way of P'u-k'ou.[3] When Chang Kuo-liang got news of this he took troops to Liu-ho to defend it,[4] and again we were prevented from getting back [to the capital]. There was no choice but for all of us to fight our way resolutely, cross the river at Chin-shan and return [that way].[5]

On arriving at Chin-shan WE COMPLETED THE RE-GROUPING.[6] At that time Chang Kuo-liang had not returned from Liu-ho.[7] We immediately launched an attack on Kao-tzu.[8] ON THIS DAY WE TOOK SEVEN CH'ING STOCKADES; THE REMAINING FOUR BIG STOCKADES WE DID NOT HAVE TIME TO TAKE. General Chi-[erh-hang-ah] came

came from Chiu-hua-shan with relief FOR THESE STOCKADES, but he was immediately driven by our troops into the Kao-tzu hills. GENERAL CHI RAN OFF THAT NIGHT AND ENTERED HIS STOCKADE AT KAO-TZU, WHICH WAS THEN SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES BY OUR TROOPS, SO THAT IT WAS CUT OFF. General Chi-[erh-hang-ah] pointed a foreign pistol at his heart and killed himself.[1]

When the Ch'ing soldiers saw that the commander had killed himself, there was chaos, AND THESE UNITS LOST THE INITIATIVE TO THE T'IEN-CH'AO COMMANDER. As soon as it became known that the Ch'ing general Chi-[erh-hang-ah] was dead and his troops without
28 a commander, the garrison was at once moved down from Chiu-hua-shan. The following morning the whole army collected at the foot of Chiu-hua-shan. Seventy or eighty stockades of General Chi-[erh-hang-ah]'s troops were without a commander and his army fell into disorder and fled without fighting.[2]

After the collapse of Chi-[erh-hang-ah]'s army, Chang Kuo-liang hastened from Liu-ho, but it was too late to save them.[3] His troops took up positions at Tan-t'u-chen, and our victorious army was then moved to Tan-t'u to do battle with Chang Kuo-liang.[4] WE FOUGHT FROM MORNING TO MID-DAY WITHOUT A DECISION. AT THE CHIA HOUR [3-5 p.m.] the garrison commander of Chen-chiang, Wu Ju-hsiao, led about a thousand men to our assistance.[5] After defeating Chang Kuo-liang's cavalry, the infantry advanced and Chang's troops were badly beaten.

Early the following morning we set out for the capital. The old Ch'ing garrison at T'ang-t'ou fled when they saw that the camp at Chiu-hua-shan was lost. Then our T'ien Ch'ao troops went straight back to the capital.[6]

The Tung Wang gave an order that we were to smash General Hsiang [Jung]'s army at Hsiao-ling-wei, before we would be allowed to enter the city.[7] Our army, which had been victorious at Chen-chiang was obliged to halt at Yen-tzu-chi, and on the

following day we took up positions there; we were forced to and there was nothing we could do; but the officers and men were cursing angrily.

Then I went myself with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, T'u Chen-hsing and
29 Ch'en Shih-chang into the capital to discuss with the Tung Wang, explaining that we were unwilling to attack General Hsiang [Jung]'s Headquarters. WE REPORTED THAT Hsiang's Headquarters had long been strongly intrenched there and could not be taken in a quick battle. The Tung Wang was full of righteous anger [and said] that those who did not obey orders would be executed; therefore we did not press our case and went into action.[1]

The following day we began the attack,[2] and from Yen-tzu-chi took up positions in four stockades at Yao-hua-men.[3] The Ch'ing commander of Yao-hua-men had been sent by General Hsiang [Jung] to hold it. I began my [line of] emplacements from here. The following day Chang Kuo-liang, who had already returned to Hsiao-ling-wei from Tan-t'u,[4] led his troops into battle against us in the early morning. FROM THE CH'EN HOUR [7-9 am.] TO THE SSU HOUR [9-11 am.] THE TWO SIDES WERE FIGHTING AND Chang's troops were defeated. THE T'IEN CH'AO TROOPS FOLLOWED UP AND GAVE CHASE. THE SAME DAY, CHANG'S TROOPS returned again to Hsiao-ling-wei. We launched an attack and besieged the Ch'ing stockades at Yao-hua-men.

The following day Chang Kuo-liang came on again with cavalry and infantry. THE TWO SIDES TOOK UP POSITIONS AND ENGAGED,[5] DISPLAYED THEIR FLAGS AND GAVE BATTLE. OUR INFANTRY WAS FIGHTING HAN TROOPS AND OUR CAVALRY FIGHTING MANCHUS. WE FOUGHT FROM THE CH'EN HOUR UNTIL THE WU HOUR [11 am. - 1 pm.] WHEN the I Wang arrived with Tseng Chin-lien, Chang Shui-mo,[6] and their troops to reinforce us.[7] On the Ch'ing side, the Manchu cavalry were first defeated, and after this the Han troops commanded by Hsiang and Chang were also defeated. On this day Hsiang and Chang were unable

to relieve Yao-hua-men, and their troops were defeated, after
30 which we gave chase from all sides. We defeated more than twenty Manchu and Han stockades at Hsiao-ling-wei, LEAVING[1] ONLY SOME OF GENERAL HSIANG [Jung]'S STOCKADES ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT. CHANG KUO-LIANG WAS INTRENCHED AT CH'I-WENG-CH'IAO; HERE ALSO THERE REMAINED ONLY A FEW[2] STOCKADES ON THE FLANKS. That night Hsiang and Chang withdrew and our T'ien Ch'ao troops did not give chase.[3]

(THIS WAS IN THE 5TH YEAR[4] AND THE TUNG WANG HAD NOT YET BEEN KILLED). Then came an order from the Tung Wang that all weapons and supplies should be brought into the city.[5] THE TROOPS ENCAMPED TO REST FOR A FEW DAYS AND THE SOLDIERS WERE WELL REWARDED, THEN I was ordered with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, T'u Chen-hsing and Ch'en Shih-chang, to take troops and give chase by way of Chü-jung.

We took Chü-jung in passing, and went down to Tan-yang,[6] where Hsiang [Jung] and Chang[Kuo-liang] had already been been for six or seven days AND HAD FORTIFIED IT STRONGLY ON ALL SIDES. WHEN I ARRIVED WITH THE FOUR [sic] CH'ENG-HSIANG AT TAN-YANG, WE PLACED OUR STOCKADES 25 LI FROM THE WEST GATE, INTENDING TO ATTACK THE TOWN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. BUT UNEXPECTEDLY CHANG AND HSIANG'S TROOPS TOOK THE INITIATIVE THE FOLLOWING MORNING and a fierce battle was joined. On that day Chang and Hsiang's troops were defeated, returned to the town and refused to come out again and fight, but defended it with determination.[7] We attacked hard but failed to take it. The Ch'ing troops were rested and vigorous, but the T'ien Ch'ao troops had been fighting for a long time without a rest, so officers and men had little fighting spirit.[8]

31 Then Chang Kuo-liang deployed his forces to give battle. Outside the south gate of Tan-yang there was a great battle, but neither side could gain the advantage.[9]

General Hsiang [Jung] was now besieged in Tan-yang, having

lost his headquarters at Hsiao-ling-wei; the officers and men were dispirited and were now shut up in Tan-yang; so General Hsiang [Jung] killed himself.[1] Chang Kuo-liang was General Hsiang's adopted son;[2] when he saw that General Hsiang had killed himself, he roused himself to give battle again, and destroyed seven of our stockades outside the south gate, killing six or seven hundred [of our men]. The commander at the south gate, the 13th chien-tien,[3] Chou Te-hsien, was killed by a shot, and the rest fled.[4] This commander was very courageous; when the troops saw that he had been killed and that Tan-yang could not be taken, they began to waver and lost heart, There was nothing to be done, so the whole army withdrew and attacked Chin-t'an, but we were unable to take it though we attacked continually for more than twenty days.[5] Here also we were fighting against Chang Kuo-liang. ON EACH DAY OF BATTLE NEITHER SIDE HAD THE ADVANTAGE, BOTH STOOD FIRM, AND WE ATTACKED THE TOWN WITHOUT EFFECT.[6] Li Chao-shou was also present.

After failing to take the town, we withdrew the army and returned to Ting-chüeh-ts'un, 25 li from Chü-jung. It was at this
32 time that the Tung Wang was killed.[7] This was pre-ordained. If General Hsiang had not been defeated and was still encamped at Hsiao-ling-wei, he could have taken advantage of the disorders when they occurred, and the capital would not have been able to hold out for so long. It was heaven-ordained that the disorders should have occurred after General Hsiang's defeat, and not decided by man.

THE DISORDERS IN THE KINGDOM, OUR DOMESTIC TROUBLES,[8] ORIGINATED FROM THIS. DISUNITY AND IRREGULARITIES IN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION ALSO ORIGINATED FROM THIS. From the disorders of the 6th Year [1856] onwards THE SOVEREIGN USED PEOPLE WHO WERE IRRESPONSIBLE, TRUSTED THOSE WHO WERE UNTRUSTWORTHY; SLANDER AND JEALOUSY FLOURISHED, ABLE AND VIRTUOUS MEN WERE DISAPPOINTED AND

SHUNNED US; THE BRAVE AND OUTSTANDING WERE NOT PROMOTED. THE PRESENT DEFEAT IS THE RESULT. FOR A LONG TIME I WARNED[1] TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY AND SUBMITTED INNUMERABLE DOCUMENTS, BUT MY ADVICE WAS NOT HEEDED. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO ABILITY, IN MY YOUTH[2] AT HOME, I DID NOT KNOW THAT THE T'IEN WANG HAD DESIGNS ON THE EMPIRE; BUT HAVING MOUNTED[3] THE TIGER I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO FOLLOW. OF THOSE WHO JOINED FREELY, THERE WERE TENS OF THOUSANDS FROM LIANG-KWANG AND I WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE LIKE THIS. EVEN IN A VILLAGE OF TEN FAMILIES THERE ARE CERTAINLY SOME WHO ARE LOYAL;[4] AMONGST TENS OF THOUSANDS, HOW COULD THERE BE NO ONE WITH ABILITY? THEY WERE NOT ALL JUST COUNTRY BUMPKINS.

IN THIS WORLD WE DO NOT KNOW THE ARRANGEMENTS OF HEAVEN. IF ONE COULD HAVE FORE-KNOWLEDGE WHO WOULD WANT TO DISOBEY THE WILL OF HEAVEN AND REBEL AGAINST IT? WHO WOULD WILLINGLY BE EVIL, [un]RIGHTEOUS[5] AND UNFILIAL? WHO IS WILLING TO TURN HIS BACK[6] ON HIS NATIVE PLACE AND LEAVE HIS ANCESTORS, TO DEPART FROM RELATIVES AND FRIENDS, GO AWAY FROM HIS FAMILY AND LEAVE HIS HOME? THESE ARE CHANGES OF PROVIDENCE WHICH WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND. THIS IS THE FATE OF MAN. IT IS THE JUST RETRIBUTION OF HEROES
33 THAT THEY SHOULD SUFFER TRIALS AND AFFLICTIONS. IT IS HARD TO ESCAPE THE PREDESTINED FATE OF FIVE HUNDRED YEARS. THE GREAT CHANGES OF SEVERAL THOUSAND YEARS FROM CHOU TIMES TO THE PRESENT, THE CHANGES AMONGST MEN, ARE NOT UNDER OUR CONTROL.

PEOPLE FOLLOWED THE MAN CALLED HUNG AND TOOK THE SAME ROAD BECAUSE OF IGNORANCE. THEY FOLLOWED HIM BECAUSE THEY WERE CONFUSED. THE DESTRUCTION OF IMAGES WAS THE T'IEN WANG'S IDEA, AND IT WAS THEIR RETRIBUTION FOR BEING SO LONG WORSHIPPED BY MEN WITH INCENSE. IN THE CHOU DYNASTY THE EXECUTED GENERALS WERE DEIFIED: THIS WAS PRE-ORDAINED.[7] TO-DAY THE DESTRUCTION OF MANY IMAGES, REALLY EXECUTED GENERALS WHO WERE DEIFIED, IS THEIR TRANSFORMATION.

I DO NOT KNOW THE COURSE OF FATE. JUDGING[8] FROM THE FACTS,

THAT OUR T'IEN CH'AO HAS CREATED INNUMERABLE GENERALS AND THE T'IEN WANG HAS DESTROYED INNUMERABLE TEMPLES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE PRE-DESTINED TERM HAS RUN OUT AND THE KINGDOM HAS PERISHED.

FROM CHILDHOOD I UNDERSTOOD NOTHING AND JOINED BLINDLY, CAUSING THE PRESENT MISFORTUNE. I LEFT[1] MY PARENTS; MY WIFE AND CHILDREN ARE SCATTERED; YET IT IS NOT IN MY NATURE TO BE UNVIRTUOUS, UNFILIAL AND UNRIGHTEOUS.

NOW THAT THE STATE HAS FALLEN AND I AM TAKEN PRISONER, IT IS MY SINCERE DESIRE [to relate] THE HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM, CAREFULLY AND IN DETAIL FROM BEGINNING TO END, TO ARRIVE AT THE REASONS FOR ITS FAILURE. BECAUSE I SEE THAT THE GOVERNOR IS A MAN OF VIRTUE, MUCH TO BE RESPECTED, A SAVIOUR OF THE PEOPLE. I HAVE LONG KNOWN OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S PROFOUND BENEVOLENCE AND LIBERALITY, HIS TRUE HEART OF A SAVIOUR OF THE PEOPLE. WHEN HE HASTENED FROM HIS HONOURED RESIDENCE TO INTERROGATE ME, I
34 DID NOT HAVE TIME TO MAKE EVERYTHING CLEAR; SO I AM ANXIOUS TO WRITE EVERYTHING CLEARLY AND IN DETAIL FOR THE WORTHY PERUSAL OF THE GRAND SECRETARY.

FROM THE TIME WHEN OUR T'IEN WANG RAISED THE REVOLT UNTIL THE PRESENT, WHEN THE TWO SIDES ARE IN CONFLICT, EACH BELONGED TO A DIFFERENT DYNASTY. ALTHOUGH I HAD HEARD [of Tseng Kuo-fan's qualities?], THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS SEEING FOR ONESELF. NOW OUR SOVEREIGN IS DEAD AND OUR KINGDOM HAS COLLAPSED AND I HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER. I HAVE LONG KNOWN OF THE BENEVOLENCE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY, WHICH EXTENDS IN EVERY DIRECTION, HIS VIRTUOUS MIND, MUCH TO BE ADMIRED.

I WILL WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING CLEARLY BECAUSE I HAVE A ROUGH AND STRAIGHTFORWARD NATURE; THAT IS WHY I WRITE EVERYTHING DOWN CLEARLY. I DO NOT SEEK TO PLEASE MYSELF, BUT WRITE STRAIGHT FROM THE HEART. I DID NOT KNOW THAT I WOULD SPEND MY LIFE SERVING HUNG [Hsiu-ch'üan] AS MY RULER, AND I DID NOT FORESEE

THE TROUBLES OF TO-DAY. HAVING SAID THIS, I WILL SPEAK OF THE DISORDERS IN THE STATE, AND OF HOW THE PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY WERE LOST.

After the killing of the Tung Wang, the Pei Wang was also killed, after which the An Wang and the Fu Wang compelled the I Wang to flee. At this time there were troops holding San-ho, and the commander was Lan Ch'eng-ch'un.[1] Urgent appeals arrived in the capital because San-ho was under siege by Ch'ing troops from the Prefecture of Lu-[chou]. So I was sent with my own troops to relieve San-ho; but when we reached Wu-wei-chou, the garrison at San-ho had already been defeated and had withdrawn, then Lu-chiang-hsien was lost.[2]

Chang Kuo-liang's troops, who had recovered from their defeat, then attacked Chü-jung.[3] The garrison there, under Chou Sheng-fu, was defeated, and withdrew.[4] Having taken Chü-jung, the Ch'ing general continued his advance and again laid siege to Chen-chiang.[5]

NOTE THAT ABOVE [I related] THE FIRST SIEGE OF CHEN-CHIANG, THIS WAS THE SECOND SIEGE.

35 After he had besieged and taken Chen-chiang, Chang Kuo-liang with General Ho [Ch'un] again laid siege to T'ien-ching.[6] this was in the 8th Year [1858].

At that time the kingdom had no generals and the government no leaders. The I Wang had taken away all the troops of the T'ien Ch'ao. Yang Fu-ch'ing was already in Fukien,[7] Wei Chih-chün was in forced retirement,[8] Lin Shao-chang had been deprived of his rank and was doing nothing.[9] Lin Ch'i-jung was besieged in Chiu-chiang,[10] Huang Wen-chin was immobilized by Ch'ing troops at Hu-k'ou,[11] Chang Ch'ao-chüeh and Ch'en Te-ts'ai were holding An-ch'ing, isolated and with few troops.[12] Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was doing well, though his rank was low; he was in the

region of Hsiao-ku-shan and Huang-yang-chen.[1]

At that time the government was in confusion. Meng Te-en and Li Ch'un-fa alone could do nothing.[2] They were kept under the thumbs of the An Wang and the Fu Wang AND COULD DO NOTHING. This was in the 8th Year [1858]. Fortunately when Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] besieged T'ien-ching, there was sufficient grain and enough of everything, to that although there were few troops in the capital, there was more than enough to eat and they were willing to fight, and therefore it stood firm.

Chang Kuo-liang's troops were from Kwang-[tung], and although they were good, they were not so strong or so willing and conscientious as those of General Tseng [Kuo-fan]. Kwang-[tung] soldiers are brave, but they are disunited. Though they had several thousand Manchu troops [with them], they were not so tough as General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s [Hu]-nan troops. For this reason, the siege of the 8th and 9th Years [1858 & 1859] did not trouble us.

The supplies for General Ho and General Chang's armies came from Fukien, Kwangtung, Kiangsu, Hang-chou and Kiangsi. At that
36 time we still had, up-river; An-ch'ing, Wu-wei, Ch'ao-hsien, Wu-hu and the strong points at Tung-[liang-shan] and Hsi-liang-[shan].[3] We had the grain supply from Ho-chou and the crossing at Liang-p'u,[4] and though [later] Liang-p'u was taken by General Te-[hsing-ah],[5] [the region] above Ho-chou was still undisturbed.[6] The capital had enough grain and to spare, and therefore stood firm, although it was closely besieged by the three generals, Ho [Ch'un], Chang [Kuo-liang] and Te-[hsing-ah].[7]

At this time I was employed on the recommendation of a court official.[8] THE SOVEREIGN PLACED HIS TRUST IN ME AND EMPLOYED ME, AND I RESPONDED WHOLE-HEARTEDLY. IF A SOVEREIGN EMPLOYS MEN WITH CONFIDENCE, THEY STRIVE TO REPAY HIS TRUST EVEN UNTO DEATH.

AT THAT TIME my young cousin Li Shih-hsien was in command of my former troops and was fortified in strong positions at Huang-ch'ih and Wan-chih.[1]

At this time all the affairs of state were handled by me alone. The Sovereign put all his trust in me.[2] The laws were strictly enforced and therefore [the state] stood firm. When orders were given no one dared to disobey; everyone was obedient and followed my instructions.

The northeast of the city was now under siege; there only remained the south gate, which was soon to be invested too.[3] I recalled Lin Shao-chang, who had been relieved of his command,[4] to the capital, and went bond for him, after which he was made Ti-kuan-yu-fu-ch'eng-hsiang, responsible for the affairs of the capital.

It was clear that the situation was not good. In the field there were no commanders I could call upon. I had no choice but to discuss with the court ministers and suggest that I should leave, and organize relief from outside [the capital]; but the ministers all insisted that I should remain. THEN I PLANNED EVERYTHING FROM BEGINNING TO END, AND EVERYONE WAS REASSURED AND WILLING THAT I SHOULD LEAVE THE CAPITAL. SO AGAIN I PETITIONED, BUT AGAIN THE SOVEREIGN WOULD NOT CONSENT. ONCE MORE I MADE A
37 COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE CASE BUT the Sovereign still refused, AND I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO LEAVE COURT.[5] A few days later I again sounded the bell and beat the drum to announce that I had a petition to present at court. I saw that I could not succeed unless I made a forceful petition. After I had beaten the drum, the Sovereign held court and I made my request as strongly as I could. The Kingdom was not destined to perish at that time; its span was not yet accomplished. The Sovereign MOREOVER CAME TO HIS SENSES and understood and granted my request.

The following day I left court, after handing over all the

affairs of the capital to Meng Te-en, Lin Shao-chang and Li Ch'un-fa. I requested that the [T'ien Wang's] eldest brother and the second brother should not be permitted to have control. At this time it was satisfactory because [the Sovereign] was willing to trust my advice.

When I had handed over the affairs of government, I took leave of the Sovereign and left the capital by the south gate, reaching Wu-hu in a day and a night.[1] I discussed with my cousin Li Shih-hsien and decided that one of us should fight on the south bank and the other on the north bank [of the Yangtse]. The Ch'ing forces were strong at this time and there were troops everywhere; [our] morale was bad, and there was nowhere to flee to.

During this period, when I first had heavy responsibility, I did not make my plans well but acted in a confused manner. But the Kingdom was not then destined to perish, and though I acted in a confused manner, it worked; though we were disorganized, the result was not bad. That is why the Kingdom survived until now.

Wei Chih-chün and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng together advanced upon Ku-chih [sic], Shuang-ch'eng [sic] and other places.[2] The T'ien Wang wanted to punish Wei Chih-chün but I went bond for him, so
38 he was appointed Ting-t'ien-fu, [and his troops] combined with those of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng.[3] NOW WEI CHIH-CHÜN, BY SURRENDERING HIS LIFE TO THE CH'ING DYNASTY, HAS WON THE PLEASURE OF BEING ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME.[4] IN FACT IT WAS I WHO SAVED HIS LIFE, AND HIS JOY IN RETURNING HOME IS MY SORROW, FOR I CANNOT FIND A WAY OUT AND MUST DIE. WHAT MUST BE MUST BE![5]

Ch'en Yü-ch'eng wished to go to Te-an, to assemble enough troops to relieve T'ien-ching;[6] but Heaven did not permit this, for at Lo-t'ien and Ma-ch'eng he was defeated and had to withdraw to T'ai-hu, where he encamped. This was between the 5th and 6th Months of the 9th Year.[7]

After Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had gone far away, Li Shih-hsien actively held down the enemy on the south bank while I remained without a plan at Wu-hu. Then I selected five thousand picked troops from my army, some of whom crossed the river at Wu-hu and others from Hsi-liang-shan to Tung-liang-shan. After crossing the [Yangtse] River at these two points, they all assembled at Han-shan.[1]

At that time I had as commanders only Ch'en K'un-shu, Hsiao Chao-sheng, Wu Ting-ts'ai and Ch'en Ping-wen.[2] By the time we had assembled at Han-shan, Ho-chou had already fallen and more than twenty ying of Ch'ing troops were stationed there. So we had to take Chao-kuan and go down river to Ho-chou. First we smashed the Ch'ing force at Ho-ts'un-p'u and then the twenty-odd ying at Ho-chou. By the time relief came from General Te-[hsing-ah] at Liang-p'u I had already defeated the garrison at Ho-chou and it was too late to save them. THERE WERE STILL[3] TWO STONE FORTS WHICH WE HAD NOT YET TAKEN, WHICH WERE RELIEVED BY GENERAL
39 TE-[hsing-ah]'S CAVALRY AND INFANTRY, AND SEVERAL HUNDRED OF MY INFANTRY WERE KILLED. CH'EN K'UN-SHU WAS THERE.[4]

Then I took my army and occupied Ch'üan-chiao, Ch'u-chou and Lai-an,[5] in order to draw off part of General Te-[hsing-ah]'s force at P'u-k'ou. But though the towns were taken and General Te-[hsing-ah]'s force divided, I had not enough troops and could not get beyond Lai-an. Then Sheng kung-pao's cavalry attacked us and after several engagements we lost the initiative and withdrew from Lai-an to Ch'u-chou.[6]

I then left Li Chao-shou to hold Ch'u-chou.[7] When Li Chao-shou was my subordinate I treated him exceptionally well, so that when my old officers saw how well I treated him they were resentful. His troops were always giving trouble, and

(THE RUINATION OF OUR T'IEN CH'AO CAME FROM, FIRST LI CHAO-SHOU, SECONDLY THE DAMAGE FROM THE ENLISTMENT OF [CHANG]

LO-HSING,[1] THIRDLY, THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ENLISTMENT OF THAT GANG OF KWANGTUNG SOLDIERS,[2] WHICH CAUSED THE DEMORALIZATION OF OUR T'IEN CH'AO, AND THE DAMAGE DONE BY THE THREE COMMANDERS LIU, KU AND LAI, AND BY YANG FU-CH'ING.[4] WHEN ORDINARY PEOPLE WERE KILLED IT WAS BECAUSE OF THESE MEN. THE SOVEREIGN DID NOT CONCERN HIMSELF WITH STATE AFFAIRS, DID NOT ENACT STRICT LAWS, DID NOT EMPLOY INTELLIGENT AND ABLE MEN TO CARRY ON THE ADMINISTRATION, SO THAT RUIN WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THESE MEN. THOSE WHO MOLESTED THE PEOPLE WERE CH'EN K'UN-SHU AND HUNG CH'UN-YUAN.[6] CH'EN K'UN-SHU WAS ONE OF MY OFFICERS AND I GAVE HIM 100,000 TROOPS. HE WAS A BRAVE MAN, THAT IS WHY I GAVE HIM A LARGE FORCE. LATER AN EVIL MINISTER SAW THAT I HAD A GREAT MILITARY FORCE AND SECRETLY ASKED THE T'IEN WANG TO PROMOTE HIM TO HIGH RANK IN ORDER TO DIVIDE MY POWER. CONSEQUENTLY HE BECAME VERY PROUD OF HIMSELF AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT MY ORDERS. I COULD NOT CONTROL HIM AND HE MOLESTED THE PEOPLE. THAT IS THE SORT OF MAN HE WAS.[9] TO EACH PLACE ON THE SOUTH AND NORTH BANKS RUINED BY THEM, I SENT OFFICIALS TO molesting the people. When they came to towns they would extort money, and if it was refused, they would maltreat the people. Officers in every hsien [3] were beaten and insulted. After such incidents he dared not face me, so he turned traitor, and went over to the Great Ch'ing.[5] When Li Chao-shou was my subordinate and maltreated the people, or when he interfered with garrison commanders, I did not so much as remonstrate with him, even when he gave over Ch'u-chou to the Great Ch'ing, I did not censure him, but even went behind the T'ien Wang's back and got his wife out of T'ien-ching and sent her to him.[7]

Having said this, I will continue from the point where I was alone without a plan to relieve the capital. This was in the 9th Year.[8]

[Ms.p.40]

Having handed over the district of Ch'u-[chou] to Li Chao-shou, I went back to Ch'üan-chiao. I had no troops to use. The Sovereign and my mother were shut up in the capital, and I wept

PACIFY THE PEOPLE, TO GIVE THEM GRAIN AND SEEDS; I ASSEMBLED THE PEOPLE AND GAVE THEM CAPITAL IN ORDER TO SAVE THEM. THE OPPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE, THE BURNING AND KILLING, WAS DONE BY THESE MEN. FROM THE TIME OF THE RISING UNTIL THEN, THERE WAS NO MALTREATMENT OF THE PEOPLE - EVERYONE KNOWS THIS. THE OPPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE WAS DONE BY THESE MEN).[2]

day and night at Ch'üan-chiao. Though I had enlisted Chang Lo-hsing and his army, this type of man accepts honours but not orders. At that time I had only my officers Ch'en K'un-shu, Wu Ting-ts'ai, Hsiao Chao-sheng, T'an Shao-kuang and Lu Shun-te,[1] who were willing to fight to the death and relieve the capital. But I had less than 5,000 picked troops at my command. I wanted first to clear Liang-p'u and restore communications across the river in order to calm the people of the capital.

Every day we trained at Ch'üan-chiao, and when thoroughly prepared, we went WITH A STRONG FORCE OF CAVALRY [?][3] down to Ta-liu-ts'un,[4] where we fortified a camp, and from Ch'iao-lin advanced on Liang-p'u.[5] But we did not expect that General Te-[hsing-ah] would send more than ten thousand cavalry and infantry to fight us at Ta-liu-ts'un. He was supported by three or four thousand cavalry under General Sheng.[6] At the first engagement we were victorious, but on the following day we lost the advantage and the old and new stockades were all lost, together with more than a thousand officers and men.[7] The defeated army went to the region of T'ang-ch'üan, while I myself returned to Ch'üan-chiao with a few cavalry.[8] It was truly hard to bear and I did not cease to weep. Once more I was in Ch'üan-chiao without a plan.

41 Then I wrote to each garrison commander summoning all T'ien Ch'ao officers and officials to come on a certain day to Ts'ung-yang in Anhwei for a meeting. The commanders from all parts came as arranged. This was in the middle of the 6th Month of the 9th Year.[9] Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, who had withdrawn after his defeat at

Lo-t'ien and Ma-ch'eng also came, although he had not been notified, to the Ts'ung-yang meeting. All swore to stand together and a plan for joint action was decided upon.

Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's troops crossed from Ch'ien-shan to Shu-ch'eng, took Lu-chou and then from Tien-fu attacked Liang-yuan and Ting-yuan.[1] This siege of Ting-yuan was made on Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's orders by Wu Ju-hsiao in command of Kung Te-shu's troops.[2] Ch'en Yü-ch'eng came down to Ch'u-chou by way of Chieh-p'ai.[3] By this time I had already returned from Ts'ung-yang to Ch'üan-chiao to regroup; then I marched to Ch'u-chou and Wu-i to join up with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng.[4] Then General Te-[hsing-ah] moved troops from P'u-k'ou by way of Hsiao-tien to Wu-i, and Sheng kung-pao's cavalry also came from Shui-k'ou.[5] There was a great cavalry and infantry battle at Wu-i, with the two armies of Te-[hsing-ah] and Sheng-[pao], and on the other, the two commanders Ch'en [Yü-ch'eng] and Li [Hsiu-ch'eng]. We fought FROM THE CH'EN HOUR [7-9 am.] UNTIL THE WU HOUR [11 am - 1 pm.], when the armies of Sheng-[pao] and Te-[hsing-ah] were defeated and our army took advantage of our victory to give chase. Te-[hsing-ah]'s army lost three or four thousand men.[6]

The following day we went to Hsiao-tien and engaged Chang Kuo-liang, who had come from Chiang-nan with picked troops to relieve
42 Hsiao-tien.[7] Chang's troops were severaly defeated, and we followed up our advantage and chased them to P'u-k'ou. Then Ch'en Yü-ch'eng attacked Te-[hsing-ah]'s army in front while I attacked in the rear, throwing it into disorder. He lost more than ten thousand killed at P'u-k'ou.[8] Communications across the river with T'ien-ching were now restored. This was the first step towards saving the T'ien Wang.

Then Ch'en Yü-ch'eng went to attack Liu-ho and I went up to T'ien-ch'ang and Yang-chou. These places had no Ch'ing garrisons and we took whatever place we came to.[9] Only Yang-chou was

garrisoned, but the troops fled without fighting and the Prefect of Yang-chou was taken prisoner.[1] HE WAS TREATED WITH POLITENESS AND RESPECT; HIS WHOLE FAMILY WAS SOUGHT OUT AND ASSEMBLED TOGETHER. WE ASKED THIS PREFECT WHETHER HE WAS WILLING OR not willing to join us. HE COULD DO SO IF HE WISHED, BUT THOSE WHO WERE NOT WILLING WERE FREE TO DO AS THEY LIKED. HE WAS UNWILLING TO FOLLOW US, SAYING THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE FAVOURS OF THE CH'ING DYNASTY AND DARED NOT REBEL AGAINST IT. So the Prefect was sent away through Hsien-nü-miao and given 350 liang for travelling expenses.

At this time I had only a few troops and did not hold Yang-chou.[2] After Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had taken Liu-ho there was suddenly an emergency in An-[hwei] Province, because the region of Huang-mei, Su-sung, T'ai-hu, Ch'ien-shan, Shih-p'ai, T'ung-ch'eng and Shu-ch'eng was taken by the Grand Secretary's officer Li Hsü-pin.[3] On a single day five despatches arrived announcing this emergency. Therefore Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had no desire to continue his advance,
43 but withdrew his troops and went to the rescue. He requested the T'ien Wang that I be instructed to go with him. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng withdrew his troops first and I followed, advancing straight on through Ch'ao-hsien. The officer who had been sent to hold San-ho was Wu Ting-kuei, and he was being hard pressed by Li Hsü-pin.[4] The Ch'eng-t'ien-yü Ch'en Yü-ch'eng - he had already been made Commander of the Front Division - led troops from Ch'ao-hsien to Pai-shih-shan and Chin-niu, and advanced. After surrounding San-ho, he cut across the rear of Li Hsü-pin and prevented relief from Shu-ch'eng from reaching Li Hsü-pin's army at San-ho.[6]

(SAN-HO WAS LOST AND AGAIN TAKEN BY THE T'IEN-CH'AO. AFTER LAN CH'ENG-CH'UN LOST SAN-HO, THE CH'ING TROOPS DID NOT HOLD IT, AND WU TING-KUEI WAS SENT THERE AS COMMANDER).[5]

Li Hsü-pin saw that the forces of the Commander of the Front

Division Ch'en Yü-ch'eng were intrenched at Chin-niu, took picked troops and at the Fourth Watch the following morning [1-3 am.], made a surprise attack on the edge of the Commander's camp.[1] It is said that [Li] Hsü-pin wanted to go into battle a dawn, but his subordinates wanted to start at the Fifth Watch [3-5 am.]. Hsü-pin said, "Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's troops are good and I fear that the battle will not go in our favour. My officers will wreck everything for me." For this reason the battle was not started at the Fifth Watch. If the officers' advice had been followed and the battle started at the Fifth Watch, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's army would certainly have been defeated.

At dawn Commander Ch'en's stockades WERE ATTACKED BY GENERAL LI [Hsü-pin] and were smashed by General Li, who pursued Commander Ch'en [Yü-ch'eng]'s troops over Chin-niu-shan. It was only just light, and there was a thick mist, so that one could hear voices
44 but could not see where one was going. Who could have imagined that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was still to the rear of Li Hsü-pin? As Li chased Ch'en in front, Ch'en fell upon Li from behind. When Li [Hsü-pin] realized that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was attacking his rear, he turned his army about to resist, but his own army fell into disorder and more than a thousand Ch'ing soldiers were killed.

Pai-shih-shan is 25 li from Chin-niu. I went there after Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had asked for me to be sent, after I had been appointed Commander of the Rear Division by the T'ien Wang. That morning, encamped about 10 li from Pai-shih-shan, I heard continuous gunfire from Chin-niu and realized that the battle had started; so I personally led my troops close to San-ho. It was just at this time that the armies of Ch'en [Yü-ch'eng] and Li [Hsü-pin] joined battle, and engaged seven or eight li in front of General Li's camp. When my troops arrived, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng saw that the soldiers were fresh and vigorous; he then smashed Li Hsü-pin's van; those at the base wavered, were defeated and fled.

Li Hsü-pin was besieged in his stockade.[1] The Ch'ing force had no relief from outside. San-ho is 50 or 60 li from Lu-[chou] Prefecture, which Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had detailed Wu Ju-hsiao to hold. Li Hsü-pin's troops at Shu-ch'eng were also cut off by Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's army, so that they could not come to the rescue.[2]

When General Li [Hsü-pin] found that no relief was possible and that his stockade was closely besieged, he killed himself.[3] Then all Li [Hsü-pin]'s troops were assembled and many of them joined Ch'en [Yü-ch'eng]'s army, and a few came to mine. But they were Hunan men, and having gone with the army some distance, these Hunan men killed ten or so of Ch'en [Yü-ch'eng]'s soldiers when they were off their guard; so Ch'en had them all killed. THERE REMAINED ONLY THOSE WHO HAD JOINED MY FORCE,[4] but after this they all ran away one after the other.[5]

After we had beaten Commander Li [Hsü-pin]'s army at San-ho I parted from Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and we continued by different routes. He passed close to Shu-ch'eng and through Ta-kuan, while I went by San-ho to Lu-chiang and Chieh-ho. T'ung-ch'eng had been taken by Commander Li [Hsü-pin]'s troops and an officer had been detailed to hold it.[6] Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and I met at Lü-t'ing-shih in T'ung-[ch'eng-hsien] and decided on the disposition of our forces. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had fought against troops under General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s commander Li [Hsü-pin], and knew what to expect. I had not fought with them, and the territory was new to me.[7] I was sent to advance on T'ung-ch'eng and Tou-p'u, while Ch'en Yü-ch'eng would advance on T'ung-ch'eng from the mountains.[8] AT THE WEST GATE THE CH'ING COMMANDER SENT TROOPS TO ENGAGE CH'EN YÜ-CH'ENG. I ALSO ARRIVED. THE CH'ING COMMANDER GAVE BATTLE ON BOTH SIDES WITH CAVALRY AND INFANTRY. The Ch'ing troops knew that at San-ho they had lost a good commander in Li Hsü-pin, and were afraid and had

(I DO NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE CH'ING COMMANDER AT T'UNG-CH'ENG).

little fighting spirit; so they were defeated. On the same day
46 our troops entered the town over the wall at the west gate. I attacked from Tou-p'u, by which time it was already night. The Ch'ing garrison withdrew and fled during the night, but many were killed. After recovering T'ung-ch'eng that night, we rested the troops for three days.[1]

An-ch'ing was already under siege and its communications were cut; but after the battles of San-ho and T'ung-ch'eng, the siege of An-ch'ing was lifted.[2] This was in the first place, the relief of T'ien-ching, OF THE SECOND SIEGE, when communications were restored through P'u-k'ou; the battles of San-ho and T'ung-ch'eng [also] raised the siege of An-ch'ing.

(COUNTING THAT OF GENERAL HSIANG [Jung] IT WAS THE SECOND RELIEF)[3]

Then Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's army went by way of Shih-p'ai into Su-sung. But his army was over confident after its victories, and at Su-sung was defeated by cavalry and infantry under General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s officers, and had to withdraw and return.[4] Commander Ch'en [Yü-ch'eng] had ordered his subordinate Li Ssu-fu to bring an army from Ch'ing-ts'ao-ke, to advance by Huang-ni-kang and north of Shih-p'ai, to help him to achieve success at Su-sung. But at Huang-nin-kang they lost a column in a Ch'ing cavalry charge, and were not able to help at Su-sung. They did not know of the defeat at Su-sung, so both failed.

Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was determined to get Su-sung at all costs, in order to protect An-ch'ing. At that time I advanced on T'ai-hu from Ch'ien-shan. In each place the Ch'ing troops withdrew of their own accord and I took the two towns. It was Ch'en Yü-
47 ch'eng who appointed commanders to garrison them.[5]

After his defeat at Su-sung, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng returned to T'ai-hu and had a discussion with me. He wanted the whole army to advance steadily on Erh-lang-ho.[6] We discussed it again and again,

but I was unwilling. He was so insistent however, that I had no choice but to agree to go with him. We then divided into columns and advanced on Erh-lang-ho. We came up against Pao [Ch'ao]s army,[1] and also General Tso's army,[2] which had come, the one from Erh-lang-ho and the other from Su-sung; infantry and cavalry advancing together. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's force was first defeated; his stockades were all taken by Pao [Ch'ao]'s army, and he was forced to take to the hills. Several thousand of the T'ien Ch'ao troops were killed. There only remained six large stockades occupied by my troops, which were besieged until nightfall, when To-[lung-ah] and Pao [Ch'ao] recalled their troops. We then broke out and got away.[3] The same night we withdrew to T'ai-hu. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng also arrived, and stationed his troops in T'ai-hu while he himself returned to An-ch'ing. I returned with my troops and camped at Huang-shan in Ch'ao-hsien, where we rested over the New Year.[4] The two armies of To-[lung-ah] and Pao [Ch'ao] also rested.

At this time Chiang-p'u was commanded by Hsüeh Chih-yuan, but in the 1st Month of the 9th Year [1859], he surrendered to the Ch'ing and gave over the town to them.[5] At this time Li Chao-shou was at Ch'u-chou, Wu-i and Hsiao-tien, and his linked fortifications joined up with Chiang-p'u. P'u-k'ou was also occupied
48 by Li Chao-shou's troops. This was because of the third siege of T'ien-ching. I was still[6] at Huang-shan and was too late to save it. When I heard of the betrayal of Chiang-p'u I hurried down to P'u-k'ou.[7] The town was deserted, but outside were Li Chao-shou's troops. I had to leave an officer to garrison P'u-k'ou in order to keep open the route to T'ien-ching for the time being. Fortunately we still had control of Liu-ho, T'ien-ch'ang, Ho-chou, Ch'ao-hsien and Wu-wei.

Then General Chang [Kuo-liang] on the south bank sent reinforcements and Liang-p'u was again closely besieged.[8] At that time

though we had a few minor crossings to the capital, in fact we did not use them. After this we had no choice but to call upon the Commander of the Front Division Ch'en Yü-ch'eng to hasten to the rescue with his troops, and he came by way of Lu-[chou] and Liang-yuan.[1]

At this time there were several myriad Ch'ing troops besieging Liu-ho.[2] The Ch'ing commander at the siege of Liu-ho was a man called Chu, from Kwangsi, a subordinate of General Chang [Kuo-liang].[3] AFTER SETTING OUT FOR LIU-HO, the Commander of the Front Division first attacked [at] Liu-ho, but was not successful in the first engagement.[4] Then he moved on to Yang-chou to make a show of laying siege to it.[5] Chu's army was stationed near the east gate of Liu-ho in more than 40 stockades. The attack on
49 Yang-chou, AFTER PASSING BY THE EAST GATE,[6] was with the intention of diverting part of Chu's force, so that our troops could wheel round and make a surprise attack. Chu's troops, which had been sent to the relief of Yang-chou, were cut off by our wheeling round.[7] There were no fighting troops there and relief could not quickly arrive. The General Chang [Kuo-liang] in Chiang-nan despatched troops to the rescue; there was a battle at Ling-tzu-k'ou and Chang's troops were defeated.[8] The same night Chu's force entirely withdrew and the siege of Liu-ho was lifted. The losses amongst Chu's troops were considerable.[9]

Then Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and I led our forces back to P'u-k'ou and destroyed fifty or sixty stockades of the Ch'ing commander Chou [T'ien-p'ei]'s force,[10] which was besieging P'u-k'ou. We moved our troops to P'u-[k'ou] from Liu-ho and fought a great battle for five or six days with the Ch'ing general Chang Kuo-liang and his commanders Chang Yü-liang and Chou [T'ien-p'ei].[11] Chang Kuo-liang's troops were defeated, and when Chou saw that his chief's troops had been defeated, his officers and men were discouraged and lost their fighting spirit; there was also the fear of having

the river behind them.[1] (SO THE TROOPS WERE AFRAID AND HAD NO DESIRE TO FIGHT).[2] The Ch'ing garrison at P'u-k'ou could not hold out and fifty or sixty Ch'ing stockades were lost. They withdrew to the bank of the river but could retreat no further. But they had not withdrawn from Chiang-p'u, so communications with the capital were only half restored at this time.[3] This was the partial relief of the fourth siege of the capital.

After the capture of P'u-k'ou and Liu-ho, General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s great army came from Huang-[mei] and Su-sung, and once more urgent reports came from the front up-river.[4] The Commander of the Front Division withdrew his troops and went to the rescue.[5] I was unable to go because I had to protect P'u-k'ou. We had smashed the Ch'ing stockades at Liang-p'u, but not thoroughly, and later they made a come-back.[6] I had long been holding P'u-k'ou and lacked supplies and provisions for the troops. From outside no relief came. On the south bank General Ho [Ch'un] and General Chang [Kuo-liang]'s force was strong, but I had no troops to fight them with, no powder and no cannon.

In the government there was no leader to take charge. The Sovereign did not interest himself in affairs of state, but relied entirely upon Heaven, enquiring neither about military nor about political matters. There was really nothing I could no in the T'ien Ch'ao. I was vigorously defending P'u-k'ou, yet I fell under suspicion and it was said that I was intending to contact the Ch'ing government and surrender. In T'ien-ching my mother and wife were held as hostages, and the river was sealed off and my troops prevented from returning to the capital.[7] There were letters between me and Li Chao-shou and when the T'ien Wang found out about this he feared that I would turn traitor, so he appointed me Chung Wang in order to make me happy and prevent me from defaulting.[8] I really do not know why the court should have taken such precautions against me.

Though I was oppressed at this time, as a man from Kwangsi, far from home, there was nowhere for me to go. We men of Yüeh have not dispersed it is really because there was nowhere for us to go, so we were compelled to carry on. IF GOVERNOR TSENG [Kuo-ch'üan] AND THE GRAND SECRETARY COULD PETITION THE EMPEROR TO
51 SPARE THESE MEN OF YÜEH, THAT WOULD BE EXCELLENT. OUR T'IEN WANG ESTABLISHED HIS KINGDOM, BUT I DID NOT KNOW THAT HE INTENDED TO FOUND A STATE. (THE GREAT CH'ING WANTS ABOVE ALL TO EXTINGUISH THE FLAMES OF WAR AND BRING PEACE TO THE EMPIRE AND WIN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE). OUR SOVEREIGN WAS IN FACT DEFEATED AND PERISHED BECAUSE HE DID NOT CULTIVATE GOOD GOVERNMENT. I HAVE LONG KNOWN OF THE BENEVOLENCE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY IN COLLECTING TOGETHER REBELLIOUS PERSONS AND PREVENTING DISORDERS AMONGST THE PEOPLE. THE SOONER THE COMMON PEOPLE CAN BE AT PEACE, THE SOONER THE CH'ING OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS CAN PUT DOWN THEIR ARMS AND CEASE FIGHTING. THEN EVERYONE WILL PRAISE THE ENORMOUS BENEVOLENCE AND VIRTUE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND OF THE GOVERNOR, AND THE WHOLE PEOPLE WILL BENEFIT. I SPEAK OUT IN THIS DIRECT AND CLUMSY WAY BECAUSE IT COMES STRAIGHT FROM THE HEART. WHO AM I TO SAY MORE OR TO ARGUE? THIS IS NOT FLATTERY ON THE PART OF THIS MILITARY CRIMINAL. I HAVE LONG KNOWN OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE GRAND SECRETARY'S BENEVOLENCE AND LIBERALITY - THAT IS WHY I HAVE SPOKEN IN THIS WAY. Now that I am on the point of death, I hope that the people may soon be at peace. My idle words have been crudely expressed and I beg that this may be excused.

Now I will continue to give a clear account of what happened after I was under constraint in P'u-k'ou. At that time Chiang-p'u was still[1] being besieged by General Chang [Kuo-liang]'s troops. I saw that the situation was not AT ALL good, and went back to the capital with a small cavalry escort[2] and petitioned
52 the Sovereign, but he would not agree. Then in the palace I

I argued with the Sovereign and asked him, "If you leave me holding P'u-k'ou, whom do you hope will come to your relief from outside?" I carefully planned the details with the Sovereign's state minister and with the Sovereign.[1] The Commander of the Front Division Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was at Ch'ien-[shan], T'ai-[hu], Huang-[mei] and Su-[sung], fighting against General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s troops and could not be moved.[2] Wei Chih-chün had already gone over to the Ch'ing Dynasty; Liu Kuan-fang and Lai Wen-hung and Ku Lung-hsien had made their names but were not yet of [much] use. The Commander of the Centre Division, Yang Fu-ch'ing, was at Tung-liu and Ying-chia-hui in Ch'ih-[chou] Prefecture, also fighting against General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s troops.[3] Li Shih-hsien, Commander of the Left Division, was in the region of Nan-ning and Wan-chih.[4]

The four gates of the capital were closely besieged by the two armies of Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang], and [surrounded by a] deep moat.[5] The Kingdom had little grain left. The Sovereign would not allow me to leave and bring relief from outside. WHAT DID THE SOVEREIGN THINK TO DO?[6] I argued forcefully with him and was severely reprimanded. He would make no clear decision because he was not interested in military matters, but relied entirely upon Heaven, and hardly ever gave orders or instructions to his ministers. I had no choice but to make another strong petition stating my determination to leave the capital. The Sovereign realized that I could not be held, and gave his consent to my leaving the capital.

The military affairs of P'u-k'ou were all handed over to Huang Tzu-lung and Ch'en Ts'an-ming;[7] then I immediately set out from P'u-k'ou and marched to Wu-hu. Within three or four days the forts along the river outside P'u-k'ou were smashed by General
53 Chang [Kuo-liang]'s troops and Chiu-fu-chou was lost.[8] Again the capital was surrounded. This was for the fifth time. Generals

Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] surrounded it with even more stockades and deeper moats. The court was without a plan and the capital was gripped as if in an iron cask. But the fortune of the T'ien Ch'ao was not yet exhausted and it was not yet destined to perish. Again peoples' spirits were roused. From outside I sent despatches to all parts and everywhere people were ready to follow my suggestions and submit to my direction. The whole burden of planning the relief of the fifth siege of T'ien-ching fell upon me. By good will and devotion I obtained the co-operation of the field commanders. To-day, if everyone knows the name of the Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng, it is really because I was ready to distribute money; countless enemy officers and officials with whom I came in contact I treated well;[1] and because I was willing to give material help to the suffering people. It was because of this, that in and out of the capital, old and young, all knew Li Hsiu-ch'eng. It is not because I was talented, and I was not the head of the government. The senior and most trusted by the T'ien Wang were: the Young Hsi Wang Hsiao Yu-ho,[2] then the T'ien Wang's elder brother Hung Jen-fa and his second brother Hung Jen-ta; the [third] most trusted was the Kan Wang Hung Jen-kan; then came the Imperial Sons-in-law Chung and Huang;[3] the fifth was the
54 Ying Wang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and sixth came Hsiu-ch'eng. After the death of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, his duties as principal commander were given to me. I WAS MERELY[4] SERVING CH'IN WHILE IN CH'IN AND CH'U WHILE IN CH'U, AND I DID MY BEST.

At that time T'ien-ching was closely besieged and we were without a plan. Then on the 2nd Day of the First Month of the Tenth Year [10 February 1860], I took my troops from Wu-hu to Nan-ling by way of Ch'ing-ke-chiang and Ma-t'ou, and from Kao-ch'iao in Ning-kuo crossed to Shui-tung.[5] At that time the Ch'ing troops at Ning-kuo were prepared for an attack on the town, THEY WERE WELL-PREPARED FOR MY ARRIVAL. To their surprise

I went past Ning-kuo by way of Shui-tung and in two days and two nights reached Kuang-te-chou.[1]

We immediately took Kuang-te and left Ch'en K'un-shu and Ch'en Ping-wen to hold it. I myself took my subordinates T'an Shao-kuang, Lu Shun-te and Wu Ting-ts'ai and left Kuang-te for Ssu-an. At Ssu-an there were some of Chang Kuo-liang's troops holding the place.[2] On this day, when we joined battle and the two sides met Chang was defeated, his stockades were taken and Ssu-an was captured.[3] We went then to Hung-hsin,[4] where we joined up with my cousin Li Shih-hsien's troops.[5] We intended to attack Hu-chou
55 with our combined forces.[6] [But the capture of] Hu-chou did not require many troops, so I left Li Shih-hsien to take it and withdrew my own troops by way of Miao-hsi to Wu-k'ang,[7] and in a day and a night, marched on Hang-chou with only six or seven thousand men.[8] We besieged the five gates of Hang-chou, and after three days and nights, broke in through the Ch'ing-p'o Gate.[9]

The capture of Hang-chou was not done by the strength of men, but was accomplished by Heaven. The advance-guard of one thousand two hundred and fifty men took Hang-chou; so it was not done by the strength of men.[10] THE PEOPLE OF HANG-CHOU COULD NOT ESCAPE THEIR PREDESTINED FATE.

My target was not really Hang-chou. I saw how Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] were besieging the capital in which my Sovereign and my mother were. I knew that the supplies for Generals Ho and Chang's armies all came from Su-[chou], Hang-[chou], Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung.[11] This is why I took special troops and made sure of a victory. The plan was to draw off General Ho and General Chang's troops from Chiang-nan, so that I could turn back and raise the siege of T'ien-ching. I was not just intending to take Hang-chou.

After entering the city we fought for several days without taking the Manchu garrison.[12] Then, as expected, General Ho and

General Chang sent troops from Chiang-nan for the relief of Hang-chou, under the command of Chang Yü-liang.[1] At the Wu-ling Gate of Hang-chou the two sides made contact,[2] and we knew that Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]'s forces were divided and that they had fallen into our trap. The following day at noon,
56 we used flags and pennons newly made in Hang-chou, in order to deceive the enemy. This is a device for withdrawing with insufficient troops. Unexpectedly Chang Yü-liang fell into the trap, and we had been gone for a day and a night before he dared to enter the city. Thus we were able to withdraw without hindrance.[3]

The T'ien Ch'ao was not yet fated to perish, so our plans were successful; [but now] its span is accomplished and our plans do not succeed. Up until now the same man has been in charge, but now our plans no longer work and the capital is lost. One reason is that the Sovereign did not have good fortune, while the Ch'ing Dynasty does have good fortune. (WITH GENERAL TSENG [Kuo-fan]'S DETERMINATION AND PERSISTENCE, THE UNITED WILL OF HIS OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS, THE TSENG FAMILY HAD THE GREAT GOOD FORTUNE OF HELPING THE CH'ING DYNASTY TO RECOVER THIS CITY, WINNING GLORY THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE. THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S PLANNING AND OF CHIU-SHUAI [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan]'S [4] ABLE STRATEGY. GENERAL AND MINISTER ACTING UNDER ORDERS ACHIEVED ABSOLUTE SUCCESS).[5]

I will leave this now and relate the withdrawal from Hang-chou in order to go to the relief of T'ien-ching, and the defeat of Chang and Ho's army. After that I will speak of the present loss of T'ien-ching. THESE MATTERS, ACCUMULATED OVER TEN YEARS, ARE DIFFICULT TO MAKE CLEAR ALL AT ONCE, [but I will attempt] TO RELATE THEM CLEARLY AND IN THE PROPER ORDER.[6]

After withdrawing from Hang-chou, we went by way of Yü-hang and Lin-an, then crossed T'ien-mu-shan and came out at Hsiao-feng, from which we went to Kuang-te.[7] We were in front and Chang Yü-liang's troops were behind. AFTER THEY ENTERED HANG-CHOU, the

soldiers looted people's property and did not want to pursue us.[1]

57 It is more than 300 li from Kuang-te to T'ien-ching, Hang-chou is eight or nine hundred li. So with all the twists and turns it is more than a thousand li. For this reason Chang Yü-liang did not have time to get back to the relief of [the Chiang-nan H.Q.] at Chin-ling.[2] This relief of T'ien-ching was done with the aid of Heaven, otherwise we could not have achieved such a wonderful success.

I had earlier arranged by letter with Yang Fu-ch'ing for him to join forces [with me] to relieve the capital.[3] Liu Kuan-fang, Lai Wen-hung and Ku Lung-hsien also came in response to my letters;[4] the Shih Wang [Li Shih-hsien] also came,[5] and we had a meeting at Chien-p'ing.[6] This was ordained by Heaven; it was like the meeting at Ssu-ming-shan.[7] THE KINGDOM WAS NOT [yet] FATED TO PERISH, THAT IS WHY IT WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN.[8]

After the meeting we immediately made our troops dispositions. Yang Fu-ch'ing took troops to attack Kao-ch'un and Tung-pa;[9] Li Shih-hsien was sent to attack Li-yang, and Liu Kuan-fang went with him.[10] Everywhere we were successful. [Yang] Fu-ch'ing took Li-shui and Mo-ling-kuan,[11] the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien took Chü-jung.[12] I came by Ch'ih-sha-shan without attacking any towns on the way, and made straight for Hsiung-huang-chen.[13] At that time Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] had positioned their forces and were encamped in more than ten large stockades. After the Shih Wang arrived we joined forces and took up positions against General Chang's army.[14] THE TWO SIDES MET AND FOUGHT FROM THE SHEN HOUR [3-5 pm] TO THE YÜ HOUR [5-7 pm] and Chang's troops were severely beaten. We smashed the Ch'ing stockades at Hsiung-huang-chen, and their troops were afraid and did not dare to fight.[15]

58 The following day we advanced by way of T'u-shan, and the Fu Wang [Yang Fu-ch'ing] came from Mo-ling-kuan to the south gate.[16]

The Ying Wang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had already withdrawn his troops from Ch'ien-[shan] and T'ai-[hu] and had come down to Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou. I was on the south bank with Yang [Fu-ch'ing], Liu [Kuan-fang] and Li [Shih-hsien]. The Ying Wang came without prior arrangement when he heard that our troops had arrived on the south bank. He crossed the river at Hsi-liang-[shan] and came by Chiang-ning-chen to T'ou-kuan, Pan-ch'iao and Shan-ch'iao.[1] I came by Yao-hua-men[2] and advanced to the foot of Tz'u-ching-shan. Ch'en K'un-shu and Liu Kuan-fang came by way of Kao-ch'iao-men, the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien came to the north gate and Hung-shan;[3] the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing came from Mo-ling-kuan to the south gate at Yü-hua-t'ai. The Ying Wang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng advanced by Pan-ch'iao and Shan-ch'iao. The front and rear parts of General Chang and Ho's army were unable to come to each other's aid, and they were defeated at Hsiung-huang-chen. Chang Yü-liang, who had taken picked troops to the relief of Hang-chou, had not yet returned and was cut off outside by my troops. The grain supply for [the armies of] Generals Ho and Chang came from Su-[chou], Hang-[chou], Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi, and these were all cut off, so that there was no grain in the camps.[4] At that time the T'ien Ch'ao had many troops[5] and in one sweep we raised the siege of the capital.[6] This was for the sixth time.[7]

59 Though we raised the siege and smashed General Ho and General Chang's stockades, we did not kill many because the whole army withdrew in the night and went straight down to Chen-chiang and Tan-yang, where they encamped. They lost between three and five thousand killed, but many more were scattered. Those of Chang and Ho's troops who ran off to Su-chou and Ch'ang-chou, kept looting the people, so that everyone hated them.[8] At that time the fame of the T'ien Ch'ao armies increased greatly; who could guess that there would be the present disaster?

The sixth relief of T'ien-ching was not planned by the Sovereign,

[but] really [by] ministers [who] were simple and loyal to the T'ien Wang. THESE MINISTERS WERE LOYAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND VIRTUOUS; BUT UNFORTUNATELY[1] THEY DID NOT ENCOUNTER AN ENLIGHTENED RULER. HEROES WERE WRONGED,[2] INNUMERABLE GOOD MEN DIED, AND PEOPLE WERE WRONGLY KILLED. THIS WAS REALLY THE FAULT OF THE SOVEREIGN, WHO EMPLOYED MEN WITHOUT FINDING OUT WHETHER THEY WERE WORTHY OR NOT, AND DID NOT PUT COMPLETE TRUST IN HIS MINISTERS. AGAIN AND AGAIN I MADE STRONG ADMONITIONS[3] AND ARGUED WITH HIM, BUT HE WOULD NEVER FOLLOW [MY ADVICE], SO WE HAVE COME TO THIS PASS.

WHEN I WAS YOUNG, AT HOME, I UNDERSTOOD NOTHING, BUT JOINED UP IN THE EXCITEMENT. THOSE WHO COULD UNDERSTAND WOULD RATHER DIE THAN DO SUCH THINGS. ONCE YOU ARE RIDING[4] ON A TIGER'S BACK[5] IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISMOUNT. I WAS SEPARATED FROM MY PARENTS, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT MY WISH. THE SOVEREIGN ESTABLISHED A DYNASTY AND FOUND HIS EVERLASTING DESTINY, [but] I was his general and served long in the army without a moment of pleasure but with plenty of troubles. THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE IN THE T'IEN CH'AO WHO DID HARM TO THE PEOPLE; WHAT COULD I ALONE DO, FOR ALL MY COMPASSION? POWER WAS NOT IN MY HANDS, SO WHAT COULD I DO? THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR,[6] THOUGH OUTSIDE, HAVE GREAT
60 PERCEPTION AND ABILITY, AND MEN OF SUCH OVERWHELMING AND UNEQUALLED TALENT MUST HAVE KNOWN THIS FOR A LONG TIME, SO I WILL NOT CONTINUE.

After the sixth relief of the capital, the Sovereign was exceedingly unreceptive to suggestions and only believed in Heaven. His edicts spoke of Heaven but not of men. At this time the army had covered itself with glory and there were more soldiers than ever. I was daily more and more involved and it was increasingly difficult to get away.

After the sixth relief of the capital no edict was pronounced

praising the generals, the field commanders were not received in audience, nor were the court officials.[1] The Sovereign was not interested in the affairs of government, but merely instructed his ministers in the knowledge of Heaven, as if all was tranquil.[2]

NOW THE STATE HAS FALLEN AND I HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR AND SHUT UP IN JAIL, AWAITING[3] PUNISHMENT. I AM SAD AND DEPRESSED IN PRISON. MY SOVEREIGN'S CAUSE HAS ALREADY COME TO SUCH A PASS THAT ALL I CAN DO IS TO WRITE FOR THE INSPECTION OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR, SO THAT THEY MAY KNOW THE HISTORY OF MY SOVEREIGN'S ATTEMPT TO FOUND A DYNASTY. I RELATE THE SOURCES OF ITS DESTRUCTION, CONCEALING NOTHING, BUT RECORDING EVERYTHING CLEARLY.

After the sixth relief of the capital, the troops rested for three days. [Then] the T'ien Wang in a severe edict, ordered me to take my troops and capture Su-[chou] and Ch'ang-[chou], giving me a month in which to pacify [the area] and report back.[4] Things being what they were, and since I was employed by him, I had to obey.

I regrouped my forces, and after selecting a day, set out to
61 advance by way of Tan-yang. In three days the army arrived at Tan-yang, where Chang Kuo-liang's troops were stationed.[5] The following day we joined battle outside the south gate of Tan-yang. WE FOUGHT FOR TWO DAYS, INDECISIVELY ON THE FIRST. THE FOLLOWING DAY WE FOUGHT FROM THE CH'EN HOUR [7-9 am.] UNTIL THE WEI HOUR [1-3 pm.]. Chang's troops were severely defeated and ten thousand of them were killed.[6] General Chang [Kuo-liang] was drowned in the river at the south gate of Tan-yang.[7] I sent officers to find his body, and buried it in a coffin at the foot of Tan-yang Pagoda. The two states were at war and each man served his own master. Alive he was an enemy, WAS A HERO,[8] dead, I did not bear him any hatred. That is why I buried him. IT WAS IN PITY FOR A

HERO. I DID NOT HATE HIM.[1]

After taking Tan-yang we went down to Ch'ang-chou.[2] General Chang [Kuo-liang]'s infantry and river troops, defeated at Tan-yang, had gone straight to Ch'ang-chou, where there were troops sent from Su-chou. They joined up with Chang Yü-liang's force, which had returned from Hang-chou,[3] and had fortified more than forty stockades at Ch'ang-chou, both large and small.

The troops arrived one day and we joined battle on the next. Chang's troops were again defeated and his stockades all destroyed. Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]'s headquarters at Chin-ling was already lost, and the troops outside had no will to fight, so they fled without giving battle.[4] After being attacked for a few days Ch'ang-chou surrendered.[5] After entering the town, we did not kill or harm the people, but some were so frightened that they jumped into the water and were drowned.[6] Once the town was taken, we immediately pacified the people and rested the troops for two
62 days, then hastened down to Wu-hsi, where Chang Yü-liang's troops from Ch'ang-chou were stationed.[7] Governor General Ho [Kuei-ch'ing] stole away with his family by boat, but I do not know where he went.[8]

When our main force reached Wu-hsi, Chang Yü-liang had already again prepared his fortifications and was strongly defending the four gates.[9] The Ch'ing commander at I-hsing, a man called Liu from Tung-hsiang in Kwangsi - I do not know his rank - came from I-hsing to reinforce Chang Yü-liang.[10] His troops came by boat across Lake T'ai, and had just arrived in Wu-hsi. [When] Chang Yü-liang's troops and mine joined battle and the two sides met, we fought for a day and a night. I was not satisfied because Chang's troops, though defeated, had pulled themselves together again. He was one of the good Ch'ing commanders. So I took my troops and my bodyguard, and went down by Hui-ch'üan-shan,[11] and launched a strong attack on the west gate. [Chang's] river troops

and infantry were severely defeated and we took the town of Wu-hsi.[1] I then rested the troops and pacified the people.[2] We rested for two days.

At that time, after Ho Ch'un's Chiang-nan Headquarters had lost the initiative and the army had been defeated, Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] had gone different ways. General Chang had intended to remain in Tan-yang in order to protect Su-chou and Ch'ang-chou. Ho Ch'un went alone down to Su-chou and went by boat to Hsü-shu-kuan.[3] LATER he heard that his assistant commander had been killed at Tan-yang, so Ho-Ch'un hanged himself at Hsü-shu-kuan.[4]

63 HAVING SAID THAT, I WILL GO ON TO TELL ABOUT LEAVING WU-HSI TO GO DOWN TO SU-CHOU. Having taken Wu-hsi, the following day we moved on to Su-[chou] Prefecture, and arriving at Ch'ang-men, divided up, and invested each gate.[5] Many of the ordinary people of Ch'ang-men suburb and other villages came to welcome us. On the doors of homes and shops were notices saying, 'Unite to kill all the government troops of Chang and Ho!' The people killed these government troops because from Tan-yang right down to Su-chou, people's property on land and water had been looted by them; therefore the people hated and killed them.[6] HAVING CLEARLY RELATED THIS I WILL SPEAK OF HOW WE TOOK SU-CHOU.[7]

We closely invested the city gates of Su-chou. The garrison had been transferred to defend [Wu]-hsi and Ch'ang-[chou] when the emergency occurred there, so that there were no troops in the city.[8] Later it was garrisoned by troops from Chin-ling, and by those who had withdrawn from Ch'ang-[chou] and [Wu]-hsi. Only Chang Yü-liang was there.[9] The other Ch'ing commanders, after the loss of Chin-ling, Tan-[yang], Ch'ang-[chou] and Wu-hsi, knowing that the troops were in bad spirits and afraid, and also under attack from the people outside, REALIZED THAT THE SITUATION WAS BAD.[10] Then Li Wen-ping, Ho Hsin-i, Chou Wu and others

64 surrendered and gave up the city. They were Cantonese.[1] When Chang Yü-liang saw that the military situation was like this, he led his SZECHUANESE SOLDIERS AND HIS[2] own troops out by the Pan Gate, and went to Hang-chou, retreating several hundred li. Hang-chou would not open the gates to him, so he was furious and stationed his troops outside the Wu-lin Gate, where they despoiled and maltreated the people. At that time there was enmity between the two garrison commanders of the provincial capital.[3]

After Li Wen-ping, Ho Hsin-i and the others had surrendered Su-chou, I immediately entered the city with my troops and accepted the surrender of fifty or sixty thousand of the troops.[4] THIS WAS NOT STRANGE. AFTER THE DEFEAT AT CHIN-LING, MANY TOWNS WERE LOST; THE COMMANDER WAS DEAD AND THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAD NO LEADER. THAT IS WHY THEY SURRENDERED. IT WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN. THE SIXTH SIEGE OF T'IEN-CHING COULD STILL[5] BE RAISED: THE SEVENTH BROUGHT COLLAPSE. THIS WAS DUE TO THE GOOD FORTUNE OF THE GREAT CH'ING [Dynasty], AND THE BRILLIANT STRATEGY AND GOOD FORTUNE[6] OF THE GREAT GENERALS, THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR, WHO ARE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING.

After I took Su-chou I OBTAINED FIFTY OR SIXTY THOUSAND SOLDIERS AND not one person was killed.[7] There were very many Ch'ing candidate officials, both civil and military, and many Manchu officers, but none were harmed.[8] They all wished to return home, and if they did not have enough money for travelling expenses, I provided it for them, and allocated boats for them. THIS IS NOT SELF-PRAISE TO GIVE GLORY TO MYSELF.[9] BEFORE HIGH HEAVEN I DARE NOT CONCEAL ANYTHING. THEY ALL DISPERSED AND WENT HOME, AND MANY RETURNED TO PEKING, WHERE THIS MUST BE KNOWN, SINCE MANCHUS [must have] GIVEN REPORTS OF IT.[10]

65 After taking the city I immediately made announcements to the people, but Su-[chou] people are ungovernable and wicked and would not be pacified.[11] Day and night they came looting as far

as the city wall.[1] My officers wanted to take troops and kill them all, but I absolutely refused. I [again] issued pacification orders, but the people would not obey and the disorders continued for more than ten days. Finally I was so dissatisfied with this situation - I had taken the city but had failed to pacify the people - that I went myself with ten or more boats straight into the villages. From all sides people came with weapons in their hands and surrounded me. All the civil and military officials with me turned pale. I was willing to sacrifice my life if the people of Su-chou could be pacified; so when spears threatened my life I did not draw back. I explained everything and the people were convinced and everywhere ceased their activity and put aside their weapons. In three days the people of Yuan-ho were first pacified. FROM THE BEGINNING OF PACIFICATION, in seven days Yuan-ho, Wu-hsien and Ch'ang-chou were at peace.[2] Far and near all other hsien submitted, and gave up fighting and became calm. Thus the people of Su-chou and Ch'ang-chou were restored to order.[3]

Chang Yü-liang's troops had retreated to Hang-chou; we gave chase and took Chia-hsing,[4] after which we rested the troops, pacified the people and did not campaign.[5] Then Chang Yü-liang, having rested and regrouped at Hang-chou, advanced and attacked
66 Chia-hsing.[6] The commander of Chia-hsing was Ch'iu-t'ien-i Ch'en K'un-shu and Lang-t'ien-i Ch'en Ping-wen.[7] Chang Yü-liang with more than 40 ying of various sizes, closely invested the two gates south of Chia-[hsing] and breached the town wall.[8] Fortunately the officers and men made an energetic and united effort, otherwise Chia-hsing would have been lost. At this time Chia-hsing sent an appeal for help to Su-chou, but suddenly Ch'ing-p'u was attacked by foreign devils in the pay of Governor Hsüeh [Huan].[9] The commander of this hsien was Chou Wen-chia; luckily he was an

excellent commander, otherwise Ch'ing-p'u would have been lost.[1] Chou Wen-chia called for aid VERY URGENTLY and I had to take an army in the middle of the 6th Month [late July] from Su-chou, and first relieve Ch'ing-p'u. We set off from Su-chou by boat, arriving on the following day, and went into action immediately. The foreign devils came out to give battle and the two sides met and fought from early morning until noon, and the devils were severely beaten. Six or seven hundred of the devil soldiers were killed and more than two thousand foreign guns taken, together with ten or more cannon and more than a hundred muzzle-loaders, and several hundred of their boats.[2] The siege of Ch'ing-p'u was raised and we passed on and took Sung-chiang;[3] then advanced to attack Shanghai. Foreigners from Shanghai had come to invite us, and outside there were Han soldiers who were in contact with [people] inside [the town]. That is why we went.[4]

67 My troops camped at Chou-chia-hui, eighteen li from Shanghai.[5] Nine li from Shanghai there were four Ch'ing stockades. My officers Ts'ai Yuan-lung and Kao Yung-k'uan were in command of the detachments.[6] On this day, the sky was bright and cloudless. After advancing to Chiu-li-[ch'iao],[7] we were about to join battle with the Ch'ing troops; but seeing our army arrive THEY HAD ALREADY FLED, giving up their positions without defending them. We were just briskly advancing towards Shanghai, while inside they were preparing a respectful welcome for me, when suddenly the bright sky became dark and rainy, and there was a storm of wind, rain and thunder. Neither horses nor men could move or keep their feet; so we did not advance. The foreigners and the Ch'ing troops who were ready to welcome me saw that I did not arrive. That night Governor Hsüeh [Huan] heard that there was contact [between us] and again bought the goodwill of the foreign devils with money, and hired one or two thousand devils to defend the town. The Ch'ing troops failed to make contact with me, THE AFFAIR FAILED and these

troops were all killed by Governor Hsüeh.[1] This having failed, I lodged for a few days at Chou-chia-hui, in a church belonging to the hung-mao.[2]

Then an urgent appeal came from Chia-hsing, and I had to take my troops back by way of Sung-chiang and [Ch'ing]-p'u-hsien, then by Kuan-wang-miao to Chia-shan and P'ing-hu.[3] There were Ch'ing
68 garrisons in these two places; but in one battle these two towns were taken.[4] AFTER TAKING THEM we continued on to Chia-hsing, to raise the siege of the town. The same day AS I ARRIVED AT CHIA-[hsing] I went up onto the wall to observe the disposition of the troops, and watch what the Ch'ing troops were doing. The following day the battle started and lasted for five days.[5] I sent one detachment to Shih-men to cut off Chang Yü-liang's communications with Chekiang.[6] In the water-bound countryside of Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] it is difficult for troops to move; there is water everywhere and no other routes to take. So when Chang [Yü-liang]'s troops saw that [my] soldiers had blocked and cut off their line of retreat, all the officers and men surrendered and gave up their stockades. Only Chang Yü-liang gave battle; the others had all surrendered. For this reason he did not dare to continue the battle, and fled back to Hang-chou.[7]

Having finished raising the siege, I moved my army back to the provincial capital [Su-chou] to rest.[8] This was in the 7th or 8th Month [c. 10 August - 9 October]. Some of the people near the city had been pacified, some had not. Outside there were still some destitute people, and I immediately distributed grain and money in order to relieve them. Outside each gate there were people with nothing to carry on their trades with. To them too I gave money, distributing more than 100,000 string of cash. The poor were every day given food TO RELIEVE THEM.[9] The grain tax which should have been paid by the people of Su-chou was not fully

collected; we also allowed them to draw up registers and pay land rents without going deeply into the matter.[1] For this reason I was popular with the people of Su-chou.[2]

69 (MY TROOPS WERE NOT ALL OF EQUAL WORTH AND I DO NOT DARE TO MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR THEM. EVERYONE CAN UNDERSTAND THIS, AND I NEED SAY NO MORE. I SERVED THE T'IEN CH'AO FROM THE TIME I JOINED UP RIGHT UNTIL NOW, AND RECEIVED GREAT FAVOURS . HOW COULD I LEAVE IT?

WHEN THE T'IEN CH'AO WAS ESTABLISHED, EVERYONE WAS WILLING. THE MAN CALLED HUNG CAME FROM HUA-HSIEN IN KWANGTUNG, TO KWANGSI, MORE THAN A THOUSAND LI. IF WE DID NOT KNOW, HOW COULD OTHERS? HOW COULD HE TELL PEOPLE BEFOREHAND THAT HE PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A STATE? IT WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN THAT AFTER LONG YEARS OF PEACE THIS MAN SHOULD APPEAR, AND BRING CHAOS EVERYWHERE. NOW I HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER; BUT HOW COULD I HAVE KNOWN THAT IT WOULD COME TO THIS? IF I HAD FORESEEN THE PRESENT DISASTER I COULD LONG AGO HAVE AVOIDED IT AND REMAINED AT HOME AS AN ORDINARY PERSON. HOW CAN ONE FORESEE THE FUTURE? KNOWING IT, WHO WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED HIM? ONLY WHEN I BECAME AN OFFICER AND HELD MILITARY COMMAND DID I STUDY FOR A LONG TIME AND GAIN AN UNDERSTANDING. THOSE WHO DID UNDERSTAND AVOIDED US AND DID NOT FOLLOW US; HENCE THE PRESENT CALAMITY.

I HAVE NO RESENTMENT. I DID ALL OF MY OWN ACCORD AND NO ONE FORCED ME. TO BE FIRST LOYAL TO CH'IN IS THE LOYALTY OF AN HONEST MAN; BUT IF CH'U CAN FORGIVE, HE WILL REPAY EVEN UNTO DEATH . [I wish to] GATHER UP ALL THE TROOPS IN ORDER TO REPAY GREAT KINDNESS. THE REMAINING TROOPS WOULD NOT CAUSE DISORDER EVERYWHERE AND THE PEOPLE COULD BE AT PEACE. IT WOULD REDOUND FIRST, TO THE FAVOUR OF THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR, SECONDLY, TO THE VIRTUE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND OF THE GOVERNOR, AND INSPIRE TEN THOUSAND GENERATIONS.

70 FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT, THE LESSON OF THE PAST IS THAT LENIENCY WILL STABILIZE THE EMPIRE. THOSE WHOSE FAME SURVIVES TO

THIS DAY ARE THOSE OF GREAT SINCERITY AND BROAD WISDOM). THIS IS ALSO THE WAY TO STRIVE FOR THE STATE.[1] (I HAVE NO NATURAL ABILITY, BUT PERHAPS AM HONOURABLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. WHEN I SEE THE RIGHT I FOLLOW IT AND NOTHING ELSE. I SERVED THE T'IEN WANG WITH ALL MY HEART AND FOR THAT REASON MY FATHER AND MOTHER, MY WIFE AND CHILDREN, ARE ALL SCATTERED). IF I HAD NOT BEEN LOYAL I WOULD LONG AGO HAVE GONE ELSEWHERE.[2] (THOUGH I HAD OTHER INTENTIONS, THERE WAS NO OTHER PLACE FOR ME, SO I COME TO SUCH AN END.[3]

I SEE THAT THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR ARE MEN OF LIBERALITY, THEREFORE I EXPRESS MY REAL FEELINGS. I AM WILLING TO DO MY UTMOST FOR THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR TO OBTAIN THE SUBMISSION OF ALL THE T'IEN CH'AO PEOPLE. THEIR EXCELLENCIES THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR WISH TO ELIMINATE THIS SCOURGE; I WILL COLLECT THESE PEOPLE FROM ALL PARTS) FOR YOU TO DISBAND.[4] (THIS WOULD BE A GOOD THING. NOW THAT I AM LOST AND THE KINGDOM HAS PERISHED, TO ASSEMBLE THESE TROOPS WILL SAVE THE PEOPLE FROM BEING MOLESTED AND WILL SET MY MIND AT EASE. IT IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE ORDINARY PEOPLE. THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS WILL BE SAVED TROUBLE, AND THE STATE SAVED EXPENSE. IT IS BECAUSE AFTER BEING CAPTURED I RECEIVED KIND AND GENEROUS TREATMENT THAT I SPEAK OUT IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD WAY, WITHOUT ANY OTHER MOTIVE. I REQUEST THAT THIS BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED), AND IT WILL BE SEEN THAT IT IS TRUE. I SAY THAT IT IS NOT THAT I AM DISLOYAL, BUT BECAUSE THE KINGDOM HAS COLLAPSED, I SPEAK THE TRUTH AND RELATE EVERYTHING IN DETAIL. (WHETHER OR NOT IT IS GRANTED WILL BE DECIDED AFTER
71 THE RESPECTED CONSIDERATION OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR, NOT BY MY INSISTENCE; BUT [5] HAVING SEEN HOW KINDLY I AM TREATED I DESIRE TO SPEAK OUT). HAVING SAID THIS, I WILL SPEAK OF SU-CHOU, AND OF HOW THINGS HAVE NOW COME TO AN END.[6]

After the relief of Chia-[hsing], I returned to the provincial capital [Su-chou]; this was in the middle of the 8th Month [last week in September]. Then a severe edict came from the T'ien Wang, ordering me to come up [river][1] and urging[2] me to bring my army and GO TO clear the north.[3] At that time I had no good plan of action; but just at this moment, from Te-an-hsien in Kiangsi, and from Sui-chou, I-ning, Wu-ning, Ta-yeh, Hsing-kuo,[4] Ch'i-shui,[5] Ch'i-chou,[6] Wu-chiang, Chiang-hsia, Chin-niu, Pao-an,[7] P'u-ch'i, Chia-yü,[8] T'ung-shan, T'ung-ch'eng and other places, more than forty leaders of risings sent people with petitions to Su-[chou], offering to join us.[9] I reported these facts in a memorial, saying that I intended to enlist some hundreds of thousands of these people, and then obey the command to come and clear the north. THOUGH I ANSWERED IN THIS WAY, the Sovereign did not at first agree, but I was adamant. I then allocated troops, selected commanders and set out, having handed over civil and military affairs in Su-[fu] Province to Ch'en K'un-shu.

(IT IS A LONG TIME AGO AND I AM NOT SURE OF THESE NAMES, SO DO NOT ASK MORE).

After the soldiers and the people were settled and everything was handed over, I set out with my army from Su-[chou] to the capital, where I explained the reasons why I did not want to clear the north. The Sovereign was full of righteous[10] indig-
72 nation, and upbraided me severely. But there was nothing I could do. No matter whether the Sovereign assented or not, in Su-[chou] I had agreed[11] to enlist the people who had risen in Kiangsi and Hupeh, so I had to go[12] and meet them. Therefore I went against the command of the Sovereign and against the ties of friendship and trust, and went with my army to Kiangsi and Hupeh.[13]

While in the capital I assembled all civil and military officials of the government for a meeting in my palace, and said, "Brother Princes! Whoever has gold or silver should buy grain

with it. Do not hoard money; buying grain is the most important thing, AND SO ON, Now that we have taken Su-[chou] and Ch'ang-[chou], we will not be attacked from down-river, but from above; and it will be difficult to withstand. The last siege was the sixth,[1] under Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]; the seventh will certainly be a formidable siege by General Tseng [Kuo-fan]. His army has the advantage of the Grand Secretary'and the Governor's excellent strategy AND DEEP SCHEMES,[2] AND UNDER THEIR COMMAND ARE devoted officials and officers. The [Hu]-nan troops are steadfast and enduring; the army is always victorious and has never been defeated. If An-ch'ing can be held, there is no need to worry, but if [An-ch'ing] is not firm, the capital will not be secure.[3] Therefore all should quickly buy grain."

Though I petitioned in these terms, the Sovereign would not change. He upbraided me saying, "You are afraid of death. I am the Sovereign with the true Mandate of Heaven, and have no need
73 of soldiers to establish peace everywhere." What could I say? (SPEECHLESS) I withdrew and with a sigh, said, "Let Meng Te-en, Lin Shao-chang and Li Ch'un-fa hold the forts at Chiang-tung-men and Yü-hua-t'ai[4] - this is the most important task. Everyone must buy grain. I leave the capital now [and will be gone] for more than four hundred days before you have news of me." Civil and military officials in the capital all followed my advice and bought grain. Then the Hungs[5] gave an order that no one could buy grain without a permit, and if anyone wanted a passport to leave the city, he had to pay for it before he would be allowed to leave; without money passports were not issued. Even if someone obtained a passport and bought grain, he was heavily taxed on his return. For this reason no one wanted to buy grain and bring it to the capital. Thus the present catastrophe, the fall of the kingdom, was really caused by the Hungs themselves. Enough of that.

I set out by way of T'ai-p'ing, Wu-hu and Fan-ch'ang, thence to Shih-tai and I-hsien.[1] We met and fought with Pao [Ch'ao]'s army. (ON THE FIRST DAY WE WERE VICTORIOUS, ON THE FOLLOWING DAY PAO [CH'AO]'S ARMY WAS VICTORIOUS), killing several hundred of my men.[4] So I immediately changed my route and did not go through I-hsien, but by way of Jo-ling to Hui-chou, then by Tun-ch'i to Wu-yuan, and from there to Ch'ang-shan-hsien, where we passed the New Year [10 February 1861].[5]

(IT WAS BY WAY OF YANG-CHAN-LING THAT WE CROSSED, INTENDING TO REACH HSIU-NING-HSIEN THROUGH I-HSIEN,[2] BUT WERE DEFEATED BY PAO'S FORCE, STATIONED IN I-HSIEN. THE MAIN H.Q. OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S ARMY WAS AT CH'I-MEN.[3] IN THIS PART THE MOUNTAINS ARE HIGH AND THE ROADS NARROW: ONCE BLOCKED THERE IS NO WAY ROUND. I DID NOT INTEND TO FIGHT FOR THIS PLACE; I WAS REALLY GOING TO HUPEH TO RECRUIT SOLDIERS, SINCE REBELS IN HUPEH AND OTHER HSIEN HAD ASKED ME TO GO. I DID NOT WISH TO BREAK FAITH WITH THEM, THAT IS WHY I DID THIS.)

At the beginning of the 1st Month of the 11th Year [early February 1861], we set out from Ch'ang-shan and went to Yü-shan,
74 Kuang-hsin and Ho-k'ou and to Chien-ch'ang, where we took up positions and attacked the town for more than twenty days without success.[6] Then a Ch'ing force came to its relief, under 'Heaven-storming Cannon' Li Chin-yang.[7] We prepared to do battle with him, but his troops and mine did not fight, but made a truce. His troops were few, mine were many: that is why we made a truce.[8]

Then I withdrew from Chien-ch'ang and went by way of Fu-chou, [Hu]-wan to I-huang, then to the region of Chang-shu and Hsin-kan, where we camped, intending to cross the river.[9] At this time the river was in spate, and on the other bank militia were in occupation, from Feng-ch'eng to above Chi-an. We could not retreat and we could not advance. We had no boats, but there were Ch'ing

gunboats in the river. We remained in Hsin-kan for several days, then suddenly the river dried up completely and I crossed with my troops.[1] THIS WAS AN ACT OF GOD, NOT DUE TO MY ABILITY.

We crossed to Chi-an and went to Shui-chou.[2] We did not intend to station there, but the people insisted on keeping us, so we occupied the various hsien in the Shui-chou Prefecture and pacified the people. The region of I-ning and Wu-ning, and other hsien in Hupeh were already occupied by [my]troops, so while we pacified the people, we assembled those who had petitioned to join us from the region of Hsing-kuo, Ta-yeh, Wu-ch'ang, Chiang-hsia, T'ung-shan, T'ung-ch'eng, Chia-yü, Pu-ch'i [all] in Hupeh, to the
75 number of about three hundred thousand.[3]

Then Pao [Ch'ao]'s army withdrew from Su-sung and came up to Huang-chou-fu,[4] and the troops of Governor Hu [Lin-i] of Hupeh also came to about twenty or thirty li from Chin-niu and Pao-an.[5] This was in the middle of the 6th Month [end of July]. The newly recruited troops had never been into battle, for this reason I did not venture to engage Pao's army.

My cousin Li Shih-hsien came from Hui-chou to the region of Ching-te and Lo-p'ing,[6] where he was fighting against Tso Ching-t'ang [sic].[7] The Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien was victorious at Ching-te, but was defeated at Lo-p'ing and lostten thousand officers and men.[8] Huang Wen-chin, Ho Ting-wen and Li Yuan-chi, in the region of Tung-liu, Chien-te and Jao-chou, were opposed by the Grand Sceretary's subordinate officers AND HELD UP and could not help Li Shih-hsien.[9] The army of Liu Kuan-fang, Ku Lung-hsien and Lai Wen-hung was behind, and again came across by way of Yang-chan-ling.[10] The Grand Secretary's army was stationed at Ch'i-men. Then Liu Kuan-fang's troops were defeated by the Grand Secretary's; Hu Ting-wen was killed by a shell, so his army could not exert
76 its full strength.[11] This army was also checked by the Grand Secretary's force and was unable to do anything.

My cousin Li Shih-hsien, after his defeat at Lo-p'ing, withdrew to Ch'ang-shan by way of Ho-k'ou.[1]

(AT CH'I-MEN THE GRAND SECRETARY WAS BESIEGED BY THE T'IEN CH'AO TROOPS. ONLY THE GRAND SECRETARY COULD HAVE DONE THIS, NO ONE ELSE COULD HAVE STOOD FIRM IN CH'I-MEN). THIS WAS THE GOOD FORTUNE OF THE CH'ING DYNASTY AND THE GOOD FORTUNE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY BECAUSE, SURROUNDED BY [our] TROOPS ON ALL SIDES, IT WAS NOT A PLEASANT SITUATION TO BE IN. IT IS A THING OF THE PAST NOW, AND I CAN SAY THAT I AM FULL OF ADMIRATION.[2] HAVING SAID THIS, I WILL RELATE [the withdrawal] FROM HUPEH, FOR THE PERUSAL OF THE GRAND SECRETARY.[3]

Having assembled new troops in Chin-niu and Pao-an, I did not fight Pao [Ch'ao] and Hu [Lin-i]'s armies, because my troops were raw, and also because I received a report from Li Shih-hsien about his defeat at Lo-p'ing, urging me to return. Tseng chiu-shuai [Kuo-ch'üan] was again besieging An-ch'ing and the Ying Wang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was unable to raise the siege;[4] so I sent Huang Wen-chin back to help relieve An-ch'ing.[5] Liu Kuan-fang was defeated by the Grand Secretary's commanders and turned back. For this reason I immediately moved all the troops on the same day from Hu-peh [Wu-ch'ang] and other hsien, in order to protect Li Shih-hsien's army.[6] One column returned by way of I-ning-chou,
77 another by Wu-ning and another by Sui-an,[7] and all assembled in Shui-chou.[8]

The people of An-i, Feng-hsin and Hsin-ch'ang were causing trouble and had seized the military supplies and money which I was transporting to and from Shui-chou. Later, when I passed through this place, I sentenced the guilty ones and executed more than twenty of the ringleaders.[9] This matter being settled, the whole army withdrew from the district, and the various hsien of Shui-chou were also entirely evacuated.[10]

Previously 'Heaven-storming Cannon' Li Chin-yang, with more

than ten ying of Ch'ing troops, stationed at Yin-kang-ling, had fought with my commanders T'an Shao-kuang, Ts'ai Yuan-lung and Kao Yung-k'uan.[1] The two armies engaged and Li Chin-yang's troops were defeated, the officers all taken prisoner and the whole army scattered. When he was brought to my headquarters, because he [Li Chin-yang] was well-known as a brave commander, I felt pity for a hero, so he was not killed or hurt. I then asked about his past and whether he was willing to join us or not. He replied that captured officers cannot do what they want. From his words I realized that he did not wish to join us. We still[2] treated him well and did not detain him, but allowed him to do as he liked. After a few days we offered him sixty-odd liang of silver for travelling expenses, but he would not accept. He went to Kiangsi [provincial capital, Nan-ch'ang]. Later I heard that he had been executed. This man was not willing to surrender TO
78 THE T'IEN CH'AO; but had been taken prisoner. OUT OF PITY FOR A BRAVE MAN WE RELEASED HIM; SIX OR SEVEN OF HIS OFFICERS ALSO RETURNED. It was a pity he was killed, not having surrendered to us.[3]

After returning from Hupeh I went to Shui-chou, [then] EVACUATED THE VARIOUS HSIEN, went towards Lin-chiang and crossed [the Kan River] at Chang-shu.[4] The main army crossed over. My cousins Li K'ai-yun and Li K'ai-shun went down river on the opposite side from Chang-shu.[5] I thought that my cousin Li Shih-hsien was still at Lo-p'ing and did not know that he had withdrawn to Ch'ang-shan. For this reason we went down river on the other side from Chang-shu, and by wooden rafts on the river, intending to go DOWN TOWARDS[6] Kiangsi [Nan-ch'ang] and join up [there]. Then my cousins going down river on the other side suddenly met an army under Pao Ch'ao, sent by the Grand Secretary, which was encamped in more than twenty stockades opposite Feng-[ch'eng] on the other side of a hill. I did not know that the Grand Secretary

had sent this army. My cousins looked from the hill-top and saw that Pao [Ch'ao]'s troops were numerous, so they did not advance but progressively withdrew their troops until they had all been withdrawn, and retreated without turning back.[1] Pao's army gave chase. Our troops all crossed and came to a small
79 river. Previously they had built a bridge here and did not know that the [local] people had dismantled it; so now there was no bridge to cross. When the enemy came in pursuit our men swam across. When the crossing was almost completed Pao [Ch'ao]'s troops arrived and we lost several dozen men.[2] They then returned to Chang-shu. THE FOLLOWING DAY a strong wind began to blow and boats could not move. THE GREAT WIND BLEW FOR FOUR OR FIVE DAYS;[3] Pao's troops could not cross and I was already three or four days march away. Only after passing Fu-chou Hu-wan did I know that Li Shih-hsien had gone down to Ch'ang-shan.[4]

After the troops had rested for three days we went down to Ho-k'ou;[5] there I saw T'ung Jung-hai, who had come back from Kwangsi, and reinforced by his men, to the number of more than two hundred thousand,[6] went down to Chekiang and divided up.[7] Li Shih-hsien had attacked Chin-hua, T'ang-ch'i and other places,[8] and after the various town in Yen-chou [Prefecture] had been taken we again discussed and decided on the division of forces.[9] I led the newly recruited troops and T'ung Jung-hai's whole army to attack Chekiang [Provincial capital, Hang-chou],[10] sending Li Shih-hsien to attack Wen-[chou], T'ai-[chou], Ch'u-chou, Ning-po and other places.[11]

I sent troops to take Shao-hsing.[12] In whatever <u>hsien</u> our army arrived [the enemy] surrendered and gave up the town to us.
80 ONLY at P'u-chiang-hsien did Chang Yü-liang fight AND ENGAGE for several days. Once Chang [Yü-liang]'s army was defeated the <u>Shih Wang</u> [Li Shih-hsien] took P'u-chiang, and then went on to Ning-po.[13] It was in the 9th Month [11 Oct.- 10 Nov.] that we reached

Chekiang [Provincial Capital].

From Fu-yang-[hsien] we took Yü-hang,[1] then went to Yen-ling-p'i and encamped at Ku-t'ang, about three of four li from the city [Hang-chou]. After establishing stockades I disposed my forces to attack the gates. We had first occupied the prefectures and hsien outside Chekiang [Provincial Capital]. Yen-chou was garrisoned by the Wang-tsung Li Shang-yang;[2] the Ch'ing troops at Ch'ü-[chou] had not been defeated.[3] Chin-hua was garrisoned by Chou Lien-te, one of Li Shih-hsien's own commanders. Lan-ch'i and T'ang-ch'i were garrisoned by Kwangtung troops. THEY WERE BANDITS WHO HARMED THE PEOPLE.[4] Li Shih-hsien led his troops from Chin-hua to take Wen-chou. HAVING TAKEN WEN-CHOU he went to Ch'u-[chou] Prefecture and then took T'ai-chou.[5] These places were all taken by Li Shih-hsien; the attack on Ning-po was also undertaken by Li Shih-hsien's commanders, the Tai Wang Huang Ch'en-chung and the Shou Wang Fan Ju-tseng.[6]

The truth about Ning-po is that the foreign devils deluded
81 us.[7] The army was encamped ten li from Ning-po and the foreign chief from Ning-po came to headquarters to request us to stay put for five days, to give time for the goods of the foreign firms in Ning-[po] to be transported out of the city ENTIRELY AND THEN our army could enter. THEY ASKED FOR FIVE DAYS. The Tai Wang would not agree.[8] He gave them three days to clear out the foreign firms, [during which time] he was willing to remain camped outside [if] supplies of grain for the troops were provided by the foreign devils and the local people.[9] On the fourth day our armies moved into the town AND IMMEDIATELY PACIFIED THE PEOPLE.[10] The foreigners took the Tai Wang to capture Hai-men-t'ing and Chen-hai-hsien. The foreign devils provided boats.[11] After taking these two places he stationed troops there and went back to Ning-po. I cannot finish what I have to say about this affair and will add more later in order to make it clear.[12]

The troops which took Shao-hsing were commanded by the Lai Wang [Lu Shun-te]; Hsiao-shan was also taken by him.[1] THE TRUTH IS THAT Shao-hsing was not taken by fighting; the Ch'ing commander gave up the city. The wall is high and the moat broad, and there is water on all sides. One can reach it or attack it by one route only, and if the town had not surrendered we would not have been able to take it.[2] Hsiao-shan also surrendered after we had taken Shao-hsing. THEN AT ONCE the Lai Wang issued a proclamation for the pacification of the people.

82 Hang-chou was cut off. Wu-k'ang and Te-ch'ing were also held by the T'ien Ch'ao troops, as were Hsiao-feng, Kuang-te, Ssu-an, An-chi — all these hsien.[3] We also had troops at Kao-ch'un and Tung-pa. Li-yang, Ch'ang-chou, Su-chou, Chia-hsing and Shih-men were also garrisoned by [our] troops.[4] Hu-chou was held by Chao Ching-hsien, but no troops came to his relief.[5] Although there were Ch'ing garrisons from Hang-chou to Hai-ning-chou and Hai-yen-hsien, as soon as our troops arrived the garrison commander of Hai-ning-chou, Chang Wei-pang, gave up the town to us.[6] Hang-chou was cut off. All the surrounding prefectures and hsien had been taken and there were no troops to come to the rescue. We were closely investing the four gates. As for outside relief, there was only Chang Yü-liang's army, which came by water by way of Hou-ch'ao-men.[7] But by that time our troops had already fortified strong positions at Feng-shan-men, two or three li from Hou-ch'ao-men. When we saw that Chang Yü-liang's troops were coming, we set out to intercept them. Hang-chou was cut off from contact with the outside; though under pressure of attack inside and out, it had not fallen.[8] There was no grain in the city and the people had nothing to eat.[9] The morale of both soldiers and people was very unsteady; but the Governor of [Chekiang], Wang Yu-ling, had the confidence of the

THIS WAS THE SECOND CAPTURE OF HANG-CHOU.

troops and people and was very determined to hold out.[1]

During the siege I had edicts shot [by an archer] into the city, addressed separately to soldiers and people, Manchus and
83 Han, appealing to each [and saying that] anyone who wanted to come over to us could do so, but if they did not wish to come over it was of no importance. I was willing to release the Manchu troops under General Jui [Ch'ang]'s command.[2] Seven days before laying siege to the city I had written asking the T'ien Wang to allow me to spare the Manchu troops and let them return to their own country. But it took more than twenty days for letters to go and come back to Chekiang, and before the Imperial Endorsement arrived I had broken into the city. Four days later I had not yet attacked the Manchu city because I was waiting for the arrival of the edict of amnesty.[3] Meanwhile I parleyed with General Jui [Ch'ang] and told him that I was willing to let his whole army return home; but he would not trust me. The Imperial Proclamation in answer to my petition to the T'ien Wang then arrived, permitting me to spare the Manchus, but still he would not trust me, and opened fire, killing several hundred of my soldiers. Then I attacked the inner city.[4]

Many men and women jumped into the water and were drowned, many were taken prisoner.[5] General Jui [Ch'ang] and the Military Governor were killed.[6] I sent people down to the river to find their bodies and buried them in coffins.[7] They did not believe in my petition and that I would allow them to go back to their country, that I did not want to harm them. I also had a message shot into the [Manchu] city, so that the soldiers and the people should know. I told them, "You have received orders from your Sovereign to defend the city of Hang-[chou]; I have received orders from my Sovereign to take it. Each serves his own Sovereign and you and I have no choice but to obey. If we can achieve a truce it will prevent the loss of lives of men, women and children.

I will provide you with boats. If you have gold and silver you may take it with you; if you have none I will give you money. You will be sent as far as Chen-chiang." (IN FACT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE, BUT HAD THEY DONE SO, THESE MANCHUS WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN RELEASED). The people of Manchuria crossed into our great country and took the imperial throne; this was ordained by fate and not achieved by them. Formerly Manchus treated the Han people well; but now we each serve a different Sovereign and there is nothing we can do about it. It was with this in mind that I did what I did.

I gave an order to each army [unit] that Manchus soldiers who were taken prisoner were not to be killed or maltreated when they fell into our hands, and that anyone who illegally killed or harmed one, would pay with his own life. Those who wished to join our army could do so, those who did not would be allowed to return to their own country WITH MONEY PROVIDED FOR THE JOURNEY. Then the bolder Manchu officers came to my headquarters and spoke about this and were given money to return home; but there were also some less courageous soldiers who all ran away in the night. There were also many who, having come into our camps, after a while established good relations with the officers, who themselves gave them money and released them. These are not empty words; the soldiers and people of Hang-chou know [of this], and amongst the Manchus there must be those [who know of it].

At the provincial capital there were innumerable Ch'ing candidate or expectant officials, who were also given money to return home.[1] The same had earlier been done at Su-chou.

From the time we were besieging Hang-chou, we were fighting every day with Wang Yu-ling's troops. At that time there was no grain in the city and the people had nothing to eat. The soldiers
85 collapsed from hunger and could not fight. There was nothing Wang Yu-ling could do. Fighting outside [the city] there was only

one of Chang Yü-liang's [commanders], K'uang Wen-pang,[1] [who] fought again and again without success. They could not break out from inside, in fact there was nothing they could do. Wang Yu-ling discussed the matter with his secretary and said, "Write me a letter to the Chung Wang telling him not to harm the soldiers and people of Hang-chou." The secretary replied, "Your Excellency, how can I write such a letter? The two states are at war; how should I address him. If I address him badly it will bring greater disaster upon your people, if I address him well the Emperor will accuse you of surrendering to him." Wang Yu-ling had no answer to his secretary's words and sighed; "There is no need to write anything. Hang-chou certainly cannot be held. I will sit in the great hall and wait for the Chung Wang, to see what sort of man he is. When I have seen [him] I will die." The secretary replied, "When this man enters the city he will certainly not let you die."[2]

There was nothing they could do. Our troops broke into the city over the wall on all sides. I myself went to the city, seized a mount and rushed alone to Wang Yu-ling's yamen to find him. I went inside but could find no trace of him. When I searched the garden at the back I found him hanging there. I ordered my body-guard to take him down, but he was already dead.[3] Then I had him carried into the great hall, where he was placed for people to identify him; and I called in his subordinates to identify him so that there could be no mistake. Then his body was
86 put into a coffin. His official hat and court robes were all returned to him and put in the coffin; his subordinates were told to keep watch over him themselves.

The following day I summoned his subordinates before me and announced to them that anyone who wished to join our army should do so at once; those who did not wish to do so could please themselves. [Wang Yu-ling's] personal troops were all Fukien

men, the other troops were mostly from Liang-hu [Hunan & Hupeh]. They were all spared. SOME OF THEM WERE WILLING TO JOIN AND SOME WERE NOT. THOSE WHO WERE WILLING, JOINED MY DETACHMENTS, THOSE WHO WERE NOT, WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR VILLAGES. They were allowed to keep the money and possessions they had, my troops being forbidden to stop them.

Later, five hundred men selected from his personal force set out with Wang Yu-ling's body in its coffin from the provincial captial. I provided fifteen boats, 3,000 liang of silver for expenses, and a pass, and [his body] was sent home.[1] Each one [of us] serves his own Sovereign, each has his own loyalty. I admired his loyal determination and regretted this brave and righteous man. That is why I took so much trouble. Alive, each serves his own Sovereign and the two sides are enemies: dead, I felt no enmity towards him. This comes from my feelings.[2] I WAS LOATH TO MALTREAT HIM, THAT IS WHY I DID THIS.

There were also Mi Hsien-chao [sic. Mi Hsing-chao] and Lin Fu-hsiang.[3] Apart from them there was Lin Chih, who was Hang-
87 chou [Chekiang] Provincial Treasurer, and had arrived in Hang-chou but had not yet taken up his post, which was still held by Lin Fu-hsiang.[4] These men were also[5] taken prisoner. They were not killed either, but treated with courtesy and not locked up. They came to my office to converse with my civil officials.[6] In the quiet evenings I would discuss affairs with Mi [Hsing-chao] and Lin [Fu-hsiang]. Later I sought out Lin Fu-hsiang's children and restored them to him, found Mi Hsien-chao's horse and returned it to him. Later Mi Hsien-chao presented this horse to my officer Wang An-chün.[7] Lin Chih was a Manchu. He was frightened and ran away the following night, and was not pursued. After ten days or so Lin and Mi wanted to leave, being unwilling to remain with us. A boat was then prepared for each of them to go from Hang-chou to Shanghai, and each was given 300 liang of silver.

But they dared no accept, and each took only 100 liang . Before they left they each wrote a letter bidding me farewell and saying, "In this world we cannot repay this friend, but in the next world we will not forget." They also said, "You, the Chung Wang, are an exceptional man. What a pity you did not encounter an enlightened Sovereign!" and so on. They left after bidding farewell.[1]

This was in the 11th of 12th Month of the 11th Year.[2] It was rainy and cloudy and we could not move. In [the region of] Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] the rivers are small and shallow and when
88 it snowed the water froze and boats could not move. I remained in Su-chou[3] for ten days or so before I left. I finished arranging the enlistment or otherwise of the Ch'ing officers in Hang-chou. I issued more than ten thousand thin wooden coffins for those who had died of starvation in Hang-chou, spending on these coffins some twenty thousand string of cash. Because the distressed people had nothing to eat, ten thousand tan of grain was brought from Chia-hsing, and twenty thousand string of cash brought to Hang-chou.[4] The grain was distributed to the poor and each poor family which had no means of support was loaned capital for their relief. There was no interest, but it was repayable in six months. The grain which was distributed as relief was not to be repaid. In four months Hang-chou was pacified. This was at the end of the 11th Year [1861]. In the 12th Month I returned to Su-[chou], where I spent the New Year [10 February 1862].

We had captured Hang-chou but An-ch'ing had been taken by the troops of Chiu-shuai [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan].[5] In the city everyone was starving, so we lost An-ch'ing. The troops in the city were those of the Ying Wang. It was surrounded with deep moats and high forts by Chiu-shuai's army. The city was cut off and the Ying Wang was unable to relieve it.[6] Then Chiu-shuai withdrew

from some of his stockades by the lakeside; in order to leave
89 a road free for [our troops] to withdraw from An-ch'ing.[1]
Contrary to his expectations the Ying Wang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng did not withdraw, but transported grain from Shih-p'ai and nearby districts into the city. When Chiu-shuai found that they did not withdraw, he again took up positions on the lakeside, and once more surrounded the provincial capital. The Ying Wang was in a predicament. The garrison commanders Yeh Yun-lai and Chang Ch'ao-chüeh were apprehensive and the Ying Wang was alarmed because he could not relieve the city.

There were three of my commanders, one of whom had entered the city to help with its defence.[2] These officers were in my command. When I went up to Hupeh I had left them to hold Liu-ho and T'ien-ch'ang, two hsien which were occupied by my troops. I had sent the three commanders Wu Ting-ts'ai, Huang Chin-ai and Chu Hsing-lung from Su-chou to hold T'ien-[ch'ang] and Liu-[ho]. Then, when there was an emergency at An-ch'ing, the Ying Wang asked for them to be sent.

When Chiu-shuai surrounded the provincial capital, Wu Ting-ts'ai was chosen to take a thousand men into the city to help Yeh [Yun-lai] and Chang [Ch'ao-chüeh] with its defence. The Ying Wang and Liu Ch'ang [Ts'ang]-lin decided to hold Chi-hsien-kuan, while the Ying Wang brought a large force to the rescue. At this time the Chang Wang Lin Shao-chang, the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing,[3] and the Tu Wang Huang Wen-chin, the Yuan Wang[4] Wu Ju-hsiao were all at T'ung-ch'eng. They sent a message to Chi-hsien-kuan saying
90 that they had received an Imperial Command to come and help to raise the siege of An-ch'ing.[5] At this time I was at Hsing-kuo-chou,[6] and heard the news of the Ying Wang's doings, but I knew that the provincial capital [An-ch'ing] could not be held. The Ying Wang left Liu Ch'ang-lin and Li Ssu-fu to hold the stockades at Chi-hsien-kuan and went by night from there to T'ung-ch'eng,[7]

having ordered my commander Huang Chin-ai to protect his rear and follow [him] to T'ung-ch'eng. Unexpectedly this was found out by the Ch'ing troops at Tiao-p'u, Ch'ing-ts'ao-ke, Huang-ni-kang and other places, and [Huang Chin-ai's force] was ambushed slaughtered by General To-[lung-ah].[1] The Ying Wang's whole army got through, but Huang Chin-ai's, which was covering his rear, was ambushed and slaughtered by General To-[lung-ah] with the loss of more than a thousand men. Huang Chin-ai's force was surrounded in flooded fields.[2] Those who were killed were all my men. In the evening Huang Chin-ai managed to escape from the water with a few hundred men. When General To-[lung-ah] saw that they were absolutely desperate, he let them pass and they reached T'ung-ch'eng.[3]

Then the Ying Wang went himself to the capital and begged the Sovereign to send relief. Then unexpectedly the stockades of
91 Liu Ch'ang [Ts'ang]-lin and Li Ssu-fu at Chi-hsien-kuan were attacked by Pao Ch'ao's army, which had been sent by the Grand Secretary, though he failed to take them after several attempts.[4] Then Pao [Ch'ao]'s army established positions and dug a long moat and every day sent out troops to fight. In our stockades they were short of powder, shot and grain; but our troops fought and defended [the stockades] day and night. The besieged troops had a very hard time and finally [Chi-hsien-kuan] was captured by Pao [Ch'ao]'s army.[5] Li Ch'ang [Ts'ang]-lin and Li Ssu-fu were killed in battle, and the whole army was destroyed.[6]

Then the Ying Wang, with the Fu Wang[7] and the Tu Wang Huang Wen-chin, once again had to come to the relief of An-ch'ing.[8] Chiu-shuai [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan] was again besieging An-ch'ing WITH AN EVEN TIGHTER CIRCLE OF MOATS AND FORTS; but after several battles he still did not succeed.[9] Then at the Ling Hu near the city Chiu-shuai made openings in the dyke and put gun-[boats] in, cutting communications, so that it was even difficult to get

messages in and out.[1] The Ying Wang Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing and the Tu Wang Huang Wen-chin were outside and Chiu-shuai's troops cut them off from the city. There was no grain in the city and it was captured by Chiu-shuai.[2] Yeh Yun-lai met his death there, Chang Ch'ao-chüeh escaped by boat.[3] Wu Ting-ts'ai and his whole force, which had entered the city to help with its defence, perished in the river. The whole garrison was lost and only a few escaped. It was a bitter and tragic blow.

When the Ying Wang, who was outside, saw that the provincial
92 capital was lost, he withdrew his troops from Shih-p'ai; the troops at Huang-[mei] and Su-[sung] all withdrew to Yeh-chi-ho. [Ch'en] intended to go up to the region of Te-an and Hsiang-yang to recruit troops.[4] Unexpectedly the officers and soldiers were unwilling to move. The troops would not follow their commander. In the night they all withdrew and went down to Lu-chou by way of Liu-an. The Ying Wang realized that he had no choice but to turn back, and so returned to Lu-chou.[5] Everyone was bickering and disunited. In face of this state of affairs, and having been severely reprimanded by the Sovereign and deprived of his rank and authority, the Ying Wang was troubled and distressed. He wanted to remain in Lu-chou for good, so did not go elsewhere, but sat tight in Lu-chou, blindly loyal to the Kingdom.[6]

General Tseng[7] then sent troops to lay siege [to Lu-chou] and it was hard pressed. Having no grain or fodder it was unable to hold out for long. Officers and men were already wavering AND THEY WERE THEREFORE NOT FIRM and Lu-chou was lost.[8] HAVING LOST HIS OFFICERS AND MEN, AND WITH NO PLAN OF ACTION [Ch'en Yü-ch'eng] fled to Shou-ch'un [Shou-chou], where he was taken prisoner by Miao P'ei-lin, who had turned traitor. He was sent to the Ch'ing camp, and THIS IS HOW he met his end.[9]

After the Ying Wang's death all his troops came under my

command. I saw that the situation was bad, and that they could not cross over to the south, so I sent for Ch'en Te-ts'ai to come to Su-[chou] to discuss arrangements personally with me,
93 and ordered him to collect enough troops and return to relieve the capital within twenty-four months. THIS WAS DECIDED. Now he has been gone for a long time and although letters occasionally arrived with reports, communications were difficult, and this has given rise to the present disaster.[1]

Having said that, I will relate how, in the 11th Year [1861], after taking the Chekiang [Provincial Capital], I returned to Su-chou in the 13th Year.[2] When I went to Kiangsi and Hupeh to recruit troops I arranged the military and civil affairs of Su-chou, Chekiang and Chia-hsing, and handed them over to Ch'en K'un-shu.[3] Only then did I leave.

Then, in the 12th Year [1862], when I returned to the Su-[fu Provincial Capital], the people were dispersed and buildings had been torn down GRIEVOUSLY. Good people came to petition me with tears in their eyes.[4] Ch'en K'un-shu was ashamed that he had let me down; when I reached Chia-hsing on my return from Hang-chou he had already fled with his own troops to Ch'ang-chou, which he appropriated for himself, and bought the title of Hu Wang. This man was one of my officers. Because he maltreated the people of Su-chou and was afraid that I would punish him, he bought this title in order to spite me.[5]

After the capture of Hang-chou and after the Ying Wang's troops had come under me, Huang Wen-chin and Liu Kuan-fang also came under my command. The T'ien Wang saw that I now had a large army and feared that I might have treacherous intentions - there were machinations by jealous ministers as well - and he appointed
94 Ch'en K'un-shu to the rank of wang in order to divide and curb my power.[6] My subordinate officers were angry and bore resentment

in the hearts. When the Sovereign saw that I had more than a million men under me how could he not be suspicious of me?

The people of Su-[fu] Province had been despoiled by Ch'en K'un-shu. When I returned to Su-chou I paid out a great deal of money and grain to the people. All shopkeepers and poor people who could not make ends meet were given capital. Farmers who had not yet planted were ordered to quickly begin cultivation.[1] RICE WAS PROVIDED FOR THEIR USE AND ALL POOR FARMERS RECEIVED GRAIN. AFTER THE 3rd MONTH[2] when I was in Su-chou, the people were all pacified. But again I distributed more than twenty thousand tan of rice and more than a hundred thousand string of cash. After the distribution of this money and rice the people were contented. Afterwards, when they were prosperous, the people all wanted to pay back the loans; we had not demanded this but they themselves wished to pay them back. Then we also reduced the grain tax for the people of all districts, and the transit dues, in order to compensate for their suffering.[3]

I saw that affairs in the capital were every day changing for the worse, and I continually presented petitions; but the Sovereign was even less willing to listen. The more I petitioned the more angry he became, and jealous ministers stirred up trouble. When I saw that my repeated suggestions were ignored I became discontented. Master and servant each had his own reasons for
95 anger. The more I petitioned the more the T'ien Wang mistrusted me. HE COERCED ME WITH HEAVENLY WORDS,[4] reduced my rank and secretly undermined my authority. When my subordinate officers saw this they were indignant and lost their fighting spirit; each though only of his own future, THROWING ADMINISTRATION AND REGULATIONS INTO DISORDER. THE SOVEREIGN SAW THE EXTENT OF MY MILITARY POWER AND WANTED TO DIVIDE MY AUTHORITY.[5]

T'ung Jung-hai was one of my officers and was entirely for me, but he was induced by slander into betraying and deserting

me. This was the result of the plotting of the Sovereign's second brother, who wanted to get control over him, and secretly put about rumours. This is the reason for T'ung Jung-hai's treachery.[1]

In the 12th Year [1862] I remained at the provincial capital [Su-chou] for four months. Then Governor Li Hung-chang went to Shanghai to take over Governor Hsüeh [Huan]'s post, and gathered together some foreign devils to fight against us.[2] Governor Li had the benefit of the heavy revenue from the Shanghai customs and had a lot of money;[3] he was therefore able to hire [foreign] devils to fight against us.[4]

They marched forth and took Chia-ting and Ch'ing-p'u;[5] then threatened T'ai-shan, K'un-shan and other districts. Urgent appeals arrived. This was between the 4th and 5th Months of the 12th Year [1862].[6] I saw that the situation was so bad and the threat so serious that I selected about ten thousand crack troops and led them myself. The [foreign] devils had good resources for attacking towns, and Chia-ting and Ch'ing-p'u are more than
96 a hundred li from the provincial capital. There was no outside relief for the towns they were attacking, so after five or six shih-chien [double hours] they would certainly succeed. Their artillery was very effective, a hundred shots out of a hundred hit their mark and destroyed the town walls, FLATTENED THE TOWN WALLS. Their foreign guns and cannon fired incessantly and [the troops] charged straight in, so that I did not have time to come to the relief. Though I set out as soon as I received the despatch, I did not arrive in time and we lost these two towns.[7]

The [foreign] devil soldiers then went on to T'ai-ts'ang, which they immediately invested.[8] Outside there were Han[9] troops who came to help them do battle, and fought their way into the town. The [foreign] devils controlled the gates, and when they saw the Ch'ing troops they would not allow them to take away any

property, but allowed men and women, both young and old, so do so. The Ch'ing soldiers dared say nothing. If one of your Ch'ing dynasty soldiers said too much, no matter what his rank might be, he would be beaten without mercy.[1] It was because of this [sort of behaviour] that our T'ien Wang was unwilling to use foreign troops. A thousand [foreign] devils would lord it over ten thousand of our men, and who would stand for that? So we did not employ them.[2]

By this time the [foreign] devils had already reached T'ai-ts'ang and had begun the battle. Outside there were more than ten thousand Ch'ing troops and three or four thousand [foreign] devils. The Ch'ing troops had more than a hundred stockades OF ALL SIZES at Sung-chiang, Ssu-ching,[3] Ch'ing-p'u, Chia-ting,
97 Pao-shan,[4] and Shanghai, and each town was garrisoned by [foreign] devils.[5] As soon as I arrived at T'ai-ts'ang I joined battle with them. Each side formed up and gave battle from the ch'en [hour: 7-9 am] to the wu [hour: 11 am - 1 pm], without a decision. Each side had a thousand or more wounded. The following morning we again formed up for battle at the east gate. A great battle lasted from the ch'en hour to the ssu hour [9-11 am], when we fiercely broke through the [foreign] devils' lines, killing several hundred. We chased them into the water and more than a thousand perished. We also smashed more than thirty Ch'ing stockades and took innumerable cannon and foreign guns.[6]

The following morning we pursued the enemy's rearguard and besieged the [foreign] devils in Chia-ting town so that they could not get out.[7] The [foreign] devils who came to their relief from Shanghai had been brought from Kwangtung.[8] They immediately came to the relief of the [foreign] devils in Chia-ting, by way of Nan-hsiang, and engaged us. The two sides met and fought for three days, all indecisively.[9] Each side had two or three thousand wounded. THEN I SAW THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT GOOD and quickly

brought up the T'ing Wang Ch'en Ping-wen, with about ten thousand men, and again joined battle. In this battle the [foreign] devils were severaly defeated, more than a thousand were killed, and they were unable to relieve Chia-ting. THOSE WHO FLED were pursued and more than half were killed.[1]

After recovering Chia-ting town I appointed an officer to command the garrison and went straight down to Ch'ing-p'u and
98 closely besieged the [foreign] devil troops there.[2] Outside there were the foreign devils from Sung-chiang, again sent from Shang-[hai] to relieve [Ch'ing]-p'u-hsien, who came by steamer TO THE RELIEF.[3] THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE WILL OF HEAVEN. I had long since positioned cannon and was waiting for them. As soon as their steamers appeared I surprised them and opened fire. The first shot hit a boat and it began to burn; so the attempt to relieve the town failed.[4] The [foreign] devil troops in [Ch'ing]-p'u then retreated and several hundred devils jumped in terror into the water and were drowned. Once off the roads there is water wherever you go, and movement is very difficult. In an emergency it is easy to make a false step which can cost one's life. That is why the [foreign] devils soldiers retreating in terror, fell into the water and were drowned.[5]

After recovering Ch'ing-p'u we went on to attack the stockades at Ssu-ching,[6] more than ten of them. We went FROM SSU-CHING to Sung-chiang and T'ai-ts'ang, and destroyed more than one hundred and thirty stockades of various sizes. The emplacements outside Sung-chiang were also destroyed.[7] There remained only the single town of Sung-chiang, which was held by the [foreign] devils. The following day some [foreign] devils came again to the relief from Shanghai in boats, carrying foreign powder and more than a thousand foreign cannon.[8] My troops came out and gave battle; the [foreign] devils were defeated and we were victorious. We captured their powder, foreign cannon and rifles.[9] At this time the foreign

99 devils did not dare to do battle with me; if they fought they were defeated.[1]

We closely invested Sung-chiang, but just as we were about to succeed,[2] General Tseng's army came down and captured Wu-hu, Ch'ao-hsien, Wu-wei, Yün-ts'ao, Tung-liang-shan, Hsi-liang-shan and T'ai-p'ing-kuan — Ho-chou as well [3]— WITH A SOUND like splitting bamboo, reached Chin-ling and threatened the capital.[4] In one day three messengers, with edicts from the T'ien Wang urging me to hurry, arrived at Sung-chiang. The edicts were very severe, WHO WOULD DARE TO DISOBEY?[5] There was nothing I could do, so I withdrew the troops from Sung-chiang WITHOUT ATTACKING THE TOWN, BECAUSE OF THE SEVERE SUMMONS.[6]

Then I returned to Su-chou and discussed with my commanders and followers as to the best way out of our difficulties.[7] I knew that General Tseng's army, coming from up-stream, had the advantage of having river-troops, and we were exhausted while they were fresh, so it was difficult for us to challenge them on the water. His army was always victorious and was in a very strong position, so that I did not want to fight him. My advice ABOUT THE SITUATION was to send great quantities of grain to the capital and take materials, grain, powder and cannon from the provinces and prefectures to the capital, to hold out for twenty-four
100 months before fighting them and raising the siege of the capital.[8] [I said that] after such a long time his troops would certainly have lost their fighting spirit and we would then fight them, and so on. I knew that when they arrived General Tseng's soldiers would be in fine condition and full of spirit, so I did not wish to engage them. Just when we had reached agreement,[9] and were about to carry it out, the T'ien Wang again sent a messenger to hurry me, with an edict which said, "I have three times commanded you to come to the relief of the capital, why have you not set out? What do you think you are doing? You have been given great

responsibilities, can it be that you do not know my laws? If you do not obey my commands [you will find] the punishment of the State difficult to endure! MO SHIH-TS'AI [sic][1] IS SPECIALLY COMMANDED TO EXPEDITE THE SENDING OF TROOPS AND TO MEMORIALIZE FOR MY INFORMATION." Under pressure from such an edict I had no choice but to act [accordingly], so IT WAS DECIDED to detach troops and set out to go there. THUS COMPELLED BY THE SOVERIEGN MY HEART WAS NOT IN IT.[2] I handed over the affairs of Su-chou and Hang-chou to my officers, and retained little authority myself. I even put my mother and family into the hands of the Sovereign as surety, to show my unquestioning loyalty.

THE PAPER IS FINISHED BUT THE STORY IS LONG AND I HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED WHAT I HAVE TO SAY. I WILL TROUBLE THE SECRETARIES TO PROVIDE ME WITH A [fresh] NOTE-BOOK AND A GOOD BRUSH. THIS BRUSH IS RUINED. [I have written] NOW THIRTY SEVEN OR THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND CHARACTERS,[3] AND THE BRUSH IS USELESS. I WILL TROUBLE THE SECRETARIES TO PASS ON MY REQUEST TO THE GRAND SECRETARY AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR, TO BE LIBERAL IN THEIR [time] LIMIT, AND I WILL WRITE AS FAST AS I CAN. ALREADY NOW....[4]

101 THE FIRST PART HAS ALREADY BEEN HANDED IN AND NOW I TAKE UP THE STORY FROM THERE. I FEAR THAT IN WHAT WAS HANDED IN YESTERDAY THERE MAY BE PASSAGES WHICH DO NOT FIT TOGETHER, SO I TROUBLE THE SECRETARIES TO EXAMINE THE FIRST PART AND ARRANGE IT FOR THE GRACIOUS SCRUTINY[5] OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR. I FEAR THAT THERE MAY BE WORDS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO PROSCRIPTIONS AND I WILL TROUBLE [the secretaries] TO CHANGE OR DELETE THEM. FROM MY EARLIEST DAYS[6] I HAVE NEVER STUDIED[7] SO MY KNOWLEDGE OF CHARACTERS IN INADEQUATE, AND I DO NOT KNOW THE PROSCIPTIONS. WHAT I HAVE SUBMITTED UP TO NOW ARE ONLY[8] THINGS WHICH I KNOW THROUGH BEING LONG IN OUR STATE, WHAT I DO NOT KNOW I HAVE NOT

SPOKEN OF.[1] I KNOW [only] WHAT I HAVE SEEN DURING MY LIFE; WHAT I DO NOT KNOW I HAVE NOT SPOKEN OF. WHAT I HAVE SUBMITTED IS A GENERAL OUTLINE OF WHAT I CAN REMEMBER. THE THINGS WHICH I KNOW ABOUT I HAVE ALL RECORDED, WITH FEW OMISSIONS. WHAT I DO NOT KNOW I THOUGHT IT BETTER NOT TO SPEAK OF. THESE WORDS ARE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND SINCERE. THE THINGS WHICH I SHOULD SPEAK ABOUT I RECOUNT WITHOUT BEING ASKED. I WILLINGLY PRESENT THIS STATEMENT, SEEING THE GRAND SECRETARY'S KINDNESS AND GREAT RIGHTEOUSNESS AND THE GOVERNOR'S BENEVOLENCE AND LIBERALITY, AND
102 RESPECTING THEIR RESOURCEFULNESS. I WOULD BE VERY GLAD FOR THIS DEPOSITION WHICH I HAVE WRITTEN TO GO THROUGH THE HANDS OF THE SECRETARIES. I FEAR THAT THERE ARE WORDS WHICH MAY GIVE OFFENCE, TO I WILL TROUBLE [the secretaries] TO BE SURE TO CHANGE OR DELETE THEM. NOW I HAVE FINISHED THE FIRST PART, I WILL CONTINUE WRITING.

Having received the strict command which I could no longer refuse, I made arrangements to detach troops from various places, and selected a day for setting out.[2] Thus coerced by the Sovereign I lost all interest in life; but considering that my mother, now more than sixty years old, had brought me up, I submitted to circumstances and obeyed. Seeing what the situation was like, I knew that we could not long survive. The Sovereign had not instituted good government, [but I had to] continue to the end my lifetime of loyalty to Heaven

Then I handed over all military affairs in Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] to various officers,[3] and went with my mother and family back to the capital and handed them over to the Sovereign as hostages to show my complete loyalty. The reason why I handed over my whole family to the Sovereign as hostages, was because he had pronounced an edict commanding his own messenger to come and accuse me to my face, saying that I was disloyal, saying that

I had my own ambitions. The court ministers urged me and I had no choice but to agree. (IN THE STATE THERE WERE GOOD FRIENDS AND ALSO PEOPLE FOR WHOM I FELT NO FRIENDSHIP. BUT MAN'S HEART IS MADE OF FLESH, AND AFTER CONSTANT URGING I WAS PERSUADED.
103 THOUGH I DID NOT WISH TO HAVE OVERALL COMMAND, I HAD MORE TROOPS THAN ANYONE IN THE KINGDOM AND IT WAS A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH I COULD NOT EVADE. AT COURT EVERYONE LOOKED TO ME, SO I HAD TO AGREE. IF I DID NOT TAKE CARE OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THREE DAYS, IF MY PALACE GATE WAS NOT OPEN FOR THREE DAYS, ALL THE CIVIL AND MILITARY, MEN AND WOMEN, WOULD COME TO BESEECH ME); HOW COULD I STOP? (THE SOVEREIGN DID NOT INTEREST HIMSELF IN MY AFFAIRS AND I SERVED HIM REALLY ONLY OUT OF LOYALTY).[1]

Then in the middle of the 8th Month I set out from the provincial capital [Su-chou],[2] passed through Li-yang and consentrated my troops at Tung-pa. Then we came straight down to Li-shui and made for Yü-hua-t'ai by way of Mo-ling-kuan. Others came by way of Pan-ch'iao and Shan-ch'iao, and we surrounded and besieged Chiu-shuai [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan]'s fortifications.[3] We attacked for THIRTY OR forty days continuously, without being able to break through.[4] Chiu-shuai held firm everywhere; the moats were deep, the forts strong, and there were many wooden bridges.[5] Their soldiers were better armed and their discipline was good.[6] That is why we attacked for many days without success. Moreover, it was in the 8th Month [12 September - 11 October] that we came, and no one had winter clothes. In the 9th and 10th Months, when it was cold, the army had no provisions. That is why we did not succeed.[7]

After the failure of the attack, the Sovereign reprimanded me severely and cashiered me.[8] He called me into the audience chamber, publicly reprimanded me and ordered me to advance at once and campaign in the north.[9] I had no choice but to obey, and set out in the snow.[10]

Once across on the north [bank] I was cut off by the [Yangtse] river, and my troops in Hang-[chou] and Su-[chou] could be ordered
104 about at will, and my commanders had no choice but to obey. The officers under my command were subject to the machinations of the Sovereign's second brother, Hung Jen-ta. Fortunately on the north bank [my troops] had succeeded in taking Liang-p'u, so that I could cross the river to the north,[1] and advance by way of Ho-chou, which had been taken the previous year by my subordinates.[2] I came later by way of Han-shan, Ho-chou and Ch'ao-hsien.[3] In this region there was hardship because the people had been despoiled; so I immediately commanded Wang Hung-chien, an official of mine,[4] to take money and buy grain and provisions for the relief of the people.[5]

From Ch'ao-hsien the troops advanced to Shih-chien-pu, where we met an army sent by the Grand Secretary, encamped in ten or more stockades.[6] I immediately deployed my forces to give battle, but [the enemy] would not come out, and merely held his positions, waiting at ease for us to exhaust ourselves. We attacked for several days without success. Then it rained for day after day without stopping. My troops were exhausted and many were ill.[7] In one night whole units would be affected, and I saw that we were in a difficult situation. We were unable to take [the enemy stockades] and could not win a battle. I could think of no solution. The Ch'ing troops would not come out and give battle, but preferred to hold firm in their strong positions. Then from outside relief arrived [for them].[8] Many of my men were ill and I had not enough troops; so I withdrew my army by way of Lu-
105 chiang, up to Shu-ch'eng and then to Liu-an-chou.[9] At Lu-chiang we came up against [enemy] troops; after two engagements the Ch'ing force was defeated. We pursued them to the town, but the gates were firmly closed.[10]

On the following day we hastened to Liu-an.[11] It was before the

harvest was ripe. I wanted to join up with Ch'en Te-ts'ai's army;[1] but there was no grain in the region and we could not set out at once. We had no choice but to return. We turned back near the border of Shou-ch'un [Shou-chou];[2] but there was no grain in this place, and having been persecuted for a long time by Miao P'ei-lin's troops, the people were suffering great hardship. So again my troops obtained nothing to eat and many died of starvation. (MANY) ate (GRASS) to satisfy their hunger; how could that give them strength.[3]

We returned to the region of T'ien-ch'ang just at the time when Chiu-shuai took Yü-hua-t'ai.[4] Ch'ao-hsien, which was held by Hung Ch'un-yuan, was taken by Pao Ch'ao's army, sent by the Grand Secretary. The defeated [troops] withdrew to Ho-chou, and there was chaos amongst the soldiers and people.[5] Yü-hua-t'ai having been lost, the capital was in panic, and the T'ien Wang sent a messenger with an edict ordering me to return.[6] I at once led my troops back. It was just at the time when the Yangtse was in spate; the roads had been destroyed by the floods and there was nowhere to march. Then [the troops at] Ho-chou were defeated and Chiang-p'u was lost.[7] The army was in disorder. Combat officers and troops, and the horses, were first taken across the river in boats. The crossing was almost completed, but some old
106 and very young, and horses which refused to embark, were left on the river bank. At this [time] Chiu-fu-chou was flooded and the soldiers had nowhere to lodge.[8] [Even if] they had rice, there was no fuel to cook with, and a great many died of hunger. Just at this time CHIU-SHUAI[9] SENT RIVER TROOPS to attack.[10] Hsia-kuan was also attacked by Chiu-shuai.[11] At the loss of this garrison, Chiu-fu-chou was given up. (I DO NOT KNOW THE FATE OF THE REST OF THE ARMY, WHO DID NOT GET ACROSS).[12]

After my return [I found that] Tseng chiu-shuai had captured our Yü-hua-t'ai and was so strongly intrenched there that we could

recover it. My troops had no provisions and could not stand firm, but dispersed down to Su-chou and Chekiang. Altogether in this whole operation we lost several myriad of fighting troops. I myself lost heart, so the Kingdom was in danger.

Our failures at Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] were due to the foreign devils causing trouble. They got rewards from Governor Li [Hung-chang] for attacking our towns. The taking of Su-chou and other districts CANNOT BE SAID TO BE DUE TO LI HUNG-CHANG'S ABILITY, BUT REALLY TO THE EFFORTS OF THE FOREIGN DEVILS; (HE USED THE CUSTOMS REVENUE FROM SHANGHAI TO HIRE THEIR HELP). These [foreign] devils would sell their lives when they saw money.[1] (THEN[2] THESE DEVILS AND) Governor Li [Hung-chang], seeing that I was not in the provincial capital [Su-chou], took the opportunity to attack it.[3] If I had not gone to the capital, and had not gone north, they would certainly not have been able to attack my city.

107 [I had not been willing][4] to go to the capital or to go north BECAUSE OF THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. I reported to the Sovereign THE DETAILS OF THE GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, saying: "The capital cannot be defended. It is closely besieged by General Tseng's troops, with deep moats and strong forts. There is no grain or fodder in the city, and no relief comes from outside.[5] [We should] give up the city and go elsewhere."[6]

THIS WAS IN THE 11th MONTH OF THE 13th YEAR [13 Dec.-12 Jan.1864]

The T'ien Wang was full of righteous anger,[7] and reprimanded me [in a manner] hard to bear. I could do nothing but kneel and again petition saying, "If you do not follow my advice it will certainly be impossible to protect the lives of all the people in the city. Chiu-shuai[8] has taken your Yü-hua-t'ai and cut off communications by the south gate, so that YOU cannot go out by the gate. They have taken your Chiang-tung-ch'iao,[9] and cut communications by the west gate. They have taken your Ch'i-kung-

ch'iao [sic][1] and have now established a fort outside the east gate, and have made a deep and long moat. Strong forces are firmly intrenched at Hsia-kuan. The roads are cut[2] and the gates blocked. In the capital the morale of the people is not steady. (THERE ARE MANY OLD PEOPLE AND CHILDREN BUT FEW FIGHTING TROOPS).[3] There are many court officials and civil officials, many people who expend food and supplies. If you do not heed the advice of your minister, ruin is inevitable."

When I had finished petitioning, the T'ien Wang again sternly reprimanded me, saying: "I have received the sacred command of God, the sacred command of the Heavenly Brother Jesus,[4] to come down into the world to become the only true Sovereign of the myriad countries under Heaven. Why should I fear anything? There is no need for you to petition and no need for you to take
108 charge of the administration. You can do as you like; remain in the capital or go away. If you do not serve my invincible Kingdom there are those who will. You say that there are no troops; but my Heavenly soldiers are limitless like water. Why should I fear the ——[5] Tseng? You are afraid of death and so may well die. State matters are nothing to do with you. The second brother of the Sovereign, the Yung Wang,[6] is in charge; the Young Hsi Wang will issue commands,[7] and the whole court will unit to execute those who disobey the commands of the Young Hsi Wang."

After being severely reprimanded in this way, I begged the T'ien Wang before the throne to take a sword and kill me so that I might avoid the punishment to come. "As the servant of my Sovereign I have never had a moment's rest. Now, when I petition on State affairs the Soveriegn scolds me thus. I wish to die before the throne,[8] as my final requital to you." I petitioned in this way, but nothing would persuade the Sovereign to agree. With tears in my eyes I went out of the palace gate. All the

officials of the court came to condole with me. The following day the T'ien Wang understood that he was wrong and conferred upon me a dragon robe in order to pacify me. (AT THIS TIME [I did not][1] DIE ONLY BECAUSE OF MY MOTHER, IT WAS REALLY NOT FOR THE SAKE OF THE SOVEREIGN).[2]

After this, I remained[3] in the capital for more than a month. In the 1st Month of the New Year, the 14th.,[4] I wished to quit the capital, but the Sovereign was afraid of my leaving. In the city the morale of the people was shaky and the court officials begged me to stay. When all the brothers and sisters in the capital heard I was to leave, men and women in the city all begged me to stay with tears in their eyes. I agreed and did not set out. My present misfortune is because OF MY MOTHER AND
109 [because the Sovereign] would not follow my advice, but behaved ungovernably and said: "Everything is decided by Heaven and there is no need for you to scheme. Obey my command, cross to the north, join up with Ch'en Te-[ts'ai]'s force, reconquer the north bank and report to me." My memorials were not sent up BECAUSE OF jealous ministers; BECAUSE OF the Sovereign's distrust of my power, my command was secretly reduced, so that the various hsien of Su-chou were lost.

At Chin-hua and Lung-yu[5] in Chekiang LI SHIH-HSIEN'S ARMY was completely held in check by Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'ang, who had been sent by the Grand Secretary.[6] Ning-po had previously been taken with the connivance of the [foreign] devils;[7] then at NING-PO the Ch'ing commander stirred the hearts of the foreign devils with money, to attack Ning-po. The foreign devils' artillery was formidable and very accurate, and knocked down the walls of the town. Our troops could not hold their ground, and abandoned the defence;[8] then withdrew consecutively from Yü-yao and Cheng-hsien also.[9] Then the foreign devils, having received a reward of money for taking Ning-po, were offered a reward to attack Shao-hsing.[10]

For the attacks on these two places the foreign devils received [much money][1] (MORE THAN FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND IN SILVER. NING-PO HAD RICH REVENUE FROM THE CUSTOMS AND THERE WAS A LOT OF MONEY THERE. THE CH'ING OFFICIALS EMBEZZLED[2] MILITARY FUNDS, GOT THE FOREIGN DEVILS TO DO THE WORK, BUT TOOK THE CREDIT FOR THEMSELVES. IT WAS THE SAME FOR THE ATTACK ON SHAO-HSING), otherwise they would not have been able to attack our cities.

110 After this, Chin-hua, Lung-yu, Yen-[chou], Wen-[chou] and T'ai-[chou] were abandoned one after the other, and the troops stationed at Fu-yang.[3] Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'ang's whole army came down and threatened Fu-yang, but fought with our armies for several months without capturing it.[4] Then once more foreign devil troops were invited; they came by water and destroyed the wall of Fu-yang with artillery fire. After more than ten engagements the [foreign] devils were defeated. Then more [foreign] devil troops were sent, and again we fought. Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'ang's troops also joined battle; hence the fall of Fu-yang,[5] Shao-hsing and Hsiao-shan.[6] Our troops withdrew to Yü-hang and established positions there. Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'ang's troops arrived and there was a battle which went on day after day. We held Yü-hang with all our strength[7] in order to protect Hang-chou.

Having taken Fu-yang, the [foreign] devil troops received their money and returned to Ning-po. Then Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'ang's troops advanced on Hang-chou by land and water, some fortifying positions at Yü-hang, others at Chiu-lung-shan, as far as Feng-shan-men, Lei-feng-t'a and Hsi Hu [West Lake], linking up with Yü-hang - a distance of more than 80 li. This region is mountainous and with many rivers, and one fort has the strength of ten. More than a hundred forts covered this 80 li. Between Hsi Hu and
111 Yü-hang we had only ten or so forts, all depending on the water for their defence. The two sides were in positions facing each other; it was a deadlock. Neither side found it convenient to

give battle. The commander of Hang-chou was the T'ing Wang Ch'en Ping-wen; Yü-hang was commanded by Wang Hai-yang.[1] The fact that Hang-chou held out for several months was due to the protection provided by the water.

Then the foreign devils attacked Cha-p'u,[2] P'ing-hu and Chia-shan, and these three places were lost.[3] Su-chou, T'ai-ts'ang, K'un-shan and Wu-chiang were all taken[4] by (THE [FOREIGN] DEVILS IN THE PAY OF)[5] Governor Li [Hung-chang].[6] This was when Chiu-shuai had taken Yü-hua-t'ai and the capital was in a panic. The Sovereign would not allow me to go down to Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] though I begged him again and again. Then the fort at Yin-tzu-shan was lost,[7] and he was even less willing to let me go. The commanders in Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] sent urgent calls for aid, and every day urgent despatches arrived. I had no choice but to petition again. The Sovereign and his ministers wanted me to provide 100,000 [liang of silver] for military expenses before they would allow me to leave. I had to hand over 100,000 liang of silver and all the jewelry of my whole family.[8] The Sovereign gave me only forty days to go to Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] and return. If I did not make up the whole sum of money or return within the time limit, I would be dealt with according to the laws of the state.[9] Seeing the urgent state of affairs down there, I was willing to agree. I had to get out of the capital and then think of another plan.[10]

I had not been gone long when Kao-ch'iao-men was taken by Chiu-shuai.[11] At that time the foreign devils were already close to the provincial capital [Su-chou]. After the defeat at Kao-
112 ch'iao-men, the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing fled back to Tung-pa, and the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien returned to Li-yang.

I was at Su-chou fighting against the foreign devils. After several days of fighting there was no clear decision, neither side being able to move forward. (THERE WERE MANY CANALS AND THE

FOREIGN DEVILS HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING STEAMERS.[1] OUR WATER TROOPS COULD NOT STAND UP TO THEM, THOUGH OUR LAND TROOPS COULD FIGHT. BUT THERE ARE TOO MANY CANALS AROUND SU-CHOU AND NOT ENOUGH DRY LAND.[2] THAT IS WHY WERE WERE DEFEATED AND LOST GROUND. THIS WAS THE EVIL BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FOREIGN DEVILS. AT THIS TIME THERE WAS A DEADLOCK).[3]

I personally led a force out of the Ch'ang Gate to Ma-t'ang-ch'iao, intending to deal with [the enemy] from outside, and obtain temporary protection for the provincial capital.[4] I stationed my troops at Ma-t'ang-ch'iao intending to return to [T'ien]-ching to persuade the Sovereign to go elsewhere and not to hold on to the capital. But I had only considered this and as yet had done nothing [about it].

The commander of Su-chou was the Mu Wang T'ang Shao-kuang, one of my favourite commanders, whom I had left to hold Su-chou.[5] Also there, were the Na Wang Kao Yung-k'uan, the K'ang Wang Wang An-chün, the Ning Wang Chou Wen-chia and the t'ien-chiang Chang Ta-chou and Wang Hua-pan. They were unrighteous traitors.[6] Kao Yung-k'uan and the others were also officers under my command, who had been soldiers since their childhood, trained and brought up until they had achieved the rank of wang. They and T'an Shao-
113 kuang were [like] my left and right hands; WHO COULD HAVE SUPPOSED THAT THEY WOULD DO THIS? I had long known that Kao Yung-k'uan and these men intended to go over to the Great Ch'ing, but though I knew, I did not punish them. In a casual moment I said to Kao Yung-k'uan, Wang Hua-pan, Chou Wen-chia, Wang An-tiao, Chang Ta-chou, Wang Yu-wei and Fan Ch'i-fa:[7] "The Sovereign has fallen on evil days and his rule cannot last long. You are all men of Hunan and Hupeh and can suit yourselves. There is no need for us to harm each other. In the present situation I cannot detain you if you have other intentions; but I myself am a famous general of our Kingdom, and who would dare go bond for me to surrender?

(I AM LOATH TO LEAVE MY FAMILY AND MY MOTHER, NOW OVER SIXTY." EVERYONE WEPT AND EACH WENT HIS WAY).[1] They answered, "The Chung Wang should set his mind at rest; we can never be unrighteous. We have been with you since our childhood; how could we have such evil intentions? If we had such intentions we would not have shared hardships with you for so many years." I was their superior and they my subordinates, and they did not dare to speak out. I watched their behaviour and knew that they had treacherous intentions; that is why I spoke. But considering the situation I did not punish them, because I had long known that
114 we were near to A LIFE AND death STRUGGLE. Because I am a man of Kwangsi there was nowhere for me to go; SO I SPARED THEM. These officers had long been under my command and had won merit in battle. I had achieved fame through their efforts and I really spoke from the heart. I had not foreseen that these men, who had been on bad terms with the Mu Wang T'an Shao-kuang since their youth, would later turn traitor, murder the Mu Wang and surrender to Governor Li [Hung-chang]. Not three days had passed after they had given up the city [of Su-chou] when they were killed by Governor Li.[2] That is why to this day the leaders do not dare to surrender.[3]

When Su-chou was lost I was at Ma-t'ang-ch'iao. As soon as I heard that the provincial capital was lost I went to Ch'ang-chou and then to Tan-yang, where I camped.[4] Then Wu-hsi fell.[5] The armies were in disarray and the people in confusion. I could think of no plan and remained temporarily in Tan-yang. My cousin Li Shih-hsien was stationed at Li-yang at that time, and he urged me to go there and make other plans.[6] He wanted to prevent me from returning to the capital, but I would not agree. Then he wanted to come with his army and force me to go there, to stop me from going to the capital. But seeing how bad the situation was, and because of my mother in the capital, from whom I could

not bear to part - A BLOOD AND BONE RELATIONSHIP - I went with a cavalry escort[1] hurriedly back to the capital by night.[2]

115 The following day I went to court and petitioned;[3] but all the men and women in the city begged me to stay, otherwise I would long ago have gone away.[4]

In Su-[fu] province there remained only Tan-yang, Ch'ang-chou, Chin-t'an, Li-yang and I-hsing. This year [1864] Ch'ang-chou was also taken by (THE FOREIGN DEVILS IN) Governor Li [Hung-chang's] (PAY), and all the soldiers in the town were killed.[5] After the capture of Ch'ang-[chou] the Tan-yang garrison also withdrew.[6] Chia-hsing in Chekiang also fell about this time.[7] Only the garrisons at Hu-chou, Ssu-an and Kuang-te had not withdrawn. The troops in Chekiang provincial capital [Hang-chou], Tan-yang, Chin-t'an, I-hsing and Li-yang had nowhere to flee to. I was besieged in the capital and none of the commanders or wangs knew what to do. That is why the move was made into Kiangsi.[8] The commander who PLANNED AND led the troops into Kiangsi was my cousin Li Shih-hsien; the troops were all from my command in Chekiang. Compelled by the pressure of events, they wanted to press forward into Kiangsi. The various commanders who led the troops were Li Shih-hsien, Liu Chao-chün, Wang Hai-yang, Ch'en Ping-wen, T'an Ying-

116 chih, Ch'en Ch'eng-ch'i and Li Jung-fa. They are already in Kiangsi, so I will leave this matter and speak of bad government in the capital which led to ruin.

From this time on [though] the state was about to perish, the T'ien Wang utterly refused to listen to anyone. After I, before the T'ien Wang's throne, had faced the Sovereign with the whole situation in the kingdom, he became very suspicious and jealous, and handed over the administration of the capital to his elder brother Hung Jen-ta. To all important gates and strategic points Hung sent men to inspect and control; I was not in charge of administration in the capital. If the Sovereign had put me in

charge of the administration it would not have deteriorated so.[1] I remained in the capital only because of my mother. I saw the predicament of our kingdom: the cities outside [the capital] had all fallen, every day the situation got worse. The Sovereign did not concern himself with the soldiers or people of the Kingdom, but shut himself up in his palace and never came out of the palace gate. If one tried to petition about affairs of the Kingdom for the sake of preserving the state, whatever one said, the T'ien Wang would only talk of insubstantial things and did not consider the Kingdom. The affairs of state had not really been delegated to anyone, and everyone had a hand in them. I had long been in the field in command of troops, and most of my commanders were outside. In the city there were only the families of those who were in the field, each with ten, or seven or eight persons.

117 Seeing that I was in the capital they banded together and formed a squad of more than a thousand.[2] In the 11th Month of the 13th Year,[3] when I entered the capital from outside, I also had my staff of officers, about ten. At that time I was only in charge of the defence of the city and was ordered to wherever there was an emergency. The poor in the capital, men and women, all came to me for help,[4] but there was nothing I could do. The Sovereign did not concern himself with this matter. When I petitioned saying, "There is no food in the whole city and many men and women are dying. I request a directive as to what should be done to put the people's minds at ease," the Sovereign issued an edict saying; "Everyone in the city should eat manna. This will keep them alive."[5] But how can manna nourish people in real life? People were to eat all sorts of things which grow in the ground, which the T'ien Wang called manna. I and the other ministers petitioned saying, "This stuff cannot be eaten." The T'ien Wang replied, "Bring and prepare some and I will be the first to eat it." Since this was what he said there was nothing anyone could do. When none was

obtained for him to eat, the Sovereign himself, in the open spaces of his palace, collected all sorts of weeds, which he made into a lump and sent out of the palace, demanding that everyone do likewise, without defaulting. He issued an edict ordering the people to act accordingly and everyone would have enough to eat.

The T'ien Wang long since knew that we would one day run out of grain; he had long known that the capital was not secure, but because he was arrogant he did not consider everything properly.
118 When he had entered Nanking, he made it into his Imperial capital, and he did not want to give up his cause. He relied upon Heaven and did not believe in men. Everything depended on Heaven. In the two or three previous years he had already ordered everyone to store up manna; each family was to provide ten tan, which was to be put in store. Some people obeyed and handed it in and some did not. The Sovereign himself in his palace had long been eating this stuff. Since the Sovereign was like this there was really nothing I could do. In the city several myriads of poor people, man and women, importuned me to save them and help them to survive. But there was nothing I could do. In the 7th and 8th Months of the 13th Year [13 Aug. - 12 Oct.1863] I had money and rice AND COULD (TEMPORARILY REGISTER AND DISTRIBUTE MONEY AND RICE TO THE POOR FAMILIES IN THE CITY, AND ALSO TO THE FAMILIES OF POOR SOLDIERS)[1] to save their lives. More than 70,000 poor people were registered, and all received 20 dollars; THOSE WHO WANTED could obtain two tan of rice by going to Pao-yen.[2] Those who could do so went to Pao-yen for rice. Families which did not have the means to do so, received money so that they could engage in petty trading,[3] in order to survive.[4] I relieved them until the 12 Month of last year [13 Jan. - 11 Feb.1864] and then I could not continue. I was too poor, and had neither money nor rice. Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] were lost as well, the capital was tightly invested

and we could not hold out however hard we tried. I petitioned the Sovereign, but he would not withdraw from the city. There was really nothing to be done, AND I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO DO THIS.[1] When I had money and rice I was able to distribute relief widely to the soldiers and people. After the people of [the
119 region from] Tan-yang to San-ch'a-ho, Lung-tu, Hu-shu, Hsi-ch'i were killed by Ch'en K'un-shu and Hung Ch'un-yuan,[2] I issued money and rice and sent an officer to succour AND RELIEVE THE PEOPLE. At this time the Sovereign's second brother and the Hung family, seeing that I cared greatly for the soldiers and people, feared that I intended to ruin the Kingdom. What they said [in secret] REACHED MY EARS: that I had been loyal once, but had turned traitor. They ignored my bitter lifetime of effort, forgot about the diligence of people like me and even said I was a traitor. I had been unswervingly loyal to the Sovereign; why should he trust in jealous ministers and call me a traitor? For this reason I was disheartened[3] and stayed in the capital with pent-up feelings [determined] to perish with him. IF IT HAD NOT BEEN BECAUSE OF THIS, I had several myriad of troops outside and could have gone FREE AND UNCONSTRAINED,[4] and not have had to suffer this disaster. I HAD LONG KNOWN THAT HIS FATE WAS SEALED, BUT AS A KWANGSI MAN I HAD NOWHERE TO FLEE TO; SO I REMAINED LOYAL TO THE DEATH. BUT PEOPLE LIKE ME, WHO HAD LONG SERVED THE SOVEREIGN AND RECEIVED HIS FAVOURS, COULD NOT LEAVE THE CAPITAL ONCE THEY ENTERED IT BECAUSE OF THE MACHINATIONS OF THE JEALOUS MINISTERS.[5]

When I went to the capital everyone was delighted; if they knew that I was to leave everyone wept. When I was in the capital the Hung family dared not oppress the people and did not venture to coerce and deceive too much the people of the city; nor did they dare to oppress and cheat the soldiers. When I was not in the city they searched every house and took away all grain, money and valuables for their own use, and no one dared to resist. Every

day the population was checked and there was no peace for men
120 or women.

Last year the T'ien Wang changed the system and insisted that in the whole [state], in and out [of the capital], in all [army] units whatever their size, [amongst] civil and military, and also amongst the people, all proclamations and printed [documents] should have INSERTED the words: 'Heavenly Father, Heavenly Brother and Heavenly King'.[1] Those who did not obey would be torn asunder between five horses. The army was to be called the 'Heavenly Army', the people, the 'Heavenly People'; the Kingdom, the 'Heavenly Kingdom'; the battalions, the 'Heavenly Battalions'; the troops were to be called the 'Royal Troops'. At the time everyone obeyed except me and Li Shih-hsien, and Li Shih-hsien still refuses to use this formula.[2] THEN[3] the T'ien Wang saw that Li Shih-hsien did not use these terms and immediately cashiered him, and to this day his rank has not been restored to him.[4]

In calling it the Kingdom 'of the Heavenly Father, Heavenly Brother and Heavenly King', it was the T'ien Wang's intention TO USE THIS to indicate that the affairs of Heaven were concealed from men. The T'ien Wang always used heavenly words to admonish people.[5] We, his officials, did not dare to challenge him, but let him give what names he wanted. Calling them 'Heavenly Dynasty, Heavenly Army, Heavenly Officials, Heavenly People, Heavenly Commanders, Heavenly Soldiers and Royal Troops,' made them all into his personal troops and stopped us from calling them our troops.[6] Anyone who spoke of 'my troops' or 'my soldiers' would be reprimanded thus: "You have treacherous intentions! THIS IS THE HEAVENLY ARMY; THERE ARE HEAVENLY OFFICIALS, HEAVENLY TROOPS, AND THIS IS THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM. HOW CAN THEY BE YOUR TROOPS?" IF ONE DID NOT CALL THEM 'HEAVENLY SOLDIERS, HEAVENLY KINGDOM AND HEAVENLY OFFICIALS' he was afraid that people were
121 going to take his kingdom from him. These are (TRUE) words.

Whoever dared to speak of 'my troops' would be torn asunder between five horses.

The titles of the wangs were also changed.[1] This was a mistake on the part of the T'ien Wang. Formerly, after the appointment of the Tung, Hsi, Nan, Pei and I Wangs, APART FROM THESE, HE HIMSELF PROCLAIMED THAT after the killing of the Tung Wang and the Pei Wang [he would] never appoint any more wangs. That there are other wangs today is because in the 9th Year [1859] his cousin Hung Jen-kan came and [the T'ien Wang] was extremely pleased to see his cousin arrive. THE T'IEN WANG WAS DELIGHTED AND GREATLY FAVOURED HIS COUSIN.[2] He had not been in the capital half a month when he was made chün-shih[3] and given the title of Kan Wang.[4] An edict was pronounced throughout the Kingdom that everyone was to be under his command. But after the appointment no plans appeared and the T'ien Wang reconsidered the matter.[5] He saw that his senior officers, who had won merit and had long served his kingdom, were resentful, and realized that the position was unsatisfactory. After the I Wang went off, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and I were the principal defenders of the Kingdom. At that time the name of the Ying Wang was already known, but I had not yet made a name for myself. I was always hard-working, helping to plan, shirking nothing. The T'ien Wang saw that after elevating his cousin - AS SOON AS HE ARRIVED HE WAS GIVEN SENIORITY, YET HE HAD NO ABILITY [6]- after two months the Kan Wang had planned nothing, [and the T'ien Wang] already regretted his error [and found it] hard to face his officers who had won merit for themselves. THEN he first promoted Ch'en Yü-ch'eng to Ying Wang. After promoting Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, he saw that I was always winning merit in battle, that I was diligent in his service, and that he owed me a debt.[7] At that time I was defending P'u-k'ou.[8] Li Chao-shou, who had long been intimate with me, when he saw that the T'ien Wang had made Ch'en

122 Yü-ch'eng a wang, - [even] LOOKING AT THE MATTER FROM THE CH'ING DYNASTY SIDE [1] - was indignant, and wrote a letter urging me to join him.[2] This letter reached me just at a time when six or seven of the T'ien Wang's shih-wei[3] came to P'u-k'ou to inspect the army. Little did I know that before Li Chao-shou's letter arrived, rumours had already reached the capital and the T'ien Wang had sent his shih-wei on the one hand to inspect the army, but also to find out whether I was up to anything.

Li Chao-shou however, boldly ordered his personal messenger to carry the letter. This messenger had once been my standard-bearer, and had followed him when Li Chao-shou had joined the Great Ch'ing. Having been sent with the letter, he was made prisoner by the sentries and there was an enquiry. The messenger said, "There is no need to arrest me. I am going especially to His Excellency Li [Hsiu-ch'eng]'s place," and so on. The sentries then brought him to headquarters. All the troops, who had come when [they heard that] an enemy had been taken, saw him and saw that a letter was found on his person. When they found the letter,[4] the shih-wei were all present. (ON THIS MATTER MA YÜ-T'ANG CAN BE ASKED; HE KNOWS THE DETAILS).[5] When the shih-wei returned to the capital everyone knew about it, and it was feared that I would turn coat. It was said thay I had long been friendly with Li Chao-shou, and that not having been made a wang I would certainly turn traitor. At that time my mother was in P'u-k'ou and my family also.[6] As a precaution against my certain treachery
123 the boats at Chung-kuan were completely sealed off to stop my troops from coming or going.[7] Then someone reported to the T'ien Wang. After ten or twenty days, nothing had happened, so the T'ien Wang issued an edict proclaiming me 'eternally loyal and righteous' and himself wrote in his own hand on yellow satin four large characters 万古忠義, sent the satin to me and appointed me Chung Wang. So I am the Chung Wang because of Li Chao-shou's

letter enticing me [to go over], in order to make me contented and prevent me from treason.

After this the number of appointments increased from day to day. This person would be promoted for merit and then they would think of another who had been diligent and might bear a grudge. So people were promoted indiscriminately without considering the [qualities of] the man. As long as there was a guarrantor, approval would be given. The department responsible for recommendations made considerable illicit profit; that is why they recommended people. Those with money, who wanted to enjoy themselves, bribed this department and were therefore recommended. Lazy and undeserving men were all made wang. He made no distinction [between them and] the officers who commanded in the field, who worked hard day and night. Those without influence, who followed a soldier's life, were disgruntled at this, and in military operations did not strive for achievement. Those who had ability were not trusted by the Sovereign, [yet] they were unswervingly loyal, the pillars of the Kingdom. The Sovereign saw that he had made a mistake and created many more wangs.[1] Words are like
124 arrows; once despatched they are hard to retrieve, and could not be cancelled. That is the reason why, after this,[2] the wangs who were appointed were all called lieh wang.[3] Then a great many lieh wang were appointed, and this could not be changed; so three dots were added at the top of the character 壬 making the title 狂 .[5] People were even more[6] disgruntled, and each had treason in his heart. Because of this people became disunited and there was profound discord.[7] THE T'IEN WANG REALLY LOST THE COUNTRY AND THE KINGDOM THROUGH HIS OWN FAULT. IN THE

(I SPEAK OUT FRANKLY. IT IS NOT THAT I AM DISLOYAL OR SLANDERING THE SOVEREIGN. IF THERE IS SOMETHING [CONCERNING] THE RISE AND FALL OF THE KINGDOM WHICH I DO NOT SPEAK ABOUT, IT IS BECAUSE I DO NOT KNOW [ABOUT IT]).[4]

EARLY DAYS WHEN [things] WERE CLEAR-CUT[1] in promoting officers and appointing officials, he selected and employed able men. We two, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch'eng, were favoured by the Sovereign, and he gave us new names. At home Ch'en Yü-ch'eng wrote his name 'Ch'en Pei-ch'eng'.[2] Seeing that he was loyal and brave, the T'ien Wang changed his name to Yü-ch'eng. At home I wrote my name as [Li] I-wen;[3] but when the T'ien Wang employed me, when I was made Chung Wang, he changed my name to Li Hsiu-ch'eng.[4]

Previously, when he employed people, the T'ien Wang selected good men. I HAVE ALREADY CLEARLY SET OUT THE REASONS FOR WHICH HE WAS DESTINED TO FALL UPON EVIL DAYS, AND LOSE THE KINGDOM AND THE COUNTRY, WHICH THE GRAND SECRETARY WILL UNDERSTAND AT A GLANCE.[5] (SUCCESS OR FAILURE, PROSPERITY OR COLLAPSE, GOOD FORTUNE OR DISASTER WERE ALL DECIDED BY THIS) self-inflicted chaos. (THERE WAS PANIC INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL, WHICH THE GENERALS AND MINISTERS WERE UNABLE TO PREVENT. IN THE CAPITAL
125 THERE WAS NO GRAIN, Chiu-shuai's troops were closely besieging it and it was cut off.[6] There was no grain to feed the armies with. In the capital TROUBLES DAILY INCREASED; poor people, men and women, crowded in front of the [palace] gates, begging for their lives to be saved. There was neither money nor grain in the state treasury, and state affairs were not in my hands. But seeing so many people in tears and crying bitterly, I had no choice but to distribute the grain stored in my own home to save the poor of the city. (AFTER I HAD RELIEVED THE POOR BY DISTRIBUTING GRAIN FROM MY OWN HOUSE), the troops under my command had not been provided for.[7] There was nothing for it, so I changed all my mother's and my wife's jewelry, gold and silver, in order to provide for the troops. That is why there is no gold or silver left in my home.

After distributing this grain for the relief of the poor people,

it still did not solve the problem, and later I petitioned the T'ien Wang on behalf of these poor people who could not keep body and soul together, begging him to release them. The Sovereign would not agree, but reprimanded me severely: "You forget the dignity of the state![1] Do not dare to let our brothers and sisters go wandering outside! Everyone should obey the command and prepare manna, so that they may eat their fill and prolong their lives. Your petition is not granted." I could not argue with him, so I left the court. The Sovereign was angry and I also was displeased.

All the people in the city, both men and women, were starving,
126 and every day implored me with tears to save them. I had no choice, so myself issued secret instructions that poor men and women were to be allowed to leave the city, to flee and save themselves. While in the city I had heard that Chiu-shuai had established a refugee relief office.[2] This fitted exactly with my intentions and made it possible to save[3] these people; so I secretly ordered that they should be allowed to leave. From last year to the present, [a hundred and][4] thirty of forty thousand have gone out through the different gates.[5] Unfortunately the Hung family used men of Kwang-[tung][6] to guard all the gates and strategic points, and they robbed all the men and women leaving the city of all their money, and despoiled these poor people. When I heard of this I was very angry and went myself to see, and found that it was true. I immediately had some OF THESE BANDITS WHO MOLESTED THE POOR killed, and after this they were able to get safely out of the various gates for the time being.

After this, retribution came to the state, and all sorts of strange things happened. The Sovereign listened to idle talk and did not cultivate good government.[7] The city swarmed with bandits and robbers, and at night the sound of firing never stopped as people were robbed and killed. Whole families were murdered and

their money and property stolen. The defeat of the Kingdom came from these misfortunes. In the 11th. Month of last year [13 Dec.1863 - 12 Jan.1864] Chiu-shuai breached the city wall at the south gate.[1] At this time there were a lot of soldiers in the city, and there was still enough to eat, so they were strong. There was also the moat between us.[2] For this reason Chiu-shuai's troops could not break in.

After this, things in the capital deteriorated from day to day.
127 Outside Chiu-shuai's troops daily increased their pressure and there was extreme anxiety in the capital. There was no one to man the stockades and defend the walls.[3] The penalty for illicit communication with the enemy, or failing to report to the T'ien Wang the discovery of [such] correspondence with [the enemy] outside the city, was the execution of [the offender's] whole family and the confiscation of his property. When Chiu-shuai's army had reached the city, the T'ien Wang had already issued a severe edict that no one dared to contravene, [against] anyone who disobeyed the T'ien Wang's command, had illicit correspondence with the enemy, had treacherous relations or enticed [others to do so]. Those who reported such activity would be promoted to the rank of wang; those who knew [of such activity] and did not report it, would be as guilty as the traitor himself. The Sovereign's elder brother was ordered to apprehend them and see that they were pounded [to death] and flayed; who is not afraid of [such a] death?[4]

Then the Sung Wang Ch'en Te-feng got in touch with the Provincial Commander-in-chief Hsiao's troops[5] outside the east [gate], and the Wei Wang Chu T'ao-ying[6] was in contact with Chiu-shuai's side. Ch'en Te-feng and Chu Chao-ying had not said anything about this to me, but news of it leaked out and the Sung Wang Ch'en Te-feng was arrested by the Sovereign's elder brother Hung Jen-fa. [The

Sung Wang][1] was friendly with me, and his mother, who was more than seventy years old, came to beg me [to help him]. I at once arranged to go bond for him and paid more than 1,800 [liang] of
128 silver to ranson Ch'en Te-feng's life. Ch'en Te-feng made contact with the Ch'ing, but he was not successful and he could not save his life. These are the facts.[2]

Not long after this, my wife's uncle Sung Yung-ch'i, came from Chiu-shuai's camp and said[3] that he had spoken with Chiu-shuai's secretary about persuading me to go over, He had an elder brother, whose name I do not know, who was a subordinate of the Grand Secretary, with the rank of lan-ling,[4] and could go bond for me. I had never seen the man Sung Yung-ch'i spoke of; I did not know who he was and had not met him and [therefore] did not venture to assent. This man was said to be in T'ai-chou, but I do not know whether this is true or not.[5]

When Sung Yung-ch'i returned to the capital from Chiu-shuai's headquarters after more than ten days, he was working with Kuo Lao-ssu. Kuo Lao-ssu was a Nanking man. Sung Yung-ch'i spoke with me and told me about this, but I did not see any letter from Chiu-shuai. He said that he had only discussed it with Chiu-shuai's secretary, and that nothing was settled. This man liked to drink. That evening we spoke a great deal. The following day he drank to excess with friends and said too much, and then
129 told Ch'en Te-feng that the Chung Wang had said such and such. Ch'en Te-feng did not know whether to believe it or not, and wrote asking me whether it was true. The following day there was a meeting in my palace to discuss grain supplies. The Pu Wang Mo Shih-k'uei, the Chang Wang Lin Shao-chang, the Shun Wang Li Ch'un-fa, Hung Ho-yuan, the eldest son of the Sovereign's elder brother, and his second son [Hung] Li-yuan, and Hung K'uei-yuan, the eldest son of the Kan Wang, were at the meeting in my palace. The Sung Wang Ch'en Te-feng's letter was handed in just at the

moment when the city despatches arrived. Who could have suspected that there was a private letter amongst them? Mo Shih-k'uei took this letter and opened it, and read about this affair. Everyone crowded round to look. The letter asked, "Does the Chung Wang really have such intentions?" Mo Shih-k'uei then said to me: "Have Sung Yung-ch'i sent for and I will question him. I am the T'ien Wang's Minister of Punishments. Since this has arisen HAVE YOUR WIFE'S UNCLE SUNG YUNG-CH'I SENT FOR SO THAT I can question him. Otherwise I will first memorialize to the Sovereign, and that will not be very convenient for you, Chung Wang!" and so on. I had no choice. It was impossible for Sung Yung-ch'i to escape. Mo Shih-k'uei assembled troops at my palace to await him. The same
130 night Sung Yung-ch'i came to my palace, and was discussing this matter with my younger brother when he was seized by Mo Shih-k'uei. Later Kuo Lao-ssu was also taken. There was a great stir about this affair and the whole city was in a turmoil. Luckily I always had the troops and the people on my side, otherwise I would long since have perished with my whole family. The court ministers distrusted each other and dared not vigorously bring me to book. Sung Yung-ch'i was thrown into prison and was to have been executed; but I was a relative of his and could not see him perish, so I bribed Mo Shih-k'uei to be lenient with him and not punish him but petition for clemency. I was implicated in this affair. Fortunately everyone in the kingdom had friendly feelings for me, otherwise my whole family would have perished (LONG SINCE).

After this there was always someone keeping an eye on me lest I turn traitor. This was about the end of the 3rd or the beginning of the 4th Month [mid-May 1864].[1] At this time I was on the wall at the east gate.[2] (THE T'IEN WANG WAS ALREADY SERIOUSLY ILL AND HE DIED ON THE 21st OF THE 4th MONTH [3 June 1864].[3] WHEN THIS MAN WAS ILL HE WOULD NOT TAKE REMEDIES, BUT ALLOWED THE DISEASE TO GET BETTER BY ITSELF. EVEN IF IT DID NOT GET BETTER HE STILL

WOULD NOT TAKE MEDICINE. FOR THIS REASON HE DIED ON THE 21st. OF THE 4th. MONTH).

The T'ien Wang was already dead and Chiu-shuai's troops were pressing us hard, so that we were in a desperate plight with no way out. Then the T'ien Wang's eldest son, Hung Yu-fu, ascended the throne in order to put the people at their ease.[1] (THE T'IEN
131 WANG'S ILLNESS WAS CAUSED BY EATING MANNA, AND BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT TAKE REMEDIES. THAT IS WHY HE DIED). IT WAS ALSO BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE GOOD FORTUNE AND BECAUSE HE KILLED THE COMMON PEOPLE. AFTER THE YOUNG SOVEREIGN CAME TO THE THRONE THERE WAS NO GRAIN FOR THE SOLDIERS, AND THERE WAS CHAOS IN THE ARMIES.[2]

Chiu-shuai made many tunnels under the wall [of the city]. From the east gate right round to the north gate many tunnels were dug, and we were unable to defend every point.[3] The Shen-ts'e Gate was smashed and knocked down twice, and defence was difficult. The Sovereign was young and had no ability to make decisions. Outside, General Tseng's troops pressed daily nearer to the city and no one, civil or military, in the capital, could think of a solution.

By the 6th Day of the 6th Month [19 July 1864] it was clear that the situation was desperate and that General Tseng was about to break into our city.[4] I immediately selected an advance-guard and sortied by night to attack Chiu-shuai's positions. The attack was not successful and I realized that the city could not be held.[5] Our troops had nothing to eat all day and all night,[6] and at dawn they all left.[7] From the top of Tzu-ching-shan General Tseng saw that the troops from the city were dispersing in disarray. At noon the same day Chiu-shuai blew up the city wall with gunpowder, and from Tzu-ching-shan and Lung-chin the whole army entered the city.[8] Our forces could not hold them.

THIS WAS THE GREAT GOOD FORTUNE OF THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR,
132 THE RESULT OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S ABLE STRATEGY AND OF CHIU-

SHUAI'S FINE ACHIEVEMENTS, WISDOM AND STRATEGY, AND THE DILIGENT EFFORTS OF CIVIL AND MILITARY. IT WAS ALSO BECAUSE THE T'IEN CH'AO WAS FATED TO PERISH; THE DAYS OF THE T'IEN WANG DISTURBING THE PEOPLE WERE DESTINED TO COME TO AN END, AND THE GREAT CH'ING WAS DESTINED TO RESTORE PEACE.

Then Chiu-shuai's soldiers scaled the walls at the four gates and entered [the city]. In the stockades outside, at Chung-kuan, when the troops saw that the capital was lost, some of them surrendered, some fled and some were killed.

AFTER I JOINED THE T'IEN CH'AO, THE T'IEN WANG EMPLOYED ME FOR ONLY[1] THREE OR FOUR YEARS, DURING WHICH I WAS OBEDIENT AND SCATTERED MY WEALTH. I WAS ANXIOUS TO RELIEVE THE POOR; FOR THAT REASON EVERYONE KNEW ABOUT ME. When the wall was breached, everyone came weeping to me. When I came back defeated from the T'ai-p'ing Gate, I went straight to the gate of the palace. The Young[2] Sovereign had already come to the palace gate with the two small sons of the T'ien Wang. They came forward to ask what was to be done; but I had no plan at the time. I took only the Young Sovereign, but could not look after the others. The Young Sovereign had no horse to ride, so I gave him my war-horse to ride, while I took a poor horse. I went straight to my home and bade farewell to my mother, my young brother and my nephew; the whole family parted from me in tears. I took the Young Sovereign and went to
133 hide in the Ch'ing-liang Shan.[3] There were several thousand civil and military officials escorting us. I WAS A MINISTER EMPLOYED BY THE T'IEN WANG AND ALTHOUGH[4] HE DID NOT INSTITUTE GOOD GOVERNMENT,[5] AND IN ESTABLISHING HIS STATE DID NOT CONSIDER THE SOLDIERS AND THE PEOPLE, THE SOVEREIGN RAISED ME TO THE RANK OF CHUNG WANG. BUT HE DID NOT GIVE THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY TO ME; THERE WERE [other] WANGS APPOINTED BY THE SOVEREIGN, AND GREAT MINISTERS OF STATE WHO WERE SENIOR TO ME; THERE WERE ALSO MANY WHO WERE JUNIOR TO ME. BUT[6] I WAS WILLING TO BRAVE DEATH IN [his] SERVICE. A

MAN OF FEELING AND PRINCIPLES, I WANTED TO SHOW GRATITUDE FOR PAST FRIENDSHIP WITHOUT FORGETTING. SINCE I WAS IN HIS EMPLOY, although he had fallen on evil days and had lost the kingdom and the country, nevertheless, I had received his favour and could not but remain loyal and do my utmost to save the offspring of the T'ien Wang. This I did in my unquestioning loyalty.

It was near to nightfall and I could think of no plan. We wanted to charge out of the north gate and make off, but Chiu-shuai's troops were strongly intrenched there and it was not possible. The civil and military officials and soldiers who were with me were paralysed with panic,[1] and everyone was weeping hopelessly. There was nothing for it, so at the Fourth Watch I braved death and led a charge, and with the Young Sovereign, charged out by way of the place where Chiu-shuai had knocked down the wall.[2] The Sovereign and his officials charged out of the encirclement at the risk of their lives. FOR ME IT WAS BECAUSE OF MY UNQUESTIONING LOYALTY, IN ORDER TO SAVE THE SOVEREIGN WHO WAS IN DANGER.[3]

After breaking out of the city we passed line after line of Chiu-shuai's fortifications, with deep ditches and strong stock-
134 ades. As the Young Sovereign escaped from the city there was firing from all Chiu-shuai's units and incessant shouting. I got separated from the Young Sovereign. Chiu-shuai's troops gave chase with cavalry and infantry. Although he got out [of the city] I do not know whether he is still alive today. He was a young boy of sixteen and had grown up from childhood without ever having ridden a horse, and moreover, had never had to suffer [such] fright. Chiu-shuai's were pursuing from all sides and he must certainly have been killed.[4] If Chiu-shuai's cavalry or infantry killed him on the road they would not have known that he was the Young Sovereign. He was a young boy; who could have known?

After leaving the city and parting from the Young Sovereign

my horse could not go on. This horse had been in battle all day in the city and was not a war-horse in any case, it was not strong enough. In addition it had not been fed; neither man nor beast had had enough to eat. By dawn everyone had scattered, but my horse could not go on. There was nothing to be done, I HAD NO HORSE AND COULD NOT GO ON. So I fled up a deserted hill to hide for a time.[1] I had nothing to eat and was hungry and absolutely unable to go on. The Young Sovereign had taken my horse to ride and now I do not know whether he is dead or alive. If I had still been riding my war-horse I would have fled elsewhere. I took refuge in a broken-down temple on the top of the hill.

AFTER I HAD TAKEN REFUGE, the people from the foot of the hill, knowing that the city had fallen, assumed that there must be people hiding on this hill. The people were poor and wanted to
135 profit from this. My life was destined to be ended, THEREFORE I WAS NOT ABLE TO ESCAPE.

I had some precious ornaments which I was carrying, wrapped in a piece of silk. I cannot think how I can have been so confused that day. When I stopped to rest in that broken-down temple I hung these pearls and jewelry on a tree so that I could rest in the shade. Unexpectedly some local people came searching. When we saw this group of people coming, the two or three of us were startled and fled, forgetting to take up the jewelry. The people chased me, and said, "If you have money on you give it to us. We do not want your life." I was hurriedly trying to escape, BUT I COULD NOT RUN, I could not move.[2] When the people in pursuit got close to me they recognized that I was the Chung Wang and all knelt down and wept. They had chased me down to the foot of the hill. BY THAT TIME THERE WERE A LOT OF THEM. THEN THEY MADE ME COMPLY AND go back with them to the top of the deserted hill.

Seeing that the people intended to help me, I was willing to return to where the broken-down temple was, and give them the pearls and jewelry as a reward for their kindness. But while these people had been chasing me, other people had unexpectedly followed behind and had taken away my things from the temple. When I returned with the people, the jewelry was nowhere to be seen. But enough of that.

All the people urged me to shave my head,[1] but I was unwilling
136 to do so. They said, "Unless you shave your head we cannot escort you." The people begged me earnestly, so I replied, "I am a great minister. Now our Kingdom has fallen and the Sovereign is dead. If I cannot get away I will be captured and taken before the Ch'ing commander; in that case there is nothing I can say.[2] [But] if I am destined to make good my escape, it would be difficult for me to face my soldiers [with a shaven head]." So I was unwilling to shave [my head]. They kept pressing me to shave it, and finally[3] I agreed and shaved it a little. That is the fact of the matter.

Then this group of people hid me, [but] the other group had got my jewelry, and they quarrelled over it. The group of people with whom I was, went and asked the other group to share it [with them]; but the other group said, "YOU ASK US TO DIVIDE THESE THINGS, BUT[4] these things are only possessed by great chiefs of the T'ien Ch'ao NOT BY ANYONE ELSE. [That shows that] you must have captured this chief." THEY SAID THAT THE PEOPLE I WAS WITH WERE GRASPING. Thereupon[5] the two groups quarrelled and consequently I could not remain hidden, AND BECAUSE OF THIS I was taken prisoner BY TWO[6] SCOUNDRELS, brought here and locked in this prison cage.[7] Due to the kindness of Chiu-shuai I have been given food AND TEA IN SUFFICIENCY. The Grand Secretary hastened from An-ch'ing and interrogated me.

(I SEE THAT THE GRAND SECRETARY) IS A MAN OF GREAT RIGHTEOUS-

NESS, PROFOUND BENEVOLENCE, (AND VAST ABILITY) and am full of remorse. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO REPAY HIS EXCELLENCY THE
137 GOVERNOR'S GREAT KINDNESS; therefore I am anxious to relate everything about our Kingdom. THIS CRIMINAL COMMANDER REALLY HAS NO ABILITY. AT HOME IN MY YOUTH I WAS A POOR PEASANT, TRYING DAILY TO FIND ENOUGH TO EAT. I DID NOT KNOW OF THE T'IEN WANG'S INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A STATE. SEVERAL MYRIAD PEOPLE CAME AND WERE WILLING TO FOLLOW HIM. I WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE WHO WAS STUPID AND CONFUSED. I BECAME KNOWN AND TOOK AN ACTIVE PART FOR THREE OR FOUR YEARS BEFORE PEOPLE KNEW THE INSIGNIFICANT NAME OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG. NOW THE T'IEN CH'AO IS FINISHED AND THIS IS REALLY [due to] THE LUCK AND VIRTUE OF THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR, AND THE HEIGHT OF GOOD FORTUNE. AS LONG AS I WAS IN THE T'IEN CH'AO I SERVED IT FAITHFULLY; BUT NOW THE KINGDOM AND THE ARMY HAVE PERISHED.

As the General of the man Hung, all the troops in the field came under my command. NOW THAT I SEE THE DEPTH OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S BENEVOLENCE, HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR'S WISDOM AND LOVE OF THE PEOPLE, HIS COMPASSION AND GOODNESS, I am willing to assemble[1] all my troops on either side of the [Yangtse] River in order to repay this kindness. I DO THIS REALLY BECAUSE I HAVE SEEN THE GRAND SECRETARY'S BENEVOLENCE. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO ABILITY, FROM THE EARLIEST YEARS WHEN MY RANK WAS LOW, I DID MY UTMOST TO SHOW GRATITUDE. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO ABILITY OR WISDOM, I COULD [always] STRIVE TO THE DEATH, LOYALLY SUPPORTING THE T'IEN CH'AO UNTIL THE KINGDOM CAME TO AN END. I NEED SAY NO MORE. (I AM WILLING TO ASSEMBLE ALL THESE TROOPS),[2] in order that this criminal and stupid person may pay his debt to the great Ch'ing Emperor. If my Sovereign had been SECURE in his Kingdom, I would be disloyal in doing this. But now the Sovereign is dead and the Kingdom has collapsed, and several hundred thousand of my troops outside (ARE DISTURBING THE PEOPLE). I cannot defend,

so am guilty with them of harming the people.[1]

138 THE T'IEN CH'AO HAS NOW LOST THE COUNTRY, I HAVE RECEIVED BENEVOLENT TREATMENT, SO I AM ANXIOUS TO ASSEMBLE [the troops] IN ORDER TO REPAY KINDNESS. HAVING SERVED THE MAN HUNG AS A GENERAL, NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN CAPTURED I SHOULD LONG AGO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED, BUT THIS HAS BEEN GRACIOUSLY POSTPONED, AND I AM BOUNDLESSLY GRATEFUL.[2] NOW OUR KINGDOM IS COMPLETELY DEFEATED AND [I wish] TO PREVENT MY TROOPS FROM CONTINUING TO MOLEST THE PEOPLE. IF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR WOULD AGREE TO THESE MEASURES IT WOULD BRING GREAT HAPPINESS TO THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR, AND THE WHOLE PEOPLE WOULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM THE GRAND SECRETARY'S BENEFICENT KINDNESS. If I have the ability to do this [but] it is feared that I have treacherous intentions, I can still be executed according to the laws of the state.[3] If I fail to do it, capital punishment by state law IS CERTAIN. I DO THIS IN TRUTH BECAUSE I TAKE PLEASURE IN PROTECTING THE PEOPLE. I FEAR THAT[4] the Grand Secretary does not trust me to do this, then keep me locked up in prison and I will still do it, if people are put at my disposal. I could stay in An-ch'ing, from which I could deal with both sides of the [Yangtse] River. I AM COMPLETELY SINCERE AND HAVE NO TREACHEROUS INTENTIONS. IF I RECEIVE THE FAVOUR[5] OF YOUR ASSENT, I WILL COMPLETE EVERYTHING SATISFACTORILY AND CERTAINLY WILL NOT GO BACK ON MY WORD. I IMPLORE [you with your] LOFTY ABILITY, TO CONSIDER WHETHER THIS MAY BE DONE OR NOT. (I HAVE WRITTEN BELOW THE PLAN FOR ASSEMBLING [the troops], WHICH I BEG YOU TO PERUSE).[6]

[The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition ends at this point. The rest of the deposition, though punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan, was omitted, and should therefore, in accordance with the method adopted so far, be in bracketed capitals, except for the parts marked by Tseng for deletion. I have abandoned this method for the final section in the interests of readability].

139 1. I request: be kind enough to spare the men of Liang-kwang. do not kill them, but give them permission to return home OR TO DISPERSE AND ENGAGE IN TRADING. If you are willing to let the men of Liang-kwang disperse, THE OTHERS WILL BE EASY TO DEAL WITH, BECAUSE THE LIANG-KWANG PEOPLE WERE THE FIRST TO JOIN THE RISING. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO SPARE THEM everyone will hear of it, and everyone will be willing to submit. [Even] if some are anxious to join your army, it would be best not to use them. THE SOLDIERS OF OTHER PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS SHOULD ALSO BE SPARED. If you follow this suggestion IT WILL BE A GREAT BLESSING FOR THE PEOPLE, it will save the Great Ch'ing the expenditure of wealth, and will save the efforts of generals and officials.

2. If this suggestion received the favour of his consent, I ask the Grand Secretary to send one or two [men] with me to undertake this mission. If in the capital there are any of my men in the hands of your troops, allow me to recommend some, each to take away a letter from me.[1] I will first bring over my son.

3. I request: let me first bring over my cousin Li Shih-hsien. Li Shih-hsien's mother and his family were all taken from Li-yang by Governor Li [Hung-chang] of Su-chou, AND WERE LENIENTLY TREATED AND WELL CARED FOR.[2] I WANT TO BRING OVER MY COUSIN, AND THIS WILL QUICKLY SHOW RESULTS. I beg the Grand Secretary to write ordering his mother to be brought to An-ch'ing, and I will write a letter [to him] and [the matter] can be quickly
140 settled. He is very filial to his mother. Though I have been captured I can very easily do this. If I write a letter to him, even if his mother has not come, it may take a little longer, but it will still succeed.[3]

4. I want to bring over the <u>T'ing Wang</u> Ch'en Ping-wen.[4] Ch'en Ping-wen and I were very friendly - the two of us were very

intimate. Now that I am a prisoner here, when my letter reaches him he will certainly agree. The others will all be willing to agree and this matter will be successful, because with me here they will all have a way out of their predicament, and it will certainly succeed. If Ch'en Ping-wen agrees, Wang Hai-yang will come too.[1] If my cousin agrees, Chu Hsing-lung and Lu Shun-te will certainly agree too.[2] If I do not bring them in, THOUGH THE GRAND SECRETARY'S TROOPS COULD FIGHT AND DEFEAT THEM, it would be a waste of effort and wealth. They have plenty of space to move in. When your troops arrive in one place they will go elsewhere and WOULD THEY NOT disturb the people? Even if they are closely beset they will still make plans to flee elsewhere. Who cannot find an alternative when there is plenty of open space?[3] If you wish me to bring over these men for you, then send messengers to them.

5. The question is being discussed: supposing he did manage to get away, what clever plans may the Young Sovereign have? This person certainly cannot have any [such plans].[4]

141 6. If the Grand Secretary will follow this suggestion and employ Ma Yü-t'ang and Chao Chin-lung, their going will certainly bring success.[5]

7. I request the Grand Secretary to issue an order to accompany my letters. If letters are sent they should not be printed. If you use a printed letter it will not be believed when it reaches my troops, and they will certainly think that the Grand Secretary produced it himself in order to deceive them. If I write myself, the commanders of my forces will all recognize [my letter] and this will be more sure. In the T'ien Ch'ao, when I sent documents with a seal affixed, unless there was a secret sign in my own hand, the commanders would not obey. After I have brought back

my cousin and my son, my nephew and my commanders, I will bring over Huang Wen-chin.[1] All should be spared and sent home, and this will certainly succeed. Even when I am here my troops will certainly obey me. My troops are well-disciplined and will all obey. MY TROOPS WERE THE MOST NUMEROUS IN THE T'IEN CH'AO, AND IF I ASSEMBLE THEM ALL TOGETHER, THE OTHERS WILL ALL FOLLOW ONCE I WRITE TO THEM.[2]

8. I request the Grand Secretary to stop the slaughter in the city of Nanking, no matter whether of wangs or officers, no matter where they come from. Pardon their crimes even if they merit death. Give them passes and money and let them go. Let them spread [the news about] outside so that everyone may know that the Grand Secretary and the Governor in their liberality have
142 spared them, and their hearts will be without recrimination, and the affair will be quickly settled.

9. IN ORDER TO ASSEMBLE THE T'IEN CH'AO GENERALS SO THAT THEY DO NOT TROUBLE THE COUNTRY, IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO BE GOOD-HEARTED AND MERCIFUL[3] TOWARDS THEM. THE GRAND SECRETARY MAY IN THIS WAY BRING THEM BACK HUMANELY, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THIS GUILTY GENERAL TO INFLUENCE THEM, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THEIR RANK OR THEIR CRIMES. IF THE T'IEN CH'AO TROOPS ARE PERSUADED TO SUBMIT BY JUST AND RIGHTEOUS MEANS, THE NIEN REBEL DISORDERS MAY BE PUT DOWN EASILY.[4] IT WILL BE EASY ONCE YOU ARE IN CONTROL OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF ANHWEI.

10.[5] I request the Grand Secretary[6] to post proclamations in all provinces, districts and villages, far and near, giving news about Chin-ling, [announcing that] all troops, no matter whom, are to be spared and can become [ordinary] people again. This is the most important thing. TODAY the weapon to be used to pacify the country should be benevolence. It is no use to inspire

awe by killing. They cannot all be killed; but kindness can win the submission OF THE PEOPLE.

THIS GUILTY GENERAL HAS NO ABILITY OR WISDOM. NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN TAKEN HOW CAN MY CRIME [1]. . . IT IS REALLY THE GRAND SECRETARY'S GREAT KINDNESS AND LIBERALITY WHICH HAVE CAUSED ME TO EXPRESS MY FEELINGS AND MY SIMPLE SINCERITY.

143 LAST NIGHT I RECEIVED THE FAVOUR OF THE GRAND SECRETARY COMING TO INTERROGATE ME, AND RECEIVED HIS BENEVOLENT INSTRUCTIONS, AND I DO NOT KNOW HOW TO REPAY HIM. THIS GUILTY GENERAL IS BURDENED WITH REMORSE [because] I DID NOT ENCOUNTER AN ENLIGHTENED [ruler].[2] BUT NOW THAT I HAVE SEEN THE BOUNDLESS KINDNESS OF THE GRAND SECRETARY, THIS GUILTY GENERAL IS RESOLVED TO RESTORE ORDER IN ONE PART [of the country] IN REPAYMENT. AFTER LAST NIGHT'S PROFOUND KINDNESS AND FRIENDLINESS I AM VERY CONTENTED TO DIE, AND HAPPY TO RETURN TO THE SHADES.[3]

The following are the ten[4] disasters of the T'ien Ch'ao:

The first disaster to the Kingdom was the defeat of Li K'ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang, who had been sent by the Tung Wang to sweep the north.[5]

The second disaster was after the defeat of Li K'ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang['s expedition] to sweep the north, when the ch'eng-hsiangs Tseng Li-ch'ang, Ch'en Shih-pao and Hsü Shih-pa[6] went to the relief but were defeated at Lin-ch'ing.[7]

The third disaster was that after Tseng Li-ch'ang and the others returned defeated from Lin-ch'ing without being able to relieve Li K'ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang, the Yen Wang Ch'in Jih-ch'ang was was sent with troops to the rescue but was defeated and beaten back

It is a long time ago and I do not remember the name of the Ch'ing commander at Yang-chia-tien.

144 at Yang-chia-tien [near] Shu-ch'eng.[1]

The fourth disaster was that Lin Shao-chang should not have been sent to Hsiang-t'an. At this time Lin Shao-chang's whole force was completely defeated at Hsiang-t'an.[2]

The fifth disaster was the result of the mutual killing of the Tung Wang and the Pei Wang. This was a great disaster.[3]

The sixth disaster was that the I Wang and the Sovereign were not on good terms; master and minister were distrustful of each other.[4] The I Wang became suspicious and took away with him all the good civil and military officials and soldiers of the T'ien Ch'ao. This was the greatest disaster.[5]

The sixth [sic] disaster was that the Sovereign did not trust other ministers and relied on his eldest brother and his second brother. These men had no ability and could not protect the state.[6]

The seventh [sic] disaster was that the Sovereign did not concern himself with administration.

The eighth [sic] disaster was creating too many wangs. This was a great disaster.[7]

The ninth [sic] disaster was that the kingdom did not employ men of ability.

The tenth [sic] DISASTER WAS THAT THERE WAS NO SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.[8]
DISASTERS TO THE KINGDOM AND TO LIFE AROSE OUT OF THESE TEN [sic] DISASTERS, AND [the loss of] LIFE WAS IRREPARABLE.[9]

145 The roots of the T'ien Ch'ao have gone BUT IF THESE TROOPS CAN

BE COLLECTED TOGETHER IT WILL PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF TROUBLE IN THE HEART OF THE GREAT CH'ING [Empire]. IT WILL REDOUND TO THE FAME AND FORTUNE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR. IF THE WORK OF COLLECTING TOGETHER FOR SUBMISSION IS SPEEDILY FINISHED, WHAT WILL IT MATTER IF THERE ARE BANDIT OUTBREAKS?

The thing to be feared now is that the foreign devils will certainly take action. Because of the Grand Secretary's kindness I will speak of this. The foreigners came to T'ien-ching and suggested[1] to the T'ien Wang sharing the country equally with him, [for which] they were willing to help him. The T'ien Wang said that he would not agree. "I strive for China and for the whole of it. If, after we have succeeded, we divide up[2] the country, everyone would ridicule us. If we do not succeed, it would merely mean letting the [foreign] devils into the country." This was said to the court ministers AND HE WOULD [NOT] AGREE. The foreign devils said, "Though you, the T'ien Wang, have masses of soldiers, they are not equal to ten thousand foreign troops. With thirty or twenty thousand of our foreign troops and with steamers, we could conquer [the empire] in no time," THE DEVILS SAID. "Ten thousand or more of our troops fought their way into Peking and then made peace, and they still owe us money.[3] If you do not co-operate with us your T'ien Ch'ao will not last long, AS YOU WILL SOON SEE FROM OUR FUTURE ACTIONS." That is what this devil chief said after the T'ien Wang had refused.[4]

146 Now it will not ve very arduous to settle the T'ien Ch'ao affair, and the first thing to do is to guard against the aggression of the foreigners. This is the truth. [The opportunity should be taken][5] now, before they make a move. THE GRAND SECRETARY SHOULD quickly decide to go to Kwangtung and buy secretly and bring back plenty of THEIR cannon.[6] First amass plenty of their guns, powder and shot, to defend strategic points.

The gun-platforms must be large. It will be necessary to buy the foreign devils' gun carriages. It is no use having their cannon without their gun-carriages.

For defending strategic positions, cannon of three or four thousand chin are adequate. It is not necessary to buy too big ones. They have shot of fifteen or thirty chin, AND HOW SHOULD CANNON BE USED FOR PROTECTION ON THE WATER.[1] ALTHOUGH WE HAD, our Kingdom's Kwang-[tung] cannon were good, but not as powerful as their cannon. [It is necessary to] get hold of one of their gun-carriages, find a good craftsman and construct them after the same pattern. Then China can make many cannon. One craftsman can teach ten, ten can teach a hundred and everyone in our country will know [how]. Many people will be able to make and operate these things and then our country can make great quantities.

147 At T'ai-ts'ang I captured a sample of their big western cannon and made some exactly the same. There are still[2] some of these in Nanking. Twenty or more of their big three hundred or four hundred chin brass cannon should be bought too. These too are guns for use on the land. Select our[3] good gunners and train them secretly in an open place. Use shot and aim at a hill, or put up a target on flat ground, in order to train gunners. With good training they will be good gunners who will never miss. They should be well fed and well paid. To fight with the foreign devils the first thing is to buy cannon and get prepared early. It is certain that there will be a war with them.

OUR T'IEN CH'AO IS FINISHED AND I AM A CITIZEN OF THE GREAT CH'ING. I WISH FOR THE GOOD OF THE SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE, TO AVOID DISTURBING THE PEOPLE OF OUR GREAT COUNTRY. SEEING THAT THE GRAND SECRETARY IS A MAN OF DEEP KINDNESS AND GOODNESS, I HAVE SPOKEN STRAIGHTFORWARDLY, WITHOUT A SINGLE FALSE WORD.

The people of Kwangtung, being near the sea, know all about the foreign devils' AFFAIRS, ABOUT THE DEVILS' INTERESTS and

their affairs. Some of them should be selected and employed in order to purchase these things. Only Cantonese can do it. There are still a number of people who bribe the foreigners,
148 HAVE CONNECTIONS WITH THE ENEMY, doing business with them. They can go to and from Kwang-[tung] and buy guns from them. One cannot buy these cannon in Shanghai or Ning-po. [Kwang]-tung Province is the [foreign] devils' old base. THE [cannon] NEEDED IN THIS PLACE COME FROM ELSEWHERE. IT IS CONVENIENT TO GO TO KWANGTUNG and Hong Kong to buy.[1]

If one wants to compete with their infantry one must go to Hong Kong and secretly buy [their] gingals.[2] These take shot of ten liang or half a chin or thereabouts. The devils [will] certainly use rifles[3] in infantry battles against us, and they fire much further than the foreign muskets I bought; therefore they did not use gingals much. I bought some [rifles?] and they were really advantageous and useful. I speak these stupid words because I fought against them, and know ABOUT IT.

NOW OUR KINGDOM IS FINISHED, AND THIS IS BECAUSE THE FORMER T'IEN WANG'S [appointed] SPAN WAS ENDED. THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE WAS HARD, SUCH A HARD FATE! HOW COULD THE T'IEN WANG HAVE BEEN BORN TO DISTURB THE COUNTRY? HOW COULD I, A MAN OF NO ABILITY, HAVE ASSISTED HIM? NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND LOCKED UP, IT IT NOT BECAUSE OF THE WILL OF HEAVEN? I DO NOT KNOW MY ORIGINS BEFORE THIS LIFE. HOW MANY BRAVE AND CLEVER MEN IN THE EMPIRE DID NOT DO THESE THINGS, AND I DID. IT IS REALLY BECAUSE I DID NOT KNOW. IF I HAD KNOWN....[4]

A P P E N D I X I

Supplement to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's Deposition.

This partial record of the interrogation of Li Hsiu-ch'eng by Li Hung-i, P'ang Chi-yun and Chou Yüeh-hsiu, members of Tseng Kuo-fan's staff (see Chapter II page 19) is known as 李秀成自述 [or 自傳 or 親供] 別錄. It came to light at an exhibition of documents from Kiangsu in 1937, having been kept until that time by the descendants of P'ang Chi-yun. It consists of seven pages bound together. On the first page there are questions written by Tseng Kuo-fan in his own hand for the interrogators to put to Li Hsiu-ch'eng. (The fact that he had listed questions is noted in Tseng Kuo-fan's diary for TC3/6/27; see Tseng: Shou-shu jih-chi p.1842). To some of these questions P'ang Chi-yun attached a terse summary of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's answer. The second page consists of two sentences in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's handwriting, the result of the interrogators' difficulty in understanding his dialect. Page three contains Li Hsiu-ch'eng's answers to the rest of Tseng Kuo-fan's questions. Pages four, five and six contain questions and answers recorded by Li Hung-i, and page seven has P'ang Chi-yun's colophon.

For the sake of clarity I have rearranged my translation of this document so that the answer is given after each question. The answers to some of the questions were not recorded, in which case the question has been left in the same order, relative to the other questions, as in the original document. The same applies to some answers to which no question was recorded.

The text, and the information contained in this and other notes, is from Lo: Chien-cheng pp.337-345.

Question: In the 9th Month of HF 4 [22 October to 19 November 1854] the garrison commander of T'ien-chia-chen was the rebel

Yen Wang, Ch'in Jih-kang. A great many rebel documents were obtained from a [captured boat; why was the Yen Wang referred to as Sun Jih-ch'ang? Was the Yen Wang cashiered and later called Sun Jih-ch'ang?

Answer: [In Li Hsiu-ch'eng's handwriting] Ch'in Jih-ch'ang was Ch'in Jih-kang, the Yen Wang.

Hu I-huang was the Yu Wang. Formerly he was a Hu-kuo-hou [marquis], later he was made Hu Wang. [No question recorded].

Q: Lin Shao-chang was defeated at Hsiang-t'an in HF 4 [1854]. He was a man of no ability; in what year was he made Chang Wang?

A. After being defeated at Hsiang-t'an he was cashiered. Two years later he was again made a chih-hui, then he was promoted to chien-tien, and then to ch'un-kuan-yu-fu-ch'eng-hsiang. In the 6th or 7th Year, when the I Wang left on his expedition, [Lin] remained in the capital in an administrative post. Lin Shao-chang did not have much ability, but he could stand much hardship. He was made Chang Wang in the 10th Year [1860].

Q: Tseng T'ien-yang returned with Lin Shao-chang to Hunan and died at Yüeh-chou. He was an able man and had seniority; why had he less power than Lin Shao-chang?

A: Tseng T'ien-yang and Lin Shao-chang's positions were equal. Tseng was stolid, Lin was bright. He knew a lot and was a hard worker, therefore he had slightly more power.

Q: Lin Feng-hsiang died in the 5th Year [1855] at Lien-chen, Li K'ai fang died at Feng-kuan-tun, Lin Ch'i-jung died in the 8th Year [1858] at Chiu-chiang. Why was Lin Feng-hsiang later called the Ch'iu Wang, Li K'ai-fang the Ch'ing Wang, and Lin Ch'i-jung the Ch'in Wang. In which year were they posthumously ennobled?

A: Lin Feng-hsiang, Li K'ai-fang and Lin Ch'i-jung were all 'meritorious state-founding ministers'. After their death they were posthumously made wangs, their sons inheriting. They were

ennobled in TC 2 [1863].

Q: Memorials from Kiangsi report that Hu Ting-wen died in the 3rd Month of the 2nd Year [April-May, 1863] at Jao-chou; memorials from Chen-chiang report that Lai Kuei-fang died in the 4th Month of this year [May-June, 1864] at Tan-yang. Are these two really dead or not?

A: Hu Ting-wen died at Jao-chou. Lai Kuei-fang, a subordinate of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, did not die at Tan-yang. He is now in I-hsing.

Q: Were the [following] eighteen people in the city [Nanking] when it was breached on the 16th.? Do you know what happened to them? The Young Tung Wang, the Young Hsi Wang, the I [懿] Wang, Chiang Yu-fu, the Hsin Wang, Hung Jen-fa, the Chü Wang, Hung Ho-yuan.

(Answer: About twenty years old.)

The Ch'ung Wang, Hung Li-yuan.

(Answer: Seventeen or eighteen).

The Yuan Wang, Hung K'e-yuan, the Ch'ang Wang, Hung Jui-yuan, the Chien Wang, Hung Hsien-yuan, the T'ang Wang, Hung T'ang-yuan, the T'ung Wang, Hung T'ung-yuan, the Tz'u Wang, Hung Chin-yuan, the Ting Wang, Hung Yü-yüan, the Han Wang, Hung Ts'ai-yuan.

(Answer: None of the above are over ten years old).

The Chin Wang, Chung Wan-hsin.

(Answer: Over twenty years old).

The K'ai Wang, Huang Tung-liang.

(Answer: A child).

The Chieh Wang, Huang Wen-sheng.

(Answer: A child).

The Kan Wang, Hung Jen-kan.

A: Seventeen are in the city, Hung Jen-kan is in Kiangsi.

Q: After Ku Lung-hsien returned allegiance [to the Ch'ing], where are Liu Kuan-fang and Lai Wen-hung now?

A: In Hu-chou.

Q: Lai Wen-hung was under Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, under whom was Lai Wen-

hung?

A: Under Li Hsiu-ch'eng.

Q: Previously there were no such titles as 'I [義] Wang', 'Fu Wang' and 'An Wang'. Why were the 't'ien-i' the 'fu-i' and the 'an-i' raised to the nobility?

A: The I Wang [義王] was Shih Ta-k'ai. Originally he was the I [翼] Wang. Later everyone was pleased at his righteousness and gave him the name I [義] Wang; but Shih was unwilling to accept it. The T'ien Wang's eldest brother was the An Wang, his second brother was the Fu Wang. Because of indignation at court the An and Fu Wangs were changed to 't'ien-an' and 't'ien-fu'.

Q: After An-ch'ing was surrounded Ch'en Yü-ch'eng again and again asked for help from Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Li Shih-hsien. Why did they not go to the relief of Anhwei, and only Yang Fu-ch'ing went to help?

A: When An-ch'ing was surrounded Ch'en Yü-ch'eng asked for help but there were no troops available. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in Hupeh and could not come back to help. But Yang Fu-ch'ing was in Ning-kuo-fu, and being close, he went to the relief.

The Li Wang, Chang Ch'ao-chüeh is in the city [Nanking], thought to be already dead. [No direct question recorded].

Li Shih-chung [Chao-shou] was formerly a subordinate and a friend; they used to correspond. When [Li Hsiu-ch'eng] went to Chiang-pei last year, Li Shih-chung urged him to surrender. [No question recorded].

Q: Why were Tseng T'ien-yang and Lo Ta-kang not posthumously given the title of wang?

A: The matter is very confused. There is nothing one can say.

Q: Do you know what happened to the bodies of Governor Lu [Chien-ying] and of [Tartar] General Hsiang [Hou]?

A: Does not know.

(The above questions were those listed by Tseng Kuo-fan).

A: The rebel Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] stated: Military intelligence reports and the word of soldiers captured in battle cannot be relied upon. Shaven-headed [ex-Taiping] informers try to get on good terms with both sides. Military secrets are not known to the soldiers. Even those close to the commander do not hear unless they are told.

Q: Did the foreigners who helped in the defence of Su-chou and Chin-ling come of their own accord or were they invited? Did Burgevine come to Chin-ling?

A: After Burgevine withdrew his troops he entered Nanking and lived in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's home. They were very friendly. Foreigners began helping the rebels in the 5th Year [1855]. Originally the rebels did not know how to use foreign guns and cannon, because their mechanism is delicate and difficult to use.

Q: Which army did the rebels fear? Which army did they despise? What good points do the government troops have? What bad points? Amongst the rebels what was good? What was badly done?

A: The rebels all feared the charges and fierce fighting of Pao [Ch'ao]'s army, the good training and steadiness of Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s army, the flexibility and skillful fighting of To-[lung-ah]'s army. In Pao's army the commanders were good but the soldiers were no good; their skill in setting up stockades and taking advantage of the terrain was not up to Tseng's. Tso [Tsung-t'ang] had no fight left after Lo-p'ing. This was because the soldiers were all old and ill, and soldiers dread old age.

Li Hung-chang is not an experienced commander. He owed his success to the helop of the foreign devils. Ah! these are unavoidably very slighting words.

The most important respect in which the rebels were inferior to the government troops is that whilst a government soldier is executed if he plunders, the rebels lived entirely off plunder, and lost the good-will of the people. The government army

employed many educated men; amongst the rebels there were no [or few] educated men.

Q: Was Huang Wen-chin in Hu-chou waiting for the rebel T'ien Wang to break through the encirclement [of Nanking] and escape with him? Are the Chekiang troops capable of fighting?

[No specific answer is reported for the first of these questions; the previous answer may refer to the second].

Q: Are Li Shih-hsien, Wang Hai-yang and the others intending to make Kiangsi their lair, or will they go back to Kwangtung-Kwangsi? Do their bands intend to remain together or will they disperse?

A: When the rebel Shih [Wang, Li Shih-hsien]'s bands infested Kiangsi, they did so at the order of the rebel Li [Hsiu-ch'eng]. Before the 8th Month they were to collect grain in Kiangsi; after the 8th Month they were to return, when the autumn rice of the Hui-[chou], Ning-[kuo] and Li-[yang] regions would be ripe. The intention was to ensure grain supply for Nanking, not to infest Kwangtung-Kwangsi or Hunan-Hupeh.

Q: The rebels who have now escaped into Kiangsi, if not making for Kwantung-Kwangsi, will enter Hunan-Hupeh; why then have they remained so long in Fu-[chou] and Chien-[ch'ang, in Kiangsi] without moving?

[No answer recorded].

Q: In the 10th Month of the 1st Year [1862], when the government troops took Yen-chou, Li Shih-hsien was nearby in Ning-kuo. Why did he not go to the relief?

A: When eastern Che-[kiang] and Yen-chou fell it was because the rebel T'ien Wang would not allow the rebel Shih [Wang] to go to its relief, but wanted him to remain close in order to relieve Nanking. When Sung-chiang was under siege and soon to fall the rebel T'ien Wang withdrew the rebel chief Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] for the relief of the capital, so that he had to give up [Sung-chiang]

and go.

A: Victory or defeat, who can tell? One can be victorious or be defeated - it is a question of ability. A commander who, after winning victory after victory, suffers a defeat and cannot recover, is not much good. [No specific question recorded].

A: The government troops kill mostly men from Liang-kwang. This unites the rebels and stops them from dispersing, and the fighting will never end. [No specific question recorded].

Q: During the winter of the 1st Year [1862] Li Hsiu-ch'eng drove his mob north, presumably in order to penetrate into the interior of Anhwei. Why then did they remain so long in Ch'ao-hsien without advancing? In the spring of the 2nd Year [1863], after Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself led his mob from Ch'ao-hsien to make a fierce attack on Shih-chien-pu, and went from Lu-chiang, T'ung-[ch'eng] and Shu-[ch'eng] straight to Liu-an, presumably to go into Hupeh intending to raise the siege of Chin-ling, why did he turn back at Liu-an and make straight for Chiang-p'u? Was it because Yü-hua-t'ai had been recaptured? Was it also because there was no grain?

A: In the winter of the 1st Year [1862] the reason why they remained at Ch'ao-hsien and did not advance was because the rebels were all ill from the cold (great snow). In the late spring or early summer of the 2nd Year [1863] they turned back from Liu-an because the troops were withdrawn for the relief [of Nanking] after the fall of Yü-hua-t'ai. Moreover, west of Liu-an there was no grain to be plundered; it had been finished by the depredations of the Nien-tzu.

A: The rebel T'ien Wang did not like to receive people; he did not read military despatches. Although his son had assumed the title of Young Sovereign, he too could not see him. According to people in the rebel palace, for thirty years [sic, for thirteen ?] he had not seen the T'ien Wang. [No question recorded].

Q: On which occasions did the government troops inflict the greatest damage on the rebels? [No answer recorded].

Q: Can the foreigners remain long in China or not? Did the rebels also think of fighting the foreigners?

A: Foreigners with foresight say they can remain only eighteen years and no longer. The government troops can certainly defeat the foreigners; but it is only advisable to fight on land, not on the water. It would be well to engage them in fierce battle and not compete with them in stratagems. It is better to rely on native Chinese cannon, supplemented with foreign cannon, and not use foreign cannon exclusively, because they are not willing to sell the best foreign cannon to China. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan came from the coastal region, from Kwangtung, and knew how untrustworthy the foreigners are. That is why he was unwilling to join up with them.

Q: The matter of Yang-chan-ling. [Li Hsiu-ch'eng was presumably questioned as to why he had failed to attack Tseng Kuo-fan's Headquarters in the winter of 1860; see page . No answer is recorded].

Q: Did many take the examinations?

A: In Anhwei only about three hundred persons sat the rebel examinations. In Nanking those who sat the rebel examinations numbered not more than ten or so.

Q: What are the Kan Wang's origins?

A: The rebel Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] had not bothered to read the various books compiled by the rebel Kan Wang.

Q: Did many achieve honours amongst the rebels? [No answer recorded].

Q: Is Shih Ta-k'ai dead? [No answer recorded].

Q: Why did the rebels not go to Li-hsia-ho? [The part of Kiangsu south of the Yangtze and east of the Grand Canal].

A: Li-hsia-ho is too much intersected by water, that is why it has not so far been molested.

Q: Are the various rebels of Shantung, Shensi and Yunnan in contact with the long-haired rebels [Taipings]?

A: The rebels of Szechwan, Honan and Shantung are all in contact with the long-haired rebels; those of Yunnan, Shensi and Kansu are not.

Q: Can you indicate the places in the city where gold and silver is hidden?

[This question is crossed out in the manuscript, according to Lo Erh-kang, presumably in preparation for its publication, and was not included in any copy of the document until Lo saw it in 1935. No answer is recorded. The questions was evidently posed however, and in a memorial Tseng Kuo-fan quoted Li Hsiu-ch'eng as saying that there was little treasure in the Taiping capital; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.29a].

Q: How many people were there in the capital when it was captured?

A: When the city was taken there were no more than thirty thousand in it. Apart from the inhabitants there were no more than ten thousand rebel troops; of these no more than three or four thousand were capable of defending the wall.

Q: How many were killed at Ch'ang-chou? How many were killed at Chin-ling? In the last ten years or so have [the rebels] come up against any militia in the various provinces who could fight? [No answers are recorded to these questions].

[P'ang Chi-yun's colophon]

In the 6th Month of the Year Chia Tzu in the T'ung Chih Reign [1864], the Earl of Hsiang-hsiang [Tseng Kuo-ch'üan] recovered Chin-ling and took prisoner the rebel chief Chung [Wang] Li Hsiu-ch'eng. The Marquis of Hsiang-hsiang [Tseng Kuo-fan] moved his Headquarters eastward from An-ch'ing, and the Provincial Judge Li [Hung-i] and P'ang Chi-yun, who came with him, were ordered to conduct the interrogation. The rebel Chung [Wang]'s written

deposition has already been forwarded for imperial inspection; in addition there are several pages of the record of the interrogation which are useful for reference. The first page is in the hand of the Marquis of Hsiang-hsiang and has small notes made during the interrogation by [P'ang] Chi-yun. The second page was written by the rebel Chung [Wang] himself at the order of Chi-yun because he could not understand [the prisoner's] accent. The third page is a record of interrogation written by Chi-yun. The fourth, fifth and sixth pages contain questions and answers clearly recorded by the Provincial Judge Li Mei-sheng at the order of the Marquis of Hsiang-hsiang. In the 8th Month of the Year Hsin Wei [1871] these [pages] were bound together, at Chia-p'ing, on the first day of spring.

[P'ang] Chi-yun.

APPENDIX II

Chao Lieh-wen's Record of a Conversation with Li Hsiu-ch'eng.

TC3/6/20 [23 July 1864] ...In the evening I went with Chou Lang-shan to where the rebel Chung Wang is, and spoke with him for a long time. He said that he is from T'eng-hsien in Kwangsi and is 42 sui. His family was formerly very poor and burned charcoal for a living. When the rebel Hung [Hsiu-ch'üan] went to Kwangsi and enticed people into joining the association and worshipping God, many followed him and all spoke of him as 'Hung hsien-sheng'. After the rising he was pressed into their ranks, under Shih Ta-k'ai. Seven or eight years later in Chin-ling he was given the rebel title of wang. I asked about the ability of the rebel leader and the qualities of the various rebel wangs. He said that they were all mediocre and that he respected only Shih Wang [sic. for Shih Ta-k'ai], who was, he said, a clever strategist.

I asked: 'At the rebel court it must have been known that he [Hung Hsiu-ch'üan?] could not be depended on, or did you think he was sure to succeed?'

He replied: 'It was like riding on a tiger - difficult to dismount, that is all.'

I said: 'Why did you not surrender long ago?'

He replied: 'One should not betray the trust of one's friends, especially since I had been ennobled by him. But wherever my troops have campaigned they have never killed indiscriminately. When we took Hang-chou Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao were made prisoner but they were treated with respect. The families of officials in the towns which fell to me were given passes and escorted out of the territory. You are surely not ignorant of this?'

I said: 'That may be, but the numbers killed by your troops were a hundred or a thousand times more than those who were spared. It was the duty of the commander to prevent this; and yet you are as

complacent as if you were innocent and even seem to imply that you were.'

He replied: 'In this I really am guiltless. In any case things are just the same in the government armies'.

I said: 'You are unrepentant, that is why I make things clear to you, so that you may be brought to your senses. How can you be blamed for what was common practice amongst the troops?' I went on to ask, 'In the autumn of the 10th Year [1860] you troops reached southern Hupeh. If they had advanced further Wu-ch'ang would have been shaken and the siege of An-ch'ing lifted. Why did you retire without fighting as soon as you heard of the arrival of General Pao [Ch'ao]?'

He replied: 'I had not enough troops'.

I said: 'Your troops were everywhere; how can you say you had not enough?'

He said: 'At that time I had Su-chou but not Hang-chou; it was like a bird without wings. I went back to plan its capture.'

I said: 'Why did you not take Hang-chou before going to Kiangsi, instead of making a march of several thousand li and then changing your plan without having achieved anything? Anyway your cousin the Shih Wang was in Hui-[chou], from which he could easily have attacked Chekiang without troubling you.'

He replied: 'My plan was badly made. At first I wanted to relieve Anhwei [An-ch'ing], but then I learned that this would be difficult. I also heard that the forces in Hupeh were strong. That is why I withdrew. Perhaps it was the will of heaven.'

I asked: 'Hung Hsiu-ch'üan only died this year; but we saw edicts from the Young Sovereign three or five years ago. What was the reason for this?'

He said: 'It was in order to accustom him to administration.'

I asked: 'If the city had not been taken this time would it have been able to hold out?'

He replied: 'There was no more grain. We were relying on obtaining grain through Chung-kuan, but very little got in. We could not have held out.'

I said: 'In searching the city the government troops have seen a lot of grain; how can you say there was nothing to eat?'

He answered: 'There may have been some in the palaces of the wangs, but it was not used to supply the troops, hence the deficiency. That is why morale was bad amongst us.' He went on to say: 'Now that T'ien-ching has fallen and I have been taken prisoner, do you think that there will be no more trouble in the land?'

I replied: 'That depends on the quality of the government, not on a victory or on your capture. We have heard that the new Son of Heaven is clever and wise; the people yearn for good rule. You rebels who disturbed half of the empire have just been wiped out, so perhaps people will not dare to make the same mistakes.

Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] also said: 'There are stars in the sky which predict that barbarian affairs are not settled; we will see this in ten or more years.' I took him up on the names and positions of these stars; but it was nothing but old wives' tales. I realized that there was nothing special about him, and asked: 'What do you plan to do now?'

He replied: 'To die. But those who have gone to the right bank [of the Yangtze] were all my troops before. If I could write a letter to disband them, so that they may avoid the fate of plundering each other, I could die without regret.' These words hinted that he was begging for his life.

I said: 'Your crimes are great and you must await the edict. This is not something which the commander-in-chief can decide.' He bowed his head and was silent, and we left.

[Translated from Chao Lieh-wen: Neng-ching chü-shih jih-chi, in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi III pp.374-5].

C. A. CCL 2nd Ed.

ABBREVIATIONS

Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi	Chao Lieh-wen: Neng-ching chü-shih jih-chi.
Chien-chi	T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi.
Chien: Ch'üan-shih	Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih.
Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao.	Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-k'ao.
Fang-lüeh	Ch'in-ting chiao-p'ing Yüeh-fei fang-lüeh.
Hamberg	Theodore Hamberg: The Visions of Hung-Siu-Tshuen and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection.
Hummel: Eminent Chinese.	A.W.Hummel (ed.): Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period.
Kuo: Jih-chih	Kuo T'ing-i: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih.
Lo: Chien-cheng	Lo Erh-kang: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-chuan yuan-kao chien-cheng. (4th Ed.)
Lo: Shih-kao	Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-kao
Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi.	Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao k'ao-shih chi.
Lo: Shih-shih k'ao.	Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih k'ao.
Shih-liao.	T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao.
Shih-lu.	Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu.
TCHT	Tsei-ch'ing hui-tsuan in TPTK Vol.III.
TPTK	Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao ts'ung-k'an: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, ed. Hsiang Ta et al.
Tzu-liao	T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tzu-liao.
Yin-shu.	T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yin-shu.

D A T E S

In giving dates the usual conventions are employed: HF for the Hsien Feng reign, TC for the T'ung Chih reign and TK for the Tao Kuang

reign. TT has been used to indicate that the date refers to the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo calendar. All date equivalents are taken from Lo Erh-kang: T'ien-li k'ao chi T'ien-li yü yin-yang li-jih tui-chao piao, Peking 1955 and Hsüeh Chung-san and Ou-yang I: Liang-ch'ien nien Chung Hsi li tui-chao piao, Peking 1957.

Dates of events are taken, unless otherwise specified, from Kuo T'ing-i: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, 2 vols., Shanghai 1946. When references are made to this work I have not usually given the page number, since this is a chronology and the references may be found under the dates in question.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. In spite of common Western usage, to which I have deferred, there is a good case for referring to the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo as a 'revolution' rather than a 'rebellion'; not only because an offensive sense is attached to the word 'rebellion' in the English usage, but also because modern Chinese historians, of both left and right, have in the main preferred to use the word 'ke-ming'. T.T.Meadows in The Chinese and their Rebellions, London. 1856 (p.25) wrote that 'revolution is a change in the form of government and of the principles on which it rests: it does not necessarily imply a change of rulers. Rebellion is a rising against the rulers which, far from necessarily aiming at a change of governmental principles and forms, often originates in a desire of preserving them intact. Revolutionary movements are against principles; rebellions against men.' The Taiping movement does not fall neatly into either of these categories: the Taipings did rise against the rulers, and they did not envisage anything but an imperial form of government. Nevertheless, they attacked principles, and in challenging Confucianism they were attacking the very roots of the traditional Chinese order; even if they did not enforce it, their 'Land System', the T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mu chih-tu, had it been workable, would have so changed the social and economic structure as to make the form of government entirely different whether they intended it or not.

2. The fullest bibliography on the Taiping Rebellion is Chang Hsiu-min & Wang Hui-an: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tzu-liao mu-lu (Revised by Chin Yü-fu), which is a supplement to Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao ts'ung-k'an (Second Series): T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, compiled by Wang Chung-min et al., 8 vols. Shanghai 1952. In English, a useful annotated bibliography is Teng Ssu-yü: Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion, Harvard 1962.

3. William James Hail: Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion, New Haven. 1927.

4. An elegant facsimile collection of Taiping printed books is T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yin-shu (20 fascicles in 2 cases), edited by the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-Kuo Historical Museum, Nanking. 1961.

5. My reasons for calling it a 'deposition' are given in a note to page

6. I have borrowed the term from F. W. Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate, California 1966, chapter V. This book gives a fascinating account of the social disorders in the region of Canton in the decade which followed the Opium War.

at the Gate, pp.117-8.

11. For Hakka and pen-ti strife in Kwangtung, see Wan Lo: Communal Strife in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Kwangtung, Harvard Papers on China, vol. 19. In Kwangsi Hakkas were called 來人 .

12. The point is made by E.J.Hobsbawm: Primitive Rebels, Manchester, 1959, p.13

13. Liu Ch'ang-yu (1818-1887, see Hummel: p.515): T'ang-fei tsung-lu (Supplement to Kuang-hsi t'ung-chih chi-yao), quoted by Hsieh Hsing-yao: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Kuang-hsi ti fan-Ch'ing yun-tung, Peking 1950 p.36.

14. 'The tough man, who is unwilling to bear the traditional burdens of the common man in a class society, poverty and meekness, may escape from them by joining or serving the oppressors as well as by revolting against them'. see Hobsbawm, op.cit. p.13

15. See pages 130-3 below.

16. For a discussion of the question of relations between the Taipings and the secret societies, see Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yü T'ien Ti Hui kuan-hsi k'ao-shih in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih k'ao, Peking 1955 pp.34-74. See also Teng Ssu-yü: New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Harvard 1950 pp.24-28. The discussion on the identity of Hung Ta-ch'üan also has a bearing on this question; for a summary of this discussion, see Teng, op.cit. pp.20-24.

17. A useful discussion of Taiping Christianity is E.P.Boardman: Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion, Madison 1952. Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate, pp.127-131 also has some brief but interesting comments.

18. See Vittorio Lanternari: Les mouvements religieux des peuples opprimés, Paris 1962.

19. Theodore Hamberg: The Visions of Hung-Siu-Tshuen and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection, Hongkong 1854 p. 49½

20. A contemporary observer, the Englishman A.F.Lindley, who assisted and warmly supported the Taipings, commented in 1866 on this error:

> The occupation of Nankin has proved fatal to the success of the Ti-pings hitherto. Insurrection, of whatever kind, to be successful, must never relinquish the aggressive movement... The Tien-wang, by settling down at Nanking and commencing

7. Sir J.F.Davis in his book China, A General Description of That Empire and Its Inhabitants, 2 vols. London ,1857 II p.412 wrote: 'There can be no doubt whatever of the existing insurrection in China having been the result of our own war. A Manchu general, in his report, distinctly stated that "the number of robbers and criminal associations is very great in the two Kwang provinces, and they assemble without difficulty to create trouble; all which arises from that class having detected the inefficiency of the imperial troops during the war with the English barbarians. Formerly they feared the troops as tigers; of late they look on them as sheep"'.

8. An interesting (undated) memorial is reprinted in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao (edited by Chin Yü-fu and T'ien Yü-ch'ing) Peking 1959 (pp.500-504) from the Chinese Serial in the British Museum. The author was Tseng Wang-yen, of Hsiang-shan, Kwangtung, who was at the time an expectant metropolitan official of the fifth rank; he was later Governor-general of Szechuan, see A.W.Hummel: Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Washington 1943 p.211. The memorial begins:

> Banditry has always existed in all parts of Kwangtung, but it has never been worse than at present. The reason is that year after year secret society bandits [教匪] have not been dealt with, and the real outlaws have not been apprehended; [instead] everything has been hushed up...

Tseng Wang-yen gives several instances of secret society outbreaks which were not reported as such. '[The officials] never dared mention the word hui [secret society]'...

> Even when one or two gangs have been arrested, the case has just been reported as one of robbery, though no stolen property was produced. Even more extraordinary, when it was known that there were bandits in a certain region troops did not go there to apprehend them: the gentry were merely ordered to deliver them up. But formerly the gentry had no armed men and were incapable of seizing them, so that the real bandits could get away. Thereupon [the authorities] would carry off in chains the spirit tablet of the ancestor from the ancestral hall of the gentry clan in question, and imprison it in the yamen....

(A reasonably faithful translation of this memorial is given in G.Wingrove Cooke: China: being 'The Times' Special Correspondence from China in the Years 1857-58, London 1858. pp.434-445).

9. See Meadows: The Chinese and their Rebellions pp.137-8

10. The name T'ien Ti Hui (Heaven and Earth Society) and its customary English equivalent, the 'Triads', is used almost as a generic term for the secret societies of South China which had roughly the same origin and characteristics. See Wakeman: Strangers

> to defend his position, committed a vital error, and one that lost him the empire. If, instead of so doing, and affording his enemies time to rally and recover from their wild panic, and concentrate their forces, he had aimed at the one terminal point, Pekin, beyond all doubt, the very éclat of his victorious march would have carried him with an almost resistless triumph into possession of the capital, and the consequent destruction of the Manchoo dynasty would have given him the empire.

From Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh, the History of the Ti-Ping Revolution, London, 1866, p.152 & p.154.

21. Lo Ta-kang (see note 5 to page 134) is said to have opposed the establishment of the Taiping capital at Nanking, see Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, Shanghai 1959 p.114, quoting from Ch'ing-shih kao. The collection of 42 essays entitled Chien T'ien-ching yü Chin-ling lun (On Establishing the Heavenly Capital at Chin-ling) in yin-shu I.10, may perhaps have been the official Taiping answer to doubts or criticisms about this decision - all the 42 authors were in favour!

22. For Tseng Kuo-fan's original conception of the function of the t'uan-lien, see Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'üan-chi: Nien-p'u ch.1 p.14b and Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih, Hong Kong 1961, 3 vols. II p.1049 ff. Imagination and foresight do not seem to have been Tseng Kuo-fan's strong points, and it is unlikely that he had any clear idea as to how the army would develop. It was only the success of his early operations which made him realize that the force could be used on a larger scale and outside his own province. Franz Michael: The Taiping Rebellion, Seattle 1966 I p.97, believes that from the first Tseng Kuo-fan had in mind something very different from what the court envisaged, which was a local force on more or less traditional lines. This may be the view expressed in Lo Erh-kang's study of the Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün hsin-chih), which I have not seen. But Chien Yu-wen does not consider that from the first Tseng Kuo-fan intended to set up an army of a new kind; although Tseng had always intended that the force should be supported out of government funds rather than from local contributions, it grew out of local Hunan t'uan-lien, and only gradually acquired a new character. A doctoral thesis by Philip Kuhn, which I have not seen, may throw light on this question; as far as I can judge Tseng Kuo-fan's own writings do not. He was probably too cautious to commit thoughts of this nature to paper.

23. Li Hsiu-ch'eng considered this defeat one of the main reasons for the failure of the Taipings, see page 252.

24. See note 2 to page 151, on the Chiang-nan H.Q.

25. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of this operation is given on pages 156-7.

26. See pages 140-2.

27. See page 143.

28. Lo Erh-kang deduces that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was a Hakka from his use of certain dialect expressions in the deposition, see Lo Erh-kang: Chung-wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-chuan yuan-kao chien-cheng (4th, revised edition) Peking 1957 p.61. Li Hsiu-ch'eng apparently told Chao Lieh-wen, after his capture, that his family were also charcoal burners, see Chao Lieh-wen: Neng-ching chü-shih jih-chi in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi (hereafter 'Chien-chi') compiled by the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo Historical Museum, 6 vols. Peking 1961, vol.III p.374. (See Appendix II page 266).

29. 監軍, an officer of the sixth rank, holding in fact a military command, and not strictly an 'inspector'; for the origin of the name, see Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-k'ao 3 vols, Hong Kong 1958 p.78.

30. (地官副丞相). See Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih kao (Revised Edition) Peking 1957 p.372.

31. ibid.

32. C.G.Gordon wrote of Li Hsiu-ch'eng:

> He was the bravest, most talented and enterprising leader the rebels had; he had been in more engagements than any other Rebel leader and could always be distinguished. His presence with the Taepings was equal to a reinforcement of 5000 men and was always felt by the superior way they resisted. He was the only Rebel chief whose death was to be regretted.

From a manuscript in the British Museum.

33. See page 170.

34. Described in the deposition on pages 178 ff.

35. See Hung Jen-kan's Deposition in TPTK II page.852.

36. ibid.

37. This question is discussed in note 6 to page 197.

38. See page 43.

39. For the history of the Huai Army, see Stanley Spector: Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism, Seattle 1964.

40. The controversial question of British official policy towards the Taipings is discussed in J.S. Gregory: British Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion in the Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIX: No.1 pp.11-24 and in the doctoral thesis on which the article is based.

41. A popular, though well-documented life of Ward is Holger Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer, New York 1930.

42. The best account of the 'Ever-Victorious Army' and of Gordon's command is Andrew Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army', A History of the Chinese Campaign under Lt.-Col. C.G. Gordon, C.B., R.E. and of the Suppression of the Tai-Ping Rebellion, London 1867.

43. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in TPTK II p.853.

44. See pages 214-4, 221, 224 & Appendix I p.260.

45. According to Tseng Kuo-fan: tsou-kao TC3/6/23 ch.20 p.27b.

46. See Ho Ping-ti: Studies on the Population of China,1368-1953, Harvard 1959 pages 246-7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. See pages 243-5.

2. See Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lueh in Chien-chi I. p.410. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's death is given on page 240 and the various other versions are discussed in a note.

3. Chao Lieh-wen (趙烈文), tzu Hui-fu (惠甫), 1832-1893, see TPTK VIII pp.729-762, Ch'en Nai-kan: Yang-hu Chao Hui-fu nien-p'u. Chao Lieh-wen's diary, Neng-ching chü-shih jih-chi covers the years 1858 to 1889. I have used the shortened version given in Chien-chi III, checking sometimes against the facsimile edition in Wu Hsiang-hsiang ed.: Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu, Taipei 1965.

4. 中丞 in the original, the courtesy title of a provincial governor.

5. The main part of the ritual for the 'presentation of a captive' [獻俘] was that an official from the Board of War conducted the prisoner to the She Chi T'an [Altar to the Patrons of the Dynasty], see Ch'in-ting Ta Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li, Kuang Hsü Ed. ch.333 pp.10b-11b.

6. The junior of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's two elder brothers, see p.130.

7. 中堂 in the original: the courtesy title of a Grand Secretary.

8. 陸路提督, an Infantry General; he was the highest ranking officer under Tseng Kuo-ch'üan at the siege of Nanking, for his part in which he was awarded honours. He was a Hunanese from Hsiang-hsiang and there were murmurs of favouritism, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.2277.

9. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/20 in Chien-chi III p.373. Corroborative evidence may be found in Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's letter to Li Hung-chang quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng p.30 and in Ting Kuo-chün: Ho Hsiang Kuan so-yen (Li Hsiu-ch'eng i-shih) ch.1 p.6a/b in Ping Tzu ts'ung-pien, 1936.

10. Chao Lieh-wen's record of this interview is translated in full in Appendix II.

11. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/23 p.376, and below, page 20.

12. See page 53.

13. See Tseng Wen Cheng Kung shou-shu jih-chi (hereafter abbreviated as Tseng: shou-shu jih-chi) TC3/6/23 Vol.3 p.1839 in the facsimile edition in Wu Hsiang-hsiang ed.: Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu, Taipei 1965.

14. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/25 p.377.

15. See Tseng: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/6/25 p.1840; Tseng: Tsou-kao ch.20 TC3/7/7 p.28b; and Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'üan-chi, Chia-hsün TC3/6/26 (dated in error TC3/6/22) to Tseng Chi-tse, Shih-chieh Edition, Shanghai 1948 p.41.

16. See Tseng: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/6/27 p.1842.

17. See Tseng: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.28b.

18. Translated in full in Appendix I.

19. This account seems to have originated with Lo Tun-yung: T'ai-

p'ing T'ien-kuo chan-chi, first published in 1913, the authenticity of which is challenged by Lo Erh-kang in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao pien-wei chi, Peking 1955 pp.49 ff. The story is repeated in Huang Hung-shou: Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo ch.5, and in Liu Yü-sheng: Shih Tsai T'ang tsa-i, Peking 1960 p.34.

20. See Tseng Kuo-fan's colophon [批記] to the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition in Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen edited by the T'ung-chih kuan of the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region, Peking 1961, p.59a.

21. The document which Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote in captivity has been called by various names in Chinese: 親供, 手供, 口供, 供詞, 自傳, and 自述. In English it has been called a 'confession', an 'autobiography' and an 'autographic deposition.' Of the Chinese appellations, the first four are variations of official usage, the character 供 being common to all; the last two, meaning 'self statement' and 'autobiography' are virtually euphemisms to avoid the stigma which the word 'confession' attaches to the document. In fact, the character 供 does not in itself imply confession; it has the more neutral sense of testimony or evidence. Although it could be argued that Li Hsiu-ch'eng's document has elements of confession in it, I see no reason for translating 李秀成親供 as 'The Confession of Li Hsiu-ch'eng.' If we are to do so, what are we to call the document written by Hung Jen-kan, which expresses no sense of guilt? The most suitable translation of 親供 is 'autographic deposition,' used by A.F. Lindley, see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.773. For the sake of simplicity I have used only the word 'deposition', which seems to express adequately the judicial nature of such documents, while remaining neutral on whether they were confessions or not.

22. Apart from that of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, the following depositions of Taiping leaders are extant: Hung Jen-kan (TPTK II pp.846-855), Lai Wen-kuang (ibid. pp.862-3), Shih Ta-k'ai (ibid. pp.780-1), Hung Fu-chen [Hung Yu-fu] (ibid. pp.855-6), Hung Jen-cheng (ibid. p.857), Huang Wen-ying (ibid.p.857-8), Ch'en Yü-ch'eng (see Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao k'ao-shih chi, Peking 1956 pp.201-2), Huang Sheng-ts'ai (in Shan-tung Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao, I, edited by Chinan Branch of the China Historical Association, Chinan 1957 pp.5-11; that of Li Shang-yang is also listed in TPTK tzu-liao mu-lu p.37. Except for those of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Hung Jen-kan and Lai Wen-kuang, which they wrote themselves, the others are records of interrogation.

23. Compare the case of Shih Ta-k'ai, who gave himself up on 13 June 1862 but was not interrogated by Lo Ping-chang (Governor General of Szechuan) until about 25 June, see TPTK II p.785.

24. See General Correspondence, F.O.17 /412, 1864 from Consuls at Shanghai, Parkes, Adkins, Markham in the Public Record Office, London.

25. i.e. P'ang Chi-yun, a member of Tseng Kuo-fan's secretariat.

26. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/6 p.381

27. See Tseng: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.28b.

28. See Tseng: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/7/7 pp.1848-9.

29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/10 p.382.

30. From Ch'iu Chüeh Chai tsou-shu ch.6 quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng p.130.

31. Hsieh Hsing-yao: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih lun-ts'ung Shanghai 1935. p.160.

32. This memorial, which is not in Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'üan-chi is quoted from Ch'iu Chüeh Chai tsou-shu ch.6 by Lo: Chien-cheng, p.130

33. Li T'ang-chieh: Li Wen Ch'ing Kung jih-chi TC3/7/17 quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng, p.130

34. See Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu ch.124 (T'ung-Chih) p.47b.

35. Quoted from Ch'iu Chüeh Chai tsou-shu ch.6 by Lo: Chien-cheng p.130.

36. See Tseng: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.22a.

37. ibid. This refers to the last section of the deposition, see pages 252-255.

38. See TPTK tzu-liao mu-lu p.34.

39. See Shih-lu TC3/12/20 ch.124 p.47b; the third of the 'ten requests' is on page 248.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

1. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/7/7 pages 1848-9, quoted above, page 22, i.e. 130 pages each with 216 characters.

2. See Tseng Kuo-fan's letter to his son Chi-tse of TC3/7/6 in Chia-hsün p.42, 'I send back Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition today.'

3. See Li Wen Chung Kung ch'üan-chi: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.5 p.31b 1905 Edition.

4. See Yang Chia-lo: Li Hsiu-ch'eng ch'in-kung k'ao, Taipei 1962 p.5

5. A facsimile of this facsimile is reproduced in Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen; the reason for this is explained on the following page and in note 8, below.

6. Except to Ch'en Yin-k'o before the war, but I assume that he did not examine the manuscript, since we know of no reaction, see Lo: Chien-cheng p.104.

7. Originally Lo Erh-kang was to have gone, not to bring back the ms. but to examine and photograph it; but he was prevented from doing so by illness, see Lo: Chien-cheng, preface to the 3rd Edition.

8. This copy of the 1936 facsimile, with Lü Chi-i's notes in the margins, is reproduced in facsimile in the photolithograph edition of Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.

9. See Lü Chi-i's explanatory note in Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen (typeset edition) pp.11-23.

10. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.11

11. Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen (facsimile) Peking 1961, and same title (typeset), Nan-ning 1961.

12. The version in TPTK II pp.787-840 and that in Yang Sung et al. ed.: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao hsüan-chi, Peking 1954 pp.150-208 are based on Lo Erh-kang's 1951 edition of Chien-cheng.

13. under the title Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu shou-kao, Peking 1958.

14. Liang Hu-lu was severely criticized by K'e Feng in a note in Li-shih yen-chiu, 1956 No.5 p.110, for having published under his own name and without acknowledgments, work which was almost entirely Lü Chi-i's, and for concealing from his former colleague Lo Erh-kang the existence of 15 photographs.

15. See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen p.1 (Typeset edition).

16. Li Hsiu-ch'eng ch'in-kung shou-chi, Taipei 1961.

17. This is clear from the slight difference in the printing of the lines and headings, and from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's note at the end of page 100 (yeh 50), starting, 'The paper is finished...'

18. W.T. Lay: The Autobiography of the Chung Wang, Shanghai 1865.

19. A.F. Lindley, an ardent supporter of the Taipings wrote in his book (Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.770-1) in 1866:

> Confessions were produced which professed to be written by the penitent rebel leaders in their dungeons, while awaiting their turn to be disembowelled or 'cut into a thousand pieces'....Among these seemingly fabricated confessions only one is worthy of any attention, and that is the lengthy composition, entitled, 'The Autographic deposition of Chung-wang, the faithful king, at his trial after the capture of Nankin.' Were it not for the known mandacity of the Mandarins, and their particular addiction to forging documents of this sort in order to lessen the prestige of the revolution by representing its principal leaders as in their merciless power, there would be little doubt but that the one in question is genuine. In 1852, previous to the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the Imperial authorities concocted an article they named the 'Confession of Tien-teh', pretending that it was the deposition of the leader of the rebellion, whom they falsely declared was their prisoner. It is quite probable that the 'Chung-wang's deposition' is of similar truthlessness, and was made up by some prisoner of note (who may have been pardoned in consequence), and the cunning writers attached to the Governor General of the two Kiang, Tseng Kwo-fan. Still it must be admitted that many portions of the alleged deposition bear not only the impress of truth (in so far as historical events, date, &c., are concerned), but expressions closely resembling the well-known sentiments of the great Ti-ping general; so that if, as we trust, he was not the author, someone pretty intimately acquainted with him must have been.

20. In Hua-tung shih-ta hsüeh-pao, 1956 No.4. I have not seen this article, and my knowledge of its contents is based primarily on Lo Erh-kang's rebuttal of the same.

21. Reproduced first in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo wen-shu, 1933. For biographical information on Li Chao-shou, see page 166, n5.

22. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi, p.1841.

23. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.378.

24. See Tseng Kuo-fan's colophon to the printed edition in Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.

25. Lo Erh-kang's case is given in Chien-cheng and in Chung Wang tzu-chuan yuan-kao k'ao-cheng yü lun k'ao-chü, Peking 1958.

26. See Appendix I page 256 (translated from Lo: Chien-cheng). This document is reproduced in Kuo Jo-yü ed.: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ke-ming wen-wu t'u lu, hsü-pien, Shanghai 1952 p.49

27. See appendix I page 265, P'ang Chi-yun's colophon.

28. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7, ch.20 p.28b.

29. ibid. pp.28a-29a.

30. ibid. p.27a (Memorial of TC3/6/23).

31. See pages 245 & 252 below. The question of forged additions to the deposition is dealt with in Chapter VI.

32. Lo Erh-kang was not aware of Chaloner Alabaster's report, quoted above, I believe for the first time; this bears out Lo's argument, not only about the difficult physical conditions under which Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote the deposition, but also that he did write it.

33. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi, p.386.

34. ibid. pp.374-5.

35. See note 6 to page 143 on Li Hsiu-ch'eng's education.

36. See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.5 pp.33b-34a

37. See page 221.

38. See Shen Pao-chen's memorial of TC3/10/13 (11 November 1864), in TPTK II p.861.

39. See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.

40. See page 216 , below.

41. See Tseng Kuo-fan: jih-chi entry for TC3/7/6, page 1848. This figure refers to the original manuscript of course, not to the

copy sent to the Grand Council.

42. The letter is dated TC3/7/7, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-hsün p.41

43. In Chiang Shih-jung ed.: Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao, Peking 1959. p.235.

44. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'üan-chi, Shu-cha ch.28 p.20b.

45. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi, TC3/7/6 p.381.

46. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/7/6 p.1848.

47. As stated by Tseng Kuo-fan in the colophon to the printed edition, see Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.

48. This can be seen from the frontespiece of the Taiwan facsimile, Li Hsiu-ch'eng ch'in-kung shou-chi.

49. This includes both 'sense' cuts and grammatical cuts. I do not know why anyone should have wanted to count the deleted characters at that time, but the figures are near enough to make one suspect that there is some connection.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. The publication of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition in facsimile, reproducing the cuts and changes made by Tseng Kuo-fan clearly marked in red, which may be checked against the printed edition, provide us with a rare example of that bureaucratic method of self-defence called 洗改文卷 , the expunging and falsification of documents, The term is borrowed from E-tu Zen Sun: Ch'ing Administrative Terms p.316 Harvard 1961.

2. In the early part of 1853, prominent gentry in nine provinces were ordered to raise militia. Books dating from the Chia Ch'ing period relating to such matters were reprinted for their benefit, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1050.

3. The biography of Chiang Chung-yuan (1812-1854) is given in Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.136-7 and that of Lo Tse-nan (1810-1856 on pp.540-1. Chiang Chung-yuan's 'Ch'u Braves' had fought against the Taipings in Kwangsi (see note 10 to page 137), but the idea now was to revive the t'uan-lien for local control against

bandits, but did not envisage them fighting against the Taiping armies, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1050

4. The Hunan Army had won a notable victory at Hsiang-t'an in Hunan on 1 May (HF4/4/5), see page 252, and Appendix I page 257, and at Yüeh-chou in July the same year.

5. Ch'i Chün-tsao (1793-1866), a Grand Secretary, Grand Councillor and Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent, see Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.125.

6. See Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng: Shu tsai-hsiang yu hsüeh wu chih in Yung-an ch'üan-chi, Yung-an hsü-pien ch.2 p.5b (Usually cited incorrectly as being from Yung-an pi-chi).

7. See pages 184 ff.

8. Quoted by Fan Wen-lan: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih I p.139, 9th Edition, Peking 1955.

9. Such as Chang Fei, Imperial Commissioner for Military Affairs in Southern Anhwei, Wang Yu-ling, Governor of Chekiang and Hsüeh Huan, Governor of Kiangsu, see Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo p.269.

10. See Tseng Kuo-fan's letter to his brother dated HF10/7/12 quoted by Chiang Hsing-te: Tseng Kuo-fan chih sheng-p'ing chi shih-yeh, Shanghai 1935 p.63.

11. For the strategic importance of An-ch'ing see note 4 to page 187.

12. Of Su-shun (1815?-1861) Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.667 says: 'In the last three or four years of his reign Emperor Wen-tsung turned to sensual pleasures to escape from worry regarding the chaotic condition of the empire. Most of the affairs of state, which previously had been decided by the Emperor in conjunction with the Grand Councillors, were now attended to by adjutant generals, particularly Tsai-yüan and Tuan-hua. But since both had indecisive personalities they often turned to Su-shun for advice. In this way Su-shun gradually assumed great power.'

13. See page 185.

14. See Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng: Su-shun t'ui-fu Ch'u-hsien in Yung-an pi-chi p.13 (Wan-yu Wen-k'u Edition)

15. See Li Chien-nung: The Political History of China 1840-1928

(Translated & Edited by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls) Princeton 1956, pp.88 ff, gives details of this coup d'état.

16. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu ch.6 pp.190-1 (Shih-chieh Edition).

17. ibid. ch.7 p.199.

18. This refers to Kuo Tzu-i, the T'ang general who won great merit for his part in suppression the rebellion of An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming.

19. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao, TC1/intercalary 8/12 (15 October 1862) ch.16 pp 27a/b.

20. Tseng Kuo-fan had done so in his memorial (supplementary p'ien) of TC2/4/27, see Tsou-kao ch.18 pp.22a/b

21. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu ch.7 p.209 (Shih-chieh Edition)

22. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.23 p.16a.

23. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/4/1 pp.338-9.

24. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu ch.7 p.213 (Shih-chieh Edition).

25. An analysis of the Tung-hua-lu led Hellmut Wilhelm to the conclusion that between 1821 and 1895 almost every high official was punished at least once during his career. Extremely severe punishments (execution, banishment, enslavement, corporal punishment or imprisonment) were imposed in about 22% of all cases brought to the emperor's attention, dismissal in 42%, and lighter punishments (reprimands, fines, and/or demotion) in the remaining cases. Cited by K.A. Wittfogel: Oriental Despotism, Yale 1957 p.338 n.

26. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha TC3/7/2, ch.24 pp.4b-5a (to Li Hung-chang).

27. See Hung Fu-chen: Deposition in TPTK II p.856.

28. See page 243.

29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/5 p.380.

30. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.27a.

31. Originally the name of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's son was Hung T'ien-kuei (洪天貴), later the character 福 was added. When his

seal was cut the two characters 真主 ('the true sovereign') were put below his name, which was consequently misread as 洪福瑱 (Hung Fu-chen), see his deposition, TPTK II p.855.

32. See page 243.

33. See page 243

34. See Shih-lu ch.110 **passim**.

35. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.28 p.20b (to Shen Pao-chen).

36. See Wu Hsiang-hsiang: Wan Ch'ing kung-t'ing shih-chi, Taipei 1957 p.161.

37. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/4/18 p.350

38. ibid. TC3/6/23 p.376

39. See Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-jung chi-lüeh p.49a in Nien-chü Lu ts'ung-k'o, compiled by Hsü Yen-k'uan, 1931.

40. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/23 p.376.

41. ibid. TC6/7/20 p.417.

42. see Chang Ch'i-yun et al.: Ch'ing-shih Vol.8 ch.546 p.6132 Taipei 1961.

43. See Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih V p.23a 1886.

44. Tso Tsung-t'ang quoted by Lo Erh-kang: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng k'u-jou-huan-ping chi k'ao in Li-shih yen-chiu 1964 No.4 p.47

45. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC4/4/14 p.348.

46. ibid. TC3/6/23 p.376.

47. See Appendix I page 264.

48. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 pp.28b-29a.

49. ibid. TC3/7/7 pp.28b-29a.

50. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/17 p.371.

51. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.29a.

52. See Shih-lu ch.110 pp.16b-17a.

53. See Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao p.238

54. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/5 p.380

55. ibid. p.386 (TC3/7/21).

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

1. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi p.1839

2. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 pp.27a-b.

3. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi p.1840

4. See Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'üan-chi: Chia-hsün (Shih Chieh Edition) 1948 p.41

5. Tseng Kuo-fan in his letter to Li Hung-chang of TC3/7/2 (3 August) wrote that 'As soon as the depositions [of Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Jen-ta] have been taken they will be executed.' See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.24 p.4a/b.

6. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/2 p.378.

7. ibid. TC3/7/4 p.379.

8. ibid. TC3/7/6 p.381. What Chao Lieh-wen wrote was: '中堂等从聽旨連日踟躕此事 俟定見後再相覆

9. Ling Shan-ch'ing: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yeh-shih, Shanghai 1936 ch.13 p.19 relates a different version of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's death: Tseng Kuo-fan invited Li Hsiu-ch'eng to a banquet and afterwards said with a sigh, 'This is to bid you farewell.' Li Hsiu-ch'eng replied, 'How should I dare disobey?' then went into a neighbouring room and cut his throat. This fanciful version is repeated by Chiang Hsing-te: Tseng Kuo-fan chih sheng-p'ing chi ch'i shih-yeh (p.88) and probably elsewhere.

10. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/6 p.381

11. Li Hung-chang writing to Tseng Kuo-fan on TC3/7/6 said,'[If] the edict orders the two rebel chiefs to be sent to the capital and they are not already executed they will just have to be sent.' See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.5 p.286.

12. See Tao-k'ou yü-sheng (pseud.): Pei-lu chi-lüeh in T'ai-P'ing T'ien-kuo tzu-liao p.213 (Edited by:Chung-kuo K'e-hsüeh-yuan li-shih yen-chiu-so ti-san so, Peking 1949. Tseng Kuo-fan cited the case of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng as a precedent for not sending Li Hsiu-ch'eng to Peking, but I doubt whether he had this incident in mind.

13. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.28b.

14. It is curious that both Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and Tseng Kuo-fan appear to underestimate the court, the former its competence to 'defend the honour of the State' and the latter its resistance to 'sweet words'.

15. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/20 p.373.

16. On the other hand it is difficult to believe that a possibility which had occurred to others did not cross Tseng Kuo-fan's own mind; he was, after all, a keen student of history. It was openly said, at least among foreigners in China at the time, that he could have made himself emperor if he had wished. (See for instance A.E. Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion, London 1891, p.463). Lo Erh-kang quotes an interesting story by Tseng Kuo-fan's own daughter to the effect that when a new house was being built for the Tseng family in Hsiang-hsiang at the end of the Hsien Feng period, a commemorative couplet was attached to the new beam of the roof which read '兩江總督太細嘿 要到南京做皇帝 ' - '[The rank of] Governor General of Liang-chiang is really not enough; he should go to Nanking and make himself Emperor.' See Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng 3rd Edition p.33.

17. This appears to be somewhat suspicious on the surface, especially as the content of the imperial edict was known in Nanking on 9 August (TC3/7/8). But it seems that this is in fact what happened. Tseng Kuo-fan told several other people that the edict had not arrived, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.24 p.5a; Chao Lieh-wen also mentions this (see Jih-chi p.381), and confirms the fact that the edict did not arrive until 11 August (ibid.p.382), as does Tseng Kuo-fan's letter to Fan Yun-chi (Shu-cha ch.24 p.5b). News of the imperial honours for the victors at Nanking and of the order to send Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Jen-ta to Peking reached Nanking on 9 August through the Tartar General Fu-ming-ah - this is confirmed by Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.381 and Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao p.235.

18. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.378. The edict referred to is in Shih-lu ch.107 p.35a.

19. Tseng Kuo-fan later told the court that according to his calculations the edict should have arrived on 7 August, see Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3a.

20. ibid. ch.20 p.28b.

21. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/20 p. 375.

22. See Appendix I, page 262.

23. See page 192.

24. See page 176.

25. See page 186. This question is discussed on page 37.

26. See pages 248-251.

27. See page 251.

28. See Lo: Chien-cheng pp.34-35.

29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.381. Chao added that at the execution ground Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote a short poem in which he stated that he had been loyal to the end (敘其盡忠之意). For a long time I was convinced that this poem, which no longer exists, expressed Li's new loyalty, to the Ch'ing Dynasty or to Tseng Kuo-fan, on the grounds that if he had expressed loyalty to the Taipings, Chao would probably have said so. But in thinking again about Li Hsiu-ch'eng's conception of loyalty I came to the conclusion that he meant this in the past tense, 'I was loyal to the end [of my Sovereign's life].' There is a statement to this effect in the deposition, see page 246.

30. Tseng Kuo-fan however, reported to the throne that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been executed by slicing, see Tsou-kao ch.20 p.28b.

31. ibid.

32. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.24 pp.4a, 4b.

33. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 pp.3a, 3b.

34. ibid. p.22a

35. Tso Tsung-t'ang's answer to Tseng Kuo-fan's letter, if any, is not known; but he wrote in a memorial on TC3/9/15 that

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was obviously just trying to protect the Taiping remnants, see Tso Wen Hsiang kung tsou-kao ch.10 p.56b.

36. See page 227.

37. See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.5 p.28b.

38. Government policy was reiterated in an edict of TC1/12/1 (19 January 1863) which is reproduced in translation as an Inclosure to No.25, Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell, January 26,1863, B.P.P. China. No.3, Papers relating to the Affairs of China, pp.46, 47.

"While, on the one hand, ever since the war in the provinces began, orders have been issued to the military to go forth and extinguish utterly the cause of that terrible disorder, the venomous influence of which was inflicting cruel suffering upon the people; upon the other, with equal frequency have Decrees from the Throne enjoined upon the Generals conducting the different campaigns the duty of greatly compassionating those who, constrained by the rebels to join them against the Government, had been thrust upon the spears of the army in the capacity forced upon them of counterfeit (sc.,rebel) officials; and they, the Generals, have been instructed that if any would bring over a number of their fellows to their allegiance, they should be allowed to reform themselves (unharmed).

"And accordingly, whenever a report has been forwarded from any of the armies in the field that certain from among the rebels have rescued themselves and have returned to their allegiance, we have in all instances forgiven them the past, and have considered how best to place them in comfort (or,security); nor has any one who, when our forces appeared before it, surrendered a city, or who, after returning to his allegiance has done us service by destroying the enemy, been left without a liberal reward immediately bestowed.

"So it was with Hung Sung-hai [T'ung Jung-hai] and those who with him brought over, at a moment's notice, a large number of followers, and surrendered a city. Their past offence was forgiven them, their merit was recorded, they were liberally recompensed. Thus was our graciousness made manifest; nor can there be any of our people, even of those who are still in the hands of the rebels, who have not seen this and heard it.

"It is but too possible at the same time that our officers and troops do not second as they should the goodly purpose of the Emperor, whose desire it is that man should live, and that when those who are in extremity would present themselves to tender their submission, they in some cases notwithstanding meet with a violent death.

"Tseng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-tang, are at the

head of large forces to destroy the rebels in the Kiang Provinces and Cheh-kiang; the terror of their arms fills the rebels with consternation. Those in Nanking are in extreme difficulty, and very shortly when the troops shall have invested the city on all sides, it will fall without further trouble.

"Now, inasmuch as there are in that city, fallen as it were between fire and water, a number (it is to be feared no few) of our subjects, who though serving the rebels with no good will, but forced by them to act, may yet be unable to rescue themselves from them, let Tseng Kwo-fan and his colleagues declare by proclamation that if anyone now constrained to grow his hair and take part in repelling the force engaged in the siege of Nanking shall faithfully return before the city fall, to his allegiance, his submission shall be accepted, whether he have been a long time or only recently on the side of the rebels, and when he shall have given up his arms and horse, these high officers shall consider whether he is to remain and serve under them against the rebels, following in every respect the precedent of Hung Tsung-hai [T'ung Jung-hai]; or if he prefer not to serve with the army, the local authorities shall be desired to send him to his own district, or otherwise to provide for him so that he shall not be without a home. Nor are the troops to be allowed to despoil him of any property he may bring with him. If they plunder him, or murder him, they shall be dealt with at once as the military code requires; and if their misdeeds by not noticed and punished by those commanding them, the moment their remissness is discovered we will command the Generals their superiors to denounce them, and punish them with all possible severity.

"And if in any other quarter in Kiang-su or Cheh-kiang, at Soo-chow or Hang-chow, whether in town or country, there be any who shall kill a rebel and return to his allegiance, or who shall submit himself with his head duly shaven; we command that the same course be followed in his case, that his past be not inquired into, that he be not wantonly put to death, lest the earnest desire to return within the pale of civilization by thereby let and hindered.

"When this proclamation, which once more affectionately appeals to the people, shall have appeared, it will behove all those now constrained to adhere to the rebels to see their error, and themselves to find out a means by which their lives may be preserved. Let them not tarry till the city is stormed, when the gem and the pebble [will be] burned in the same conflagration, repentance will be too late.

"Let Tseng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-tang print this Decree upon yellow paper, and post in every direction, that men may know how great is our desire that the living may be overshadowed as with a canopy (by our goodness), and that all may be allowed to live a new life. Respect this!"

39. See Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate, Chapter XV.

40. See Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi: Fu-ngo shu-tu, ch.67 p.26a.

41. See Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.508.

42. Hu Lin-i quoted in Tai I: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih kao, Peking 1958 p.353.

43. See Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion, Seattle 1954 pp.93-5

44. See Hail: Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion p.267n.

45. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1889.

46. ibid. p.1053.

47. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi HF11/8/13 p.201.

48. See Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-chün jih-chi pp.27b-28a.

49. Pao Ch'ao probably regretted this later; his army mutinied on 30 April 1865 (TC4/4/6), see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.399 and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.22 p.11a/b.

50. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.18 p.1

51. Ts'ai Shou-ch'i, a would-be impeacher of Tseng Kuo-fan found himself impeached, see Shih-lu ch.137 pp.13,18-19.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

1. See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen p.59a

2. Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/7 p.381 and TC3/7/10 p.382.

3. They were almost certainly omitted from the copy sent to the Grand Council as well, since there is only a discrepancy of 192 characters between this version and the An-ch'ing printed edition, see page 24

4. It is not immediately clear what Tseng Kuo-fan meant by these markings, which do not conform to his usual practice in cancelling deletions. Cut were usually made by bracketting or

circling the portion to be deleted; if Tseng Kuo-fan wanted to cancel such a deletion (which frequently happened), he either put a mark (∪) next to each character, or at the beginning and end of the deletion, as on pages 48 and 63 for instance. But on the pages in question there is the ∩ mark at the top of each line and a stroke through the brackets at the bottom of each line. In other circumstances there would be no doubt that Tseng Kuo-fan meant these deletions to be cancelled, but the fact that the two pages were then entirely suppressed is puzzling.

5. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.22a.

6. See Appendix I page 260.

7. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.6 pp.14a-17b (TC3/2/20).

8. See note 3 to p.248.

9. This falsification, not being visible on the manuscript itself, was entirely overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

10. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.27a.

11. ibid. p.28a

12. See page 240 and note 3.

13. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.27a.

14. Compare this with Chao Lieh-wen's estimate that not many were killed, quoted on page 48.

15. See Appendix I page 264.

16. Li Hsiu-ch'eng believed that he had listed ten 'failures'; in fact there are eleven, since two are marked '6'.

17. This point was made in conversation by Mr. Wang Erh-min.

18. Though punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan, this section, like the 'ten requests' was omitted from the Grand Council copy and from the printed edition. Tseng Kuo-fan later had it copied and sent to the Grand Council.

19. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3a.

20. ibid. p.22a. We do not know what these 'other remarks' were,

since this document has not yet come to light in the archives, though perhaps refers to pp.253-255.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.

1. A.F.Lindley quotes a proclamation by the Chung Wang posted on a Roman Catholic church near Shanghai, ordering that 'not the minutest particle of foreign property is to be injured,' on pain of decapitation; the foreigners themselves were to be 'regarded as brethren;' see Lin-Le: Ti-ping Tien-kwoh p.298

2. J.H.Teesdale: Lin Sin Cheng [sic], the Chung Wang or 'Faithful Prince' (The Faithful and Devoted of a Myriad Years), An Episode in the Taiping Rebellion, in the Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol.LVII, 1926 pp.92-109

3. Quoted by Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng, 3rd Edition, p.34.

4. He did not publish his detailed study until the authenticity of the deposition had been questioned by Nien Tzu-min and others, see page 30.

5. Such as Ling Shan-ch'ing: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yeh-shih, Shanghai 1936.

6. Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng, 3rd Edition p.30

7. See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen, p.1

8. Liang Hu-lu: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu shou-kao, Peking 1958, preface, p.3

9. The contrary view is put forward in an article by Stephen Uhalley, Jr.: The Controversy over Li Hsiu-ch'eng, an Ill-timed Centenary, in the Journal of Asian Studies Vo. XXV, February 1966, pp.305-317, see note 33, below.

10. See Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1963 No.4, pp.27-42.

11. This was done by Chang Hsia in an article in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1964 No.5/6 pp.35-42.

12. See Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works Vol.III p.76, London 1954.

13. See note 9 to page 209.

14. See pages 225, 239.

15. See Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1964 No.4 pp.19-80.

16. Lo Erh-kang explained that in using this term he was thinking of the captured warriors of old, who would inflict injuries upon themselves in order to prove their loyalty to their new masters.

17. See Lo: Chien-cheng plate V,i-ii.

18. See note 1 to page 229.

19. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.11 p.14b (HF10/5/3).

20. This proclamation is reproduced in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo wen-shu, which I have not seen.

21. Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC2/3/25 p.268 and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.15b (TC2/3/27).

22. See note 2 to page 232.

23. See Appendix I p. 262.

24. The preface to a Taiping publication, now lost, entitled Chung Wang hui-i chi-lüeh, contained such words, written by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, according to Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che ch.3 in TPTK VI p.594.

25. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.375, see Appendix II p. 268.

26. According to A.F.Lindley, see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.770

27. Li Kuo-huai's story appeared in his article, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-Kuo Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng kung-tz'u ping pa, published in the periodical Hsueh Feng VII.5.

28. According to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's answer in interrogation, see Appendix I p. 264.

29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.372 (TC3/6/19).

30. This was not known in Nanking until after Li Hsiu-ch'eng's death.

31. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.375.

32. An index, published in Shih-hsüehyueh-k'an 1964 No.11 pp.43-44, lists 70 such articles.

33. A useful, though incomplete survey of the discussion is given by Stephen Uhalley Jr.: The Controversy over Li Hsiu-ch'eng (J.A.S.vol.XXV). But this article is somewhat tendentious and misleading. It is true that the discussion was not a purely historical one; it took place in the context of a much wider discussion on the 'correct' attitude to history as the record of class-struggle, and on other philosophical questions. But it was not a purely political discussion either, although a number of articles were exceedingly didactic and sometimes puerile. I know of no grounds for assuming, as the author does, that one or other of the articles represented 'the Party line.'

34. See, for instance, the second article by Chi Pen-yü: Tsen-yang tui-tai Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti t'ou-hsiang pien-chieh hsing-wei in Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1964 No.4 pp.1-18 and T'ien Yü-ch'ing: Kuan-yü Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 9 September 1964.

35. See, for instance, Ts'ai Shang-ssu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti keng-pen wen-t'i ho yen-chiu fang-fa-ti keng-pen wen-t'i, loc.cit. 1 September 1964; T'ang Ts'an-kung and K'ung Kung-hsün: Li Hsiu-ch'eng shih T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ke-ming-ti p'an-t'u, loc.cit. 17 September 1964; Feng Yuan-k'uei, Li Mao-kao & Shen Wei-pin: Lun "Fang kuei-fan wei hsien," in Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1965 No.5 pp.47-52.

36. See, for instance, Mou An-shih: Kuan-yü Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti p'ing chia wen-t'i in Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 September 1964.

37. ibid.

38. See Li Yen-chü: Chung Wang pu chung in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 8 August 1964.

39. See, for instance, Su Shu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng shih wei-hsiang huan shih t'ou-hsiang?, loc.cit., 2 August 1964.

40. See Chu Chung-yü: Ying-hsiung i shih, hu-t'u i shih, loc,cit. 8 August 1964.

41. See Fan Shu-i & Lü I-tsu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Jen-min Jih-pao, 3 August 1964.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Hung Jen-kan is said to have commented upon Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition, but his remarks have not survived; see Shen Pao-chen's memorial of TC3/10/13 in TPTK II p.861

2. Perhaps this also has something to do with the absence of a tradition of military history, as opposed to military literature, in China.

3. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.351

4. From "Memo. (by Major Gordon, R.E.) on the Events Occurring Between the 29th November and 7th December, 1863." Published in the 'Friend of China,' Saturday, 12th December, 1863, quoted in Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.716.

5. From a manuscript now in the British Museum.

6. The great scarcity of references to this document in contemporary Chinese sources indicates that it was not widely known, and can hardly have been very influential.

7. The Taiping Bible was reprinted from the Chinese translation of the Bible by the Pomeranian missionary Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803-51).

8. Reprinted in TPTK II pp.728-730.

9. See Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.118.

10. See pages 160 & 178, and TPTK II pp.741-2.

11. See Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u: Chieh-yü hui-lu p.160.

12. Samuel B. Griffith: Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Oxford 1963 p.77.

13. See Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo t'ien-cheng k'ao in the Journal of Oriental Studies, 1954 Vol.I p.47, quoting Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi, showing that landowners were at least not excluded from a general invitation to return which the Taipings announced to all who had fled.

14. Except for the visit of the British interpreter, Chaloner Alabaster, whose report is quoted above, page 20 .

15. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p. 372 and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao

ch.20 p.28b.

16. See Hung Fu-chen: Deposition in TPTK II p.856.

17. ibid. 'Mr. T'ang' had unwittingly befriended the fugitive boy.

18. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition, in TPTK II p.847. This point was made in an article by Su Shu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng shih wei-hsiang huan shih t'ou-hsiang, in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 2 August 1964.

19. See Chi Tun-yü: Pu-neng t'i Li Hsiu-ch'eng ti t'ou-hsiang pien-chieh hsing-wei pien-hu, in Shih-hsüeh Yüeh-k'an, 1964 No.10 pp.8-10.

20. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3b.

21. ibid. ch.20 p.28b.

22. See Chi Pen-yü: Tsen-yang tui-tai Li Hsiu-ch'eng t'ou-hsiang pien-chieh hsing-wei, in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1964 No.4 pp.1-18

23. See, for instance, Huang Hung-shou: Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo ch.51 p.9a (Taiwan Reprint of 1959).

24. See also the first page of the deposition (page 130).

25. This judgement is based on a general impression of the deposition as a whole; but one might point to the frequent occurrence of non sequitur, especially in passages dealing with abstract ideas, as a sign of the lack of literary training and discipline of its author.

26. A. F. Lindley, who wasadmittedly a great admirer of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, and dedicated his book to him, wrote:

> I had ample opportunity to notice the exceeding popularity of the Chung Wang amongst the country people, for everywhere we passed they turned out to welcome his arrival, and all I questioned declared him to be a good and just man, who respected and protected the rights of the meanest peasant of the land. Many of the Ti-ping chiefs were popular with the civilians, some were disliked, all were considered better than the Manchoo, but none were so beloved as the Chung Wang.

Lin-Le: Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh p.496.

27. See for instance: Hua I-lun: Hsi Chin t'uan-lien shih-mo shu,

in Tzu-liao pp.123,127; Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yü hui-lu p.150; Anon: Keng Shen pi-nan jih-chi, in Chien-chi IV p.485; Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.217-8, and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3a.

28. See Shih Ta-k'ai's letter to the Brigade-general T'ang Yu-keng, in TPTK II pp.759-760, his deposition (ibid.pp.780-2), and Lo Ping-chang's memorial (pp.782-6).

29. A point made in conversation by Mr. Su Cheng.

NOTES TO THE DEPOSITION

(Numbered by the page)

Notes to Page 130.

1. For 洛 read 蕗 .

2. For 中丞 read 中丞 . The courtesy title of the governor of a province. Throughout the deposition this refers to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, who was at the time Governor of Chekiang.

3. 中堂 in the original, the courtesy title of a Grand Secretary, in this case, Tseng Kuo-fan, who was given the title in 1862.

4. Tseng Kuo-fan arrived at Nanking from An-ch'ing on 28 July 1864 (TC3/6/25), and in the evening briefly interrogated Li Hsiu-ch'eng, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi Vol.III p.1840

5. For 墓 read 墓 , for 衣 read 依 .

6. Such a publication has not yet come to light. It is known however, that a Taiping 'Decree Bureau' (詔書衙) existed before the Taipings established their capital at Nanking, see Chang Te-chien et.al.: Tsei-ch'ing hui-tsuan (hereafter abbreviated as TCHT), 1855, reproduced in TPTK III pp.25-348. Other references exist to 'decrees' of the kind mentioned by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, see Chang Hsiu-min et al.: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tzu-liao mu-lu p.64 and Lo Erh-kang: k'ao-shih chi pp.83-86. The only document of this nature which survives is the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-jih, which is reproduced in Tai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yin-shu, edited by the Nanking T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo Historical Museum, Shanghai 1961 I.1; the original is in the Cambridge University Library.

7. For biographical details of these two men, see Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-kao (Revised Edition) Peking 1957, pp.398-9.

8. The main source of biographical information on Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and his family is Theodore Hamberg: The Visions of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection, Hong Kong 1854, which is based on verbal and written information given to Hamberg by Hung's cousin, Hung Jen-kan. Chïen: Ch'üan-shih Vol.I draws on this work and supplements it with details of Hung's family history which he learned from local people during a visit to Hua-hsien in 1942.

9. This does not agree with Hamberg's account, which is that all three children were born of the first wife, see Hamberg p. 2. Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably assumed that君母李氏(the Ruler's mother Li), as she was known in the Taiping capital, was his real mother, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.14.

10. This sentence is interlinear and contains an illegible mark after 'father'.

11. The date of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's birth is Chia Ch'ing 18/12/10 (1 January 1814), see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I pp.1-5.

12. 講道理 in the original. These meetings were not only used for religious indoctrination, but seem to have been the Taipings' principal method of communicating with the people. They probably played an important role in early Taiping successes. Unfortunately such records as exist of what was said at the 'preachings' are very brief and generally hostile. "...they build a high stage and exhort the people to unite and win the empire. This they call 'chiang tao-li.' Each time, they urge their people not to think of their homes, that life and death are governed by fate, that wealth or poverty is decided by Heaven, that bitterness comes before sweetness and sorrow before joy, and so on." See Yü I-t'ao: Chien-wen-lu in Chien-chi II p.128.

A.F.Lindley gives the following account: "Once during each month, the whole of the people are assembled - soldiers, civilians, men, women and children, in some prominent locality under the canopy of heaven; a platform is erected, and their chief Wang or governor preaches to them, and gives a general lecture upon the subject of all orders, military, civil, and social administration. This mass meeting is also practised previous to any grand or important movement taking place." See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.322.

The authors of TCHT, in a much more hostile judgement, record that such 'preachings' took place before public executions, conscription drives, before selecting beautiful women, before sending rebels on particularly difficult assignments and so on. See TCHT ch.9 pp.226-228.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to Lu Te-shun [sic - his name was in fact Lu Shun-te], written before the attack on Shanghai in 1860, ordered him to select a place which could hold 'several myriad people' and conduct a meeting there. See Shih-liao p.164.

13. According to Hamberg, p. 5 , Hung Hsiu-ch'üan attended the village school from 1819 to 1828, after which his help was needed at home.

14. For biographical details on Feng Yun-shan see note 11 to p.132.

Notes to page 131.

1. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's illness was brought on by his third failure in the examinations at Canton. The first attempt was in 1828 (TK 8) after he had passed the hsien examination; the second was in 1836 (TK 16). After the third failure in 1837, he fell ill and had to be carried back to Hua-hsien in a litter, see Hamberg, p. 9.

Although Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that the illness lasted seven days, the usual Taiping version is forty days; see Hamberg, p. T'ai-p'ing T'ien-jih, p.1a; Hung Jen-kan: Hung Hsiu-ch'üan lai-li (1852), reprinted in TPTK II p.689ff (the original is in the British Museum); Wang chang-tz'u-hsiung ch'in-mu ch'in-erh kung-fu-yin in Yin-shu II.16, which is the account written by Hung hsiu-ch'üan's brothers, and Ying-chieh kuei-chen (1861) in Yin-shu II.19. A psychiatrists opinion, based on the historical sources, is given by P.M.Yap: The Mental Illness of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (Far Eastern Quarterly XIII, 1954). More fruitful however, would be a comparison with similar hallucinations amongst religious leaders of popular revolt, described for instance in Vittorio Lanternari: Les mouvements religieux des peuples opprimés, Paris 1962.

The illness of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan became part of Taiping mythology. He found an explanation for his dreams when, in 1843, his cousin drew his attention to a collection of Christian tracts in Chinese, which Hung had acquired, though not read, six or seven years earlier. See E.P.Boardman: Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion, 1851-1864, Madison 1953. 'Forty days in the wilderness' may have been what led to the legend of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's forty-day illness.

2. The characters for 'God' are elevated four places, according to the Taiping custom.

3. The last character of the first page of the facsimile is missing, the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition gives 業佳 .

4. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was born in Fu-yüan-shui, Hua-hsien, Kwangtung; but his family soon moved to Kuan-lu-pu, about 60 li southwest of Hua-hsien and about 100 li north of Canton, see Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing-chün Kwang-hsi shou-i shih, Chungking 1944 p.57. The population of Kuan-lu-pu was about 400 in Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's time. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and Feng Yun-shan's family tombs were destroyed at the order of the court in the winter of 1851, see Ting Shou-

ts'un: Ts'ung-chün jih-chi (HF1/10/13) in Chien-chi II p.297. The village school and part of the village itself was razed in 1854, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.14.

5. For 騰 read 藤 .

6. Li Hsiu-ch'eng undoubtedly meant that these places are a great distance from Hua-hsien in Kwangtung, not that they are a great distance apart. There is no evidence that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan went to all these places himself, preaching the faith. According to his own account in the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-jih (pp.22a-36a), he did not leave home until 2 April 1844 (TK24/2/15), accompanied by Feng Yun-shan. After travelling widely in Kwangtung, they went to Tz'u-ku-ts'un in Kuei-hsien (Kwangsi), only passing through T'eng-hsien on the way. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan went home to Hua-hsien in November, leaving Feng Yun-shan in Hsün-chou-hsien, and remained at home until March 1847, when he spent several months at Canton, receiving instruction from the American missionary Roberts. In July, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan went back to Kwangsi, again passing through T'eng-hsien, and was re-united with Feng in August. In October they went to Hsiang-chou, where they destroyed a temple. Thus, of the places listed by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Hung himself only records having visited Hsün-chou, Hsiang-chou and T'eng-hsien. If all the other places 'knew about Hung hsien-sheng' (p. 133), it was because of the missionary activity of Feng Yun-shan and the others.

7. He is usually known as Ch'in Jih-kang. After Wei Ch'ang-hui was given the title Pei Wang, the last character of Ch'in's name was changed to 'kang' (綱) to avoid 昌, which was taboo. The title 'wang' - king or prince - was not given to these men until December 1851 (see note 5 to page 138). 'Ch'eng-hsiang' (丞相) might be translated 'secretary of state'. There were 24 ch'eng-hsiang, the title being prefixed by one of the characters 天, 地, 春, 夏, 秋, 冬, and further divided into ranks of 正, 副, 又正, 又副. See Lo: Shih-kao p.196.

8. In his deposition Shih Ta-k'ai stated that the seven original leaders had 'elected' (推) Hung Hsiu-ch'üan as their leader, see TPTK II. p.780. This deposition however, unlike that of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, was merely the record of his interrogation and was not written by Shih Ta-k'ai himself; too much weight should not be attached to precise wording.

9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written 其各 here - a Kwangsi dialect expression; Tseng Kuo-fan changed it to 其餘皆是...

Notes to Page 132.

1. The T'ien-ch'ing tao-li-shu p.9b in Yin-shu II.12 gives the Tung Wang (Eastern King)'s home as P'ing-tsai-shan (平在山); in fact the place is called P'eng-ai-shan (鵬隘山), according to T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao (Report of Field Investigations into the Taiping Uprising), compiled by an investigation team. Peking 1956, p.38. Most of the inhabitants of this place made a living by charcoal burning. Yang Hsiu-ch'ing seems to have been something like a local boss, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I. p.135, based on Kuei-p'ing hsien-chih. He was related by marriage both to Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, who acted as his lieutenant, and to the Tseng family of P'eng-ai-shan, with whom Feng Yun-shan lodged in 1846. It is probable that he was a convert of Feng's. Before the rising he had already organized an armed band which beat up tax-collectors. Local tradition says that when they moved about the hills at night, each man in the band carried four lanterns, giving an impression of great numbers, see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao p. 39. According to TCHT p.45, he was virtually illiterate.

2. 不知機 in the original. This might also mean 'he had no military skill.'

3. Nor could his opponents. "The rebel chief Yang Hsiu-ch'ing obtained zodiacal battle plans for the art of war by consulting a spirit..." see Chou Chen-chün: Fen-shih tsa-chi in Chien-chi II p.17.

4. He later moved to P'eng-ai-shan, not far from where Yang Hsiu-ch'ing lived, see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao p.38. He came from a poor peasant family and, like Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, was a convert of Feng Yun-shan. He owed his high position in the early Taiping hierarchy to his claim, made at a time when Feng Yun-shan was in prison, to speak with the voice of Jesus. Yang Hsiu-ch'ing claimed at the same time to speak with the voice of God, see Lo: Shih-kao pp.288-9 & p.281.

5. Feng Yun-shan came from Ho-lo-ts'un (和樂村) according to a secret investigator's report taken from Canton in 1858 and now in the Public Record Office (F.O.682/68/4). This village was very near to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's home. From the beginning Feng Yun-shan was Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's righ-hang man; but his early death, the subsequent domination of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, and the virtual deification of Hung himself, have tended to overshadow the importance of his role in the early years of the Taipings. It was he who founded the God-worshippers' Association, while Hung Hsiu-ch'üan

was at home in Hua-hsien, see Hamberg, p.28 . The authors of the TCHT state that 'all the rebel doctrinal rules and military regulations' were his work, see TPTK III p. 47. The Taiping calendar is said to have been worked out by him while in prison in 1848, see Pan-hsing li-shu in TPTK I. p.205.

6. Wei Ch'ang-hui, the Pei Wang or Northern King, was formerly known as Wei Cheng or Wei Chih-cheng. He was of Chuang minority origin, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.138. There are differing reports as to the wealth of his family, see Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng p.140, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao pp.40-41, and TCHT p.47. The T'ien-ch'ing tao-li-shu (in Yin-shu II.12), probably the most authoritative source, confirms that he came from a wealthy family.

The Hsün-chou hsien-chih, (cited by Lo in Chien-cheng, p.140) records basically the same story as that reported to Lo Erh-kang, Chien Yu-wen and members of the investigation team by local people. Wei Ch'ang-hui, according to them, had wealth but not honour, and so bought for his father the degree of chien-sheng (Student of the Imperial Academy), not for himself, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng states. On his father's birthday, We put up outside his house what the local gentry considered was a presumptuous tablet commemorating the event. This was defaced during the night, and members of the Wei family were later subjected to insults if not to injury. Wei Ch'ang-hui appealed to Feng Yun-shan, and the God-worshippers helped him to revenge himself by pillaging the offending gentry.

This bring us to the question of Wei Ch'ang-hui's occupation. Chien Yu-wen suggests that one of the reasons why Wei wanted to buy a degree for his father was because he was anxious to blot out the stigma of having been a yamen employee. Local tradition, according to Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.176, has it that Wei had been a yamen clerk who went round the villages collecting taxes. From Li Hsiu-ch'eng's wording it is not clear what Wei's relations with the yamen were; he merely says 在家是出入衙門辦事, which I have translated, 'he was in and out of the yamen on business.' It is unlikely that Wei had any influence with the yamen, as in this case he would not likely to be maltreated by other gentry. The investigation team was not able to throw further light on this matter, but put forward two hypothetical questions: first, was not the degree of chien-sheng probably bought for Wei Ch'ang-hui himself, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng stated, rather than for his father, who was old and could hardly benefit much? secondly, was not Wei's connection with the yamen perhaps limited to the negotiations for the purchase of the degree?

7. The I Wang (Assistant King), Shih Ta-k'ai's family moved from Ho-p'ing-hsien (Kwangtung) to Kuei-hsien (Kwangsi), where they

lived at Na-pang-ts'un, not at Pai-sha as Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote, although Shih's grandfather had lived there for a time. His mother was of the Chuang minority, see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao pp.43-4. According to his own deposition, Shih Ta-k'ai's studies came to nothing and he earned his living as a farmer, see TPTK II p.780. The T'ien-ch'ing tao-li-shu (in Yin-shu II.12) says only that his family was wealthy. He was about 33 sui at the time of his death in 1863 and can only have been about 20 at the time of the rising. This may account for his low position in the Taiping hierarchy.

8. Little is known of Ch'in Jih-ch'ang's early days apart from what Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote here. According to T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao pp.87-8, he was a Hakka from a village called Tuo-chu-t'ang, near Pai-sha.

Notes to Page 133.

1. According to the Hsün-chou fu-chih, quoted by Lo Erh-kang in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih k'ao pp.17-18, it was the arrest of the rebel Ch'en Ah-(or Ya-) kuei (see page 144), which provoked the Taiping rising. Troops sent to arrest Ch'en insulted and molested members of the God-worshippers' Association in the villages through which they passed, perhaps because it was known that Ch'en had already agreed to join the God-worshippers. On hearing of this Feng Yun-shan is said to have announced that if they were going to be killed anyway, it would be better to revolt. This tends to confirm Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remark that strife between militia and the God-worshippers 'forced a rising.' Hung Jen-kan said in 1852 that the original intention was not rebellion, but that oppression by officials and soldiers forced the God-worshippers to revolt. But he also contradicted himself in saying that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan realised that he was bound to clash with the government.

2. Interlinear.

3. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '6th Month,' and error not noticed by Lü Chi-i. This has complicated the problem of the date of the rising, since is was accepted as Li Hsiu-ch'eng's record of the date. The question is argued at some length by Lo Erh-kang in his article Chin-t'ien ch'i-i k'ao in Shih-shih k'ao pp.9-33, and by Chien Yu-wen in Ch'üan-shih I. pp.224-228 and in his T'ai-p'ing-chün shou-i shih pp.203-207. Both specialists agree that the date of the rising was 11 January 1851 (TK30/12/10), Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's birthday; but neither knew when they wrote their studies on this question that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had originally written '10th Month.' It is doubtful however, whether this would have changed

their opinions. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's date probably refers to the beginning of mobilization and assembly at Chin-t'ien. Meng Shih-yung recorded in a letter that this process of concentration began in the '9th Month' (i.e. between 5 October and 3 November), see Meng Shih-yung chia-shu in TPTK II p.755. Groups of God-worshippers from Po-pai, Lung-shan, Kuei-hsien and Kuei-p'ing did, it is true, all arrive on the same day, 31 December 1850 (TK30/11/28), and the first military engagement was on the following day, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.222.

4. Hu I-huang came from a well-to-do family, and had passed the hsien examination, see TCHT ch.1 p.50. Other biographical details are given in Chien: Ch'üan-shih I pp.140-1. Shan-jen-ts'ung was near Hua-chou in P'ing-nan-hsien, see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao, p.47.

5. The commander of the government troops who surrounded Shan-jen-ts'un (see below, note 2 to page 134) was apparently not aware that it was the rebel leaders who were at Hu I-huang's home, or even that they were in the village.

6. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

Notes to Page 134.

1. For 仍言 read 仍然 .

2. Li Hsiu-ch'eng here gives the impression that this was a planned and almost ceremonial occasion; in fact, it was a rescue operation. In mid-November there had already been armed conflict between charcoal-burners at P'eng-ai-shan and 'braves' under the Sub-district Magistrate of Ta-huang-chiang. Earlier, at the beginning of November, God-worshippers going to Chin-t'ien from Hua-chou and other regions had fought and defeated some local troops, and the incident had been reported to the provincial authorities. Because of this, a detachment of Yunnan troops under Chou Feng-ch'i and Assistant Colonel Li Tien-yuan was sent to Ssu-wang-hsü in P'ing-nan-hsien in early December. There Li Tien-yuan learned of a 'lair of rebels' at Shan-jen-ts'un, and organized the siege of the village by blocking the only road out of it. He did not venture to attack the village, hoping to reduce it by starvation. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan immediately sent a messenger to Chin-t'ien, and Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, after arousing the enthusiasm of the followers by 'speaking with the voice of God,' despatched a force under Meng Te-en, himself a

a P'ing-nan man who knew the district well. They attacked and routed the enemy on 25 December 1850 (TK30/11/22) and three days later Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was brought to Chin-t'ien. See Meng Shih-yung chia-shu in TPTK II p.755 and Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.214-220.

3. This should be 大頭羊 not 大頭揚 . He is also refered to as 大頭妖 (the big-headed imp) in the T'ien-ch'ing tao-li shu p.12a, which gives an account of his perfidy. He was a leader of the San-ho-hui (Triads), whose real name was Chang Chao. Hamberg (p. 55) states that he would not join because Taiping discipline was too strict. He later co-operated with the government, after surrendering in February or March 1851; but he proved to be an unreliable ally and was executed soon afterwards, see Hsü Kuang-chin memorials of HF1/3/28 and HF1/9/2 in Ch'in-ting chiao-p'ing Yüeh-fei fang-lüeh (hereafter abbreviated as Fang-lüeh) edited by I-hsin (Prince Kung) et al. 1872. Facsimile edition, Taipei 1965, ch.3 p.31a and ch.18 pp.1b-2a.

4. His real name was T'ien Fang (田芳). He was a colleague of Chang Chao and suffered the same fate.

5. Originally Lo Ta-wang (羅大旺), of Ch'ao-chou (Kwangtung). He was a T'ien-ti-hui (Triad) leader, but joined the Taipings with several thousand men and became one of their trusted commanders. He had some dealings with foreigners later, see Meadows: The Chinese and their Rebellions p.152. He was killed in battle in 1855. He seems to have maintained an interest, if not connections, with secret societies, see Lo: Shih-shih-k'ao pp.34-74 (T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yü T'ien-ti-hui kuan-hsi k'ao).

6. This sentence is interlinear and very ungrammatical.

7. This should read 大皇江ㄅ , according to Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p. 122, though Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien gives 黃 . It is where the Ssu-chiang meets the Hsün-chiang, see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao, map.

8. For Hsiang Jung's biography, see Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.292.

9. This should read 雙界山 , Shuang-chieh-shan.

10. The move to Tung-hsiang was not made immediately. The sequence of events was as follows:-

28 December 1850 (TK30/11/25) Hung Hsiu-ch'üan arrived at Chin-t'ien.
11 January 1851 (TK30/12/10) Proclamation of the rising.
13 January (TK30/12/12) The Taipings went down the Ta-huang River and took Chiang-k'ou-hsü, a prosperous market town which

they may have taken mainly to get supplies, make weapons and so on. Thence the Taipings intended to make for Kuei-lin by boat, but the surrender of the pirate Chang Chao (Ta-t'ou-yang) provided Hsiang Jung with a 'fleet' and obliged the Taipings to take the land route.

8 March (HF1/2/6) The Taipings withdrew from Chiang-k'ou-hsü and went towards Wu-hsüan.

23 March (HF1/2/21) Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was proclaimed T'ien-Wang at Tung-hsiang (Wu-hsüan), see Pan-hsing li-shu in TPTK I. p.206, which was the the Taiping H.Q. for the time being, the vanguard being at San-li-hsü (30 li S.E. of Wu-hsüan).

3 April (HF1/3/2) Chou T'ien-chüeh and Hsiang Jung attacked at San-li-hsü and were defeated. (Chou T'ien-chüeh had been appointed Governor of Kwangsi in December 1850. A letter which he wrote at the time gives a vivid picture of his troubles, see Chih Erh-nan shu in Chien-chi VI p.3; another curious letter, the original of which I have been unable to trace, is given in translation in Meadows: The Chinese and their Rebellions pp.153-160).

14 May (HF1/4/14) The Taipings moved from Tung-hsiang towards Hsiang-chou. The battle at Miao-wang probably occurred about this time.

17 May (HF1/4/17) The Taipings encamped at Chung-p'ing-hs4, where government troops under Wu-lan-t'ai, Hsiang Jung and Chou T'ien-chüeh attempted an encirclement.

9 June (HF1/5/10) Wu-lan-t'ai's troops were defeated at Ma-an-shan. In spite of this the Taipings then evidently gave up hope of reaching Kueilin by this route.

2 July (HF1/6/4) The Taipings withdrew from Chung-p'ing,

8 July (HF1/6/10) they arrived at Hsin-hsü (Kuei-p'ing) leaving a rearguard at Shuang-chieh-shan, west of Tz'u-ching-shan.

(This note is based on Chien: Ch'üan-shih, Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, Peking 1959, Kuo T'ien-i: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, Shanghai 1947, and Hamberg: The Visions of Hung Siu-tshuen.)

Notes to Page 135.

1. The encircling operation was completed on 11 August (HF1/7/15). By this time 30,000 government troops and 'braves' were involved, but they were not very effective, mainly because their

commanders were unable to co-operate, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p. 295 and Kuo: Jih-chih. Contrary to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's statement, the Ch'ing commander at Hsin-hsü was Wu-lan-t'ai; Chang Ching-hsiu was an intendant, see Fang-lüeh ch.7 p.35b.

2. The government attack began on 25 July (HF1/6/27) and the important Taiping defence post at Shuang-chieh-shan was lost on 11 August. This must have been one of the main reasons for the decision to withdraw, though in his proclamation of HF1/7/19 Hung Hsiu-ch'üan gave the reason as the lack of salt and the number of sick and wounded. This proclamation was a sort of mobilization order for the break-out, and confirmed the position of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing as commander-in-chief, see T'ien-ming chao-chih shu in TPTK I. pp63-4. On 11 September the Taipings went from Hsin-hsü to Ssu-wang and Kuan-ts'un (P'ing-nan-hsien) by the only route which was not blocked, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.303.

3. This should read 思迴 not 思回 .

4. Hsiang Jung had hurried to P'ing-nan-hsien when he heard the news of the Taiping break-out, and established ten stockades at Kuan-ts'un, where the Hsi Wang and the Nan Wang were waiting for him. The government troops had allowed their powder to get wet and were severely beaten. After this Hsiang Jung retired to P'ing-nan township for a month on the pretext of illness, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.304 and Hsieh: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Kuang-hsi-ti fan-Ch'ing yun-tung p.22

5. This should read 八堌水 not 八箇水 .

6. Yung-an-chou is now called Meng-shan (蒙山).

7. For 上 read 尚 . The character 上 , by Taiping protocol, could only be used for God (上帝), and in all other cases was replaced by the character 尚 , see Ch'in-ting ching-pi tzu-yang p. 2b in Yin-shu II.20. This is the reason for Li Hsiu-ch'eng's frequent confusion of the two characters.

8. This and the following paragraph are repeated in more or less identical terms later in the deposition (see page 143), where the autobiographical section proper begins; annotation is therefore given below.

9. In the original 自拜上之後 . This could mean no more than, 'After I joined the God-worshippers' Association...'

10. This should be 大旺圩 not 大黃圩 .

11. In February 1850, before he joined the Taipings, Lo Ta-kang had already attacked Yung-an at the head of a T'ien-ti-hui force, see Chung Wen-tien: T'ai-p'ing-chün tsai Yung-an, Peking 1962 p.8 n2.

Notes to Page 136.

1. This would be about 20 September 1851.

2. As a rule the property of God-worshippers when they joined the Association was sold at a low price and the money handed in; houses were only burned when there was no buyer, according to the Hsün-chou fu-chih, quoted by Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.203.

3. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 和池 for 州池.

4. Yung-an was the first administrative town the Taipings took. It was a small town, difficult of access, surrounded by a small brick wall. The Taiping H.Q. was established in the city, and an outer line of defences was placed at some distance. The most important point in this line was at Shui-tou, about 10 li south ofthe town. The Taiping occupation, which lasted several months, was not without incident. Disagreement between the Ch'ing commanders continued and they could not decide whether to surround and siege the town, or attempt to dislodge the Taipings and then pursue them. The result was that neither alternative was carried out with any vigour. The early attempts at blockade were very incomplete because the Ch'ing efforts were mainly confined to operations north and south of Yung-an, and along the Ch'ang-shou River. Although the Ch'ing commanders had some 46,000 troops at their disposal, including 'braves', the eastern front was almost entirely neglected. When Hsiang Jung arrived after his disastrous defeat at Kuan-ts'un, he was most unenthusiastic about the plan to 'surround and exterminate' and left at the end of October for Kueilin on the pretext of ill health. His troops however, managed to establish themselves in two of the valleys to the east of Yung-an; but on 19 October they were so seriously defeated that they withdrew from Yung-an altogether and refused to co-operate with Wu-lan-t'ai in a joint attack on Shui-tou. The encirclement does not seem to have been so serious as Li Hsiu-ch'eng implies, although the Taipings had severe supply difficulties as the result of an economic blockade which was fairly easy to enforce. This note is base on T'ien-ch'ing tao-li shu p.12b in Yin-shu I.12; Chung Wen-tien: T'ai-p'ing-chün tsai Yung-an; Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.307ff and Wang K'un: Shun-pi sui-wen-lu p.357-8 in TPTK IV.

5. For 'Tai' read 'Sai' (賽尚阿), Sai-shang-ah, Imperial Commissioner Commanding Troops in Kwangsi, see Hummel: Eminent Chinese, p.208.

6. Wu-lan-t'ai was Assistant Commander under Sai-shang-ah, ibid. p.293.

7. For 招平 read 昭平. Ku-su-ch'ung is one of the valleys south east of Yung-an, about 18 li from the town.

8. The garrison at Ku-su-ch'ung consisted of about 1,000 Green Standard troops from Shou-chou (Shou-ch'un) in Anhwei, see Lo: Chien-cheng, p.148 n4.

9. On 5 April 1852.

10. This is confirmed by the Provincial Judge Yao Ying, who wrote that although the Taipings could obtain saltpetre, there was no sulphur, and they had to use their ammunition very sparingly; quoted by Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.325. At Chin-t'ien the Taipings had appointed an officer to be responsible for the supply of saltpetre; see TCHT ch.2 p.63. The Taiping destruction of temples had an utilitarian aspect: saltpetre was extracted from old bricks by breaking them up, soaking and boiling the powder and then filtering; see Anon: Keng Shen pi-nan jih-chi in Chien-chi IV p. 496, and elsewhere.

Notes to Page 137.

1. For 仙回 read 仙逕.

2. Wu-lan-t'ai's troops attacked the Taiping rear, which consisted mainly of old men, women and children, including Wei Ch'ang-hui's uncle; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.327. Hung Ta-ch'üan (the T'ien Te Wang) was captured here, starting a controversy about his real identity which continues to this day; see Teng Ssu-yü: New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion p.20ff.

3. This was on 8 April 1852 at Lung-liao-k'ou, Ta-t'ang-shan. Yao Ying, in a letter, reported that 800 of Hsiang Jung's troops were killed and some dozens of Wu-lan-t'ai's; quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng, p.149 n9.

4. In fact Wu-lan-t'ai died at Yang-shuo, according to Lo: Chien-cheng, p.150 n9. The six months which they spent at Yung-an

gave the Taipings time for a great deal of expansion, organization and consolidation: (i) New recruits were enlisted, some of them from secret societies; for instance, unemployed miners from Kuei-hsien joined the Taipings at Yung-an; see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao, pp.51-2. At Yung-an the Taiping numbers were 37,000 of which five or six thousand were fighting men; see TCHT p.290. (ii) The extent of organizational and other changes is indicated by the number of important Taiping books which were first published at Yung-an:- T'ien-ming chao-chih shu, proclamations dealing, inter alia, with the communal treasury system; see Yin-shu I.3, T'ien-t'iao-shu and T'ai-p'ing chao-shu, containing fundamental doctrinal works; see Yin-shu I.1; T'ai-p'ing chün-mu and T'ai-p'ing t'iao-kuei, dealing with military organization, see Yin-shu I.2; Pan-hsing chao-shu, consisting of proclamation, including the political call-to-arms against the Manchus, see Yin-shu I.3. A brief account of each of these books may be found in Teng: Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion. The Taiping calendar was also adopted at this time. (iii) 'Internal security' was strengthened, not only by these organizational measures but also by the case of Chou Hsi-neng, a Taiping traitor, whose unmasking also increased the supernatural prestige of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing; see T'ien-fu hsia-fan chao-shu in Yin-shu II.3, also published at Yung-an, and T'ien-ch'ing tao-li shu p.21b-22b in Yin-shu II.12.

5. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 告 for 山 .

6. Kueilin was poorly defended at this time; even the cannon had been sent to the Yung-an front. The Taipings had acquired Ch'ing uniforms, flags and documents from Hsiang Jung's defeated troops, and had intended to take Kueilin by a trick. Hsiang Jung however, is said to have seen this force making for Kueilin, and hastened there himself with nothing but a bodyguard, taking a short-cut. He arrived there only half a day before the Taipings, but foiled their plans and saved Kueilin from capture and himself from disgrace. The wall was high and strong and the garrison determined. Twenty buried cannon dating from the Ming dynasty were found and put into service, and Taiping attacks both by assault and mining failed to win them the city. The siege lasted 33 days, from 18 April to 19 May 1852; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.364-372 and Chung Wen-tien: T'ai-p'ing-chün tsai Yung-an. The Taipings saved face in official pronouncements by saying that theu had not been much interested in Kueilin because spies had told them that the store-houses there were empty; see T'ien-ch'ing tao-li shu p.13a in Yin-shu II.12.

7. Now Ch'üan-hsien.

8. The Taipings arrived at Ch'üan-chou on 22 May (HF2/4/4).

9. Interlinear.

10. The Taipings had not originally intended to take Ch'üan-chou; but a gunner on the town wall could not resist the temptation of firing on a yellow palanquin which he detected amongst the Taipings as they passed by. This palanquin contained Feng Yun-shan, who was mortally wounded by the shot, and a terrible vengeance fell upon the town of Ch'üan-chou; for having wounded the Nan Wang and for resisting the Taiping attack which followed in a particularly determined manner, the whole population is said to have been put to the sword when the town fell on 3 June 1852 (HF2/4/16). After leaving Ch'üan-chou, the Taipings fell into an ambush at So-i-tu (Soh-i Ferry), 10 li north of the town, where they were severely defeated in a two-day battle with Chiang Chung-yuan's militia force. Feng Yun-shan died of his wounds while the fighting was in progress. The importance of this engagement is discussed in Hail: Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion, pp.76-7, and in Chien: Ch'üan-shih, p.409.

11. After their defeat at So-i-tu, the Taipings seem to have made for Yung-chou, but the bridge there had been destroyed and all boats moved to the other bank of the river; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih, p.411. They then moved on to Tao-chou, which was given up to them without a fight on 11 June (HF2/3/25); they remained there for two months, during which they replenished their supplies and enlisted large numbers of new recruits, many of whom were members of secret societies, particularly the T'ien-ti Hui. The three Taiping proclamations published under the title Pan-hsing chao-shu (in Yin-shu I.3) were issued at this time and were perhaps primarily addressed to secret society members.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's figure of about 50,000 enlisted in this region is confirmed to some extent by (a) Huang Sheng-ts'ai's deposition (in Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao, p.7), (b) Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial of HF3/2/12, which reads in part: 'Everyone knows how numerous secret society bandits are in Hunan; last year, when the Yüeh rebels entered Hunan, most of the T'ien-tu Hui members joined and followed them,' see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.2 p.1b.

Chiang-hua was captured on 24 July (HF2/6/8) by a force of about 1,000, in an operation in which secret society members played an important part. The town was entered by a trick; a secret society leader gained entry disguised as a Ch'ao-chou 'brave' and killed the hsien official in his yamen; see Fang-Lüeh ch.15 p.6a-b. Chinese documents in the Public Record Office, filed under F.O.682/112/4, also contain material on these events.

At this time there were evidently a number of Taipings who wanted to go back to Kwangsi by way of Kuan-yang; only Yang Hsiu-

ch'ing opposed the idea, according to TCHT ch.11, pp.290-1, and insisted that they make for Nanking. There was also a possibility, it appears, of a southward move into Kwangtung. Spies disguised as merchants, nearly all local T'ien-ti Hui men, were sent to Lien-chou to find out how strongly it was defended; see Fang-lüeh, ch.16 p. 6a ff;(this is Yeh Ming-ch'en's memorial, partly based on the depositions of captured rebel spies. The copies of some of these are in the Public Record Office - F.O. 682/112/4.

12. Chang Kuo-liang's name was formerly Chang Chia-hsiang (張嘉祥). He had been a T'ien-ti Hui leader of the biggest pre-Taiping rising in Kwangsi, in the spring of 1848. This covered not only parts of Kuei-hsien in Kwangsi, but also Ch'in-chou and Ling-ch'uan in Kwangtung. At the height of the rising Chang Chia-hsiang is said to have had over ten thousand followers, attracted by such slogans as 借富救貧 (take from the rich and save the poor), 殺官留民 (kill officials but spare the people) and 上等的人欠我錢 中等的人得覚眠下等的人跟我走好过租牛耕瘦田 (the upper class owes us money, the middle class should wake up; lower classes come with me! It is better than hiring an ox to plough thin land!); quoted in Liang Jen-pao: Ching-t'ien ch'i-i ch'ien Kuang-hsi nung-min ch'i-i in Li-shih chiao-hsüeh, 1957 No.1. In the winter of 1848, in spite of these resounding slogans, Chang Chia-hsiang struck a bargain with the forces of law and order, and went over to the government side with a number of his followers. For the rest of his life he fought against the Taipings under Hsiang Jung and Ho Ch'un, having changed his name to Chang Kuo-liang.

13. This should read 茶陵州.

14. Ch'en-chou was taken on 17 August (HF2/7/3) with inside help from the T'ien-ti Hui. Two other towns, Chia-ho and Lan-shan, had been occupied a few days earlier; see Fang-lüeh ch.15 p.36b. Ch'en-chou was a prosperous town and an important communication centre between Kwangtung and southern Hunan; the Taipings stayed there for more than a month, besieged and surrounded by armies under the command of Ho Ch'un, which had followed them at a discrete distance; see Fang-lüeh ch.15 p.32a-b and Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh p.63 in Chien-chi I. Ch'a-ling-chou was taken on 3 September (HF2/7/20)

15. The Taiping force was evidently a small one. Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh p.63 gives 3,000+; Kuo: Jih-chih p.187 gives 3,000 to 4,000; Chien: Ch'üan-shih, p.420 gives 2,000. The Taipings had probably received information that Ch'ang-sha was weakly defended; in fact there were no more than two or three thousand troops and some 'braves;' see Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih I p.3b. The government commanders were expecting the attack

to come through Lei-yang and Heng-chou (now Heng-yang), where troops were consequently stationed. Nevertheless, the Taiping force was too small to surround the city, and its attack, throughout the campaign, was limited to the south and west sides of Ch'ang-sha, and they were unable to prevent relief from getting into the city; by the middle of November a Ch'ing force of fifty or sixty thousand was defending Ch'ang-sha; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.428.

The first engagement was on HF2/7/28 (13 August) at Shih-ma-p'u, 10 li from the city. A Ch'ing force had been hastily posted there, consisting of about 2,000 Green Standard troops from Shensi. Li Ju-chao: Ching-shan yeh-shih p.5 in TPTK III gives 3,000 troops and 480 'braves', of whom some 1,700 men and 90 officers were killed. Other reports say that 600 were killed and 500 'braves' fled; see Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh p. 64, and Fang-lüeh ch.16 pp.25b-26b. The Taipings claimed '2,000 + ' dead, dozens of officers killed, and the capture of 4,000 loads of powder and innumerable mules and horses; see the letter from Tseng Shui-yuan et al. to the T'ien Wang and the Tung Wang, in the Public Record Office (copy) F.O.682/279/A3.

16. The Hsi Wang, Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, was wounded on 12 September (HF2/7/29). The date of his death is not known exactly, but was probably within a month of his being wounded; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.187. The report announcing this disaster was sent on the same day, under the names of Tseng Shui-yuan, Lin Feng-hsiang and Li K'ai-fang. The main army, with Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, set out from Ch'en-chou on HF2/8/12, according to Kuo: jih-chih, on HF2/8/15, according to the author of Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh, p.64, and arrived at Ch'ang-sha, according to Kuo, on HF2/9/1 (13 October). There was a battle on 14 October in which the Taipings suffered considerable losses; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.431.

Notes to Page 138.

1. In Tao-chou, Ch'en-chou, Kuei-yang and Lei-yang, several thousand coal miners had been enlisted by the Taipings and organized into a sappers' battalion (土營); see TCHT ch.4 pp.138-9 and ch.3 p.107, also Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih pp.601-2 in TPTK IV. The sappers saw action at Kuei-yang, Han-yang, Wu-ch'ang, and also at Ch'ang-sha and Nan-ch'ang, but here their efforts were not successful. The defenders foiled their attempts by counter-tunnelling and pouring water and filth into the Taiping tunnels; see TCHT ch.4 p.138. In the defence of Nan-ch'ang, blind men were used as sound detectors, and when the Taiping tunnels

had been located, they were destroyed by dropping iron balls from the city wall, or by pouring in boiling oil; see Ma Lung-pao: Chien-wen tsa-chi p.78 in Chien-chi Vol.II. The Taipings sometimes beat drums to cover the sound of tunnelling. For other details of mining techniques, see Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih pp.601-2 in TPTK IV.

At Ch'ang-sha about ten tunnels were dug but only three were successful, each destroying part of the wall; see Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh, p.65 and Chang Yao-sun: Ch'u-k'ou chi-lüeh, p.71 in Chien-chi I. Chien: Ch'üan-shih states that 5 tunnels blew up as intended.

2. The proper name for Sha-chou ('the sand shoal') is Shui-lu-chou; it is opposite to Ch'ang-sha on the Hsiang River. Shih Ta-k'ai's troops were stationed there. Hsiang Jung, with 3,000 troops, attacked on 31 October (HF2/9/19) the northern end of the island, and were ambushed by the Taipings in the woods as they marched southwards. Hsiang Jung lost a third of his force and only got away himself because he was mounted; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.153 n14. Most of the mining of Ch'ang-sha was done after this battle, which the Taipings hoped would distract enemy attention from the city itself.

3. This is confirmed by Li Ju-chao: Ching-shan yeh-shih, p.5 and in Fang-lüeh ch.19 p.5b.

4. This sentence was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

5. A jade seal was found when Nanking fell in 1864, but it is not certain that it was the one to which Li Hsiu-ch'eng refers here; see Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo wen-wu t'u-shih p.27. A gold seal, found at the same time, has not survived. According to a story which Chao Lieh-wen heard at the time, it was stolen from the Grand Council by Mu-chang-ah's son, who had it melted down; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC5/2/7 pp.400-1. (Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I p.191, gives a slightly different version. As to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's statement that the T'ien Wang was proclaimed Emperor, and the other Wangs appointed at Ch'ang-sha, this does not agree with the T'ien-ming chao-shih shu (TT1/10/25) in Yin-shu I.3 pp.11a-13b, which states that this was done at Yung-an.

6. The Taipings withdrew on 30 November (HF2/10/19) on a rainy night, after throwing a pontoon bridge over the river; see Fang-lüeh ch.19 p.4a/b. Government troops pursued them in the wrong direction as far as Hsiang-t'an, before realizing that they had gone north west; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.197.

7. Tseng Kuo-fan changed Honan to Hunan, although it is clear from what follows that Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant the former.

8. The Taipings took I-yang on 3 December 1852 (HF2/10/11), after constructing a pontoon bridge over the Tzu-shui; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.437. They were welcomed in the town with incense and flowers, Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh p.65. There are different estimates of the number of boats captured: Huang Sheng-ts'ai, in his deposition gives '1,000+' (Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao p.7); Wang K'un: Shun-pi sui-wen lu p.365 says that 3,000 boats were taken at Lin-tzu-k'ou; Hung Jen-kan in his deposition says 'several thousand;' see TPTK II p.851.

9. For 林子口 read 臨資口. This is where the Tzu-shui flows into Tung-t'ing Lake. The Taipings arrived here on 7 December and left on the 10th, some by land and some by boat; see Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh, p.65.

10. Yueh-chou was taken on 13 December 1852 (HF2/11/3). (Li Ju-chao: Ching-shan yeh-shih, p.5 gives 15 December as the date). Although the governor of Hupeh, Ch'ang Ta-ch'un, had emphasized the importance of holding the town, 'the screen of the whole province of Hupeh,' Fang-lüeh ch.15 -.22a, the Taipings got the gate open by pretending to be Hsiang Jung's troops and took the town without a fight. The Tartar General had hastened off to Wu-ch'ang as soon as the Taipings attacked Ch'ang-sha; see Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh p.65. The people 'welcomed the rebels into the town,' according to Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih p.583.

Yueh-chou was an important military transit centre, hence the stock of ancient arms. Wu San-kuei (1612-1678) revolted in 1673 and had some success in Hunan. The arms stored in Yueh-chou were probably cannon, though one record says 'cannon and powder,' see Li Ju-chao: Ching-shan yeh-shih p.5; but it is difficult to believe that powder can have been of much use after 174 years. Several thousand more boats were captured here, and T'ang Cheng-ts'ai was appointed 'tien-shui-chiang' (典水匠) to be responsible for them; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.438.

The ineptitude of the Ch'ing officials at Yueh-chou is typical of the conditions which made possible the rapid Taiping advance. The Sub-prefect of Han-yang, Chang Yao-sun, urged the importance of holding Yueh-chou upon the Governor of Hupeh, who went himself to the town to organize its defence. He had boats full of boulders sunk in the river in order to block the entrance to Tung-t'ing Lake, and was highly satisfied with the result, confident that 'not a sail could get past.' Chang Yao-sun suggested that troops be posted at the barrage as well, otherwise, 'if we can block, the

rebels can un-block.' The Governor replied that it had taken them two weeks unceasing work to make the barrage, and the rebels would not be able to remove it in less than a month. So only 1,000 troops were left in Yueh-chou. When the Taipings arrived they fled, and it only took the rebels one day to open the channel; see Chang Yao-sun: Ch'u-k'ou chi-lüeh pp.71-73. The Taipings left Yueh-chou on 17 December 1852.

11. The Taiping advance from Yueh-chou was by land and river. The land route was on the south bank of the Yangtse. Han-yang was taken on 23 December (HF2/11/12). A pontoon bridge of large timbers, joined by hausers, and later strengthened by anchors, was thrown across the Han River; see Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih pp.594,596. The Taipings crossed over and took Hankow on 29 December.

12. Wu-ch'ang had only a small garrison of 3,000 troops and 1,000 'braves'. The military commander, Shuang Fu, had from the first decided upon passive defence. For this purpose, he determined to raze all buildings in the suburbs which could provide cover near the city wall for the attackers. The suburban population, which must have been considerable, objected to this and offered to raise money to build an extra wall of earth. This was done. Nevertheless, destruction of the suburbs began on 16 December and continued until the 25th, when the Taipings arrived and found the fires still burning. Only two gates had been left open and on the day when the destruction of the suburbs began, people had been crushed to death trying to get into the city. On 21 December there was nearly a riot when a rumour circulated that even inside the city wall buildings were to be destroyed. So before the Taiping attack began the Ch'ing authorities were already very unpopular, and the people could easily be 'enticed' to join or help the Taipings. Although Hsiang Jung and his army arrived long before the city fell, they were not able to get close to Wu-ch'ang, where the commanders refused to make any attempt to link up with them. No sorties were permitted. The Taipings eventually took the city by mining. Although the defenders used blind 'mine detectors,' the officials were so afraid of allowing troops out of the city, that the sounds which the blind men heard were dismissed as 'someone chopping wood.' The city fell on 12 January 1853 (HF2/12/4). See Mao Lung-pao: Chien-wen tsa-chi, p.72 in Chien-chi II, Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih, pp.585-587.

13. There was great slaughter in the first two days after the city was taken, the Tung Wang having announced that 'officials and soldiers must not be spared; the people must not be injured.'

But after two days of street fighting a new order was given that government officials and soldiers could be spared as long as they did not resist. Large numbers of people joined the Taipings at Wu-ch'ang, 'nine out of ten men and one or two out of ten women,' according to one source, (Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih p.572). All accounts say that these people were forced to join, but the authors were all hostile to the Taipings, and in view of the unpopularity of the government and the growing prestige of the Taipings, who had taken their first provincial capital, it is reasonable to suppose that coercion was not always necessary. When they left Wu-ch'ang the Taipings are said to have numbered 500,000; see TCHT p.296.

Notes to Page 139.

1. Huang-chou was taken on 11 February 1853 (HF3/1/4); Ch'i-shui on 16 February (HF3/1/6) or possibly earlier; Ch'i-chou on 24 February (HF3/1/17); Chiu-chiang (Kiukiang) on 18 February (HF3/1/11) and An-ch'ing (Anking) on 24 February (HF3/1/17).

2. A force of a thousand troops sent earlier to Huang-chou to get grain, had brought back to Wu-ch'ang 100 boat-loads, see Huang Sheng-ts'ai's deposition in Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao p.7. There was virtually no resistance in any of these towns; but on 15 February there was a battle near Wu-hsueh in Hupeh in which a force of about 6,000 government troops under Lu Chien-ying (Governor General of Liang-chiang) was defeated. It is said that the Taipings had captured a messenger whom Lu Chien-ying had sent to Hsiang Jung, and had then sent back a bogus messenger with a forged document asking Lu to advance immediately; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao ch.1 p.37 in TPTK VII and Lü Chien-lieh: Chi (Wu-hsi) hsien-ch'eng shih-shou k'e-fu pen-mo p.245 in TPTK V. At Chiu-chiang the garrison of 2,000 fled, and it is said that the town was taken by five members of the Taiping 'Childrens' Brigade'- see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.468. An-ch'ing was abandoned to the Taipings, leaving an immense stock of grain and treasure; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.59.

3. For biographical details on Lai Han-ying see TCHT p.71 and Lo: Shih-kao pp.334-5.

4. Lu Chien-ying returned to Nanking after his defeat at Wu-hsueh without organizing resistance elsewhere; he then shut

himself up in his residence and refused to see anyone or do anything. He was cashiered by the edict of Hf3/1/27 (Fang-lüeh ch.26 pp.12b-13b) and replaced by Hsiang Hou (祥厚); but Nanking was already surrounded, and the order never reached Lu and Hsiang. The garrison was very small, about 10,000, with only 3,900 Manchu bannermen and 1,000 Green Standard troops; the rest were 'braves.' This was totally inadequate for the defence of the city, which was 96 li (about 34 miles) around the wall. The error of purely passive defence was repeated with even greater incompetence and stupidity than at Wu-ch'ang. The Governor, Yang Wen-ting, would not let anyone leave the city, on pain of death, but fled himself to Chen-chiang. The Provincial Commander-in-chief, Fu-chu-ah, took 500 troops who were 'as weak and timorous as women,' to Yü-hua-t'ai, a strategically placed hill south of the city, where they laid up a large stock of munitions. At the first alarm they fled, leaving the arms for the Taipings; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih, citing Wang Shih-to: I Ping jih-chi.

The Taiping vanguard arrived on 6 March (HF3/1/27) and the main force started arriving on the following day; see Huang Sheng-ts'ai's deposition in Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao p.7. The walls of Nanking were so high and so strong that there was little to be done except to attack by mining. This was concentrated at the I-Feng Gate (north west of the city), where three tunnels were started from the Ching-hai Temple. In the city itself, an efficient 'fifth column' spread alarm and despondency. Three thousand Taiping agents are said to have previously entered the city disguised as monks; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih, quoting from Yüeh-fen chi-shih by Hsia Hsieh.

On 18 March (HF3/2/9), the Taipings staged a dramatic diversion outside the south gate, where several hundred cavalry, enveloped in a sheet of flame, charged towards the city. On each horse there was a lighted scarecrow clothed in red. Under cover of this diversion the tunnels at the I-Feng Gate were completed, and the following day two of them were exploded simultaneously. The third failed to go off until later, by which time there were already several hundred Taipings in the breach, who were killed by the blast. Those who broke into the city were beaten back in street fighting, and the breach was mended, Lu Chien-ying however, had been killed, and the news of this, added to the knowledge that the wall had been breached, was sufficient to make most of the garrison give up the fight. Three gates were abandoned and the Taipings entered by scaling the wall.

On the 20th March only the Manchu garrison, the inner city of ming times, remained to be taken. When this fell, most of the population of 40,000 were massacred; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp. 480-491.

The capture of Nanking took 12 days, not 7, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng states.

5. It is a reflection of the poverty of the source material on many of the most important aspects of the history of the Taipings that this semi-fictional account is one of the few records dealing with this vital question of early Taiping strategy. The story of the boatman is repeated in at least two other sources. One is Shen Mou-liang: Chien-nan ch'un-meng-an pi-chi in TPTK IV, which was first published in the late 1870's. Here the boatman is identified with the Ch'uan Wang (船王), T'ang Cheng-ts'ai. Lo Erh-kang however, has demonstrated that this book, which pretends to be the personal observations of a scholar who was a prisoner of the Taipings for several years, is in fact a clever concoction from a number of identifiable published sources. The story of the boatman in this book seems to have come from the edition of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition which was published by Tseng Kuo-fan in 1864. T'ang Cheng-ts'ai was neither a boatman, nor a Hunanese, nor - at that time - an old man. He was in addition, well-known to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who would no doubt have said so if he had been the boatman in question; see Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao pien-wei chi pp.5-37. Another version is in Pan-wo chü-jen (pseud.): Yüeh-k'ou ch'i-shih chi-shih p.15 in Chien-chi I, in which the boatman is identified as a man called Chiang.

Stripped of its semi-fictional character, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version is that it had been the intention of the Taipings to pass to the west of Tung-t'ing Lake and go north to Honan to make their base there, presumably for an attack on Peking. But the unexpected acquisition at I-yang of several thousand boats with their boatmen, not only presented the Taipings with a tempting alternative to the arduous march north, but also created within their ranks a powerful lobby which encouraged the adoption of this alternative. The effectiveness and compliance of these new adherents depended upon their being allowed to remain in the Yangtse valley.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not at this time party to the inner councils of the Taipings, and we cannot be sure that the decision was made at I-yang. It was more likely to have been made at Wu-ch'ang, at the point where a decision could no longer be delayed. Here too, more detailed intelligence would be available as to the strength of government garrisons at various places. The story of the boatman would seem to indicate that the decision was not made without a great deal of discussion and disagreement.

It is often assumed by historians that from the earliest times the Taipings had earmarked Nanking as their capital. At Yung-an, or earlier, the Taipings are said to have taunted government soldiers by shouting, 'We are going to take Chin-ling: what have we to fear from you?' from Tz'u-ching shih-lüeh in Hsün-chou fu-chih (TC13) quoted in Chung Wen-tien: T'aip'ing-chün tsai Yung-an p.120. Taiping proclamations from Yung-an announce their destination as 'the Little Paradise' (小天堂); see T'ien-ming chao-chih shu in Yin-shu I.1 pp.7b, 9b, 10b, but they do not

tell us where it is. Finally, Chung Wen-tien: op.cit p.120, quotes a folk rhyme he heard from an old man of Yung-an, which identifies 'Little Paradise' with Nanking.

But this evidence does not prove that Nanking had been chosen as the Taiping capital. The only sources which identify 'Little Paradise' with Nanking, do so retrospectively, being written long after the Taipings were installed there. The same applies to the account of the execution of Tseng Shui-yuan, a Taiping leader whose brother deserted because, in spite of promises, family life had not been restored after the Taipings reached 'Little Paradise;' see Lo: chien-cheng p.158.

When they were in Tao-chou, many of the Taiping leaders are said to have wanted to go home to Kwangsi; only Yang Hsiu-ch'ing insisted that they should press on to Nanking, (see note 11 to page 137). But this too was recorded in the TCHT in 1854 without quoting the source, and does not agree with Li hsiu-ch'eng's statement that the Taipings intended to go to Honan through Ch'ang-te.

Another interesting account, which seems to have been written not long after the Taipings left Ch'ang-sha is: 'Those who have come from among the rebels say that they plan to swarm north, some day to disturb Honan, others say to press forward their depredations from Chiang-nan.' See Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh p.66. Even when the Taipings were in Wu-ch'ang the government had no idea where they were going next; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.31 in TPTK VII. The main preparations were made in the Yangtse valley and in Honan; see Fang-lüeh ch.20 passim.

Whether the Taipings had even intended to establish their capital in Honan we do not know. Nor do we know whether they had already decided on Nanking when they set off down the Yangtse from Wu-ch'ang, or whether they merely intended to hold the city for a short period before pressing northward. If this was so, the glory of establishing their capital at once in the old Ming capital was irresistable. Apart from the economic advantages, it had the extra political advantage of strengthening the Taipings' claim to be a Chinese dynasty; it must also have pleased the powerful T'ien-ti Hui groups, who were, at least on paper, devoted to the idea of restoring the Ming.

6. On 29 March 1853 (HF3/2/20). There is a colourful description of the event in Shen Tzu: Yang-cho-hsüan pi-chi in Chien-chi II. p.266.

Notes to Page 140.

1. The first 'Proclamation for the Pacification of the People'

(安民告示) issued in Nanking announces that the Taipings had received Heaven's Command to chase out the Manchus, who had misruled for 200 years. The people are urged to remain in their respective occupations. All are ordered to paste up the character 'shun' (順: obedient) on their doors, to worship God and so on. After the rounding up of remaining 'imps' (妖: the Taiping pejorative for government officials, soldiers and so on), the prisons and stores were opened up and the archives burned. Contributions could buy exemption from labour service; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.501ff.

2. The segregation of the sexes began at Chin-t'ien as a measure of military discipline, made necessary by the fact that whole families joined, but reinforced, no doubt, by protestant attitudes. The T'ien-ch'ing tao-li shu emphasizes the contrast between this strict discipline and the indiscriminate rapine practised by the local Kwangsi bandits; although family life had still not been restored after the establishment of the capital, what glory had been achieved! This was because the State had been put before the family, public interest before private; see Yin-shu II.12 pp. 21a,27a,29b.

When the Taipings took Nanking marriages were forbidden and husbands and wives were not even allowed to meet. The Tung Wang announced that this was to be a temporary measure only, until Chih-li had been conquered. (During a general strike of Andalusian anarchist peasants in 1902 marriages were postponed, and not merely for economic reasons; see Hobsbawm: Primitive Rebels p.84). Although the rule undoubtedly contributed to discipline and order, and probably impressed the population as long as it did not apply to themselves, such an inhuman law inevitably aroused opposition, and was rescinded in January 1855. Temporary segregation continued to be practised for the first few days after the Taipings took a town. For such measure in Shao-hsing, see Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter (1861) to his nephew and son in TPTK II p.740, and Lu Shu-jung: Hu-k'ou jih-chi in TPTK VI p.789ff. As a short-term measure this may have been more or less acceptable, especially as the usual sequal to the capture of a town in Chinese warfare was large-scale rapine. There is no evidence that there was ever a women's regiment as such, although there are many accounts of women taking part in fighting. In Nanking women participated in fairly rough work, carrying water, earth or bricks; but also formed an 'embroidery ying' (繡錦營) and sometimes helped with guard duty; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, Revised Edition, Peking 1963 pp.205-6; Shih-liao p.518; Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo-ti fu-nü in Shih-shih k'ao pp.317-340; Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao, pp.1187-1276.

3. A distinction should be made between the offices of the

各典官 ('various control officers' - ke-tien-kuan), see TCHT ch.3, whose offices were called 'ya' (衙) and whose function was to provide supplies and services to the whole Taiping organization, both civil and military, and the 諸匠營 ('various artisans' ying - chu-chiang-ying), to which Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to be referring here. The latter, unlike the former, were purely productive in nature, but the relationship between them is far from clear. The 'chu-chiang-ying' were only established at Nanking and it is possible that they took over the functions of the 'ya'. There were six ying: for carpenters, weavers, gold and silver smiths, cobblers, wood-block engravers, and an 'embroidery and brocade ying' (繡錦營) which, according to one source, consisted of male embroiderers, but which Lo Erh-kang believes to have been made up of painters and decorators. The 't'u-ying' had been set up earlier (see note 1 to page 138), and included masons; building at Nanking was done by the 't'u-ying' and the 'mu-ying' (木營) together. The organization of the 'chu-chiang-ying' was para-military; the carpenters' ying was also responsible for guarding the T'ien Wang's palace; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, pp. 140-151; Lo: Shih-kao, pp.121-130; and Chang Chi-keng i-kao in TPTK IV pp.765,775.

All able-bodied males who did not join the Taiping army were allocated to work either in the various 'ya' or in the 'chu-chiang-ying.' The old and disabled were supported by the state in units of 25 called '牌尾館' (p'ai-wei-kuan); those who could, did light work such as sweeping the streets or picking up waste paper; see TCHT pp.653,654,621,717. Nominally all children under 14 or 15 were similarly distributed in the 'p'ai-wei-kuan;' but in practice, small children went with their mothers into the women's ying. Large numbers of children were employed as servants and sometimes took part in battles. Presumably because of the absence of family life, it was common for children to be adopted by Taiping officials and soldiers, though this practice was forbidden by Taiping military law; see TCHT p.228.

These organizations were an integral part of the Taiping system of military communism, and followed the provision in the 'Land System' (天朝田畝制度) for the establishment of groups of peasants with skills, which would provide goods, or services such as building in the slack farming season; see Yin-shu I.9 p.3a. In Nanking the 'chu-chiang-ying' were closely connected with the suspension of family life, the confiscation of private property, and equal state support for all. All commerce was stopped and there was gradual confiscation of private property as the ability of the Taiping administration to provide for the population increased. Distribution was through the 'tien-kuan' organizations (ya); but the problem of supply was so great that in 1854 the Taipings were obliged to restore private, though strictly controlled trading;

see Shih-liao p.138; Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng nan chi-lüeh in TPTK IV pp.716-717; Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an p.493. At first, people only needed to register in order to get as much grain as they needed (發粮無数); see Hsieh Chieh-ho: Chin-ling Kuei Chia chi-shih lüeh in TPTK IV p.656. But a grain shortage soon developed. Houses in the city were allocated by the regime and land in the city was 'nationalized.' People were allowed to keep their bedding and other personal property, but private grain, the stock of shops and so on, were all confiscated; Li Ch'un: op.cit. pp.494-497.

4. This is confirmed by Hsieh Chieh-ho: Chin-ling Kuei Chia chi-shih lüeh p.665 and by Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng nan chi-lüeh, p.712.

5. To prevent people from moving property out of their reach, the Taipings only allowed them to retain what they could carry, such as clothes and bedding, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, p.495. In Su-chou in 1860, people were allowed to leave the city, but if they carried bundles they were considered to be fleeing and stopped; see Pan Chung-jui: Su-t'ai mi-lu chi, ch.1 in TPTK V p.284.

6. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote '婦女亦由', the last character probably being an error for '同;' but even then the sentence does not make much sense.

7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally wrote '以順帝心怒不息' and then crossed out '怒'; but it was left in the printed edition.

Notes to Page 141.

1. Only Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was entitled to the acclamation 'wan sui' (a myriad years). Yang Hsiu-ch'ing was formerly entitled to 'nine hundred years' and the other wangs to 'one thousand.'

2. Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably meant 'to kill the three brothers.' It is not clear whether they were brothers or cousins. Yang Fu-ching, who was not in the capital at the time, and thus escaped death, seems to have been a cousin; another was Yang Yun-ch'ing, see Lo: Shih-kao p.423, and yet another was called Yang Hui-ch'ing, see Chao Lieh-wen: Neng-ching chü-shih jih-chi, p.318.

3. The Ch'ing commander at the siege of Ning-kuo (now Hsüan-ch'eng) was Teng Shao-liang. He was killed in battle against Li Shih-

hsien on 15 December 1858 (HF8/11/11); see Kuo: Jih-chih. Li Shih-hsien was not killed until 1865.

4. Interlinear.

Notes to Page 142.

1. The lack of reliable source material on this outbreak of internecine strife, probably the most important single event of the whole rebellion, is another indication of the general dearth of internal evidence, which affects several aspects of Taiping history. Three things make it impossible to put together a full and coherent account of what occurred at this time. First, the lack of source material. (The most reliable accounts seem to be those of the missionaries Macgowan and Bridgman in the North China Herald, which were based on the reports of foreigners in Taiping service). Secondly, the accounts given in contemporary Chinese sources are so fictionalized or romanticized as to arouse considerable scepticism. Thirdly, the Taipings themselves were extremely reticent about the event, and probably played down Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's role in it.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account, for all its brevity, is the fullest Taiping record of the event which survives. Shih Ta-k'ai's deposition and that of Hung Jen-kan, given even shorter versions, the latter having no more than a passing reference to the deaths of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing and Wei Ch'ang-hui; see TPTK II pp.781-783, 846-858.

That Wei Ch'ang-hui (the Pei Wang), Shih Ta-k'ai (the I Wang) and Ch'in Jih-kang (the Yen Wang) were resentful of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing is not in any doubt. Shih Ta-k'ai's deposition confirms Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of Yang's overbearing nature; but in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version of the killing of Yang and of the events leading to it, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan is assigned only a passive role. This is the crux of the question. Did Wei Ch'ang-hui kill Yang Hsiu-ch'ing on his own initiative, by arrangement with Shih Ta-k'ai, or did he do so at the command of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan? Li Hsiu-ch'eng's statement seems unequivocal; Hung is not mentioned even as having given tacit consent to the killing.

Kuo T'ing-i believes that Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version is the true one, and gives evidence to support his view. That Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was not party to the plan to kill Yang is born out, in Kuo's opinion, by the fact that Yang Hsiu-ch'ing was posthumously honoured by the Taipings, the day of his death being commemorated as 'the day the Tung Wang ascended to Heaven,' and that his son was allowed to inherit the title of 'Young Tung Wang,' while Wei Ch'ang-hui, on the other hand, was not even mentioned in Taiping

documents afterwards, and his title lapsed. Moreover, Kuo T'ing-i points out, one record (the Chin-ling sheng nan chi-lüeh) says that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan reproached Wei for killing Yang, and Li Hsiu-ch'eng relates (see page 164) that the T'ien Wang wanted to have Wei's brother executed; see Kuo: Jih-chih pp.484-491.

Lo Erh-kang does not agree with this theory. Curiously enough, he too, like Kuo T'ing-i, relies on Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account, but he uses it to prove the exact opposite. Lo takes as unmistakably implied in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remarks about the killing of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, that it was done on Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's orders. The fact that the same remarks can be used to support two opposing theories is an indication of the neutral nature of those remarks. They cannot be taken as convincing evidence of Hung's passive role: even less can they be considered as 'iron proof' of the opposite, as Lo Erh-kang believes. It is true that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not in a senior position at the time of the internecine strife, nor was he in the capital; on the other hand, in the high position to which he later rose, he would surely have known the truth. The other arguments which Kuo T'ing-i cites to support what he considers as Li Hsiu-ch'eng's claim that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was not implicated, prove no more than the fact that Yang Hsiu-ch'ing was not posthumously dishonoured, and that Wei Ch'ang-hui was subsequently considered the villain of the piece.

The evidence for Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's initiative in the matter is fairly strong. Even if we admit that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's mind was somewhat deranged, we cannot easily believe that he would have passively submitted to Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's usurpation of his throne. Moreover, the fact that of the original leaders Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was the only one to come out of the struggle personally unscathed, (Yang, Wei and Ch'in were killed, Shih forced to defect) indicates, though it does not prove, that it was his authority in the end which prevented his dethronement. The case for his complicity is strengthened by the accounts of Bridgmen and Macgowan, who say that Wei and Shih (Macgowan adds Ch'in) were summoned by Hung to deal with his dangerous rival; and also by Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng nan chi-lüeh, I-liang's memorial of HF6/11/3 (Fang-lüeh ch. 163) and that of Kuan Wen of HF6/11/2 (Fang-lüeh ch.165), and by two accounts in Wang Shih-to: I Ping jih-chi (all cited by Lo Erh-kang), which record the arrival at An-ch'ing of orders from Hung Hsiu-ch'üan for the execution of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's brother, and confirmatory intelligence received by Chang Fei (former Governor of Kiangsi).

That Yang Hsiu-ch'eng had insisted on being acclaimed 'wan sui' is born out by several different accounts. Shih Ta-k'ai in his deposition merely said that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had promoted Yang hsiu-ch'ing, see TPTK II p.781 (Unfortunately this deposition is merely a secretary's abbreviated account of what Shih said in interrogation). Chang Ju-nan records that after the 'wan sui'

incident, Yang intended to go to Hung's palace to depose him, but that as soon as he left his residence (insufficiently disguised perhaps?) a retainer let off fireworks - de rigueur at each public appearance of the Tung Wang - and the unexpected commotion gave warning to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan; see Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng nan chi-lüeh, p.703.

Wei Ch'ang-hui arrived at Nanking on 1 September 1856 (HF6/8/3) with about 3,000 troops in 200 boats; see Chang Ju-nan: op.cit. p.703 and Fang-lüeh ch.161 p.20a. After some slaughter, including that of the Tung Wang, the remainder of his troops, numbering several thousand, were tricked into a brutal and machiavellian trap. It was announced, according to the accounts in the North China Herald, that Wei Ch'ang-hui and Ch'in Jih-kang were to be publicly punished in front of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's palace for exceeding their duty. The remainder of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's troops were invited to attend the humiliation of the assassins. Once they had been lulled into a false sense of security by a staged execution of '400 strokes' on Wei and Ch'in, they were invited to unburden themselves of their arms and rest in two temple halls which had been prepared for the purpose. As soon as they were inside they were massacred.

According to Bridgman's informant, Wei and Ch'in killed between 20,000 and 30,000 people after the assassination of Yang. (This high figure is confirmed to some extent by Wang Shih-tuo: I Ping jih-chi (cited by Lo Erh-kang) and by official Ch'ing reports, see Fang-Lüeh ch.162 p.26a.

Shih Ta-k'ai arrived back in the capital to stop the killing at the end of September or the beginning of October, but had to flee almost at once.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng relates the date of Wei Ch'ang-hui's death to the time when Shih Ta-k'ai was at Ning-kuo, but it is not clear whether he means before or while Shih was there. According to Fang-lüeh ch.163 p.26b and Ch.166 p.6b, Shih Ta-k'ai was at Ning-kuo between 10 and 28 November. Macgowan records that Shih Ta-k'ai asked the T'ien Wang to have Wei Ch'ang-hui killed and that he refused until he discovered how popular Shih was. Two other accounts say that Wei Ch'ang-hui had attacked the T'ien Wang's palace,(Chang Ju-nan: op.cit., and Li Kuei: Chin-ling ping-shih hui-pien) but neither is entirely reliable. The killing of Wei and Ch'in seems to have been accomplished without much slaughter.

Shih Ta-k'ai returned to Nanking in early December, having received Wei's head preserved in brine. But he was dissatisfied with the state of affairs at the capital and left again towards the end of May 1857, posting up proclamations that he was leaving T'ien-ching 'never to return'; see Ho Kuei-ch'ing's memorial of HF7/5 intercalary/3 in Fang-lüeh ch.175 p.13a and that of Fu Chi & Cheng K'uei-shih, ibid. ch.176 p.6b., the proclamation is in Tzu-liao.p.6

This note is based on Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ling-tao chi-t'uan nei-hung k'ao in Shih-shih k'ao pp.239-316; Chien:

Ch'üan-shih II ch.17; Kuo: Jih-chih pp.484-491; Chia Shu-ts'un & Hsü Sheng: Kuan-yü T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo Hung, Yang, Wei, Shih shih-chien-ti chi-ko wen-t'i in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 26 April 1964; Kuo I-sheng: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo "Nei-hung" shih-chien tsa-k'ao, ibid. 19 December 1964; Mr. Bridgman's Corrpespondence, in North China Herald, 3 January 1857; Mr. Macgowan's Correspondence, ibid. 9 May, 1857.

For the results of the internecine strife, see page 12.

2. For 說 read 悅.

3. After extensive campaigning with a large army, cut off from the Taiping government, Shih Ta-k'ai was captured and killed in Szechuan in 1863 and his army destroyed; for biographical material on him, see Lo: Shih-kao p.302ff; Chien: Ch'üan-shih ch.18

4. For 來意 read 來歷.

Notes to Page 143.

1. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

2. At the time of his capture Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave his age as 42 sui, which means that he was probably born in 1823, see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.374. He was probably a Hakka, see Lo: Chien-cheng, p.61.

3. He was eventually given the title of Yang Wang (揚王). He succeeded in escaping from the capital when it fell in 1864, and was last heard of fighting with Wang Hai-yang in the summer of 1865; see Lo: Shih-kao, p.77.

4. This probably means the cultivation of trees for charcoal burning.

5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng told Chao Lieh-wen in 1864 that his family had made a living by charcoal burning, see Chao: Jih-chi p.374.

6. With about three years of education Li Hsiu-ch'eng would presumably have got through the Four Books and the Five Classics. There is a local tradition in his native place that he was employed as a cook in the village school, and learned the lessons by listening as he worked. So good was his memory that he was able to recite the lessons better than the pupils; from T'ai-p'ing

T'ien-kuo ke-ming tsai Kuang-hsi tiao-ch'a tzu-liao hui-pien, cited in Li P'ei-jan & Ch'en Jen-hua: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng ts'an-chia ke-ming-ti tung-chi, in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 5 September 1964. This seems quite credible in view of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's known love of reading, (of books banned by the Taipings, according to Ling Shan-ch'ing: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yeh-shih ch.13 p.7), of calligraphy, see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.218. Lo Erh-kang points out that by the time he joined the Taipings, Li Hsiu-ch'eng had probably forgotten much of what he had learned, otherwise it is unlikely that he would have been an ordinary soldier. Lo also sees in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's use of certain phrases, such as '帝王之家', '明賢偃避,' '城高池深,' evidence that he had read some T'ang and Sung prose; but this no more follows, than to assume that a man who says something about 'a custom more honoured in the breach...' has ever read Hamlet; see Lo: Chien-cheng p. 96.

7. This note in the margin is strongly reminiscent of popular romantic novels, in which heroes obtain supernatural gifts from mysterious sages. Such books were banned by the Taipings, but Li Hsiu-ch'eng, is said to have been very fond of them; see Ling Shan-ch'ing: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo yeh-shih, ch.13 p.7. His fatalism and certain other things in the deposition may be traced to them.

Notes to Page 144.

1. For 峯 read 烽 .

2. For 分 read 紛 .

3. For 加 read 嘉 . For information on Chang Chia-hsiang (Chang Kuo-liang) see note 12 to page 137.

4. See note 3 to page 134.

5. His name seems to have been Ch'en; he was a subordinate and perhaps a relative of Ch'en Ya-kuei, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I. p.180.

6. I have not been able to identify Lo-mi-ssu and Liu Ssu.

7. For 亭 read 停 .

8. See note 4 to page 133.

9. See note 3 to page 140 for the organization of the 'ya.'

10. On the east side of the city, just south of Hsüan-wu Lake, see Map

11. 監軍 (chien-chün), an officer sixth in seniority after a 主將 (commander-in-chief); they were not, strictly speaking, inspectors, but held actual military command; see Chien: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-k'ao, p.78; Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, pp.187-188, and TCHT ch.3 p.106.

12. The I-feng Gate was at the northwest corner of the city, see Map II page . It is not clear where Kao-ch'iao was; Kuo T'ing-i doubts whether it was a place-name, see Jih-chih p.267.

13. There is evidence that Shih Ta-k'ai went to An-ch'ing to take over the command of the Western Expedition from Hu I-huang, in September 1853. Either Li Hsiu-ch'eng mistook the date when he went to An-ch'ing, or else he had forgotten that Shih Ta-k'ai had preceded him there; see TCHT p.48 and Hu Chien-fu: Feng-hao shih-lu in TPTK V p.9, which records the capture by Shih Ta-k'ai of Chi-hsien-kuan (Anhwei) on 16 October.

Notes to Page 145.

1. Now Ho-fei (Anhwei). At this time it was the temporary provincial capital, An-ch'ing being in Taiping hands. The Taipings' Western Expedition, which had left Nanking in May 1853, took An-ch'ing in June, but failed to take Nan-ch'ang in Kiangsi after a siege of three months. In September the expedition divided into two armies, one to press westwards along the south bank of the Yangtse, and another, under Hu I-huang, went north from An-ch'ing and attacked Lu-chou in November. The town was defended with considerable skill by Chiang Chung-yuan, who had been appointed Governor of Anhwei. On 14 January (HF3/12/16) the Taipings finally broke into the town, after mining the wall. They were helped by the treachery of the Prefect, who had a grudge against Chiang Chung-yuan. The latter took his own life after the fall of the town. There is a vivid description of the siege and of the first few days of Taiping occupation in Chou Pang-fu: Meng-nan shu-ch'ao in TPTK V.

2. Added by Tseng Kuo-fan.

3. Chou Peng-fu quotes a 'Pacification Proclamation' saying that scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants should remain in their occupations; those who wanted to join the Taipings could do so, those who did not could go home, see Meng-nan shu-ch'ao p.70

4. Shih Ta-k'ai left Nanking in June 1857.

5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote this sentence in the lower margin. Kuo: Jih-chih p.481 records the death of Ch'in Jih-kang on 22 August 1856 (HF6/7/22) at Chin-t'an. This conflicts with the report of Macgowan in the North China Herald of 9 May 1857, which both Lo Erh-kang and Chien Yu-wen follow.

6. For biographical details, see below, note 5 to page 146. The rank of chih-hui (指揮) came third below that of chu-chiang (commander-in-chief); see Chien: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I p.75.

7. For biographical details see Lo: Shih-kao pp.397-8. As ts'an-t'ien-an (參天安) he was a court official of the 14th rank; see Chien: op.cit. I p.101.

8. Li Shih-hsien was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's cousin; for biographical information, see Lo: Shih-kao p.410ff.

9. There seems to be an error here. At the time when Shih Ta-k'ai left Nanking (the summer of 1857), Li Hsiu-ch'eng cannot have been a chih-hui, since at the relief of Chen-chiang (see page 150) at the beginning of 1856, he was already a fu-ch'eng-hsiang, a higher rank than that of chih-hui; see Lo: Chien-cheng, pp.166-7.

10. Shih Ta-k'ai left An-ch'ing and passed into Kiangsi on 5 October 1857 (HF7/8/18), see Kuo: Jih-chih.

11. According to Chiao-p'ing Nien-fei fang-lüeh, ch.53 pp.17-18, quoted by Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion, Seattle 1954, p.31, Chang Lo-hsing had 100,000 rebels under him. This may not be very accurate either. The question of Nien strength is discussed, somewhat inconclusively, in Teng Ssu-yü: The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare 1858-1868, Paris & La Haye, 1961.

12. Between 50,000 and 70,000 Taipings followed Shih Ta-k'ai when he defected, according to Ch'en Feng-ts'ao p'in Lu-an-chou tsung-chih, a Taiping document recently discovered in the Ming-Ch'ing Archives; see Tzu-liao pp.6-7.

13. Ho Ch'un, a Manchu, was Chiang-nan t'i-tu (commander-in-chief) at this time. After the death of Hsiang Jung (see page 158 below) he was appointed Imperial Commissioner in his stead.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng here gives the impression that the loss of Lu-chou was the result of Shih Ta-k'ai's defection. In fact the Taipings lost Lu-chou in 1855, more than two years earlier. Contrary to

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account, Chou Sheng-k'un, the Taiping garrison commander, at least managed to get away, see Kuo: Jih-chih p.420, Lo: Chien-cheng p.170.

14. This is inaccurate. In fact, after the capture of Lu-chou on 10 November, Ho Ch'un sent a force to attack Shu-ch'eng, which the Taipings abandoned in the night of 20 February (HF6/1/15). Ho Ch'un in the meantime led an attack on San-ho-chen, which he took on 16 September after a siege of ten months, in spite of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's effort to relieve the town from Chü-jung (see page 161, below). After this, Ho Ch'un attacked Lu-chiang, which had been held by the Taipings since March 1854, and took it on 18 September (HF6/8/20). Ho Ch'un did not leave for Chiang-nan until 4 October; see Hu Ch'ien-fu: Feng-hao shih-lu pp.16-18, Chien: Ch'üan-shih II pp.1009-1012 and Fang-lüeh ch.162 p.21a.

15. This refers to Ch'in Ting-san (秦定三), Provincial Commander of Fukien. Like Hsiang Jung, he had been fighting the Taipings since 1851, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih I p.274.

Notes to Page 146.

1. T'ung-ch'eng had been taken by the Taipings in November 1853 (HF3/10/14) and came under attack during the siege of Lu-chou in the winter of 1854. After the fall of San-ho and Lu-chiang, it was besieged by Ch'in Ting-san, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.1011,1012.

2. This was in fact because Shih Ta-k'ai had gathered together a force to deal with Wei Ch'ang-hui, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1580.

3. A strategically placed town on the border betwen Honan and Anhwei. Chang Lo-hsing (1811-1863) had been a salt-smuggler; he began Nien activities in the Chih-ho region in about 1852. Although Nien rebels seem to have helped and joined the Taipings' Northern Expedition in 1853, more formal co-operation between them did not begin until after 1856, when Chang Lo-hsing was elected leader of united and reorganized Nien bands. In 1858 Chang joined the Taipings because of lack of supplies; he had co-operated with Li Hsiu-ch'eng in March 1857 (see page 148 below). In a letter written in May 1860, Li Hsiu-ch'eng refers to him as 征北主將, (commander-in-chief of the northern campaign). In 1860 Hung Hsiu-ch'üan gave him the title of Wu Wang (沃王). This note is based on TPTK pp.721.746, Ma Ju-heng & Liu Shou-i: Kuan-yü Nien-chün ling-hsiu Chang Lo-hsing-ti tzu-shu ho hsi-wen in Kuang-ming Jih-pao 10 October 1962, and on Teng Ssu-yü: The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare, Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion.

4. Li Chao-shou was formerly a bandit in Ku-shih (Honan). In 1854 he was 'pacified' by the Tao-t'ai, Ho Kuei-chen, whom he killed the following year on learning that he had orders to dispose of the former bandit; see Fan Yü-jun: Hsing-lieh jih-chi p.92 in Chien-chi III. He then joined the Taipings and served under Li Hsiu-ch'eng at T'ung-ch'eng. It is not clear what his relations with Chang Lo-hsing were. Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion p.92, implies that they did not co-operate, and even clashed with each other. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's intention to gain Nien support in order to hold T'ung-ch'eng was known to the Ch'ing commanders, who were considerably shaken by the possibility that the formidable Shih Ta-k'ai, who was thought to be in command in Anhwei, might be reinforced by Nien rebels; see Fang-lüeh ch.164 pp.14a-15a.

5. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng (1853?-1862) was originally called Ch'en Pei-ch'eng (陳玉成, see page 236 below), until Hung Hsiu-ch'üan changed his name. His nickname, on the government side at least, was 'the four-eyed dog' (四眼狗), and he is often referred to in official documents as '狗逆' (the dog rebel). This was because he had birthmarks under each eye. He was senior to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, and his promotion more rapid. In the TCHT (1855) he has seven lines of biography and Li Hsiu-ch'eng only one. For biographical details see Lo: Shih-kao p.365-370; his deposition may be found in Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi pp.201-202. For Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's betrayal and death, see below, page 209.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng's order of events is at fault in this passage. Ning-kuo was taken by Shih Ta-k'ai on 2 May 1856 (HF6/3/28) and attacked by a government force under Teng Shao-liang on 6 November. The relief of Ning-kuo to which the deposition refers on page 141 was on 17 December. At this time Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was left in command because Shih Ta-k'ai went to the capital to deal with Wei Ch'ang-hui. Shih did not leave An-ch'ing for good until October 1857. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's request for help fromCh'en Yü-ch'eng at Ning-kuo was before, not after Shih Ta-k'ai's defection.

Notes to page 147.

1. In response to this appeal Ch'en Yü-ch'eng left Ning-kuo on 23 December 1856 (HF6/11/26). The town fell to Teng Shao-liang on 28 December (HF6/12/2); see Fang-lüeh ch.176 p.32a-b.

2. For 棕陽 read 樅陽.

3. Ts'ung-yang is 120 li south of T'ung-ch'eng at the entrance of Ts'ai-tzu Lake and Pai-t'u Lake. Government officials reported

that Taiping troops not only from Ning-kuo, but also from Wu-ch'ang, Han-yang, Huang-mei and Ch'i-chou, to the number of thirty or forty thousand, had assembled at Ts'ung-yang; see Fang-lüeh ch.167 p.44b.

4. Ch'eng-t'ien-yü (成天豫) was one of the six ranks of nobility which evolved after the internecine strife; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'-t'an pp.237-244

5. The Ch'ing commanders assumed that the relief force would make straight for T'ung-ch'eng, presumably up the lake, which would take them to within about 20 km. from the town. That they were taken unawares is confirmed by Fu Chi, Governor of Anhwei, who memorialized that the Taipings had unexpectedly gone down the Yangtse from Ts'ung-yang, even as far as Yü-ch'i (beyond Wu-hu), and had made their way inland from different points along the river; see Fang-lüeh ch.168 p.14a/b.

6. According to Fu Chi, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's force consisted of eighty to ninety thousand men, in 3,000 boats and with 200 gunboats, ibid.

7. Wu-wei, T'ang-t'ou (Ts'ang-t'ou) and Yun-ts'ao were all taken on 11 January 1857 (HF6/12/16); see Kuo: Jih-chih.

8. For 湯頭 read 倉頭 , Ts'ang-t'ou.

9. Interlinear.

10. Ch'en Shih-chang was sent from Nanking, left the Yangtse at Yü-ch'i, and went to Hsiang-an and Yun-ts'ao by water; see Fang-lüeh ch.168 p.14b. The title 'ya-t'ien-hou' was one of the six ranks of nobility; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, pp.237-244.

11. The Huang-lo River flows from Ch'ao Hu (Ch'ao Lake), by way of Tung-kuan and Yun-ts'ao into the Yangtse at Yü-ch'i; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.171. Tung-kuan is about half way between Yun-ts'ao and Ch'ao-hsien, see Map III.

12. The senior commanders under Fu Chi were Ch'in Ting-san (t'i-tu) and Cheng K'uei-shih, (tsung-ping).

13. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 滹河 for 界河 , all other editions follow, and Lü Chi-i did not correct the error. Chieh-ho is to the north of T'ung-ch'eng; see Fang-lüeh ch.168 p.38b, but I do not know the exact location. Li Hsiu-ch'eng mentioned Chieh-ho

later in the deposition (see page 171) and the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition made no change.

Lu—chiang was taken on 31 January 1857 (HF7/1/6) after a siege of two days (ibid. pp.37a-39b). Ch'ing troops had been withdrawn from T'ung-ch'eng as soon as Lu-chiang was threatened, but they dared not enter the town, and fled back to T'ung-ch'eng as soon as Lu-chiang fell. Ta-kuan, 40 li from T'ung-ch'eng, was attacked on the same day; see Kuo: Jih-chih and Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1583-4.

14. This is confirmed by Fu Chi's memorial in Fang-lüeh ch.170 p.11b, and by Hu Ch'ien-fu: Feng-hao shih-lu p.20.

Notes to Page 148.

1. The date of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's sortie and the general attack was 24 February 1857 (HF7/2/1). By this time the Taipings had established a line of stockades ten li north of T'ung-ch'eng, and were reinforced by troops from Wu-hu; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1584. Fu Chi's version is that forty or fifty thousand Taipings had arrived from An-ch'ing on 24 February; he complained that all the Taipings from Ning-kuo and Hupeh had descended upon him; see Fang-lüeh ch.170 pp.11b-12a

2. After the defeat of the government forces, Ch'in Ting-san withdrew to Liu-an and Cheng Kuei-shih to Lu-chou. Taiping troops took Shu-ch'eng on 27 February (HF7/2/4) and Liu-an on 3 March, after which Ch'in Ting-san also withdrew to Lu-chou.

3. Hu Ch'ien-fu records that there had been a crop failure the previous autumn, which led to a serious famine in northern Anhwei in the early part of 1857. Hungry peasants could not get enough to eat even by enlisting as 'braves' and therefore gave their allegiance to the rebels, see Feng-hao shih-lu p.20.

4. Kung Te-shu (called Kung Te -龔得- in Ch'ing documents, and nicknames 'blind Kung') was a competent military commander and formerly an aide to the Nien leader Chang Lo-hsing; later he commanded a Nien banner. Su T'ien-fu, whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng called Su Lao-t'ien, was commander of the Nien Blue, or Black Banner; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.173, Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion p.26, Teng Ssu-yü: The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare p.95.

5. Ho-ch'iu-hsien (Ying-chou Prefecture, Anhwei) was taken by Li Hsiu-ch'eng on 18 March (HF7/2/23), after which he unsuccessfully

attacked Ying-shang (HF7/4/2) and then withdrew to Liu-an.

6. Cheng-yang-kuan, a strategic point on the Huai River in Feng-yang Prefecture, was taken on 11 March (HF7/2/16). Shou-chou was attacked on 13 March and besieged until the 21st (HF7/2/26), when Ch'en Yü-ch'eng withdrew southwards.

7. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng took Ying-shan on 27 April and Huang-mei on 12 May.

8. This is not entirely correct. In fact Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was fighting primarily against government troops under Kuan Wen (Governor General of Hu-kuang) and Hu Lin-i (Governor of Hupeh); Li Hsü-pin, with a detachment of the Hunan Army did not cross over from Chiu-chiang until 18 August (HF7/6/29); see Fang-lüeh ch.176 p.17b.

9. The Taipings were severely defeated on 18 August in the region of T'ung-ssu-p'ai (潼司牌); Li Hsiu-ch'eng's 松子牌 may be an error for this; see Fang-lüeh ch.178 pp.15b-18b.

10. One of the six ranks of nobility, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.237-244.

11. The office of chang-shuai (掌率), the senior administrative officers at court, was created after the defection of Shih Ta-k'ai and the demotion of Hung Jen-ta and Hung Jen-fa from the rank of wang. Meng Te-en seems to have been the first chang-shuai, though there is some doubt as to the date of his appointment. His son said that it was in 1856, 'when Shih Ta-k'ai left the capital,' see Meng Shih-yung chia-hsin, TPTK II p.755; but in fact Shih left in 1857. In his deposition, Hung Jen-kan wrote that the appointment was made in 1858, see TPTK II p.851. See also Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an p.255

Notes to Page 149.

1. Interlinear.

2. This question is further discussed on pages 233 ff.

Note to Page 150.

1. This refers to the second siege of Chen-chiang, in December 1857,

described in more detail below, pages 150-151.

Notes to Page 151.

1. For the death of Chou Sheng-k'un see below, page 154.

2. We are now back in 1856.

3. Ho Ch'un not Chang Kuo-liang was the senior officer under Hsiang Jung at this time. Hsiang Jung had been appointed Imperial Commissioner late in February 1853 (HF3/1/20). He had conferred with the resilient Ch'i Shan (Kishen of Opium War fame, see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.126-129), and had decided to establish two headquarters, one at Yang-chou (the 江北大營 or Great Camp of Chiang-pei) and another at Nanking (the 江南大營 of Great Camp of Chiang-nan). Hsiang Jung arrived at Nanking with his army on 18 April (HF2/2/29), eighteen days after the Taipings had occupied the city, and established his headquarters about 3 km. away, at Hsiao-ling-wei, see Map II. From this time until its destruction by the Taipings in July 1856, the Chiang-nan H.Q. laid ineffective siege to Nanking. The number of troops never seems to have exceeded about 20,000, but this number was often substantially reduced in order to meet demands elsewhere, including Chen-chiang and Anhwei (where Ho Ch'un was sent early in 1855). Morale at the H.Q. was bad and Hsiang Jung himself was not a particularly talented or active commander. As operations dragged on the patience of the Emperor wore thin, so that when, in January 1854, Hsiang Jung suggested getting 1,000 cavalry from the Chiang-pei H.Q, he was told in a vermilion endorsement: "You have followed the rebels all the way from Kwangsi to Chiang-nan at great cost in troops, without having the least success to show for it. Now you have got your eye on troops from Chiang-pei! How can you have the gall? Certainly not! If you must have troops from Chiang-pei, you had better send up your head in return." See Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao in TPTK VIII p.258.

4. i.e. the Ming Tombs, see Map II.

5. See Map II. This place is sometimes referred to in contemporary documents as Ch'i-weng-ch'iao (七甕橋), e.g. Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lüeh, in Chien-chi I p.401 and Hu En-hsieh: Huan-nan i chia yen in Chien-chi II p.351; but more often as Ch'i-ch'iao-weng (七橋甕), e.g. Anon: Yüeh-ni chi-lüeh in Chien-chi II p.38; Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.639 and Anon: Shih-wen ts'ung-lu in Chien-chi V p.120

6. Chen-chiang had been taken by the Taipings on 31 March 1853

(HF3/2/22) and garrisoned by Lo Ta-kang and Wu Ju-hsiao. At the end of April, Hsiang Jung sent a force under Teng Shao-liang which laid siege to the town in a somewhat indecisive manner until about the end of August, when the Taipings at Chen-chiang began to feel the effects of the blockade. A new Ch'ing commander, Yü Wan-ch'ing, had replaced Ho Ch'un in December 1853, who had himself relieved Teng Shao-liang. In the spring of 1855 Chi-erh-hang-ah (see note 7, below) arrived from Shanghai and took command of the siege. By this time the town was completely cut off and the siege force numbered about 10,000 men. Relief expeditions from Nanking under Wei Ch'ang-hui failed to get through in December 1855; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.1287-1303.

7. Chi-erh-hang-ah was a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner. He was appointed Governor of Kiangsu in 1854. He had been sent by Hsiang Jung to Shanghai which had been taken over by the Small Dagger rebels (小刀會) in September 1853, and had succeeded in recovering the town on 17 February 1855 (HF5/1/1); see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.118-119.

8. Chiu-hua-shan is also called Ching-yen-shan (京峴山), for 當涂 (Tang-t'u) read丹徒 (Tan-t'u).

9. For三岔河 read 三汊河.

10. This is possibly an error for T'o-ming-ah (託明阿), commander of the Chiang-pei H.Q.

11. For 上 read 尚.

12. Interlinear; omitted by Lü Chi-i.

13. According to Macgowan's informant, Ch'in Jih-kang was in command of the relief of Chen-chiang. This has some confirmation in a memorial by Te-hsing-ah and Teng Shao-liang reporting the capture of a Taiping document, quoted by Kuo: Jih-chih p.437, but incorrectly cited as from Fang-lüeh ch.15 instead of ch.151, and incorrectly dated as HF6/4/19 instead of HF6/4/9. But from most accounts of the operations the name of Ch'in Jih-kang is missing; for instance, Ni Tsai-t'ien: Yang-chou yü-k'ou lu in TPTK V p.115, Ch'en Ch'ing-nien: Chen-chiang chiao-p'ing Yüeh-fei chi in Chien Chi I p.180 and Hsien T'ung Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 p. 39a. It seems likely that even if the Taiping forces were under Ch'in Jih-kang's command, he himself probably remained in Nanking, leaving effective control in the hands of other officers, of whom Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was the senior, although Li Hsiu-ch'eng gives the impression that he was.

14. This is an error for Ts'ang-t'ou (倉 頭), which is in the north of Chü-jung-hsien, and not in Chen-chiang Prefecture.

15. The Taiping relief force set out from Nanking on about 20 January 1856 (HF5/12/25); it consisted of 20,000 troops according to Pien Nai-sheng: Ts'ung-chün chi-shih in TPTK V p.94, though this may be an exaggeration. They established a line of stockades between Tung-yang, Lung-t'an and Hsia-shu-chieh. The main fighting, which was indecisive until about April, was in the region of Kao-tzu.

Notes to Page 152.

1. This probably refers to the battle at Ts'ang-t'ou (倉 頭) or T'ang-t'ou (湯 頭), both names are used, on 6 March 1856 (HF6/1/30). Taiping pressure on Kao-tzu made Chi-erh-hang-ah send relief to Chang Kuo-liang from Chen-chiang. A few days later he came himself to direct the fighting; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1294.

2. Pien Nai-sheng records that "the rebels were only on the other side of the hill and we could hear each other speak;' Ts'ung-chün chi-shih, p.96. Li Hsiu-ch'eng may be referring to this. Hsiang Jung's dissatisfaction with the deadlock is reflected in his replacement of Teng Shao-liang with Chang Kuo-liang as commander of the Ch'ing forces at Kao-tzu; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao HF6/3/3, p.587.

3. This incident is also mentioned in Ch'en Ch'ing-nien: Chen-chiang chiao-p'ing Yüeh-fei chi p.181; but it may have been taken from the deposition.

4. For 雖言 read 雖然.

5. This refers to the T'ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho.

6. The account of the operation is far from clear, and it is difficult to make sense of it without adequate maps. The Ch'ing stockades were along the Ch'a-ho. The other river, the T'ang-shui-shan-pien, flowed from the Yangtse to the Ch'in-huai River, through Chü-jung, Lung-t'an and Mo-ling. The Taipings moved up this river in order to get to the rear of the Ch'ing army, which moved forward to stop them. See Ch'en Ch'ing-nien: Chen-chiang chiao-p'ing Yüeh-fei chi pp.180-181.

Notes to Page 153.

1. They had been abandoned when the Taipings advanced along the T'ang-shui-shan-pien. How Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force got behind the enemy is made clear neither by his own account or by that of Ch'en Ch'ing-nien, which is the most detailed one from government sources. Official reports were extremely reticent about this operation.

2. Ch'en Ch'ing-nien gives the distance between the two rivers as 10 li, see Chen-chiang chiao-p'ing Yüeh-fei chi p.181.

3. i.e. 2 April 1856 (HF6/2/27).

4. Chin-shan is on the south bank of the Yangtse in Tan-t'u-hsien near Chen-chiang; Kua-chou is on the north bank opposite to Chen-chiang. This operation was chiefly designed to relieve the Chen-chiang garrison's shortage of supplies, but was reported as a flight in Ch'ing documents, and the loss of 16 stockades on the south bank on 2 April was not mentioned. On 29 March, the Prefect of Yang-chou announced publicly that the Taipings had been defeated at Chen-chiang and that Yang-chou was no longer in danger. On 2 April however, a despatch arrived at the Chiang-pei H.Q. from Chi-erh-hang-ah, with the warning that the Taipings had seized boats and were intending to cross. But it was Lei I-hsien's birthday, and most of the officers in the Chiang-pei H.Q. from T'o-ming-ah down, were celebrating with him and had no time to worry about despatches; see Hsien T'ung Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 p.43a. There was no effective opposition to the Taiping crossing because the Ch'ing boats were large and clumsy and only useful when the wind was right; see Tu Wen-lan: P'ing-ting Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh quoted in Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1298.

5. For 卜著灣 read 朴樹灣 .

6. Interlinear.

7. This was on 2 & 3 April (HF6/2/27-8), see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.597. T'o-ming-ah and Lei I-hsien did not even send out troops until a day later, and then the soldiers were 45 days in arrears of pay and were hungry; they did not put up much of a fight. The Taiping attack on the H.Q. was facilitated by the presence of Taiping agents in Lei I-hsien's force; see Hsien T'ung Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 pp.42-43b.

8. Yang-chou was taken without a fight on 5 April 1856 (HF6/3/1).

Notes to Page 154.

1. Chou Sheng-k'un was killed in battle on 4 April (HF6/2/29) and his troops forced to withdraw on 6 April; the Taiping stockades at Huang-ni-chou were taken on the same day. After this, such was the concern caused by the Taipings' seizure of Yang-chou, that several thousand Ch'ing troops were sent to the north bank; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih II p.1299; Kuo: Jih-chih and Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao pp.597-8.

2. At this time the Taipings had presumably decided to launch a combined attack, with Shih Ta-k'ai's force, on the Chiang-nan H.Q. Shih Ta-k'ai began to move eastwards by marching on Le-p'ing on 3 April (HF6/2/28), see Kuo: Jih-chih.

3. The Taipings withdrew from Yang-chou on 14 April (HF6/3/10) and took Chiang-p'u on the same day, and P'u-k'ou on the 16th. The Ch'ing commander of P'u-k'ou fled to Liu-ho, pursued by Taipings.

4. Chang Kuo-liang crossed from the south bank on 16 April and attacked the Taipings in the rear. In the meantime Te-hsing-ah recovered Yang-chou. The small Taiping garrison, who were listening to 'preaching' at the time, were taken unawares; see Ni Tsai-t'ien: Yang-chou yü-k'ou lu p.116. On 22 April Chang Kuo-liang took P'u-k'ou, but after the Taipings had withdrawn eastwards towards Yang-chou (see note 5 below) was himself called back to Chiang-nan because Ning-kuo was threatened by Shih Ta-k'ai's advance; it fell on 2 May (HF6/3/28), see Kuo: Jih-chih.

5. The Taipings took I-cheng on 28 April and gave it up on 4 May (HF6/4/1). On 26 May they withdrew from San-ch'a-ho to Kua-chou and from there crossed to Chin-shan on 27 May (HF6/4/24).

6. 定叠 is a Kwangsi dialect expression meaning to complete something satisfactorily, see Lo: Chien-cheng p.30

7. Chang Kuo-liang had in fact left the north bank on 16 April and was at this time fighting Shih Ta-k'ai in the region of Mo-ling-kuan, which Shih's troops had attacked on 18 May.

8. On 29 May 1856 (HF6/4/26).

Notes to Page 155.

1. On 1 June 1856 (HF6/4/29). The official version was that Chi-

erh-hang-ah was killed by an enemy shot, see Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.119. But two other accounts agree with that of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, even about the 'foreign pistol'; see Chao Lieh-wen: Lo-hua ch'un-yü-ch'ao jih-chi and Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yü hui-lu, quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng p.185 n19.

2. This was on 3 June. Missing from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account is the subsequent fighting at Yü Wan-ch'ing's H.Q. at Ching-yen-shan on 5-6 June; see Pien Nai-sheng: Ts'ung-chün chi-shih p.97, which otherwise confirms Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version, except to say that only 30+ Ch'ing stockades were destroyed.

3. In fact Chang Kuo-liang returned with some 3,000 men from the region of Mo-ling-kuan, where on 20-21 May (HF6/4/17) he had inflicted a defeat on Shih Ta-k'ai.

4. Chang Kuo-liang engaged the Taipings first at Tan-t'u on 8 June, then advanced to Ching-yen-shan on 10 June and defeated the Taipings there on the following day; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1302 and Kuo: Jih-chih.

5. On 12 June 1856.

6. On 13 June (HF6/5/11) the Taipings gave up all their stockades outside Chen-chiang and went back to Nanking by way of Kao-tzu and Kuan-yin-men, in order to join up with Shih Ta-k'ai and deal with the Chiang-nan H.Q. Chang Kuo-liang's army followed them back; see Fang-lüeh ch.154 p.18a

7. Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's refusal to allow these troops to enter the city before the Chiang-nan H.Q. at Hsiao-ling-wei was defeated may have been connected with other than purely military considerations. There was a shortage of grain in the capital at the time, and earlier (HF5/11), after the fall of Lu-chou, he had refused to allow the troops into Nanking for this reason; see Hsien T'ung Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 p.34. On this occasion Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's decision may also have had something to do with his plan to usurp.

Notes to Page 156.

1. Events proved that Yang Hsiu-ch'ing had been right to insist. He may have been aware that there were only 5,000 Ch'ing troops at the Chiang-nan H.Q.; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao (HF6/5/22) p.638.

2. On 17 June (HF6/5/15).

3. For猺化門 read堯化門.

4. Chang Kuo-liang had in fact returned from Li-shui on 18 June, reaching the Chiang-nan H.Q. on the 19th.

5. For想 read相 .

6. For張瑞謀read張遠謀.

7. Shih Ta-k'ai and his force returned to the capital after Chang Kuo-liang had been recalled to the Chen-chiang front (see note 3 to page 155). Then one part of Shih Ta-k'ai's force took Chiang-p'u and another was sent to Li-shui to prevent Ch'ing reinforcements from reaching the Chiang-nan H.Q. from the region of Su-chou and Ch'ang-chou. On 18 June another part of the army occupied Pai-hsiang and fortified positions at Yao-hua-men, Hsien-hao-men and Shih-pu-ch'iao; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih II p.1308.

Notes to Page 157.

1. For 乘 read剩 .

2. For 已 read 幾 .

3. Hsiang Jung withdrew on 20 June to Ch'un-hua-men and on the following day to Tan-yang by way of Chü-jung.

4. This is an error for 'the 6th Year [1856]'.

5. The Chiang-nan military commissariat, taken by the Taipings on 20 June, does not seem to have been very well stocked, see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao pp.652-3. Spoil from the camps may have been more plentiful.

6. Chü-jung was taken on 27 June (HF6/5/25) by the northern column advancing through T'u-ch'iao; the southern column made for Li-yang; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.650. The Taipings arrived at Tan-yang on 2 July (HF6/6/1)

7. On 2 July, according to Hsiang Jung, six or seven thousand Taipings attacked the Ch'ing positions outside Tan-yang. All the local people having fled, there was no one to conscript for the construction of defences and Hsiang was obliged to order a retreat into the town; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.653

8. The Taiping were reinforced from Chen-chiang, but Hsiang Jung's estimate of the numbers of this relief force (10,000) is probably an exaggeration; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.667.

9. The Taiping army was defeated on 18 July (HF6/6/17) with a loss of 600 men; as a result of this, Ch'in Jih-kang was deprived of his title of wang; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1313

Notes to Page 158.

1. This is at variance with other accounts. Te-hsing-ah reported in a memorial that Hsiang Jung died of illness, see Fang-lüeh ch.158 p.25b (HF6/7/17). In his last memorial Hsiang Jung complained that he could hardly walk because of pain in the legs, see Tsou-kao. p.670.

2. 契 爺 is a Liang-kwang dialect expression, see Lo: Chien-cheng p.188 n2.

3. 檢點 , an official of the 7th rank, immediately below the ch'eng-hsiang; there were 36 chien-tien, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.114,122.

4. On 13 August (HF6/7/13).

5. There is an account of this siege in Ch'iang Ju-hsün: Chin-t'an chien-wen chi in TPTK V p.193, where it is stated that the attack was a prelude to a move on Ch'ang-chou.

6. This passage was overlook by Lü Chi-i. Chin-t'an was garrisoned by a force of 2,000 troops under Li Hung-hsün, but 1,300 of them were sent to Li-yang before the Taiping attack began. The rest were assisted by militia and twenty rusty cannon. But the defence was efficiently organized and there seems to have been close co-operation between the troops and the gentry. Chang Kuo-liang sent relief into the town on 22 August, but as the Taiping numbers increased, he decided to come himself, on 4 September. Ch'iang Ju-hsün: Ching-t'an chien-wen chi p.200 says that under such a commander as Ch'in Jih-kang the Taipings had hoped to take the town in two days; but instead, Ch'in had been killed there. Li Pin: Chung-hsing pieh-chi ch.28 p.13a (1910 University Microfilms, Xerox copy), also says that Ch'in was killed at Chin-t'an; but Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version, supported by Macgowan's report, (that he was killed during the internecine struggle) is probably more reliable.

7. The Tung Wang, Yang Hsiu-ch'ing was killed on 2 September. The

Taipings withdrew from Ting-chüeh-ts'un (25 li from Chü-jung) on 4 September (HF6/8/6). Afterwards, Li Hsiu-ch'eng was sent to San-ho (see page 161) and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng to the relief of Ning-kuo. Chang Kuo-liang took Pao-yen on 19 September (HF6/8/21) and re-occupied Kao-ch'un and Tung-pa on the following day; he began the siege of Chü-jung on 4 October (HF6/9/6). Ho Ch'un had been appointed to succeed Hsiang Jung, although Chang Kuo-liang was a much more competent commander; he was however, not a Manchu and had been a bandit. Ho Ch'un arrived at Tan-yang in the middle of October.

8. For 肖詳 read 蕭牆.

Notes to Page 159

1. For 緑 read 諫 .

2. For 紉 read 幼 .

3. For 奇 read 騎 .

4. This is a quotation from the Lun-yü V. "The master said: In a hamlet of ten houses you may be sure of finding someone quite as loyal and true to his word as I..." See Arthur Waley: The Analects of Confucius. London 1938 p.114.

5. The character 不 is missing here.

6. For 輩 read 背 .

7. This passage shows the influence of the popular Ming novel 封神演義 (Canonization of the Gods), author unknown, which is strongly fatalistic in character and contains a mixture of Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian ideas. This may have been one of the banned books which Li Hsiu-ch'eng liked to read, see note 6 to page 143).

8. For 坐 read 度 .

Notes to Page 160.

1. For 齊 read 離 .

Notes to Page 161.

1. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 洪 (Hung) for 藍 (Lan), for which in the original, Li Hsiu-ch'eng used the abbreviated character 艹. Lan Ch'eng-ch'un was Ch'un-kuan-yu-fu-ch'eng-hsiang, according to Ti-fu tao-jen (pseud.): Chin-ling tsa-chi in TPTK IV p.643, he had been a chien-tien with a command in Ho-fei-hsien, Anhwei; see TCHT p.73.

2. San-ho was taken by troops under Ho Ch'un on 16 September 1856 (HF6/8/18) after a siege of about ten months. Lu-chiang was taken about two days later; see Kuo: Jih-chih.

3. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account now jumps to 1857. The events between the loss of San-ho and the fall of Chü-jung are related on pages 146-8.

4. Chü-jung was taken by Chang Kuo-liang on 16 June 1857 (HF7/5 intercalary/25), having been under siege since 4 October 1856 (HF6/9/6); see Fang-lüeh ch.177 pp.7b-9a. After 12 June the siege force was joined by Ch'ing units from Li-shui, which had been recovered on that day; Ch'in Ting-san had also arrived from An-ch'ing on 31 May, ibid. ch.177 p.7b & ch.175 p.18a.

5. Ho-ch'un attacked Chen-chiang on 26 July 1857 (HF7/6/6); Kua-chou was besieged at the same time by an army from the Chiang-pei H.Q. until 27 November (HF7/10/12), when both towns fell. Relief was sent under Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's brother Hung Jen-fa from Nanking on 7 November, who occupied Shih-pu-ch'iao, Lung-t'an and Hsia-shu-chieh; see Fang-lüeh ch.184 p.1aff; but was unable to make any further headway against Chang Kuo-liang's troops. Nor was the Chen-chiang garrison force under Wu Ju-hsiao able to make contact with them. About the middle of November or a little earlier, Li Hsiu-ch'eng came south from Lu-chou by way of Chao-kuan and Ho-chou, and crossed the Yangtse in an attempt to relieve Chen-chiang; but he was defeated by Chang Kuo-liang on 14 December, and Hung Jen-fa on the 15th. (Hung was incorrectly reported killed). Chang Kuo-liang recovered Chen-chiang on 27 December (HF7/11/12), but Li Hsiu-ch'eng had managed to get most of the garrison out; see Fang-lüeh ch.165 pp.32,34-35.

6. By establishing positions at Kao-ch'iao-men, Lung-po-tzu (Chung-shan) and Hsiao-ling-wei on 8 January 1859 (HF8/11/24). The new Chiang-nan H.Q. was between Kao-ch'iao-men and Ts'ang-po. A moat of 1½-2 chang (17-23 ft.) deep and wide was dug, which eventually stretched from outside the Shui-hsi Gate to the Yangtse on the north side of the city, a distance of about 100 li. It was not

completed until the winter; see Fang-lüeh ch.191 p.17, Shih Chien-lieh & Liu Chi-tseng: Chi (Wu-hsi)-hsien-ch'eng shih-shou k'e-fu pen-mo in TPTK V pp.246-7, and Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh in Chien-chi I p.44.

7. Yang Fu-ch'ing, later the Fu Wang (輔王), was a cousin of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, and one of the few members of his clan to survive the massacres of 1856; he was in Kiangsi at the time. In March 1857 he went from Kiangsi into Fukien, returning in July. In November he joined up with Shih Ta-k'ai, but broke with him the following year. For other biographical details, see Lo: Shih-kao pp.23-4.

8. Wei Chih-chün was Wei Ch'ang-hui's younger brother, though this was not, according to Lo Erh-kang, the reason for his disgrace; he had been responsible for the loss of Wu-ch'ang in December 1856; see Lo: Shih-kao pp.296-7, Lo: Shih-shih-k'ao p.303 and page 164, below.

9. Lin Shao-chang had been cashiered for his failure at Hsiang-t'an in the Spring of 1854, see page 163, and Appendix I, page . Other biographical details are given in Lo: Shih-kao pp.340-2.

10. Lin Ch'i-jung was the garrison commander of Chiu-chiang from 1854 to 1858, when in May the town fell and the whole garrison of 17,000 Taipings, including Lin, was wiped out. Tseng Kuo-fan said of him that 'his endurance was unparalleled'. He was posthumously given the title of Ch'in Wang. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.194

11. Huang Wen-chin, later the Tu Wang, was familiarly known as 'Huang the Tiger'. He commanded the Taiping garrison at Hu-k'ou for 3 years, until the town fell on 26 October 1857, see Lo: Shih-kao pp.424-5.

12. Chang Ch'ao-chüeh, later the Li Wang, became second-in-command to Ch'ing Jih-kang at An-ch'ing after Shih Ta-k'ai returned to Nanking in the winter of 1853; see Lo: Shih-kao p.404 and TCHT p.64. Ch'en Te-ts'ai, later the Fu Wang, was a subordinate of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, see Lo: Shih-kao p.430

Notes to Page 162.

1. Hsiao-ku-shan is in Su-sung Prefecture and Hua-yang-chen is in Wang-chiang Prefecture, Anhwei. (Lo: Chien-cheng p.194)

2. Very little seems to be known about Li Ch'un-fa. He is first mentioned in 1854 as being the secretary of a board (shang-shu). In 1860 he was '二天將' - a title probably created about that time, of rank approximately equal to that of the ch'eng-hsiang; he was, with Meng Te-en and Lin Shao-chang, one of the ruling triumvirate. His specific office was that of ching-chi t'ung-kuan (京畿統管), which perhaps means that he was 'mayor' of Nanking; see Yu-chu Chao-chih in Shih-liao p.115; Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.244-5; Lo:Chien-cheng p.194, and Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.22.

3. Commonly called 'The Pillars' by westerners. "At the distance of about forty-five miles above Nankin...where the river narrows to about fourteen hundred yards, running between two granite bluffs, called the 'pillars,' of about two hundred feet in height. The rebels have fortified the position strongly after their fashion, having constructed numerous batteries upon the high slopes, connecting them by a brick wall." See G.J.Wolseley: Narrative of the War with China in 1860, London 1862 p.362

4. The main crossing over the Yangtse at Nanking was from P'u-k'ou north bank in Chiang-p'u-hsien; thus, Liang-p'u (the two 'p'u). By 3 April 1858 (HF8/2/20), the only crossing still open was at Chiu-fu-chou, which was under water during the summer months. By that time, Ch'ing troops were in control of P'u-k'ou, see Fang-lüeh ch.190 p.13a. Chiang-p'u fell to the government on 12 April (HF8/2/29), ibid. p.16b, after which the Taiping forts on Chiu-fu-chou were attacked.

5. Te-hsing-ah (d.1866) was a Manchu of the Plain Yellow Banner. At this time he was commander of the Chiang-pei H.Q.

6. But only until 16 April 1858 (HF8/3/3), when Ho-chou fell to the government.

7. Ho-ch'un reported intelligence to the effect that there was enough grain in the capital to last until the 7th Month (early Autumn), but there was a shortage of oil, salt and other supplies; see Fang-lüeh ch.195 p.7.

8. This presumably refers to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's appointment as chu-chiang (commander). The title, according to Hung Jen-kan, was revived by Hung Hsiu-ch'üan in 1858. Before they were given the title wang at Yung-an in 1851, Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, Feng Yun-shan, Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, Wei Ch'ang-hui and Shih Ta-k'ai were all chu-chiang. "In 1858 Ch'en Yü-ch'eng received the appointment of ch'ien-chün chu-chiang [前軍主將 Commander of the Front Division],

Li Hsiu-ch'eng, hou-chün chu-chiang [後軍主將 Commander of the Rear Division], Li Shih-hsien, tso-chün chu-chiang [左軍主將 Commander of the Left Division] Wei Chih-chün, yu-chün chu-chiang [右軍主將] Commander of the Right Division, and Meng Te-en chung-chün chu-chiang [中軍主將 Commander of the Centre Division] with general control over military affairs." See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition, TPTK II p.851. This must refer to the first half of 1858, since we know that in September 1858 Yang Fu-ch'ing was made chung-chün chu-chiang. See Lo: Shih-kao p.423, Li Ch'un: T'aip'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, pp.249-250.

Notes to Page 163.

1. The passage in capitals is omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.
Huang-ch'ih and Wan-chih, in southern Anhwei, were taken by Li Shih-hsien on 28 February 1858 (HF8/1/15). In the Chiu-Ju T'ang Edition this passage reads: "At this time my cousin Li Shih-hsien was employed on the recommendation of a court official, he..."

2. This is not in agreement with what Hung Jen-kan wrote in his deposition, see note 8 above; both Meng Te-en and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng were senior to Li Hsiu-ch'eng.

3. Chang Kuo-liang at first concentrated his attacks on the north-west side of the city; but on 16 April 1858 attacked Ch'i-ch'iao-weng and threatened Yü-hua-t'ai, an important strongpoint to the south; see Fang-lüeh ch.191 -.17, ch.193 p.1a.

4. See note 2 to page 252, & Appendix I p.257.

5. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

Notes to Page 164.

1. This may have been on 15 April (HF8/3/2). Ho Ch'un reported a sortie of Taipings from the south gate on this day, see Fang-lüeh ch.192 p.1a

2. The Taiping attack on Ku-shih (Honan) was on 20 January 1858 (HF7/12/6), see Ch'u Chih-fu: Wan-ch'iao chi-shih p.97 in Chien-chi II.

3. 定天福 , one of the six ranks of nobility which evolved after

the internecine struggle; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.237-244. Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix pp.70-74 lists over 80 different t'ien-fu.

4. Wei Chih-chün surrendered to the government in the winter of 1859, see Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu (Yang Tsai-fu to Tseng Kuo-fan) in Chien-chi VI p.195 and Lo: Shih-kao p.297. According to some of the local people of Chin-t'ien, before reaching home he informed the elders of the village that everyone coming to welcome him home would receive one dollar, but that he refused to pay out when he found that the offer had been accepted by too many people. He is said to have been inundated by claims for damages, because of the destruction of houses in the village belong to anyone who had had anything to do with him, by government authorities. He did not meet these claims but contributed such things as a bridge, and a free ferry for the good of the community. He asked for leave to return home late in 1865, when he was a fu-chiang (colonel); but this was not granted at the time; see Tseng Kuo-fan: P'i-tu ch.3 p.18b. I do not know whether he had been home before 1865 or whether Li Hsiu-ch'enh was merely misinformed. (see T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao p.92.)

5. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

6. Te-an, in Hupeh, in now called An-lu. It is not clear what the aim of this operation was. If Li Hsiu-ch'eng is correct in saying that it was to 'assemble enough troops to relieve T'ien-ching,' this may mean that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng hoped to enlist Nien allies in this region. He had already co-operated with a Nien force under Han Ch'i-feng in the attack on Ku-shih; see Chiang Ti: Ch'u-ch'i Nien-chün shih lun-ts'ung, Peking 1959 p.123ff. According to Ch'ing intelligence reports based on the interrogation of prisoners after the capture of Huang-an (see note 7 below), the Taipings intended to make for Hsiang-an, on the Han River; see Fang-Lüeh ch.196 p.2, Perhaps there were Nien forces in the Hsiang-yang region to be enlisted; it was an old centre of Nien influence. But it seems more likely that an attack on Wu-ch'ang from the rear was planned.

7. This is an error for 'the 8th Year'; that is between 9 June and and 10 July 1858. The Taiping siege of Ku-shih failed on 6 April (HF8/2/23); Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and Wei Chih-chün passed into Hupeh. They occupied Ma-ch'eng on 24 April (HF8/3/11) and Huang-an on the 26th. When Chiu-chiang fell to the Hunan Army on 19 May, aid was sent, aid was sent which enabled the government forces to recover Huang-an on 9 June (HF8/4/28), thus completing the encirclement of Ma-ch'eng, which was then abandoned by the Taipings; see Fang-lüeh ch.192 p.17b, ch.195 pp.1b,13b, ch.196 pp.1-2.

Notes to Page 165.

1. Kuo T'ien-i: Jih-chih gives 13 or 14 April 1858 as the date of the crossing and assembly at Han-shan. This is incorrect, since Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote in the subsequent paragraph, that by the time they had assembled, Ho-chou had already fallen; this was on 16 April. The date of the Taiping counter-attack from Han-shan was 4 May; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.199.

2. Ch'en K'un-shu, later the Hu Wang (see below, page 210 and note 9), Of Hsiao Chao-sheng nothing seems to be known. Ch'en Ping-wen was later made Ting Wang, and surrendered in 1864. Wu Ting-ts'ai was killed in action at the fall of An-ch'ing in 1861; see Lo: Chien-cheng, pp.197-8.

3. For 上 read 尚 .

4. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.
Chao-kuan, a strategic point in Han-shan-hsien, was taken by the Taipings on 4 May (HF8/3/21), before the Ch'ing forces had finished taking up their positions. Ho-ts'un-p'u is 20 li north of Ho-chou in the direction of Chao-kuan, on a river which flows through Ho-chou into the Yangtse. Ho-chou was taken by the Taipings on 9 May (HF8/3/26). See Lo: Chien-cheng p.198 and Fang-lüeh ch.193 pp.1a-5b.

5. The Taipings took Ch'üan-chiao on 11 May, Ch'u-chou on the same day and Lai-an on 13 May (HF8/4/1), see Fang-lüeh ch.192 p.31.

6. After the Taipings captured Ch'üan-chou and Ch'u-chou, Te-hsing-ah, fearing that they would then advance to Liu-ho and threaten the Chiang-pei H.Q., sent 2,000 troops to prevent this. His forces were severely overstretched, about ten thousand troops covering an area of 'several hundred li'. He complained that 'the troops in Kuang-[chou] and Ku-[shih] push the rebels into western Anhwei, the troops at Ch'i-[chou] and Huang-[mei] push the rebels into southern Anhwei, at [Chiang]-p'u and Liu-[ho] they push them from the east into northern Anhwei, so that the whole of the province is an ocean of rebels.' See Fang-lüeh ch.193 pp.31b-32a.
Sheng kung-pao refers to Sheng Pao; see Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.508. But he was not present at this battle; he was at Liu-an, see Fang-lüeh ch.193 pp.35b-36a & pp.40a/b.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave up Lai-an on 20 May (HF8/4/8).

7. Li Chao-shou came to Ch'u-chou from Nanking on 11 June, Kuo: Jih-chih.

Notes to Page 166.

1. A contemporary diarist wrote, "At first the long-haired rebels [the Taipings] had very good regulations; when they took a town or occupied territory, after the people were pacified, they were well treated, so that they [the Taipings] were able to hold half of Chiang-nan. But after they joined up with the Nien bandits it is hard to describe how the people were oppressed, and the result is the present defeat." See Tao-k'ou yü-sheng (pseud.): Pei-lu chi-lüeh in Tzu-liao p.214.

2. This refers to Kwangtung T'ien Ti Hui (Triad) members enlisted in Kiangsi by Shih Ta-k'ai in 1855-56, to the number of 'several hundred thousand.' (Fang-lüeh ch.369 p.13a). They constituted an enormous reinforcement for the Taiping armies, but the advantage was probably outweighed by what Li Hsiu-ch'eng called the demoralizing effect of this recruitment. Contrary to precedent, these T'ien Ti Hui bands were not incorporated into the Taiping military machine, and were consequently not subject to Taiping education and discipline. Their behaviour damaged the 'public image' of the Taipings, and infected the Taiping troops with their own indiscipline. They were unreliable allies because they often refused to co-operate, and were inclined to come to terms with the government. See Lo: Shih-shih-k'ao pp.68-74.

3. For Taiping local government, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.285-308 and Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I pp.377-490.

4. Liu is Liu Kuan-fang, a ch'eng-hsiang in 1855, a chu-chiang in 1859, he was made Hsiang Wang in 1861. He is said to have been killed at Ch'ang-hsing in 1864, see Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.29; but Lo: Shih-kao p.427 says that he was later heard of at the fall of Hu-chou, after which not more is known.

Ku is Ku Lung-hsien, later made Feng Wang, though he does not seem to have held very high rank previously. He surrendered to the government in southern Anhwei in 1863, though he had refused to do so when Wei Ch'ang-hui turned coat, and had attacked him, in company with Liu Kuan-fang; see Kuo: Jih-chih Appendix p.29.

Lai is Lai Wen-hung, the Kuang Wang, was killed in 1864 (ibid.)

For Yang Fu-ch'ing see note 7 to page 161.
Tseng Kuo-fan in a memorial of TC2/2/27 (April 1863) remarked that Li Shih-hsien, Yang Fu-ch'ing, Huang Wen-chin, Ku Lung-hsien and Liu Kuan-fang were 'dispirited and do not always obey the T'ien Wang and the Chung Wang's orders; they tend to become wandering rebels (游賊), see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.8b. This is perhaps

why he asked about Liu, Ku and Lai when interrogating Li Hsiu-ch'eng; see Appendix I page 258.

5. Li Chao-shou surrendered to Shang Pao on 1 November 1858. When he first became a rebel he had sent his wife and mother for safety to Chou-chia-k'ou in Honan; but their artificial poverty aroused suspicion, and they were seized and handed over to Sheng Pao, who exclaimed, "Now I have Ch'u-chou and Ch'üan-chiao in my hands." Not long afterwards Li Chao-shou was persuaded to surrender and was given by the court a new name, Shih-chung (世忠), and the rank of ts'an-chiang (lieutenant colonel); see Chang Jui-ch'ih: Liang-huai k'an-luan chi in Fan Wen-lan, Chien Po-tsan et al.: Nien-chün (Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao ts'ung-k'an No.3), Shanghai 1953 vol. I p.296. Li Chao-shou remained in control of Ch'u-chou, Lai-an, Ch'üan-chiao, Wu-ho and T'ien-ch'ang, with some 30,000 troops; see Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion p.92.

6. Hung Ch'un-yuan, later the Tui Wang, was executed on Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's orders in 1863, for the loss of Yü-hua-t'ai (see p. 220); Lo: Chien-cheng p.202

7. It is not true that Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not censure Li Chao-shou; his letter of remonstrance, dated 1 November 1858 (TT8/10/27), omitting the preamble, reads as follows:

> Ever since I (lit. this commander) have been associated with you I have been aware of your great ability, and uncommon qualities as a commander. Consequently I treasured you and regarded you like my hands and feet. Judging from your character, [I though] you understood friendship, understood constancy and the sharing of difficulties. Little did I think that you were a traitor. It is too late to regret that I did not realize this earlier. Little did I know you, [one of] my favourite officers. I instructed you to behave with goodness and urged you to follow the ways of virtue, little imagining that you would turn upon me, ungrateful for my kindly and righteous feelings. But enough of that! Let me ask you, why did you give allegiance to the T'ien Ch'ao? Now that you have surrendered to Sheng Pao, can you be sure that your past will not be examined? It will be a long time before you can live down your past offences. How can a man of worth close his eyes to what is before him and not think of the evil to come? Moreover, our Sovereign the T'ien Wang treated you not ungenerously, and I treated you with friendship. You you know that as long as you were in the T'ien Ch'ao I always covered up for you, inspite of your bad behaviour, always quarrelling with your comrades in the kingdom, inspite of your subordinates who were continually molesting innocent people so that soldiers and people were resentful? Now you have surrendered to the imps, and everyone [vows to] take and execute you. You

may have forgotten my former friendship, but can you have forgotten that my cause is to exterminate imps on behalf of our Kingdom? Now that you have surrendered to Sheng Pao, your immediate plan is to hand over Ch'u-chou and Lai-an. Thus with enmity you repay favours! But this is something which my unforgetting heart will not accept. I hope that now you have gone over to the imps, you will pit your strength against mine. Your officers and men were all moulded by me, and I know their worth. You want to oppose the T'ien Ch'ao, so I vow to march out and punish you. Our friendship is over! The extirpation of other imp forces can wait; but Sheng Pao and you must be blotted out at once. Consider; do you imagine that you can hold out in Ch'-chou, relying on Sheng Pao's protection? Do you now know that for all their violence and cruel savagery, head imp Hsiang [Jung] at the east gate of T'ien-ching, head imp Ch'in [Ting-san] who fought us at T'ung-ch'eng, head imp Te-[hsing-ah] who resisted around Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou this year, and head imp Li [Hsü-pin] who attacked San-ho, were entirely wiped out by our massed armies? I urge you, since you have already thrown in your lot with the imps, why go back and forth when you could easily hasten into retirement. If you still depend on some cunning trick, I fear that you will not be safe from two enemies. Can it be that the imps are not well-disposed to you because you came [to us] after killing an imp tao-t'ai? Do you not fear the T'ien Ch'ao will not forgive you for turning coat and surrendering to the imps? This abnormal vacillation, can it be the action of a man of will-power? Are these the traces he wishes to leave behind him in the world? How pityful!

See TPTK II. pp.694-696. The original is in the Palace Museum, Peking.

8. This is an error for 'the 8th Year' - 1858. It was corrected in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

9. Ch'en K'un-shu eventually bought the title of Hu Wang (see page 210). He would have surrendered to the government, but was discouraged from doing so by Li Hung-chang's slaughter of the wangs who did so at Su-chou; see page 227, below and Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.29b. The British Museum has a letter addressed to him from Li Hsiu-ch'eng, complaining that no response had been recieved to requests to come to the relief of Su-chou, see TPTK II p.764. (A translation of this letter is given in Andrew Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army', A History of the Chinese Campaign under Lt.-Col. C.G. Gordon, C.B., R.E. and of the Suppression of the Tai-Ping Rebellion, Edinburgh and London 1868 pp.187-8).

Notes to Page 167.

1. T'an Shao-kuang, the Mu Wang, was assassinated at Su-chou in 1863, see below, page 227. Lu Shun-te, the Lai Wang, was betrayed and executed in 1865, see Lo: Shih-kao p.407.

2. In spite of the hostile tone of the majority of contemporary material on the rebellion, it is nevertheless possible to find a good deal of evidence to support Li Hsiu-ch'eng's claim that bad behaviour amongst the Taipings armies was the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, if this had not been so it would be exceedingly difficult to account for their success, particularly in the early period. Several contemporaries attribitued this to good discipline. See, for instance, Tsêng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.8b.

3. 重馬 in the original.

4. This should be Ta-liu-chuang (大劉莊), according to Fang-lüeh ch.195 p.9b.

5. The Taipings took up positions at Ta-liu-chuang on 5 June 1858 (HF8/4/24). Ch'iao-lin is about 40 li southwest of Chiang-p'u.

6. I can find no trace of any of Sheng Pao's troops having been at this battle. He was at Liu-an at the time; see Fang-lüeh, ch.194 p.15b.

7. Te-hsing-ah's memorial reported the victory but not a defeat. He claimed to have killed, between 24 May and 6 June (HF8/4/12-25) some ten or eleven thousand Taipings, and to have taken prisoner 1,680. Yet Li Hsiu-ch'eng stated (page 167) that he only had 5,000 troops, though he may have been supported by Nien auxiliaries. The 'new stockades' referred to are probably the three established at Chiang-chia-k'ou during the night of 4 June, which were destroyed on the following day by Te-hsing-ah. The main Ch'ing victory was the destruction of 13 Taiping ying at Ta-liu-chuang on 6 June; see Fang-lüeh ch.195 pp.9a-11b.

8. For 奇 read 騎 .

9. This is an error for 'the 6th Month of the 8th Year', i.e. 10 July - 8 August, 1858.

Notes to Page 168.

1. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng arrived at Lu-chou on 11 August, and took the town

on the 23rd (HF8/7/15), possibly with inside aid; see Fang-lüeh ch.201 p.2b.

For 店鋪 read 店埠.

Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had a force of about 20,000, according to government intelligence, though one source gives 'several myriads'. It seems possible that Ch'en's aim was to relieve pressure on An-ch'ing, which was under attack by the Hunan Army. If this is so, he was successful, since he drew off some of the best troops under Li Hsü-pin (see below, page 169). Li Chao-shou, who had already made the preliminary negotiations for his surrender, warned Sheng Pao that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng would give the appearance of making for Liu-an, but in fact, his target was Lu-chou. See Fang-lüeh ch.199 pp.27b-28a, ch.200 pp.10a/b, ch.201 p.2b.

2. Li Chao-shou reported to Sheng Pao that an attack on Ting-yuan was planned, in which 10,000 Taipings under a commander called Ch'ien would join up with a Nien group under Chang Lung at Ch'ih-ho-chen; see Fang-lüeh ch.201 p.21a. The attack on Ting-yuan was made on 21 September (HF8/8/15). At this time the Nien were glad of Taiping co-operation because Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te-shu had been obliged to withdraw from Liu-an, after the town had been given over to the government by treachery on 25 May (HF8/4/13); see Ch'ung-hsiu An-hui t'ung-chih p.18 in Fan Wen-lan et al.: Nien-chün Vol.II.

3. According to Ch'ing reports, a force of 'several myriad' rebels descended on Chieh-p'ai in Ting-yuan-hsien on 9 September. Sheng Pao's troops killed 'four or five hundred' of them; see Fang-lüeh ch.202 p.4a. Lo: Chien-cheng p.204 n6 however, gives Chieh-p'ai as in Ch'üan-chiao-hsien.

4. The first move towards P'u-k'ou from Ch'u-chou seems to have been made on 23 August, but the Taipings were beaten back on the following day, after which they presumably decided to await the arrival of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's force; see Fang-lüeh ch.200 pp.21b,22.

5. On 17 September (HF8/8/11) Ch'en Yü-ch'eng moved on P'u-k'ou from Wu-i. Relief was then sent from the Chiang-pei H.Q. by way of Hsiao-tien, see Fang-lüeh ch.202 p.6a. I can find no evidence that Sheng Pao's cavalry were present at this engagement.

6. Te-hsing-ah's force numbered about 15,000 in all, Fang-lüeh ch.102 p.7b.

7. The engagement at Hsiao-tien was on 27 and 28 September (HF8/8/21 & 22), but it was the yu-chi (游擊) Feng Tzu-ts'ai who came from the Chiang-nan H.Q. with 5,000 men, not Chang Kuo-liang; see Fang-Lüeh ch.203 p.14b.

8. I can find no confirmation of this figure, though Te-hsing-ah, after withdrawing to Kua-chou, complained that he had no troops left (無一旅之師), see Fang-lüeh ch.203 p.14b.

9. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng took Liu-ho on 24 October (HF8/9/18). Li Hsiu-ch'eng took T'ien-ch'ang on 30 September (HF8/8/24), I-cheng on 4 October and Yang-chou on 9 October (HF8/9/3).

Notes to Page 169.

1. The Prefect of Yang-chou was Huang Ch'in-nai (黃欽贏), see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1635.

2. The Taipings withdrew from Yang-chou on 21 October (HF8/9/15).

3. A government force under Yang Tsai-fu, To-lung-ah and Pao Ch'ao began to draw in on An-ch'ing in October 1858. At the same time, a detachment consisting of the best troops of the Hunan Army, under Li Hsü-pin (see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.463-4), moved northeast from T'ai-hu, taking Ch'ien-shan on 27 September (HF8/8/21);(Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih III p.12b incorrectly gives the date as HF8/9/1), T'ung-ch'eng was taken within a few days; there is disagreement as to the exact date. Hu-Chien-fu: Feng-ho shih-lu p.20 gives 11 October (HF8/9/5). (The author was a native of T'ung-ch'eng), Ch'u Chih-fu: Wan-ch'iao chi-shih in Chien-chi II p.99 gives 12 October, and Kuo: Jih-chih gives 13 October. Shu-ch'eng was taken on 24 October.

4. The town of San-ho, on the Ta-chieh River, west of Ch'ao Hu, had both military and economic importance, being a supply centre for grain and arms for Anhwei and Nanking, and the 'screen' of Lu-chou. The Taipings built a wall round the town, protected by nine forts. Li Hsü-pin began his attack on 3 November 1858 (HF8/9/28). See Hu Lin-i: Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi ch.31 pp.1b-8 and Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih III p.13b.

5. San-ho had been taken by Ho Ch'un on 16 September 1856, see page 161.

6. Pai-shih-shan and Chin-niu-chen are both in Lu-chiang-hsien. Chin-niu is about 30 li south of San-ho. Wu Ju-hsiao and Kung Te-shu came south from Lu-chou and cut off possible relief for Li Hsü-pin from Shu-ch'eng. But Li Hsü-pin had already, on 7 November, taken the nine Taipings forts which defended the wall of San-ho; see Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi ch.31 pp.1b-8.

Note to Page 170.

1. This battle took place on 15 November 1858 (HF8/10/10). According to Hu Lin-i's account, Li Hsü-pin marched on the Taiping positions at Chin-niu-chen at the 'Fifth Watch' [3-5 a.m.]; see Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi ch.31 pp.1b-8.

Notes to Page 171.

1. According to Hu Lin-i's memorial, which was based on reports from survivors, the Hunan Army advanced southwards for 15 li before being attacked in a thick mist in which 'one could not distinguish things a foot away.' In the absence of details of the Hunan Army dispositions it is difficult to know exactly what Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant by the words 陣門 and 陣腳, which I have translated as 'van' and 'base' respectively. Hu Lin-i's account is of little help in this matter, being almost equally vague about the positions of the various units and the precise order of events. It is clear however, that most of Li Hsü-pin's force was cut off after the advance on Chin-niu-chen, and could not get back to their stockades, which were then taken by the Taipings. Taiping encirclement of the remaining Hunan Army units was completed by a sortie from the town of San-ho, and by the opening of a dyke on the river, cutting off the line of retreat. The battle ended late at night, presumably after the death of Li Hsü-pin. Tseng Kuo-fan's brother, Tseng Kuo-hua, was also killed at San-ho. See Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi ch.31 pp.1b-8.

2. Hu Lin-i stated that a large force under Li Shih-hsien (an error for Wu Ju-hsiao) and Chang Lo-hsing joined the San-ho battle, and brought Taiping numbers to 100,000, probably a much inflated figure; ibid. p.3a.

3. Hu Lin-i reported that Li Hsü-pin died in battle, 'covered with spear wounds.' ibid. p.4b.

4. This sentence in the original reads 諸我營具一兩在; the meaning is somewhat unclear. It was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

5. There are various accounts of the size of Li Hsü-pin's force. Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih III p.13b gives it as 13 ying, which at full strength would be 6,552 men; Hu Ch'ien-fu: Feng-ho shih-lu p.21, gives 12 ying (6,048 men); Hu Lin-i: Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi ch.32 p.2a and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.10 p.14b, both state that Li Hsü-i had 5,000 men at San-ho. But according to Tseng Kuo-fan there were 6,000 casualties (ibid.p.15a), though this figure

includes the Hunan Army losses at T'ung-ch'eng. Kuan Wen (Governor General of Hu-kuang) memorialized that 'at one blow more than a myriad crack troops were lost...' Fang-lüeh ch.209 p.15a. Whatever the actual losses, the defeat of the cream of the Hunan Army, under one of its best officers, ('he commanded like a god', according to Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih III p.13b), was a grave setback for Tseng Kuo-fan. Hu Lin-i spoke of the spirit of the army having been completely destroyed by this blow. See Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo pp.236-244; Lo: Chien-cheng pp.208-210; Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1637-1645.

6. The Hunan Army commander at T'ung-ch'eng was Brigade General Chao K'e-chang, see Fang-lüeh ch.208 p.16b. He set out to the relief of Li Hsü-pin at San-ho, but turned back, presumably on receiving news of the defeat. Relief was then sent to T'ung-ch'eng from the force besieging An-ch'ing, and from Ch'ien-shan, ibid. p.18b.

7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng can hardly have meant that the territory around T'ung-ch'eng was new to him; he had been commander there and had organized the relief of the town in 1857, see page 145 ff, above. He probably meant the territory in the region of Su-sung and T'ai-hu, where the proposed campaign would take place.

8. Although this passage was not altered by Tseng Kuo-fan, the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads, 'Ch'en Yü-ch'eng advanced on T'ung-ch'eng from K'ung-ch'eng.' Lü Chi-i did not correct this error. Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in the margin above this passage, 'The two routes do not tally; why should they have separated and then joined up?' I do not know the answer to this question.

Notes to Page 172.

1. T'ung-ch'eng was taken by the Taipings on 24 November 1858.

2. An-ch'ing had been under siege for about two months, but after the defeat of the Hunan Army at San-ho and T'ung-ch'eng, the Ch'ing commander Tu-hsing-ah was afraid of being taken in the rear, and decided to raise the siege. The government forces under To-lung-ah and Pao Ch'ao withdrew on 27 November to Shih-p'ai and then to Su-sung and T'ai-hu; see Fang-lüeh ch.209 p.1b and Ch'u Chih-fu: Wan-ch'iao chi-shih p.100

3. The sentence in the margin (omitted by Lü Chi-i) was probably meant to be added to the text, so that it would read, 'Counting that of General Hsiang, it was the second relief of the second siege

of the capital.

4. The Taipings came south from T'ung-ch'eng on 27 November (HF8/10/22) through Shih-p'ai, and took Ch'ien-shan and Huang-ni-kang. The Ch'ing garrison at T'ai-hu had already fled. On 30 November the Ch'ing force which had been besieging An-ch'ing arrived at Su-sung and Erh-lang-ho. In preparation for their attack on Su-sung, the Taipings took up positions in the region of Ching-chiao, but were defeated there on 1 December (HF8/10/26) by troops under To-lung-ah. See Fang-lüeh ch.209 pp.28b,29b.

5. This was on 27 November (see note 4 above). Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was senior in rank to Li Hsiu-ch'eng.

6. Erh-lang-ho is 30 li northwest of Su-sung. Pao Ch'ao's army had taken up positions there after withdrawing from the siege of An-ch'ing; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.212

Notes to Page 173.

1. Pao Ch'ao (1828-1886) held the rank of ts'an-chiang (Lieut.-Col.) in the Hunan Army. His force was known as the T'ing-chün (his 字 being 春霆); see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.609-10.

2. 'Tso' is an error for 'To', i.e. To-lung-ah (1817-1864), a Manchu General, ibid. p.609.

3. This Taiping defeat was on 10-11 December (HF8/11/6-7) at Hua-liang-t'ing and Ching-ch'iao, see Fang-lüeh ch.210 pp.11-12.

4. The Taiping New Year was on 8 February 1859 (HF9/1/6).

5. Hsüeh Chih-yuan had been a Nien rebel, and had been given command of Chiang-p'u, which had been incorporated into the new Taiping province of T'ien-p'u (天浦). The mandate of his appointment (undated) in Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's handwriting, is reproduced in Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I p.74; see also TPTK II p.671. In February 1859, Hsüeh Chih-yuan sent a messenger to Chang Kuo-liang offering to surrender, and Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) was sent by Ho Ch'un to accept his allegiance. Thus, on 28 February, P'u-k'ou once more passed into government hands. The Taipings made a desperate effort to save Chiang-p'u, but their attack was beaten off. Hsüeh Chih-yuan changed his name to Hsüeh Ch'eng-liang. In 1860 he turned coat again, but was killed by Li Shih-chung. See Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh in Chien-chi I p.250 & Lo: Chien-cheng pp.213-4.

6. For 上 read 尚 .

7. The Taipings began their attack on the enemy stockades outside the town on 13 March 1859 (HF9/2/9). Two days later, according to Ch'ing reports, some seventy or eighty thousand rebels, including reinforcements from Chiu-fu-chou and from Li Shih-hsien's force south of the Yangtse, attacked in six columns. See Fang-lüeh ch.215 pp.6b,8a.

8. In March 1859 (HF9/2) Te-hsing-ah, Commander of the Chiang-pei H.Q., was cashiered for failure to relieve Liu-ho (see page 168), and Ho Ch'un, who was already commander of the Chiang-nan H.Q. was appointed to the command of that of Chiang-ei as well; see Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh pp.47-8. Chang Kuo-liang was Assistant Commander.

Notes to Page 174.

1. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had taken Liu-an on 8 March; on the 19th and 20th he defeated a force under Li Meng-ch'ün at Kuan-t'ing near Lu-chou; on the 26th, coming from Liang-yuan he attacked Hu-ch'eng, where, on the 29th and on 5 April he defeated Sheng Pao's troops. After this, he set out for the relief of Liang-p'u; see Fang-lüeh ch.216 p.13

2. 15,000 according to Fang-lüeh ch.216 -.26b

3. This is an error. Li Hsiu-ch'eng refers here to Li Jo-chu (李若珠), who is described as t'i-tu (provincial c-in-c) of Kwangsi by Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.48.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng has very much compressed his account of this campaign, which lasted much longer than he implies. There were moreover, two feint attacks on Yang-chou. The sequence of event was as follows:- There was a Taiping attack on Liang-p'u on 15 April, with 'no less than forty or fifty thousand troops,' according to Fang-lüeh ch.216 pp.33b-34a. Between 17 and 27 April, Li Jo-chu and Feng Tzu-ts'ai attacked, and eventually took the Taiping forts at Chiu-fu-chou. On 30 April Ch'en Yü-ch'eng attacked the Ch'ing force east of Liu-ho in order to relieve pressure on the town. Meanwhile, reinforcements under Fu-ming-ah and Chang Yü-liang arrived from Chiang-nan, see Fang-lüeh ch.217 p.29b. On 3 May, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng made the first feint attack on Yang-chou (ibid.ch.218 pp4a,7a), Li Hsiu-ch'eng's reference is to the second one. As a result of this, Chang Yü-liang and Ma Te-chao were sent from Liu-ho to protect Yang-chou. On 13 May Ch'en Yü-ch'eng went northwest to T'ien-ch'ang, and on the 26th, attacked Sheng Pao's H.Q. at Chiu-p'u; but returned

south again on the 27th, after his troops had suffered a defeat at T'ien-ch'ang, and took up positions near Liu-ho at Ling-yen-shan and Pa-fou-ch'iao; see Fang-lüeh ch.219 p.10b, ch.220 p.8b. If this attack on Yang-chou had been intended as a diversion, which one must assume, it was not successful, since the Taipings were once again defeated on 15 June between I-cheng and Liu-ho. After this Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, together with Wei Chih-chün, went again to T'ien-ch'ang and thence to Hsü-i, where on 26 June they once more defeated Sheng Pao and occupied the town. On 2 July Ch'en Yü-ch'eng moved south and attacked Lai-an and Ch'u-chou, which was held by Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou); see Fang-lüeh ch.222 pp.6-8. Ch'u-chou was besieged until 20 August, when Ch'en raised the siege and went to Ho-chou and Ch'üan-chiao. In the meantime, in the north, Wu Ju-hsiao, in co-operation with Nien rebels, occupied Ting-yüan on 17 July and Hsü-i on 25 September. On 16 September, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng fell out with Wei Chih-chün (nothing is known of the details of the quarrel) and Wei crossed the Yangtse to Ch'ih-chou, which he gave over to the government on 22 October. Then Ch'en Yü-ch'eng went north, either by way of An-ch'ing, or else through Ho-chou and Ch'üan-chiao, possibly because his commander in the north, Wu Ju-hsiao, had been wounded on 25 September. (Sheng Pao in fact reported him killed, Fang-lüeh ch.224 pp.14b-15a).

5. For 陽艸 read 揚艸.
Ch'en Yü-ch'eng began the second attack on Yang-chou on 14 October, and this time relief was sent from Liu-ho under Li Jo-chu and Chu Ch'eng-hsien. But on 15 October, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng suddenly turned back and attacked Li Jo-chu's main camp at Hung-shan-yao, near Liu-ho; see Fang-lüeh ch.225 p.4.

6. This sentence was deleted for grammatical reasons. Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably meant that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had deliberately passed close to Li Jo-chu's H.Q., near the east gate of Liu-ho, in order to draw off the Ch'ing troops in the direction of Yang-chou.

7. See note 5, above.

8. The battle at Ling-tzu-k'ou was on 23 October (HF9/9/28). The Taipings defeated the government troops, under Feng Tzu-ts'ai, before they had had time to take up their positions; see Fang-lüeh ch.226 pp.10b-11b.

9. The main Ch'ing losses seem to have been at a later battle, on 1 November, when the Taipings made another attack on the garrison at Hung-shan-yao and killed 3,000. Li Jo-chu got away with his own battalion only, and was later cashiered for not having led his whole force in a break-out; see Fang-lüeh ch.228 p.11. Hsiao Sheng-yuan:

Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.48 records that there were six thousand dead and only three or four thousand survivors, as against five thousand dead and two thousand eight hundred taken prisoner, which was the official figure (Fang-lüeh loc.cit.).

10. Chou T'ien-p'ei was Provincial Commander-in-chief of Hupeh.

11. This battle, to which the previous sentence also refers, lasted from 16-21 November (HF9/10/22-27), during which time the Taipings kept up the pressure on Yang-chou; see Fang-lüeh ch.226 p.27, ch.227 pp.9-10. Chang Kuo-liang came from Chiang-nan on 18 November (ibid. p.5b).

Notes to Page 175.

1. The original reads 中有大江之盈慊 ; the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 中有大江之隔

2. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

3. Chang Kuo-liang engaged a Taiping force under Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Chiang-p'u from 30 November to 16 December with considerable success, and went back to Chiang-nan on 26 December (HF9/12/3); see Fang-lüeh ch.227 pp.23, ch.228 pp.2b,3a,10b.

4. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 楚軍 (the Hunan Army) for 大軍 . Tseng Kuo-fan had gone south in the summer of 1858 in order to organize the defence of Chekiang and Fukien, threatened by the activity of Shih Ta-k'ai in south Kiangsi. By August 1859 however, Kiangsi was entirely free from Taipings, after Shih Ta-k'ai had crossed into Hunan and Yang Fu-ch'ing had been defeated at Ching-te-chen. Tseng Kuo-fan then returned to Hupeh, and in late September, together with Hu Lin-i, drew up a new plan of action for a simultaneous attack on Lu-chou and An-ch'ing by four armies. (i) Tseng Kuo-fan himself would command an army which would advance through Su-sung and Shih-p'ai and attack An-ch'ing. (ii) Another army under Pao Ch'ao and To-lung-ah would advance on T'ung-ch'eng through T'ai-hu and Ch'ien-shan. (iii) A third army, under Hu Lin-i, would make for Shu-ch'eng by way of Ying-shan and Ho-shan. (iv) Li Hsü-i (Li Hsü-pin's brother) would move on Lu-chou by way of Shang-ch'eng and Ku-shih. Tseng Kuo-fan arrived at Huang-mei on 26 November, remained there for eight days, and then moved to Su-sung on 6 December. See Fang-lüeh ch.227 p.37a & Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.1670-1674.

5. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng withdrew from Chiang-p'u on 21 November. By this

time he had already been given the title of Ying Wang; but the exact date of the appointment is not known, see Kuo: Jih-chih pp.624-6

6. This presumably refers to Chang Kuo-liang's activities between 30 November and 16 December; see note 3 above.

7. Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) reported to Sheng Pao that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been taken to the capital (Nanking) in chains, perhaps because his troops were said to have helped Wei Chih-chün in his quarrel with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, during which several thousand Taipings had been killed; see Fang-lüeh ch.224 p.5

8. His appointment as Chung Wang is described in more detail on p.234.

Notes to Page 176.

1. For 上 read 尚.

2. This presumably means merely 'a small escort', since cavalry can hardly have been needed to cross the Yangtse from P'u-k'ou to Nanking.

Notes to Page 177.

1. 'The Sovereign's State minister' refers, I assume, to Hung Jen-kan (1822?-1864). He was a cousin of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and one of his earliest disciples, who did not however, take part in the rising. He was an educated man, but had failed the examinations at Canton. In 1853 he went to Hong Kong, where he became a catechist in the China Inland Mission. It was here that he met the Swedish missionary Theodore Hamberg, whose book is based on what Hung Jen-kan told him at this time. In 1854 Hung failed to get beyond Shanghai in an attempt to join the Taipings at Nanking, and went back to Hong Kong. In 1859 however, he succeeded in reaching the Taiping capital and was very soon given high rank, the title of Kan Wang, and made head of the whole administration, with powers similar to those previously held by Yang Hsiu-ch'ing.

In his deposition, written after his capture in Kiangsi in 1864, Hung Jen-kan wrote: "The Chung Wang three times had discussions with me about strategy, and I said, 'At this time, when the capital is under siege, it will be difficult to make a direct [counter]-attack. It is necessary to make a determined attack on the weakly-defended towns of Hang-chou and Hu-chou in the [enemy] rear, wait until they

draw off forces for a distant campaign, and then turn back and raise the siege. This is certain to succeed.'" See TPTK II pp.851-852. In Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account however, there is no suggestion that the plan was not his own. Lo Erh-kang considers this to be correct, on the grounds that Hsü Yao-kuang, who saw a copy of the Taiping publication Chung Wang hui-i chi-lüeh (not since traced), wrote that the plan was worked out at a military meeting in Wu-hu; see Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an-Che p.594. But this is no proof that the idea was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's, though it is by no means incompatible with his military skill. Indeed, such diversionary tactics had been used in the relief of Liu-ho (see page 175 above). On the other hand, even an unmartial scholar would be familiar with the concept of 'attacking Wei in order to relieve Chao' (圍魏救趙); so the suggestion may have come from Hung Jen-kan even if his exploits as a military commander were undistinguished. Nor was Li Hsiu-ch'eng above stealing Hung Jen-kan's thunder. He was resentful if the latter's rapid rise to overall command, and thought little of him as a planner or as an administrator. He considered his writings as not worth reading, see Appendix I page 263. If ever the lost book containing the record of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's military meetings come to light, we may know much more about this, and many other questions. (For other comments on Hung Jen-kan, see page 233).

2. See note 4 to page 175.

3. Yang Fu-ch'ing had taken Ching-te-chen in October 1858 and lost it the following year on 13 July (HF9/6/14). In the winter of 1859 he was attacking Ch'ih-chou, which Wei Chih-chün had given over to the government. He recovered it on 24 December.
For 英家會 read 殷家滙. For this place and Tung-liu, see Map V.

4. For 南寧 read 南陵, Nan-ling, in Anhwei.

5. By this time Nanking was almost surrounded. Ho Ch'un's emplacements stretched from Shang-yuan-men, north of the city, to San-ch'a-ho on the northwest side, a distance of 130 or 140 li (about 45 miles). There were 130 stockades of various sizes along the moat, and about 40,000 troops; see Fang-lüeh ch.195 p.5

6. Deleted for grammatical reasons, and omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

7. Huang Tzu-lung. later the Ch'ao Wang, was captured and executed at the fall of Wu-hsi in 1863. Ch'en Ts'an-ming was primarily an administrator; nothing more seems to be known of him. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.216.

8. The Taiping forts at Chiu-fu-chou were taken by Chang Kuo-liang on 31 January 1860 (HF10/1/9). Li Hsiu-ch'eng must therefore

have left P'u-k'ou on 5 or 6 January.

Notes to Page 178.

1. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads: '不計何軍將官與我...' But there is no great significance in the change.

2. He was the son of the Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, who was killed at Ch'ang-sha (see page 137). In 1860 he was only 12 or 14 years old, see Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.118, quoting an eye-witness. His power seems to have come from his position as chi-tsou-kuan (賫奏官), in which he was responsible not only for the forwarding of memorials, but also for deciding whether they should be presented or not. He also seems to have had an important ceremonial function (ibid.); he was responsible for the transmission of the T'ien Wang's orders (see below, page 222). I do not know to what extent he was merely a figure-head. See Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.47,256; Lo: Chien-cheng p.219; Yu T'ien Wang Chao in Shih-liao pp.118-120. (Hake's information came from a letter to the Editor of the North China Herald from the missionary J.L.Holmes, published on 1 September 1860 and reproduced in B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, pp.137-144, Inclosure 5 in No.72.)

3. Chung Wan-hsin (or hsing), the Chin Wang, was little more than 20 years of age in 1864, Huang Tung-liang, the K'ai Wang, was still a child. See Lo: Chien-cheng pp.220-1

4. For 故 read 過 .

5. See Map IV.

Notes to Page 179.

1. Kuang-te was taken by the Taipings on 24 February 1860 (HF10/2/3).

2. In fact the troops at Ssu-an were under Chou T'ien-shou, an officer under Li Ting-t'ai (Brigade General of Hang-chou) who was later demoted for having failed to defend Hang-chou; see Fang-lüeh ch.232 pp.3a,4b, 5.

3. Ssu-an, in Ch'ang-hsing-hsien, was taken by the Taipings on 3 March 1860 (HF10/2/11),see Fang-lüeh ch.232 p.14. Ch'ang-hsing was taken

on the same day.

4. For 紅心 read 虹星橋 (Hung-hsing-ch'iao). See Map IV.

5. Li Shih-hsien was made Shih Wang sometime early in 1860. Chien Yu-wen suggests that Li Hsiu-ch'eng joined up with Li Shih-hsien before, not after, the capture of Ssu-an, see Ch'üan-shih III.p.1721.

6. Hu-chou is now called Wu-hsing (吳興).

7. Wu-k'ang was occupied by the Taipings on 9 March (HF10/2/17). On the same day they engaged a force of 400 'braves' under the Provincial Judge Tuan Kuang-ch'ing at Yü-hang. This detachment had been sent from Hang-chou to hold up the Taiping advance. But the Taipings engaged the 'braves' with part of their force, and sent another part to march on Hang-chou by small paths. See Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che p.571 and Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi in Chien-chi IV p.7

8. For Taiping numbers in this operation, see below, note 10. This was a surprise attack and Hang-chou was ill-prepared. There were only four ying, with about 2,000 men, and about 820 'braves' in the city. Outside there were 1,000 troops and 1,000 newly-enlisted 'braves' together with the 400 'braves' under Tuan Kuang-ch'ing. Hung Jen-kan in his deposition (TPTK II p.852), implies that the intention was to get into the city by stealth, wearing Ch'ing uniforms; but because some of the Taipings stole horses and gave the game away, they were prevented from entering Hang-chou. Several accounts agree that the Taipings took advantage of the fact that it was the birthday of the Buddha, and there were many pilgrims at T'ien-chu, outside the city. This, and the presence of numerous refugees in the region, enabled the Taipings to get close to the city without being detected. They probably intended to get in at nightfall, but were discovered, and the gates closed. See Li Tz'u-ming: Yüeh-man-t'ang jih-chi pu Shanghai 1936 VII Keng-chi p.33b (HF10/3/13) and Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che p.571.

9. According to this, the attack on the city did not begin until 16 March. This seems to be correct. There is no record of any fighting before the 17th, though the suburbs of Hang-chou were burned both by the Taipings and by the defenders as early as 11 March. On 13 March the Taipings employed a ruse in order to give an impression of great numbers and perhaps get the enemy to waste ammunition; they took wooden images from temples, dressed them up in Taiping uniforms, and positioned them on hills round the city, in stockades, with banners flying. See Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.8 and Mou Te-fen: Keng Shen Che-pien chi, quoted in Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1725. On 17 March the Taipings fortified positions on the side of West Lake, near the city. Tuan Kuang-ch'ing, who had returned from Yü-hang on

12 March, attacked the Taipings and was defeated. A relief force under Mi Hsing-chao, which arrived on the same day, fled on seeing the enemy. In the meantime, with gongs and drums to cover the sound, the Taipings were mining the wall at the Ch'ing-p'o Gate. The explosion took place in the early morning of 19 March (HF10/2/27) and the city was breached. On entering the Taipings were joined by some of the 'braves' who had acted as a 'fifth column' by spreading alarm and despondency. They identified themselves to the Taipings by binding round their heads red cloths which they had previously concealed in their garments. Apart from the Manchu garrison, all other troops fled. See Fang-lüeh ch.233 p.2, Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che pp.571-574, and Anon: Tung-nan chi-lüeh in TPTK V pp.231-238

10. The march on Hang-chou, according to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, was made with six or seven thousand men, and the actual capture by the vanguard of about 1,250. This figure is born out to some extent by a contemporary record, which states that on 10 March (HF10/2/18) there were only a few hundred Taipings outside the city, and on the following two days, though the number increased, there were still no more than a thousand; see Fang Chün-hsi: Chuan-hsi yü-sheng chi in TPTK IV p.515. On the other hand, the fact that the Taipings established 'more than ten stockades' near West Lake on 17 March, seems to point to the arrival of a larger force. Possibly their intervention was not needed to take the city. The Taipings were certainly aware of the weakness of the garrison, since for some time they had a spy in Hang-chou called Wang Tao-p'ing, disguised as a fortune-teller (ibid.p.571). See also Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.8

11. The Tartar General was Jui Ch'ang; he was obliged by his superiors to limit his activities to the defence of the Manchu garrison, according to Fang Chün-hsi: Chuan-hsi yü-sheng chi p.517. In this case, and since they did not intend to hold Hang-chou, the Taipings attack on the inner garrison must have been fairly half-hearted.

Notes to Page 180.

1. In response to urgent appeals from the Governor of Chekiang, the court ordered Ho Ch'un to send relief to Hang-chou. He seems to have been quite aware that the Taipings hoped to divide his forces and raise the siege of Nanking, since he wrote to this effect in a memorial late in March, which reached Peking on 5 April, see Fang-lüeh ch.233 p.13a. But it was one thing to understand the enemy's general intent and another matter to foresee exactly how it would be carried out. The Governor of Chekiang does not seem to have got wind of the coming

attack on Hang-chou until after the Taipings had taken Ssu-an on 3 March; it was after this that within the space of 5 days he sent off two appeals to Peking for relief to be sent. But at the same time Ho Kuei-ch'ing (Governor General of Liang-chiang) was also sending urgent messages to Ho Ch'un, and it was impossible to ignore the Taiping threat to Su-chou. Consequently, by about 12 March, Ho Ch'un had sent out more than 10,000 troops from the Chiang-nan H.Q. (Ho Kuei-ch'ing in a memorial gave the figure as 13,000, see Fang-lüeh ch.232 p.19a). Troops were withdrawn from Chiang-p'u and Yang-chou, and sent to I-hsing, Kao-ch'un and Tung-pa. Althought Ho Ch'un had been ordered, implicitly, to send relief to Hang-chou by routes west of T'ai Hu (which might have helped to frustrate the Taiping plan), the threat to Su-chou and the appeals of Ho Kuei-ch'ing made him recall Chang Yü-liang from Liu-ho, and send him with 2,000 or 2,500 men from Chiang-nan to Ch'ang-chou and Su-chou on 10 March. See Hsien Feng tung-hua hsü-lu ch.90 pp.41a,42a,45; Fang-lüeh ch.232 pp.2a,16a, 17a; Anon: Tung-nan chi-lüeh p.232 and Lo: Chien-cheng p.222-3

2. 兩家會話 in the original. The sense is not entirely clear, since Li Hsiu-ch'eng sometimes used such phrases as 答話 to mean 'to give battle', see page 29 of the manuscript, line 11, for instance.

3. According to Hsü Yao-kuang, the advance guard of Chang Yü-liang's army arrived at P'ing-wang, near the Kiangsu-Chekiang border, on 14 March; but instead of pressing on to Hang-chou, the commander was persuaded to encamp and defend Chia-hsing. Chang Yü-liang himself arrived at Su-chou on 16 March, and was similarly persuaded by the Provincial Treasurer, who had a personal interest, to go to the relief of Hu-chou and not bother with Hang-chou. That Chang Yü-liang came at all to Hang-chou was due to the efforts of the Chekiang Grain Intendant who, with considerable difficulty, persuaded Chang to come by boat with a small force of 600 on 22 March; see Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che pp.572-3. Chang Yü-liang then sent a disguised messenger into the city to make contact with the Tartar General, and the relieving force entered Hang-chou on 24 March, after a small skirmish in which 18 Taipings were killed. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.51 and Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.7.

The 'device for withdrawing with insufficient troops' was used, though the need was less obvious, at Shanghai in 1860. "...some gentlemen...discovered that the rebel host was represented by a few straw-stuffed figures." J.W.Maclellan: The Story of Shanghai, From the Opening of the Port to Foreign Trade. Shanghai 1889 p.49. See also Hsüeh Huan's memorial, translated in B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860 p.202.

4. 九齣. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan was the ninth child.

5. This passage was omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

6. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force arrived at Kuang-te on 4 April (HF10/3/14)

Notes to Page 181.

1. Tseng Kuo-fan added two characters (張 & 後) to replace those which he deleted in this sentence, making it read,'Chang's troops later took the property of the people of Hang-chou...'

2. In fact Chang Yü-liang did not attempt to get back to the Chiang-nan H.Q. Three different officials strove for his services: Ho Ch'un wanted him back, the Tartar General of Hang-chou wanted to keep him, and Ho Kuei-ch'ing anxious to have his help in defending Ch'ang-chou. See Fang-lüeh ch.233 pp.24b-25a; ch.235 p.39a, and Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.138-9. ChangYü-liang's own desire, if his subsequent actions may be taken as evidence, was to remain in the region of Hang-chou, where he later built a house, while his army engaged in looting. See Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.24 and Fang-lüeh ch.235 p.23.

3. Yang Fu-ch'ing came from Ch'ih-chou (see note 3 to page 177) to Ning-kuo on 22 March (HF10/3/1) and took Hung-lin-ch'iao near Ning-kuo on 5 April.

4. Liu Kuang-fang, Lai Wen-hung and Ku Lung-hsien were already in southern Anhwei and had occupied Nan-ling on 15 January; they occupied Hsüan-te on 20 February and attacked Hui-chou on the 28th.

5. Li Shih-hsien had been left attacking Hu-chou when Li Hsiu-ch'eng marched on Hang-chou. He raised the siege on 3 April to come to Chien-p'ing.

6. Chien-p'ing (now Lang-chi) in Anhwei, was an important town controlling communications between Anhwei and Kiangsu. In spite of this, Ho Ch'un, Ho Kuei-ch'ing and Chang Fei (in charge of military affairs in Southern Anhwei) shifted the responsibility for defending it on to each other, with the result that no troops were sent to reinforce the garrison; see Anon: Tung-nan chi-lüeh p.232. The town was taken on 8 April (HF10/3/18), (or on 11 April, according to Fang-lüeh ch. 235 p.4a).

7. Ssu-ming-shan is in eastern Chekiang, south of the town of Ssu-ming. I know of no account of a military meeting there.

8. This sentence is omitted in Lü's copy.

9. The attack was, broadly speaking, in three column. Yang Fu-ch'ing's force was the centre column, which advanced north from Kao-ch'un, taking Tung-pa on 12 April (HF10/3/22) - a force of 3,000 sent by Ho Ch'un did not arrive in time, a similar force sent to Kao-ch'un fled without fighting; see Fang-lüeh ch.235 pp.4b, 12a; Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.51.

10. The eastern column divided into two, of which Li Shih-hsien commanded the right wing. He took Li-yang on 13 April (HF10/3/23). The town was only defended by 800 troops and relief did not arrive in time; see Fang-lüeh ch.234 p.24b, ch.235 pp.4b, 12a. Liu Kuan-fang, commanding the right wing of the centre column, accompanied Li Shih-hsien as far as Li-yang.

11. Li-shui was taken on 18 April (HF10/3/28) and Mo-ling-kuan on 23 April (HF10/3 intercalary/3).

12. After taking Li-yang, Li Shih-hsien attacked I-hsing on 15 April, and then moved on Ch'ang-chou with three or four thousand men in order to prevent relief from south Kiangsu from reaching the Chiang-nan H.Q. Ch'ang-chou was weakly defended at the time, but it was presumably not the intention of the Taipings to take it. Later, reinforcements were sent in; see Fang-lüeh ch.235 pp.17a,28b. On 17 April Li Shih-hsien attacked Chin-t'an, to which reinforcements were despatched from north of the Yangtse, The Taipings withdrew from Chin-t'an on 22 April and moved on Chü-jung, to which reinforcements had been sent from the Chiang-nan H.Q.; but these troops did not even man the walls or take up defensive positions. They billeted in private houses outside the town and fled when the Taipings arrived on 23 April. See Fang-Lüeh ch.236 p.4 and Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.52.

13. Ch'ih-sha-shan is probably Ch'ih-shan, between Li-yang and Chü-jung; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.226. Hsiung-huang-chen, according to Lo Erh-kang, is the popular name for Ch'un-hua-chen, west of Chü-jung, 20 li from Nanking. Li Hsiu-ch'eng arrived here on 27 April.

14. Li Shih-hsien arrived on 27 April, direct from Chü-jung.

15. The Ch'ing commander at Hsiung-huang-chen was Chang Wei-pang. He had a nominal force of 3,000, but in fact there were only 1,000 men. They did not fortify positions, but fled at the approach of the Taipings on 27 April; see Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.53.

16. Yang Fu-ch'ing had not yet been made Fu Wang; the title was given

to him as a reward for his part in this campaign. He reached Mo-ling-kuan on 23 April and Yü-hua-t'ai, outside the south gate, on 29 April.

Notes to Page 182.

1. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng left An-ch'ing early in March 1860, passed through Lu-chou and Ch'üan-chiao, and attacked Ch'u-chou, which was held by Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) on 6 March. Captured Taipings reported that it was Ch'en's intention to attack the Ch'ing forces on Chiu-fu-chou; see Fang-lüeh ch.234 p.18b. If this is so, his failure to take Ch'u-chou and Ch'üan-chiao may have made him decide to come south of the Yangtse on 29 April. Perhaps this is why Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that Ch'en had come 'without prior arrangement' (page 182). One contemporary record says that Ch'en Yü-ch'eng crossed at Chiang-p'u (see Li Kuei: Ssu-t'ung chi in TPTK IV p.468); but Fang-lüeh ch.235 p.13b confirms Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version.

2. For 雍化門 read 堯化門 .

3. Ch'ing official reports call the place 紅山 , see Fang-lüeh ch. 235 p.31a; but Lo: Chien-cheng p.226 gives 洪山 .

4. The Chiang-nan troops were receiving a month's pay and rations every 45 days, see Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.257.

5. More than 100,000, according to Ho Ch'un, see Fang-lüeh ch.236 p.20b.

6. The final battle began on 2 May (HF10/3 intercalary/12) when the three columns (that of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng being the western column) reached Nanking. It continued day and night until 5 May, when the Ch'ing siege line was broken at the southwest corner of the city. Late the same night the Ch'ing stockades near the main camp were taken. With great difficulty Ho Ch'un was persuaded to get out of bed, and he withdrew to Chen-chiang in pouring rain. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.55. Relief of Nanking was completed when the Ch'ing gunboats withdrew from Chiu-fu-chou and communications were restored with the north bank of the Yangtse. See Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to Chang Lo-hsing in TPTK II pp.721-2.

7. It is hard to see how this can be called more than the fifth relief of Nanking, at the most. The first, 1856 (see page 157); the second, 1858 (see page 172); the third, 1859 (see page 173), though this was no more than the temporary re-opening of communications; the fourth,

1859, the 'partial relief' (see page 175).

8. Several contemporary sources confirm this; see, for instance, note 1 to page 186. See also Chapter IV page 43 for the result of this destruction of the Chiang-nan H.Q.

Notes to Page 183.

1. The character 不 is missing in this sentence.

2. For 忽 read 厓 .

3. For 練 read 諫 .

4. For 奇 read 騎 .

5. For 輩 read 背 .

6. For 承 read 丞 .

Notes to Page 184.

1. Hung Jen-kan, in his deposition (TPTK p.852) stated that after the victory, congratulations were offered at court, presumably by himself and the generals who took part; after which there was a discussion on future campaigns.

2. 自言升平之旬 in the original. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads 自言升平之局. Lü Chi-i assumed that 言 was a mistake for 然, since Li Hsiu-ch'eng commonly confused there characters, the pronunciation of which is very close in Kwangsi dialect. It is possible that Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended to write 自認升平之局.

3. For 上 read 尚 .

4. According to Hung Jen-kan, during the discussion on 11 May, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng proposed a campaign for the relief of An-ch'ing; Li Shih-hsien wanted to move into Fukien and Chekiang, and only Li Hsiu-Ch'eng agreed with Hung Jen-kan's own plan, which was to take advantage of their recent successes to press on towards Su-chou, Hang-chou and Shanghai. After securing their rear in this way, they were to purchase about 20 steamers and advance up-river, sending an

army into Kiangsi and another into Hupeh, thus clearing the areas on both sides of the Yangtse. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in TPTK II p.852.

5. The Taipings arrived at Tan-yang in the evening of 18 May (HF10/ 3 intercalary/28). Ch'en Yü-ch'eng in his deposition implied that he went on this expedition as far as Tan-yang, see Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi p.201. The vanguard was commanded by Liu Ts'ang-lin, a subordinate of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 p.18a.

6. Ho Ch'un went with 3,000 men to Tan-yang on 11 May to support a force under Hsiung T'ien-hsi, which had returned from Chekiang. Chang Kuo-liang had arrived on 24 May in response to Ho Ch'un's call, with some 13,000 men; but little preparation was made for the defence of the town. Morale in the Chiang-nan army was at a dangerously low ebb, partly because the troops had not been paid for some time, and partly because of the unpopularity of the Brigade General Wang Chün. It was openly said amongst the soldiers that unless they were paid and unless Wang Chün were dismissed they would refuse to fight; but Ho Ch'un refused even to post him elsewhere. As for pay, though some money was available, the Treasurer refused to distribute it until the records were straight and new registers had been drawn up, the old ones having been destroyed when the H.Q. fell. When payment was finally made, after a delay of ten days, each man only got 4 liang, and even this was called a loan. There was considerable resentment, since 4 liang was not even a month's pay, and they were in arrears of several months. When battle was joined on 19 May, the Ch'ing troops at first refused to open fire. The Taipings did not advance, presumably because they suspected a trap. This situation lasted for about two hours, and then the Taipings attacked the Ch'ing stockades at the east gate, after which the whole Ch'ing force fell into disorder and fled, its commander to Ch'ang-chou. Tan-yang then fell to the Taipings. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh pp.56-7; Ho Ch'un's official report is in Fang-lüeh ch.238 pp.12b-16a.

7. This is confirmed by Ho Ch'un (Fang-lüeh ch.238 p.14b) and by Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.258. Later there were rumours that he had been killed by Ho Ch'un, who was jealous of his achievements. Chien Yu-wen believes that Chang committed suicide as a result of his defeats and because of bad relations with his commander; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1749-1750.

8. This was written between the lines without any attempt to fit it into the text.

Notes to Page 185.

1. This sentence is omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

2. Now Wu-chin (武進). The Taiping attack on Ch'ang-chou began on 22 May (HF10/4/2).

3. Chang Yü-liang had reached Ch'ang-chou from Hang-chou on 24 April. Ho Ch'un ordered him to the relief of the Chiang-nan H.Q., but Ho Kuei-ch'ing kept him in Ch'ang-chou; see Li Pin: Chung-hsing pieh-lu ch.47 p.2a.

4. Ho Ch'un and Ma Te-chao withdrew on 22 May, Chang Yü-liang on the 24th, after some of his troops outside the town had changed sides. Three thousand Ch'ing troops were killed. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh p.58; Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.259 and Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.141.

5. There was some stout resistance from the citizens and a small force of 300 'braves'. On 25 May the Taipings made a 'sweetly worded' offer of 200,000 liang of silver if the town would surrender, in which case the Taipings promised to by-pass the town without attacking. If however, the town was not willing to change its allegiance, those who wished could leave by the east gate. The offer was not accepted; but relief did not arrive. When the defenders heard no sound of battle outside the town, they realized that the last Ch'ing troops had fled. Ch'ang-chou was then taken after some street fighting, on 26 Lay 1860 (HF10/4/6). See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.154, Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.259.

6. A British missionary commented that when towns in the southeast were taken by the Taipings '...more lives are lost by suicide than by the sword.' Report of the Rev. Griffith John to the Rev. Dr. Tidman, August 16, 1860, quoted in Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.292.

7. The Taipings attacked Wu-hsi on 29 May 1860 (HF10/4/9).

8. In fact Ho Kuei-ch'ing had bolted from Ch'ang-chou, not Wu-hsi on 20 May, on the pretext that it was necessary for him to hurry back and organize the defence of Su-chou. When the people of Ch'ang-chou heard of his intention to leave, several thousand people assembled to beg him to remain. When they refused to move out of the way, Ho Kuei-ch'ing ordered his guards to fire, and several kneeling citizens were killed. He was followed in flight by more than 1,000 'disorderly soldiers'. He reached Wu-hsi by boat, but refused to stay there. When he reached Su-chou, the Governor of Kiangsu, Hsü Yu-jen, declined to open the gates to him, perhaps because of his predatory retinue, and he was obliged to take refuge at Ch'ang-shu and later at Shanghai. He was subsequently tried and

executed for his failure to hold the Ch'ang-chou - Su-chou region against the Taipings. See Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.259; Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.141; Shih Chien-lieh & Liu Chi-tseng: Chi (Wu-hsi) hsien-ch'eng shih-shou k'e-fu pen-mo p.250; Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1776-1781, and Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.620.

9. Chang Yü-liang arrived on 27 May (or 25 May, according to Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.260).

10. The Ch'ing commander at I-hsing was the tsung-ping Liu Chi-san.

11. This should be Hui-shan (惠山), see Lo: Chien-cheng p.235

Notes to Page 186.

1. On 30 May 1860 (HF10/4/10). In Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh pp.260-261, there is an interesting account of the Taiping capture of Wu-hsi. On 24 May there was no market, and shopkeepers did no business. The only trading was by soldiers, selling what they had stolen. On the following day there was widespread looting and burning by disbanded soldiers and local bandits. A certain Captain Chiang tried to stop these disorders, but was unable to, even after going round the town killing looters at sight, until his clothes were red with blood. Though Ma Te-chao tried to assemble some of the scattered troops with a promise of immediate pay, no one responded. Ma was left holding the town while Chang Yü-liang and other commanders took up positions outside. According to this account, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force arrived on 26 May, but were beaten off at Kao-ch'iao by troops under Tseng Ping-chung. On the following day the Taipings constructed three pontoon bridges, which enabled them to get into the rear of the Ch'ing force at Kao-ch'iao; but again they were defeated. On 28 May the Taipings crossed Hui-shan and made a direct attack on the west and south gates. Chang Yü-liang and the other commanders withdrew as soon as the west gate was taken, and by noon the town was in Taiping hands. About 100 of the defenders failed to get away in time; half of them were killed by the Taipings, the remainder escaped over the wall but were killed by peasants in a nearby village. (Peasants at Ch'ang-chou had taken similar vengeance on government troops at Ch'ang-chou, according to Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.141). The Taiping advance-guard galloped through the streets of Ch'ang-chou from east to west and from north to south, without killing anyone, and then went off in the direction of Su-chou. The Taiping troops who followed were less orderly; nevertheless, people began to return to the town on the grounds that 'if the rebels did not take their property, the soldiers would.' See Shih Chien-

lieh & Liu Chi-tseng: Chi (Wu-hsi) hsien-ch'eng shih-shou k'e-fu pen-mo for another account of the fall of Wu-hsi.

2. "The false Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng made proclamations for the pacification of the people, and strictly prohibited disorderly acts by the long-haired rebels [Taipings]; several bandits were executed and their heads displayed at the town gates, so that the local people who had fled were keen to return home. Cunning people in the villages started talking of presenting tribute..." See Hua I-lun: Hsi Chin t'uan-lien shih-mo in Tzu-liao p.121.

3. For 許庶関 read 澉墅関, Hu-shu-kuan, see Map VI; about 30 li from Su-chou, and an important customs barrier. Ho Ch'un 'went alone' presumably because his troops gradually dispersed, see Fang-lüeh ch.238 p.1b.

4. Apart for the Governor of Kiangsu's memorial (Fang-lüeh ch.238 p.20) and another account (quoted by Lo Erh-kang), most other versions agree that Ho Ch'un committed suicide, but disagree as to the means he employed. One may chose between hanging, shooting 'with a foreign pistol' and poisoning with a mixture of alcohol and opium; see Lo: Chien-cheng pp.235-6.

5. The Taipings arrived before Su-chou on 1 June 1860.

6. The people of the Ch'ang-men suburb, and perhaps to a lesser extent of the Hsü-men suburb also, suffered particularly because for several days before the appearance of the Taipings, shops and other buildings had been burned on the orders of the Governor, so that they could not be used as cover for an assault on the city. There was, of course, looting at the same time. According to one source 'several myriad' shops were destroyed. See Yao Chi: Hsiao ts'ang-sang chi I in TPTK VI p.445, and P'an Chung-jui: Su-t'ai mi-lu chi in TPTK V p.271. Contemporary records of the depredations of government troops are extensively quoted in Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1758-1760.

7. This sentence was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

8. According to Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.261, the Taiping army in this operation numbered over 100,000, the garrison at Su-chou less than 4,000.

9. Chang Yü-liang's troops entered Su-chou on 1 June (or 31 May, according to Wu Ta-cheng: Wu Ch'ing-ching t'ai-shih jih-chi in TPTK V p.329). During his retreat from Ch'ang-chou, Chang Yü-liang had collected a following of dispersed soldiers, amongst whom there were Taipings in disguise. On arrival at Su-chou he ordered that only his personal troops be allowed into the city, but in fact, several

times the permitted number entered, including the Taiping 'fifth column'. See P'an Chung-jui: Su-t'ai mi-lu chi pp.271-2. Another account has it that the Taiping agents had been in the city for several months, see Feng Shih: Hua-ch'i jih-chi in TPTK VI p.661.

10. Wu Ta-cheng saw local people killing government soldiers outside Su-chou on 2 June, see Wu Ch'ing-ching t'ai-shih jih-chi p.330.

Notes to Page 187.

1. Li Wen-ping, from Chia-ying, Kwangtung, had joined Liu Li-ch'uan's 'Small Dagger' (小刀會) Rising in Shanghai in 1853, but had later surrendered to the government and had bought the office of Candidate Circuit Intendant in Su-chou. When the city was threatened by the Taipings, he was given command of some Kwangtung 'braves'. He opened the Ch'ang Gate to the Taipings on 2 June, enabling them to take Su-chou without fighting. For this service he was rewarded with high office. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1771-3. Ho Hsin-i was a candidate prefect, according to Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh; of Chou Wu nothing seems to be known.

At the time there was a rumour that Chang Yü-liang himself had come to terms with the Taipings. Chao Lieh-wen heard that Chang had agreed to give up Su-chou. Later, in that city, a Taiping remarked to someone, "Your Big Chang [i.e. Chang Kuo-liang] is dead, and there remains only Little Chang [Yü-liang], who is our man. Who is there left to fight us?" See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.147-8.

2. Omitted in Lü's copy.

3. Chang Yü-liang arrived at Hang-chou on 3 June. Ho Kuei-ch'ing and Wang Yu-ling (Governor of Chekiang) reported: "Outside Hang-chou there are twenty or thirty thousand dispersed troops from Su-chou; there is no means of knowing whether there are not spies amongst them." See Fang-lüeh ch.240 p.24b. This may have been one of the reasons, or at least the official excuse, for not letting Chang Yü-liang into the city. The 'two commanders' to which Li Hsiu-ch'eng referred were presumable Wang Yu-ling (the Governor) and Jui-ch'ang, the Tartar General.

4. After the final defeat of the Chiang-nan H.Q., the death of Ho Ch'un and the disgrace of Ho Kuei-ch'ing, Tseng Kuo-fan was appointed on 7 June (HF10/4/18) Governor General of Liang-chiang. He was ordered to hasten to the relief of the southeast; if he was not able to penetrate the territory, he was to bestride the Yangtse and prevent the rebels from advancing northwards. See Hsien Feng tung-hua

hsü-lu ch.92 p.13b. Chang Yü-liang was appointed Imperial Commissioner for the Military Affairs of Chiang-nan in place of Ho Ch'un. When the news of the fall of Su-chou reached Peking, Chang Yü-liang was also dismissed and Jui Ch'ang was given his command. All this time, Tseng Kuo-fan was repeatedly urged to advance on Su-chou by way of Ning-kuo, Kuang-te and Chien-p'ing. This was contrary to his belief that nothing should be done which would hinder the siege of An-ch'ing, the key to his strategic plan for the defeat of the rebellion. To placate the court, he felt obliged to move his H.Q. south of the Yangtse, and he informed Peking that he would advance into the south-east in three column. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.11 p.14b and Tai I: Chung-kuo chin-tai shih-kao I, Peking 1958 p.370.

5. For 上 read 尚 .

6. For 擇 read 澤 .

7. Elsewhere Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave the figure as twenty or thirty thousand, see Li Hsiu-ch'eng's communication addressed to the British 'Plenipotentiary' at Shanghai, quoted in Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1794.

8. The Governor of Kiangsu however, jumped into the water with his seal of office and was drowned. Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave him a proper burial, and said he was 'a loyal official.' See Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yü hui-lu p.160.

9. Lü Chi-i read the character 帑 in this sentence as 參 , Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao III p.1355, as 貪 . The sense however is more or less the same.

10. Tseng Kuo-fan's deletions in this section are rather confusing. First he deleted some parts and then crossed out the deletion marks; some parts deleted by him were nevertheless included in the printed edition. No particular signifiance need be attached to this.

11. The texts of three such proclamations made in Su-chou survive. See Wu Ta-cheng: Wu Ch'ing-ching t'ai-shih jih-chi pp.336,337 and TPTK II pp.723,724.

Notes to Page 188.

1. Wu Ta-cheng: Wu Ch'ing-ching t'ai-shih jih-chi p.333 confirms this.

2. Yuan-ho, Wu-hsien and Ch'ang-chou (長洲) are hsien in Su-chou Prefecture.

3. This something of an exaggeration. In some regions near Su-chou the militia (t'uan-lien) made a show of submission to the Taipings, but secretly conserved their organization and even increased their strength. This was particularly true at Yung-ch'ang, Wu-hsi and Chin-kuei, where clandestine anti-Taiping activity continued. The preservation of militia groups was of assistance to the government forces in their reconquest of the region in 1863-4.

4. Chia-hsing was taken, with inside aid and by Taipings disguised as refugees and disbanded Ch'ing soldiers, on 15 June (HF10/4/26); see Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.13 and Feng Shih: Hua-ch'i jih-chi p.662. (Jui Ch'ang and Wang Yu-ling in a memorial gave the date as 14 June, see Fang-lüeh ch.243 p.9a.)

5. Between the Taipings occupation of Chia-hsing and Chang Yü-liang's attack on that town, the rebels captured several other towns in the southeast: on 15 June, K'un-shan and Yang-shan; on 17 June T'ai-ts'ang and on 22 June Chia-ting (both given up on 26 June); on 30 June, Ch'ing-p'u; on 1 July Sung-chiang and on 4 July, Chiang-yin.

6. Chang Yü-liang began his attack on Chia-hsing on 5 July.

7. T'ien-i was one of the six ranks of nobility, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.237-244.

8. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads '西南兩門' (the west and south gates). The character 嘉 in the original may be an error for 西. Chang Yü-liang did attack the small west gate of Chia-hsing, and even broke in, but seems to have fallen into a Taiping trap, who, before withdrawing from the town by another gate, scattered a great deal of desirable property on the ground; the collection of it ruined the discipline of Chang's force. Later, on 26 August, Chang Yü-liang one more broke down part of the town wall, but was prevented from advancing by a sudden rain-storm. Chang Yü-liang wanted to commit suicide, while Ch'en Ping-wen said, 'Heaven is on our side.' See Feng Shih: Hua-ch'i jih-chi pp.665-6.

9. Hsüeh Huan (1815-1880) was Governor of Kiangsu after the death of Hsü Yu-jen (1860), until 1862.
According to H.B.Morse: International Relations of the Chinese Empire Shanghai. 1910 p.591, the Shanghai tao-t'ai Wu Hsü called on the British and French consuls on 23 May 'to request officially that the allied ofrces should undertake the protection of Shanghai against the Taiping rebels, who had then captured Changchow [Ch'ang-chou]'. In fact Ch'ang-chou did not fall until 26 May. Moreover, letters written to Hsüeh Huan by Wang Yu-ling (Governor of Chekiang) on 25 May, just before the Taiping capture of Ch'ang-chou, which reached Hsüeh on 27 May (just after the fall of Wu-hsi), suggest that Wu Hsü did not

merely ask the foreigners to protect Shanghai, but also asked for assistance in defending Ch'ang-chou and Su-chou. See Ching Wu & Chung Ting (eds.): Wu Hsü tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi, Peking 1858 pp.44-45.

Su-chou gentry had been agitating for such an appeal to be made for some time; but Hsüeh Huan had resisted the suggestion for traditional reasons: the danger of inviting foreigners into the country and so on (ibid.pp.46-7). The answer which Wu Hsü sent back to Hsüeh Huan was that the consuls considered that the question of helping in the defence of Su-chou could only be discussed face-to-face with Ho Kuei-ch'ing, who was both Governor General of Liang-chiang and Commissioner for the Affairs of Various Nations. Ho Kuei-ch'ing accordingly went to Shanghai and on 9 June, after the fall of Su-chou, had a conference with Frederick Bruce 'to attempt an accomodation of our differences with the Imperial Government; and to move us to apply our force to the pacification of this province, in the welfare of which we had a commercial interest, ...' (B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, Memorandum of a Conference between Mr. Bruce and Commissioner Ho, pp.68-9.) Later Ho Kuei-ch'ing saw a representative of the French consul, but neither from the British or the French did he receive any satisfaction. According to Ho Kuei-ch'ing's new personal secretary Hsiao Sheng-yuan, the answer which the consuls gave was, that 'if the Emperor would agree to the fifty-odd treaty clauses, [embodied eventually in the Tientsin Treaty,-C.A.C] they would be only too willing to bring back immediately the steamers which had been sent to Tientsin, first re-capture Su-chou and then attack Chin-ling [Nanking] in order to obliterate the rebellion and restore the boundaries of the Empire.' When Ho Kuei-ch'ing memorialized to this effect, the Emperor's Vermilion Rescript was, 'A lot of fraudulent connivance! Not to be permitted!' See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yüeh-fei chi-lüeh pp.58-59. In Ho Kuei-ch'ing's memorial however, there is no suggestion of an ultimatum of this kind, or that the foreigners had agreed to help in the suppression of the rebellion on these terms; see Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo, Peiping 1937, ch.52 pp.13a-17b. There is no mention in Bruce's memorandum, quoted above, that he said anything about bringing foreign troops back from the north; but he did suggest that the Chinese should come to terms at once, which would enable them to bring Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and his troops south to suppress the rebellion. At this Ho Kuei-ch'ing begged Bruce not to 'joke or trifle'.

Two months after the fall of Su-chou, Shanghai itself was threatened, and on 26 May, Bruce and Bourboulon notified the Taipings of their intention to defend Shanghai 'as a purely military measure, since the port served as an intermediate base for the troops in the north, and disclaiming any political motives'; See Morse: op.cit. p.592. After this announcement, preparations were made for the defence, not only of the concessions, but of the Chinese town as well.

In the meantime, a wealthy merchant in Shanghai called Yang Fang,

known to foreigners as 'Ta-kee', after the name of his firm) and some other merchants, with the permission of Wu Hsü, engaged two Americans, F.T. Ward and Henry Burgevine, to enlist a force of foreigners to take the field against the Taipings, primarily for the defence of Shanghai. Ward began enlisting on 2 June, and the first operation of this force, which later became known as the 'Ever-Victorious Army' (E.V.A.), was an attack 'with about 100 Foreigners, mostly sea-faring men' on the town of Sung-chiang, which had been taken by the Taipings on 1 July. This resulted in 'a repulse with some loss'. See Andrew Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army" p.63. Ward returned to the attack on 16 July, his force augmented by a company of Manilamen, and supported by some government troops. On this occasion they succeeded in taking Sung-chiang. A colourful report of desperate fighting, with 62 killed and 101 wounded, became the generally accepted account of this victory. See Holger Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer; the Story of Ward and the Taiping Rebellion, New York 1930 pp.117-122. But there is an interesting account of the event by Wu Yün, Prefect of Su-chou, who was present on board a Ch'ing gun-boat when Sung-chiang was taken. According to him, there were only 40 foreigners there; the rest of the attacking force was made up of several hundred 'braves'. The main Taiping force had left the town to attack Shanghai, leaving only several hundred troops who were 'old and weak', who had not even closed the gates of Sung-chiang. Ward himself, according to Wu Yün, was at Shanghai at the time; but hurried to Sung-chiang when he heard the news. He had a force of only 80 foreigners at this time, and hesitated to show himself much because of official disapproval by the British and French. See Wu Yün: Liang-lei-hsüan ch'ih-tu in Chien-chi VI p.131. (Wu Yün probably provided information for the official version, see Hsüeh Huan's memorial in Fang-lüeh ch.245 p.3). Whichever account is true, 'Ward received the ransom of the city and Ta-kee and other patriotic merchants were promoted in rank,' see Wilson: op.cit. p.63. On 12 August however, Sung-chiang was once more taken by the Taipings, see Fang-lüeh ch.247 p.8a and ch.248 p.12a.

Ward was then offered a reward for the recovery of Ch'ing-p'u, which he attacked on 2 August with 280 foreigners and a force of 10,000 Ch'ing troops under Li Heng-sung (Li Adong) and about 200 small boats. Ward's men scaled the wall of the town but were beaten off, a failure attributed, typically enough, to the presence of Europeans in Taipings service, particularly to the efforts of a man called Savage, who assisted in the defence of Ch'ing-p'u. Ward then, 'being an irrepressible sort of element,... returned to Shanghai and, despite his wound, immediately returned to Singpoo [Ch'ing-p'u] with two eighteen pounders, and 100 fresh men, mostly Greeks and Italians. See Wilson: op.cit. p.64.

Notes to Page 189.

1. Chou Wen-chia was formerly a carpenter and was blind in one eye. He was later made Ning Wang. He was one of the wangs who surrendered at Su-chou and was killed on Li Hung-chang's orders (page 227, below), see Lo: Chien-cheng p.240.

2. Ward's second attempt to take Ch'ing-p'u was on 8 August; he was defeated on the following day. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's figures for the number of killed, and for the number of foreign guns and muzzle-loaders taken, are much exaggerated. Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer p.130 gives about 100 killed and the same number wounded. Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army" p.64 merely says that Li Hsiu-ch'eng 'surprised and outflanked Ward, took his guns, boats, and a good many muskets, and drove him back to Sung-chiang.'

3. On 12 August. Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army" p.64 says that the Taipings were repulsed, but Kuo T'ing-i: Jih-chih p.699, cites evidence to the contrary; see also Fang-lüeh ch.247 p.8a and Ch.248 p.12a.

4. The decision to occupy Shanghai is said to have been taken on 11 May 1860, see note 4 to page 184; although in his deposition Lai Wen-kuang accused Li Hsiu-ch'eng of attacking Shanghai against the orders of the T'ien Wang, see TPTK II p.863.

From Su-chou Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote to the 'British Plenipotentiary' in Shanghai on about 20 June. In this letter, which is dignified and friendly in tone, he gave a brief survey of Taiping achievements up to that date, which were due 'to the favour of Heaven, the good fortune of the Sovereign and the protection of your honourable country.' After listing the towns which he had taken after the capture of Su-chou, Li Hsiu-ch'eng explained the necessity for taking Shanghai: although it was only a hsien, the presence of the foreign representatives there, and its importance as a centre of foreign trade, made it desirable that there should be sone sort of agreement in case of inadvertent infringement of foreign interests. The British plenipotentiary was therefore invited to come to Su-chou to discuss these matters. Just as Bruce and Bourboulon had informed the Taipings that they intended to defend Shanghai 'as a purely military measure,' so Li Hsiu-ch'eng (who had not received this message) informed Bruce that at such time as operations were started against Shanghai, 'it would be because my State is at war, and not in order to cause any trouble to your honourable country.' This communication is reproduced in Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1794-5.

It would seem that after this letter was written, Li Hsiu-ch'eng had contact with some foreigners in Su-chou, who encouraged him to take Shanghai. Chao Lieh-wen's brother, who spent four months in

Su-chou under the Taipings, said that foreigners who came there during the summer told the Taipings that Shanghai was virtually undefended and could be easily taken. These, or other foreigners had also presented the rebels with 'several hundred muskets.' See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.218.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng certainly appears to have considered that official contact had been made with him on the initiative of the foreign consuls. He addressed another communication to the representatives of Britain, America and France on 10 July (TT10/5/31), in which he referred to the 'representatives previously sent by your honourable countries.' Again they were invited to come to Su-chou, where they could meet the Kan Wang (who was in charge of foreign affairs), and discuss a treaty of friendship. Li Hsiu-ch'eng also stated that he had ordered a swift advance on Shanghai, but that his troops would halt before the town to await the reply of the consuls, before deciding upon an attack. At the same time, Li Hsiu-ch'eng also complained that there were some foreign boats in the river outside Sung-chiang, and that help was being given by foreigners to the 'imps' in defending Shanghai. See Wu Hsü tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi pp.4-5.

It is clear that Li Hsiu-ch'eng expected that Shanghai would fall into his lap; that on approaching the town, the foreigners would give him 'a respectful welcome' (see page 189), and that the activity of his 'fifth column' in the town, together with the forseeable pusillanimity of the Ch'ing troops, would enable him to occupy it without the necessity of fighting. This would account for the very small force which Li Hsiu-ch'eng took to Shanghai, 'a portion of his own body-guard, and some 3,000 irregular troops, more as an escort than for any offensive purpose.' See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.237. It would also account for the extraordinary behaviour of the Taipings in hardly returning fire when they themselves were fired upon; ibid. pp.275-278. After the event, on 21 August, Li Hsiu-ch'eng in a letter of reproach indicated explicitly, and by addressing his communication only to the British, American and Portuguese consuls, implicitly as well, that the French were to blame for what had happened.

> "That good faith must be kept is the principle which guides our dynasty in its friendly relations with other peoples; but deceitful forgetfulness of previous arrangements is the real cause of foreign nations having committed a wrong. When my army reached Soo-chow, Frenchmen, accompanied by people of other nations came there to trade. They personally called upon me, and invited me to come to Shanghae to consult respecting friendly relations between us in future. Knowing that your nations, like us, worship God the Heavenly Father and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, and are therefore of one religion and of one origin with us, I placed entire and undoubting confidence in their words, and consequently came to meet you at Shanghae.
>
> It never occurred to my mind that the French, allowing them-

selves to be deluded by the imps (the Chinese Imperial Authorities), would break their word and turn their backs upon the arrangement made. Not only however did they not come on my arrival to meet and consult with me, but they entered into an agreement with the imps to protect the city of Shanghae against us, by which they violated their original agreement. ....

If you other nations have not received the money of the imps, why did several of your people also appear with the French when they came to Soo-chow and invited me to Shanghae to confer together? ....

On coming to Soo-chow I had the general command of upwards of one thousand officers, and several tens of thousands of soldiers... If we had the intention of attacking Shanghae, then what city have they not subdued? What place have they not stormed? ... I came to Shanghae to make a treaty in order to see us connected together by trade and commerce; I did not come for the purpose of fighting with you."

The Chinese original of this document is lost, this translation, taken from Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.281-284, first appeared in the North China Herald No.527 of 1 September 1860. What appears to be a precis of the Chinese original is in Wu Hsü tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi p.3

Andrew Wilson's comment on this is:

"In his [Li Hsiu-ch'eng's] own account of this affair he says that he was induced to go to Shanghai 'by some Barbarians residing there;' and, in a communication which he sent in to the Foreign authorities on the 21st August, he expressly accuses the French of having deceived him. This is rather curious, and is not quite explained away by the Hon. Mr. Bruce when he remarks, in his despatch of the 4th September 1860, that the French were of all Foreigners the least likely to have made any advances to the Taipings. It is well known that the Roman Catholic priesthood in China - a very powerful body, with a system of underground communication all over the Empire - were bitterly hostile to the Rebellion, and it is not at all unlikely that some of their agents may have been employed in luring the Chung Wang on to his injury by false representations of the ease and safety with which Shanghai might be occupied." See The "Ever-Victorious Army" p.66.

5. This should be 徐家滙 (Hsü-chia-hui), the 'Sikawai' or 'Sikawei' of western accounts.

6. Ts'ai Yuan-lung was later made the Hui Wang; he surrendered to the government early in 1864; see Lo: Chien-cheng p,241. Kao Yung-k'uan (or 雲寬), later the Na Wang (often the 'Lar Wang' in western accounts, was one of the Taiping leaders who surrendered

at Su-chou and was executed (see page 227).

7. Near Fa-hua-chen and Hsü-chia-hui in Shang-hai-hsien; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.241.

Notes to Page 190.

1. According to Hsüeh Huan, at Sung-chiang a rebel document was captured which contained the information that 3,000+ Cantonese of Kwangsi soldiers at Shanghai wished to join the Taipings; see Hsien Feng tung-hua hsü-lu ch.94 p.20b. "There was not only the danger to the settlement from the rebels without, but there was danger from within, as the place swarmed with bad and desperate characters, both foreign and native." Maclellan: The Story of Shanghai p.48. In Hsüeh Huan's memorial reporting the defence of Shanghai against the Taipings, which Bruce called 'a tissue of unmitigated falsehood from first to last', he mentioned that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was only persuaded to attack Shanghai because a Cantonese told him that there was a Kwangsi man in the town who was prepared to make a disturbance and open the gates; see B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, Bruce to Elgin, 15 October 1860, pp.199,202.

2. Hung-mao (紅毛), the Red-heads, refers to the French. The most detailed account of this Taiping attempt to take Shanghai is contained in B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, which includes the letter of Bruce to Russell of September 4, 1860; Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to the Consuls of Britain, France and the United States (inclosure 1 in No.72); an extract from the North China Herald, giving Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to the Consuls of Britain, the U.S. and Portugal (inclosure 3 in No.72); a letter from Lieut. Pritchett to Lieut. Col. March, reporting the event of 30 August, and an extract from the North China Herald on 25 August 1860 entitled 'The Advance of the Tai-ping Insurgents on Shanghae (inclosure 6 in No.72). There are other accounts in Maclellan: The Story of Shanghai pp.47-49 and in C.A. Montalto de Jesus: Historic Shanghai, Shanghai 1909, pp.104-115.

3. Kuan-wang-miao is in Wu-hsien. This shows that Li Hsiu-ch'eng returned to Su-chou after leaving Shanghai and before going to Chia-hsing; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.242.

4. Chia-shan was taken by the Taipings on 29 July (HF10/6/12) and P'ing-hu on 1 August (HF10/6/15).

5. This is confirmed by the official record. Chang Yü-liang's force numbered about 30,000, but consisted almost entirely of dispersed soldiers from Ch'ang-chou and Su-chou. The Taiping army, according to the official Ch'ing version, was 100,000 strong. This is almost certainly an exaggeration, designed to excuse Chang Yü-liang's defeat; see Fang-lüeh ch.249 p.21b and Ch.250 p.23a. Chang Yü-liang does not seem to have been very enthusiastic about the siege of Chia-hsing. He had built himself a house outside the town, ("Was not the town itself good enough for him to rest in?" is Shen Tzu's comment) and seemed to regard the operation as a miniature siege of Nanking, which would take a very long time; see Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.24.

6. This detachment was under the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien.

7. Some of Chang Yü-liang's troops were in contact with the Taipings. After his defeat, Chang went first to Shih-men and then to Hang-chou, but his troops were refused entry into the town; see Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che ch.2 p.576. Chang Yü-liang was said to have been wounded in this battle, but this may have been invented to excuse his defeat; see Fang-lüeh ch.249 p.30a & ch.250 p.2b.

8. Su-chou was the capital of a new province created by the Taipings, called Su-fu (蘇福省).

9. In accordance with Taiping policy people were discouraged or prevented from living in the city. During resettlement in the suburbs people were given a daily ration of rice (5 sheng) for four or five days, while they were establishing their own means of livelihood. Those who had not capital to set up businesses were able to borrow it from the Taiping administration, or the equivalent in goods. 70% of this was a loan, the remaining 30% a free subsidy. See P'an Chung-jui: Su-t'ai mi-lu chi p.276

Notes to Page 191.

1. The question of taxes and land rents under the Taipings is discussed in Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo t'ien-chih t'ien-cheng k'ao in Journal of Oriental Studies 1954 Vol.1 pp.26-68; in Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an chapter 1; in Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao chapter 9, and elsewhere.

2. There is some confirmation for this. "The Faithful King [Li Hsiu-ch'eng] then proceeded to Soochow, where the distress of the people was very great. It is to his credit that he endeavoured in

every way to relieve them, and was so far successful that they erected to him an ornamental arch - a tribute of gratitude which caused them considerable trouble, when, afterwards, the city was recovered by the Imperialists, bu whom it was pulled down." See Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army" p.67. This refers to an arch erected outside the Ch'ang Gate of Su-chou, on which was written 'the people cannot forget' (民不能忘). It was destroyed at the order of Li Hung-chang in 1863. When Li Hung-chang enquired why it had been put up, he was told that it was because of the decrease in taxation; in the past taxation was higher in Kiangsu than in any other province and that, for instance, the tax quota of Sung-chiang alone was higher than that of the whole province of Fukien. The people had often appealed against this, but only after the occupation of the region by the Taipings had anything been done, and the taxes reduced by four tenths. See Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yü hui-lu p.149.

Notes to Page 192.

1. This sentence was clearly marked for deletion by Tseng Kuo-fan; see Chapter VI page 70 .

2. This sentence was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan.

3. This seems contradictory: 'other intentions' (他意) usually means treacherous or at least disloyal intentions, yet in the previous sentence Li Hsiu-ch'eng protested his loyalty.

4. Deleted because the meaning is not clear; '尔除' in the original.

5. For 不故 read 不過 .

6. Pages 69 and 70 in the manuscript, and the first 3 lines of page 71 seem to have been first marked for deletion by Tseng Kuo-fan, and then these marks cancelled by him (see Illustration I, page 508); at least it is clear that similar marking of p.48 of the ms. was taken by the printer or copier to mean that the passage was not to be deleted. However, similar marking on p.64 of the ms. (line 13) was not understood in this way, though in this case the marking is less clear. Again, as a rule when Tseng Kuo-fan intended a passage to be cut, he did not punctuate it(see p.32 of the ms. for instance). The whole of this passage however, has been punctuated by Tseng; it is evident moreover, that certain passages were intended to be deleted (see notes 1 and 2 above), being circled in red, and this would of course have not been necessary if the whole passage was to be cut.

I assume therefore that Tseng first marked the whole passage for deletion line by line, although sometimes he cancelled large passages by tracing a single line round the whole passage (see p. 100 and p.14a of the ms.); then he decided to let the whole section remain, and cancelled the markings at the top and bottom of each page, punctuated the text, and marked individually the passages he wanted omitted.

The curious thing is that not only was the whole passage omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition, but it was also entirely overlooked by Lü Chi-i. (See Chapter VI page 71).

Notes to Page 193.

1. For 由 read 游 .

2. For 推 read 摧 .

3. For a discussion of the meaning of this, see note 13, below.

4. For 鄂 read 國 .

5. For 池 read 蘄 .

6. For 池 read 蘄 .

7. For 宝 read 保 .

8. For 加 read 嘉 .

9. I do not know who these people were, though they were possibly T'ien Ti Hui members. The appropriate gazeteers may have the answer.

10. Tseng Kuo-fan crossed out the character 義 (righteous), presumably on the grounds that a rebel was incapable of such feeling, and replaced it with the character 盛 (abundantly).

11. For 肯 read 答 .

12. For 肯 read 該 .

13. According to his own account, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's disobedience consisted in his refusal to 'sweep the north'. But it is not clear that '掃北' means in military terms. The Ch'ing government was at the time in the throes of a war with Britain and France, whose troops entered Tientsin on 23 August; the Emperor fled to

Jehol on 22 September. It is reasonable to suppose that the Taipings may have considered the moment opportune for another expedition to the north to unseat the rival dynasty. This is partly born out by the fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng referred to the Northern Expedition of 1853 using the same term (掃北) - see page 251. Both Kuo T'ing-i: Jih-chih p.711, and Chien Yu-wen: Ch'üan-shih III p.1841, favour this view (though they differ as to the role of Jung Hung in the matter). The other view, taken by Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo p.283, and by Yü Ming-hsia: Kuan-yü Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti chan-chi chi p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1965 No.2 p.29 is that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's intention was merely that Li Hsiu-ch'eng should campaign on the north bank of the Yangtse, in the operation previously planned for the relief of An-ch'ing. In the absence of further material it is not possible to say which of these views is the correct one. But in either case Li Hsiu-ch'eng could have justified his refusal on the grounds that the original plan for the relief of An-ch'ing was that he should operate south of the Yangtse (see note 4 to page 184). Three Taiping leaders, Hung Jen-kan, Lai Wen-kuang and Huang Wen-chin, criticized Li Hsiu-ch'eng in their depositions, but none of them did so for his conduct in this particular matter. This may suggest that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not alone in believing that it was undesirable that he should 'sweep the north'. Nevertheless, his excuse seems weak, and the real reason for his unwillingness was that he was becoming increasingly tied to his own base, and tended to underestimate the importance of An-ch'ing. This question, and the failure of the campaign to relieve An-ch'ing is dealt with in greater detail below, see note 6 to page 206.

Notes to Page 194.

1. See note 7 to page 182.

2. 院為 in the original; 院 may be an error for 淵 .

3. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's subsequent actions show that he underestimated the importance of this strategic dictum, see note 6 to p. 197.

4. For 羽花台 read 雨花台 . The fort at Chiang-tung-men was on the west side of the city, about 3 li from the Shui-hsi-men (see Map III), and included both Chiang-tung-men and Chiang-tung Bridge; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.295. The Yü-hua-t'ai fort was on a hill of that name outside the south gate; it was a large stone fort with a watch-tower from which one could see into the city. Yü-hua-t'ai was linked with other fortifications outside the south gate. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.246 & Tiao-fu tao-jen (pseud.): Chin-ling tsa-chi p.633.

5. This presumably refers to Hung Jen-fa and Hung Jen-ta.

Notes to Page 195.

1. T'ai-p'ing is now called Tang-t'u (當涂). Li Hsiu-ch'eng reached Wu-hu on 16 November 1860. For石甚 read石埭. This was the beginning of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's participation in the Taipings' second Western Expedition, which had been planned at the meeting in Nanking in May 1860 (see note 4 to page 184). The first operations were Yang Fu-ch'ing and Li Shih-hsien's capture of Ning-kuo on 26 September 1860, Li Shih-hsien's occupation of Hui-chou on 9 October, and on the north bank, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's capture of Ting-yuan on 10 October. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's later departure, which contributed to the failure of the whole expedition, may have been due to his disagreement with the T'ien Wang.

The original plan, briefly outlined by Hung Jen-kan in his deposition (see TPTK II p.852), was that once the Kiangsu delta was conquered and Shanghai occupied, the Taipings would buy 20 steamers, which would be used to transport an army up the Yangtse to Hupeh. Two other armies, on either side of the Yangtse, would join this one for an attack on Wu-han. The failure of the Taipings to take Shanghai and acquire steamers necessitated some change of plan, which may have been worked out between Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng when the latter was in Su-chou (see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1803) and in later discussions in Nanking.

The immediate aim of the expedition was to attack the enemy at places to which he was bound to send relief, in this case the cities of Wu-ch'ang, Han-yang and Han-k'ou, in order to draw off part of the Hunan Army which was besieging An-ch'ing. It was also part of the struggle for control of the middle reaches of the Yangtse - the key to the survival of the Taiping regime at Nanking.

In essence it was a gigantic pincer movement on Hupeh. In conversation with Harry S. Parkes, Ch'en Yü-ch'eng gave an account of the campaign as it had developed up until March 1861:-

> "He [Ch'en Yü-ch'eng] informed me that he was the leader known as the Ying Wang (or Heroic Prince); that he was charged from Nanking to relieve Ngan-king [An-ch'ing], and had undertaken a westward movement with the view of gaining the rear of the Imperial force besieging that city on the western side. So far he had been completely successful. Leaving Tung-ching [T'ung-ch'eng], a city forty miles to the north of Ngan-king, on the 6th instant [March], he marched in a northwest direction upon the district city of Hoh-shan [Ho-shan], thus avoiding all the Imperialists' posts in the districts of Tung-ching, Tseen-shan [Ch'ien-shan], and Taihoo [T'ai-hu]. On the 10th he took Hoh-

shan, where there was no considerable head of force opposed to him, and then turning to the south-west, reached Ying-shan on the 14th, which fell in the same way. Hastily securing the munitions of these two places, of which he stood in need, he passed on to Hwang-chow [Huang-chou] and succeeded in surprising a camp of Amoor Tartars, killing, as the Ying Wang said, all the men, and capturing all their horses. This, and a small affair at Paho, placed him in possession of Hwang-chow, which he entered without opposition on the 17th instant.

He had thus taken three cities and had accomplished a march of 600 le [li] (say 200 miles) in eleven days, and was now in a position either to attack in rear the Imperial force, whose flank he had now turned, and draw them off from Ngan-king, or postponing that operation, to occupy Hankow, from which he was distant only fifty miles. He added, however, that he felt some hesitation in marching upon that place, as he had heard that the English had already established themselves in that port. ....

Having put several inquiries to him as to the future plans of the insurgents, he readily entered into the following particulars relative to the campaign in which he said they were then engaged, and to which his information appeared to be limited.

Four rebel columns are in the field, his own and three others, severally commanded by the Chung Wang, Shi Wang [Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien] and Foo Wang [Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing]. These three "Wangs" (or Princes) were to leave Hwang-chow [probably an error for Nanking, C.A.C.] in the middle of the first month (February), and, marching in different directions on the south of the Yang-tze, while he, the Ying Wang, moves through the country on the north bank, they propose to rendezvous at Woo-chang [Wu-ch'ang] in the third month (April). The Chung Wang is to cross Keang-se [Kiangsi], below Nan-chang [Nan-ch'ang],(the capital of that province). and march by Suy-chow [Shui-chou] to Yoh-chow [Yueh-chou], on the Tung-ting Lake, and thus reach a position to the west of Woo-chang. The Shi Wang is to cross the Poyang Lake, and visiting or passing by Nan-chang, is to enter Hoopih [Hupeh] by Ning-chow, and thus approach Woo-chang on the south face. The Foo Wang is to make for Hoo-kow [Hu-k'ou] and Kiu-kiang, and embarking his force, if he is able to do so, is to ascend the Yang-tze and attack Woo-chang on the east side; while, as already pointed out, the Ying Wang's force is to close in upon the north side."

See B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yang-tze-kiang River pp.53-56, Report by Mr. Parkes of his Visit to the Ying Wang at Hwang-chow.

2. Hsiu-ning had been taken by the Taipings under Li Shih-hsien on 12 October 1860 (HF10/8/28); it was then besieged by units of the Hunan Army under Pao Ch'ao and Chang Yun-lan, from 11 November onwards.

3. Tseng Kuo-fan moved his headquarters from Su-sung to Ch'i-men on 28 July 1860.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng arrived at I-hsien on 1 December (HF10/10/19) and took the town. This threatened to cut off Pao Ch'ao and Chang Yun-lan's communications with the H.Q.at Ch'i-men; they wheeled round and defeated Li Hsiu-ch'eng on the following two days, see Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih V p.5b.

5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force took Wu-yuan on 30 December, Te-hsing on 1 January, and laid siege to Yü-shan on 8 January. His main force crossed into Chekiang and took Ch'ang-shan on 10 January, leaving other troops besieging Yü-shan until 16 January. It is possible that this move into Chekiang had something to do with the arrival from Kwangsi of Wang Hai-yang, formerly a subordinate of Shih Ta-k'ai, who had broken with him and led away a substantial number of troops; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.738. Lo Erh-kang however, in Shih-kao p.421, says that Wang Hai-yang did not join up with Li Hsiu-ch'eng until later in the year.

6. After their New Year (10 February), the Taipings seem to have set out immediately; they arrived at Yü-shan on 12 February, at Kuang-feng on the 15th, at Kuang-hsin on the 20th, and laid siege to Chien-ch'ang on 4 March. The town was poorly defended, with a garrison, according to Tseng Kuo-fan, of less than a thousand troops. Though the Taipings mined the wall, they were unable to break in, and the siege was raised on 23 March. See Fang-lüeh ch. 261 pp.7b-8b. This bring up the question as to the size of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force. A. F. Lindley, who claimed to have been with Li Hsiu-ch'eng when he set out from Nanking, wrote: "...these two brigades, the body-guard of the Foo-wang [Yang Fu-ch'ing], second in command, and a small body of cavalry, were all the troops the Chung-wang took with him from Nanking; but these were the very élite of the Ti-ping forces. The strength of the whole division was about 7,500, which was to be considerably increased by re-inforcements in Ngan-whui [Anhwei]... At the cities of Wu-hu, Tae-ping-foo, Tae-ping-hien [T'ai-p'ing-hsien] and several others we halted and were joined by large reinforcements, so that before we approached the neighbourhood of the enemy the strength of our army was but little short of 27,000 men..." See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.246-7. This figure is confirmed to a certain extent by the memorial of Yü K'o, Fang-lüeh ch.264 p.10b, who reported that at Yü-shan there were '20,000+' Taipings, and by Kuan Wen and Hu Lin-i's memorial, Fang-lüeh ch.266 p.32b, which gives the same estimate. At Hsiu-ning Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force consisted of 'several myriad men', according to Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chueh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lüeh p.367. It is difficult to understand why, with such a force, the Taipings failed to take this town. It was

defended, according to Tseng Kuo-fan, by a force of only 700+ troops, see Tseng Kuo-fan to Kuan Wen quoted in Tai I: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih kao I p.377.

7. Li Chin-yang held the rank of fu-chiang (colonel) in the Hunan Army, commanding 1,500 men. He had previously been a Taiping officer. See Fang-lüeh ch.260 p.10b.

8. For the fate of Li Chin-yang, see below, page 198.

9. The siege of Chien-ch'ang was lifted on 23 March; the Taipings set out for I-huang on 25 March, occupied Hsin-kan on 4 April and Chang-shu on the following day.

Notes to Page 196.

1. It is difficult to believe that such a large river could suddenly dry up completely, though Li Hsiu-ch'eng is unequivocal on the point. It is possible that the dry state was normal at this season, and that the spate was caused by melting snows.

2. The crossing was made on 8 April; Chi-an was taken on the following day. Shui-chou was occupied on 4 May (HF11/4/6). Omitted from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account is the attack on Lin-chiang by part of his force on 21 April. It was near here that Li Chin-yang was taken prisoner. See below, page 198.

3. For 甫祈 read 蒲圻. Tseng Kuo-fan estimated the number of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's new recruits as 'several hundred thousand' or 'near to two hundred thousand', quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng p.252. Hu Lin-i reported that seventy or eighty thousand had been pressed in I-ning and Wu-ning; see Fang-lüeh ch.266 p.32a.

4. There are several errors here. In March 1861 Tseng Kuo-fan was already proposing to turn Pao Ch'ao's army (the T'ing Chün) into a mobile force which could be sent to deal with emergencies as they arose, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 p.9a (HF 11/2/8). On 4 May Pao Ch'ao left Ching-te-chen to go to the aid of To-lung-ah near T'ung-ch'eng in northern Anhwei, where he remained until 22 June, having won a victory at Chi-hsien-kuan earlier in the month. Then he was ordered by Hu Lin-i to campaign in eastern Hupeh, north of the Yangtse. He was also asked by the Governor of Kiangsi to come south and clear the rebels out of Shui-chou and other places. Tseng Kuo-fan's despatch then arrived ordering him to proceed to Shui-chou by way of Chiu-chiang. On leaving Anhwei Pao was not

certain what he was going to do. In the event, he stopped and laid siege to Su-sung, but did not go on to Huang-chou; see Pao Ch'ao chih Huang I-sheng shu in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu (Chien-chi VI) p.289. At Su-sung he received Tseng Kuo-fan's order to cross to Chiu-chiang and go to the relief of Nan-ch'ang, which was then threatened by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, see Tseng Wen Cheng Kung Nien-p'u ch.7 p.1b. Pao Ch'ao arrived at Chiu-chiang on 8 August, and on 24 August moved to attack Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Feng-ch'eng from Shui-chou. (See also Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.15 p.1b).

5. Li Hsü-i came south on 15 June (HF11/5/8) from Huang-kang on the north bank with 3,000 men, and took up positions 20 li east of Wu-ch'ang, sending troops to attack the Taipings at Hsien-ning, P'u-ch'i, Ch'ung-yang and T'ung-shan; other troops attacked Hsing-kuo, Ta-yeh and Wu-ch'ang-hsien. Three thousand infantry and cavalry were also sent to the region of Chih-fang, southeast of Wu-ch'ang. Gunboats under P'eng Yü-lin patrolled the Yangtse and the lakes. Hu Lin-i himself left T'ai-hu on 19 June, and arrived at Wu-ch'ang by boat on 9 July, to take charge of the defence of Hupeh. See Fang-Lüeh ch.266 p.33b; ch.267 pp.28a, 29b; ch.269 pp. 2a/b, 3a/b, 4a/b.

6. For景得 read景德. Li Shih-hsien left Hui-chou in the early part of December 1860, but did not go to the region of Ching-te and Lo-p'ing until 21 March. Between these dates he was investing Ch'i-men, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng mentioned later in the same passage.

7. Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885) joined Tseng Kuo-fan's staff at Su-sung early in 1860 and shortly afterwards was ordered to raise a corps of 5,000 men for service in Kiangsi and Anhwei. He recruited his army at Ch'ang-sha in the summer of 1860 and began military operations in the autumn, in the region west of Tseng Kuo-fan's H.Q. at Ch'i-men; see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.762-767.

8. From about the end of December 1860 until early March 1861, Li Shih-hsien was besieging Ch'i-men. On 8 March he moved south and occupied Wu-yuan, cutting one of the supply routes of Tseng Kuo-fan's H.Q. At Wu-yuan he was attacked by Tso Tsung-t'ang from 16 March until the 22nd, without any decisive action having taken place. On 22 March however, Tso Tsung-t'ang was defeated and withdrew to Ching-te-chen and then to Lo-p'ing. Li Shih-hsien occupied Ching-te-chen on 8 April, after which he intended to attack Lo-p'ing and Ch'i-men; but when Ching-te-chen fell Tseng Kuo-fan decided to move his H.Q. to Hsiu-ning. Li Shih-hsien attacked Lo-p'ing from 15 April to 23 April (HF11/3/14), when he was severaly beaten by Tso Tsung-t'ang; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 pp.15a-17a. For another comment by Li Hsiu-ch'eng on the Lo-p'ing battle, see Appendix I, page 260.

9. Huang Wen-chin and Yang Fu-ch'ing took Chien-te on 15 December, and thus cut communications between An-ch'ing and Tseng Kuo-fan's H.Q. at Ch'i-men, until 28 December when the government recovered Chien-te. On 20 December Huang Wen-chin and Li Yuan-chi occupied P'eng-tse, and on the 22nd took Fu-liang, cutting the supply route of the Ch'i-men H.Q. Jao-chou was taken on 24 December by Li Yuan-chi. On 5 January 1861 Huang and Li attacked Ching-te-chen and Fu-liang, which made Tseng Kuo-fan despatch Pao Ch'ao to relieve Tso Tsung-t'ang's army. The Taipings were defeated at Jao-chou on 7 March with great losses and forced back to Chien-te. Huang Wen-chin went north over the Yangtse in May to help in the relief of An-ch'ing. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih p.1869.

10. Liu Kuan-fang, Ku Lung-hsien and Lai Wen-hung defeated Tseng Kuo-fan's outer defences at Yang-chan-ling and T'ung-lin-ling on 28 December 1860 (HF10/11/17), at the same time as Li Shih-hsien attacked Chi-men from Hsiu-ning. They then took up positions near I-hsien. Though defeated there and forced back across Yang-chan-ling on 30 December, they still threatened Ch'i-men from the north, and by 15 February were once again within 60 li of Tseng Kuo-fan's H.Q. They were defeated on 17 and 18 February at Hung-men-ch'iao and Ta-ch'ih-ling, and thereafter, unsupported by other Taipings armies, did not attempt to attack Ch'i-men.

11. The second part of this sentence is omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition, and replaced by 'Huang, Hu and Li's army...' which is joined up with the following sentence.
There is some doubt as to when Hu Ting-wen was killed. Lo Erh-kang gives the year as 1863, following a memorial of Shen Pao-chen; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.252. That some uncertainty existed is shown by the fact that Tseng Kuo-fan had Li Hsiu-ch'eng questioned on this point before he had seen the deposition. The question was whether Hu Ting-wen had really been killed in 1863 or not. But Li Hsiu-ch'eng's answer, as recorded, was merely that he had been killed at Jao-chou. This does not help much since there was fighting at Jao-chou in 1861 and in 1863. It seems almost certain that 1863 is right, since there is evidence of his activities after 1861; see Lo: Shih-kao p.426 and Appendix I page 258.

Notes to Page 197.

1. Li Shih-hsien reached Yü-shan on 29 April and occupied Ch'ang-shan on 3 May (HF11/3/24).

2. The whole of this deleted passage was omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

3. Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to have overestimated the strength of Tseng Kuo-fan's force at Chi-men, and consequently he lost an opportunity for inflicting a crushing defeat, and probably, of taking Tseng himself. When the Taipings broke the outer defences at Yang-chan-ling and T'ung-lin-ling, Tseng Kuo-fan did not expect to get away alive. This is clear from a letter he wrote at the time:

> "At present my first worry is the danger to Chang [Yun-lan]'s army, the second is that fate of the headquarters at Ch'i-men, from which the rebels are only 80 li away, a day's march, with no means of fending them off. We are now studying how to defend our stockades. If the rebels arrive we will hold fast and await relief; but if anything goes wrong, my determination is as ever, and I shall not shirk in the face of difficulties....
>
> Looking back on the fifty and more years of my life I have no regrets, except that my studies are not completed; as for the rest, I have nothing serious with which to reproach myself."

The letter ends with exhortations to his brothers to look to the education of the younger generation. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu p,181 (HF10/10/20). By 15 February 1861 (HF11/1/6) the Taipings were again within 60 or 70 li of Ch'i-men with a force of over 100,000; by 19 February they were only 20 li away (see Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih V p.6b). But instead of launching a direct attack, the Taipings concentrated on attempting to cut the life-lines of the H.Q., see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1862. The pressure on Ch'i-men only eased after Tso Tsung-t'ang's civtory over Li Shih-hsien at Lo-p'ing (23 April); only then did Tseng Kuo-fan feel that he could sleep at ease. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu p.186 (HF11/3/24).

4. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had reached Huang-chou on 18 March 1861, but returned to Anhwei a month later, reaching T'ai-hu on 22 April.

5. Huang Wen-chin crossed the Yangtse at Wu-hu with 7,000 men and joined with Hung Jen-kan in an expedition to relieve An-ch'ing. This was in early May; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1869.

6. The failure of the Western Expedition resulted from the withdrawal of both the northern and the southern arms of the pincer which should have closed on Wu-han. Several important questions about this failure remain unanswered because of the lack of historical documentation. There was, as far as we know, no court-martial or inquest, which might have provided documents for historians to analyse; so we have to rely upon a number of scattered and often superficial references. The problems are surveyed below, but the answers are no more than tentative.

The reasons for Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's withdrawal seem simpler and more comprehensible than is the case with Li Hsiu-ch'eng. Ch'en arrived at Huang-chou on 18 March, in good time for his rendezvous

with Li Hsiu-ch'eng, which was to take place in the 'third month' (between 11 April and 11 May) according to Harry Parkes' report quoted above (note 1 to page 195). He waited at Huang-chou for a month, and then went back to Anhwei. In the meantime, as we have seen, he was visited at Huang-chou by Parkes, and in the course of the conversation told him 'that he felt some hesitation in marching upon the latter place [Han-k'ou] as he had heard that the English had already established themselves at that port.' Parkes continued:

> "I commanded his caution in this respect, and advised him not to think of moving on Hankow, as it was impossible for the insurgents to occupy any imporium at which we were established without seriously interfering with our commerce, and it was necessary that their movements should be so ordered as not to clash with ours. In this principle he readily acquiesced, and said that two of his leaders who had pushed on beyond Hwang-chow should be directed to take a northerly or north-westerly course, and go towards Maching [Ma-ch'eng] or Tih-gnan [Te-an], instead of towards Hankow."

Then follows, in Parkes' report, the passage already quoted in note 1 to page 195, describing the components of the expedition. At the end of that passage the report continues:

> "Returning to the subject of Hankow he observed, that although he might desist from occupying that place, the other Wangs, being uninformed of our position there, might still continue to carry out the above plan, and he suggested that both the English and the insurgent interest might be accomodated by our taking Hankow and Woo-chang, and allowing him to occupy Han-yang.
>
> I explained to the Ying Wang that our objects in coming up the Yangtse were strictly commercial; that our recent Treaty with the Imperial Government, with whom we were now at peace, gave us the right of trade upon the Yang-tze; but as the insurgents utterly destroyed trade wherever they went, they would render this right nugatory if they occupied those ports that had been expressly opened to our commerce. Han-yang was one of the three cities connected with each other, and forming one great mart commonly called Hankow. The rebels could not take any one of these cities without destroying the trade of the whole emporium, and hence the necessity of their keeping away altogether. These subjects, however, I added, are in the hands of the Admiral who commands the English expedition in the river. He is now on his way back, and as he passes Nanking will, doubtless, come to a distinct understanding on the above points with the insurgent authorities there; the latter, it may be presumed, will then forward instructions to the Ying Wang for his guidance, and until the receipt of these instructions he should refrain from making any further movement on Hankow. That as nothing had been heard at Kiu-kiang of the advance of Chung Wang, or the other leaders, up to the 9th instant [March], it might be presumed

that at that date they had not yet crossed into Keang-se [Kiangsi]. [In fact Li Hsiu-ch'eng had crossed into Kiangsi on 15 February, and on 9 March was laying siege to Chien-ch'ang; it is difficult to believe that this was not known in Chiu-chiang at this time, C.A.C.]. He, the Ying Wang, would therefore not have the advantage of their support if he moved at once upon Hankow, and would have to contend alone with the Imperial force assembling for the defence of Woo-chang, as well as with the Gan-hwuy [Anhwei] force, which would then close upon his rear.

The Ying Wang seemed to concur entirely in what I urged. He computed his own followers at 100,000 men, but considered that scarcely half of them had yet reached Hwang-chow. He should first fortify his position, he said, at Hwang-chow, and then be guided by circumstances as to his next operations. Perhaps he might attack the Imperialists between him and Ngan-king [An-ch'ing] or, perhaps, make an incursion into the north of Hoopih." See B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yang-tze-kiang River. April 8. Inclosure in No.17 pp.53-56.

This interview took place on 22 March. After it, as Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had apparently promised, one part of his force pushed to the north-west, towards Te-an, occupying the town on 29 March and Sui-chou on 2 April. Another force attacked Ma-ch'eng from Ying-shan and Ho-shan on 15 April. No move was made in the direction of Wu-han. On 21 March Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's forces occupied Kuang-chi and Huang-mei, and on the following day Ch'en returned to Anhwei.

It seems clear therefore that there were three main reasons for Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's withdrawal. First, he feared that if he had waited any longer the enemy would gain ground in the siege of An-ch'ing. This is born out by Hung Jen-kan's deposition, see TPTK II p.852. Secondly, he appears to have been influenced by the persuasion (or threats) of Parkes to abandon the attack on Wu-han. Thirdly, although Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not yet overdue, he may have been convinced by Parkes that he was either going to be very late, or that he was not going to turn up at all. One might speculate that if Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had decided to attack Wu-han as planned, not only would the British have been unable to do anything about it, but he would probably have been successful in raising the siege of An-ch'ing. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was only about 23 years of age at this time and may have been easily influenced.

The reasons for Li Hsiu-ch'eng's failure to carry out his part in the original plan are more complex. He himself mentioned this matter in two places, in the deposition and in his replies to Chao Lieh-wen's questions during the conversation they had after Li's capture on 23 July 1864. (see Appendix II). There were three main reasons for his withdrawal:-

(1) Li Hsiu-ch'eng claimed that his troops were mostly raw recruits with no battle experience, (see page 197). To Chao Lieh-wen he said 'I had not enough troops' (see Appendix II page 267). But when Chao challenged him on this he apparently had nothing further to add. Nevertheless he could perhaps have made a case for himself on these grounds. The size of his army on this expedition is discussed in note 6 to page 195; it seems to have been in the region of twenty to thirty thousand, excluding the Hupeh recruits. This does not mean that they were all fighting men. Lindley gave the figure for Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's army at Huang-chou as 50,000 men but said that it 'did not possess a fighting strength of more than half that number, the rest being simply the coolies in usual attendance upon all Chinese armies.' (Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.348) If the same proportion applied to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force, the number of his combat troops was comparatively small. This might help to explain his failure to take the town of Chien-ch'ang, though he may merely have wanted to avoid unnecessary casualties. However, the force was sufficiently unimpressive to be described by the Governor of Kiangsi as 'decrepit; see Yü K'e to Tseng Kuo-fan, in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.210 in Chien-chi VI.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng had of course enlisted a large number of recruits, both in Anhwei and in Hupeh, but they were probably very poorly armed and ill-disciplined, and he might well have hesitated to lead them into battle against the forces defending the outskirts of Wu-ch'ang. It is true that if he had reached Hupeh in March as planned, he would have found the provincial capital virtually undefended and in a state of considerable panic. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1853; Fang-lüeh ch.261 p.3a, and P'en Yü-lin to Tseng Kuo-fan in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu pp.206-7. But by the time the Taipings arrived, reinforcements had been sent and the capture of Wu-ch'ang would have been much more difficult.

(2) Another reason given by Li Hsiu-ch'eng was the defeat of Li Shih-hsien at Lo-p'ing in April and of Liu Kuan-fang at I-hsien in February. But he seems either to have received an exaggerated report of the gravity of his cousin's defeat, or else to have deliberately exaggerated it himself as an excuse for turning back. He wrote in the deposition that his cousin had lost ten thousand men (see page 196), but Tseng Kuo-fan himself claimed no more than 'four or five thousand' of the enemy killed; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 p.16b; and even that was probably an inflated figure. We have no means of knowing whether Li Shih-hsien really did send an urgent appeal for Li Hsiu-ch'eng to return and, if he did, why he should have done so. The defeats of Li Shih-hsien and Liu Kuan-fang do not seem to us now to justify the abandonment of the Western Expedition, though Li Hsiu-ch'eng may have felt that they left his rear unprotected.

(3) When further questioned by Chao Lieh-wen, Li Hsiu-ch'eng said that he returned in order to take Hang-chou, without which his

territory was 'like a bird without wings'; see Appendix II page 267 This seems to be the most pertinent of the reasons he gave for turning back. He may well have been more interested in enlarging his own territory than in the fate of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo as a whole; he probably considered that the defeat of Li Shih-hsien would somehow prevent him from taking Hang-chou if he did not hurry back at once. It is difficult however, to believe that he was unaware of Tseng Kuo-fan's single-minded determination to take An-ch'ing before doing anything else, and of the fact that there were few effective government forces south of the Yangtse anyway. Hung Jen-kan wrote later: "Once the Chung Wang had got control of the two provinces of Su-[fu] and Hang-[chou, Chekiang], he rested on his laurels and bothered no more about the north bank or about the capital." See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in TPTK II p.852. Thereafter Li Hsiu-ch'eng did nothing to help Ch'en Yü-ch'eng beat off the enemy at An-ch'ing, nor to help him recover the city once it had been taken. Instead, his vast army of over half a million men remained in Kiangsu and Chekiang, where there was comparatively little threat from government forces.

Hung Jen-kan wrote that Li Hsiu-ch'eng turned back because he was 'afraid of a slight rise in the water,' (ibid.). This was not given as a reason by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself in any source that I know of. (Franz Michael: The Taiping Rebellion p.154 asserts the contrary, but without quoting any source). There is no confirmation that this was an important reason. But Li Hsiu-ch'eng does seem to have had some difficulty in communicating with Lai Wen-kuang across the Yangtse, probably because of tight Ch'ing control of the river. He received a letter from Lai Wen-kuang on 15 June at Hsing-kuo, giving him some information about the military situation on the north bank. He replied to this letter on 21 June, and sent his letter by way of Ch'i-chou, but it never reached Lai Wen-kuang. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote again on 27 June, and enclosed a letter to be passed on to Ch'en Yü-ch'eng. These he entrusted, curiously enough, to the British Consul at Hankow, Mr. Gingell, who visited him at Hsing-kuo at this time, with the consequence that the letter was eventually delivered, not to Lai Wen-kuang but to the British Museum, where it remains. This would seem to indicate, apart from an extraordinary naieveté, considerable communication difficulties, and perhaps a certain amount of indifference about the fate of the whole campaign.

Indeed this seems to be the inescapable verdict. It was not that Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not understand the importance for the Taipings of holding An-ch'ing; the contrary is clear from his remarks on 162, 193, & 194. Hung Jen-kan moreover, wrote that Li was the only main commander to agree with his strategy for the Western Expedition, see TPTK II p.852. But this was before Li Hsiu-ch'eng had acquired the new province of Su-fu. After his conquests in the Yangtse delta he was much less enthusiastic about the Western Expedition. One

may even suppose that he only agreed to command the southern route of the expedition because it fitted in with his own plans for recruiting in Hupeh. It is possible that he never had any intention of attacking Wu-ch'ang, or perhaps that he intended to make the decision only when he got there.

Another factor which may have influenced his decision to return, was the presence of a large group of about 200,000 troops who had deserted Shih Ta-k'ai in Kwangsi, and whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng incorporated into his own army on his way back through Kiangsi. It is possible that he wanted to intercept them before they could be absorbed by anyone else.

(The important problem of Taiping history which is the subject of this note is dealt with in Lo: Chien-cheng pp.253-257; Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1851-3, 1875-6; Yü Ming-hsia: Kuan-yü Li Hsiu-ch'eng ti chan-chi chi p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1965 No.2 pp.21-42; and F. Michael: The Taiping Rebellion pp.154-7).

7. This is evidently an error for Te-an; corrected in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

8. The withdrawal was not in fact simultaneous (see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.14 p.2b) and began with the recapture by government forces of the town of Hsiu-ning on 9 July 1861 (HF11/6/2), whose garrison fled to Chin-niu. That Chin-niu and Pao-an were abandoned by the Taipings, rather than reconquered, is born out by a letter from P'engYü-lin to Tseng Kuo-fan, which reads in part:-

> "According to reports, there are large numbers of rebels at Pao-an and Chin-niu. Ch'eng Ta-chi and Chiang Chih-ch'un went there in the certainty of a big fight in which they could kill to their hearts' content (飽殺一場). But the rebels heard the news and fled, and would not fight with our troops - it was really exasperating! Now several myriad of rebles from Pao-an and Chin-niu have all gone back to Hsing-kuo. It is very hot, and Ch'eng and Chiang's troops have to give chase. If at Hsing-kuo there is no battle, it means that the rebels will go back to Kiangsi and will just wear out our troops by rushing away. What can one do? Mr. Ch'eng and Mr. Chiang are not cruel, they cannot wash Hsing-kuo in blood; but if they can completely get rid of all those in that town who have collaborated with the rebels, exterminate them root and branch and leave no evil behind, perhaps this may preserve order and be a warning to future generations. Otherwise, if our troops go there, shave the heads of the whole [male] population, roll up their banners and put them back to work on the land, once our armies withdraw, not only will the peasants and artisans of the place all turn into rebels, but even all the scholars and merchants will do so as well. From being a habit it becomes

their nature, just like making a living by buying and selling. It is really the womb of evil in Hupeh, a hot-bed for the long-haired rebels in the Empire. If the southeastern half of the land has no peace, it is all because of Hsing-kuo." See Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.312

The Taipings withdrew from T'ung-ch'eng on 10 July, and from Ch'ung-yang on 13 July; from Ta-yeh and Hsing-kuo on 14 July.

9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally wrote '後將其經過...' Tseng Kuo-fan took this to mean 'when I passed through this place,' and accordingly changed the character 將 to 由. I believe that Li in fact meant that he inquired into the circumstances of the case (經過).

10. The Taipings withdrew from Shui-chou on 14 August.

Notes to Page 198.

1. Yin-kang-ling was an important pass between Shui-chou prefecture and Lin-chiang prefecture. Li Chin-yang was indeed captured at this place, but it was before the Taipings went into Hupeh, not after, since he was released and turned up in Nan-ch'ang on 21 May; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 p.20b.

2. For 仍言 read 仍然.

3. After leaving the Taipings Li Chin-yang went to Nan-ch'ang on 21 May. He was executed on 9 June for indiscipline and military failure; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 p.20b. Li Chin-yang had told the Governor of Kiangsi Yü K'e that he was not prepared to take orders from Tso Tsung-t'ang (see Yü K'e to Tseng Kuo-fan, HF11/3/30, in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.210), which may have aroused Tso's vindictiveness, since after Li Chin-yang's arrest, Tso wrote to Tseng Kuo-fan suggesting that Li be sent to his H.Q. to be dealt with, and expressed the opinion that 'if this kind of man cannot be used, he should be killed,' (ibid. p.215).

4. The Taipings left Shui-chou on 14 August and crossed the Kan River on 26 August, near Lin-chiang; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.14 p.6a.

5. Tseng Kuo-fan's version, reported in his memorial of HF11/8/2, is that from Chang-shu Li Hsiu-ch'eng sent a force of about 20,000 under the Yü Wang to attack Feng-ch'eng, and that Li himself crossed to the west bank of the river and advanced northwards; see Tsou-kao ch.14 p.6b. The Yü Wang (Hu I-huang) however, had died in

1856.

6. For 相下 read 向下 .

Notes to Page 199.

1. Tseng Kuo-fan claimed that Pao Ch'ao had won a great victory, killing seven or eight thousand Taipings, "there were bodies everywhere and rivers of blood." See Tsou-kao ch.14 p.6b. But Li Hsiu-ch'eng distinctly implies that there was no engagement, and this is born out by the way in which Chao Lieh-wen questioned Li Hsiu-ch'eng about this event, asking him, "Why did you withdraw on hearing of Pao's arrival?", see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.374 and Appendix II p.267.

2. No changes were made by Tseng Kuo-fan here, but the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads 'several hundred men'.

3. Tseng Kuo-fan added 'for three of four days' to the previous sentence, for grammatical reasons.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng moved on Fu-chou at the end of August 1861.

5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng withdrew from Fu-chou on 8 September and crossed the Fu Shui to Hu-wan; whereupon Pao Ch'ao gave up the pursuit and went north to the siege of An-ch'ing.

6. After reaching Kwangsi in the autumn of 1859, Shih Ta-k'ai's force began to disintegrate. A large group of his troops under T'ung Jung-hai and Chu I-tien deserted the I Wang on 2 September 1860 at Liu-chou in Kwangsi and made their way back towards Nanking, to place themselves under the central command of the Taipings once more. They reached Kiangsi late in 1861 and then passed into Chekiang. In May 1861 they were in Kiangsi again and on 18 September 1861 (HF11/8/14), met up with Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Ho-k'ou and were absorbed into his force. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih II pp.1481-1501 and the memorial of Chi Ch'ing-yuan, Chu I-tien and others addressed to the T'ien Wang in Wu Hsü tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi pp.5-11.

7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan was for a two-route advance into Chekiang: one, under his own command and with T'an Shao-kuang, Kao Yung-k'uan and T'ung Jung-hai to attack Hang-chou; the other, under Li Jung-fa (Hsiu-ch'eng's son) and Ch'i Ch'ing-yuan, to take Ning-po and Shao-hsing and prevent the enemy from sending help to Hang-chou.

See Wu Hsü tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi. p.9. (An-ch'ing had fallen to the Hunan Army on 5 September).

8. After moving in to the province in May, Li Shih-hsien had occupied a substantial part of western and southern Chekiang: Sui-an on 8 May, Shou-ch'ang on 12 May, Lung-yu on 26 May, Chin-hua on 28 May, Sui-ch'ang on 13 June, Sung-yang on 18 June, Ch'u-chou on 23 June, Yung-k'ang on 25 June and Yen-chou on 26 July. See Kuo: Jih-chih and Anon: T'ai-p'ing-chün k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien jih-piao in Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao 1963 No.1 pp.208-216.

9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng reached Yen-chou-fu on 13 October, where, presumably, he met Li Shih-hsien and made further plans.

10. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's whole force now numbered at least 700,000; Li Shih-hsien probably had more than 100,000; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1933.

11. There seems to have been little Taipings activity in Wen-chou; the Prefectural town (Yung-chia) was occupied for a very short time early in October, but this was by members of a secret society called the Chin-ch'ien Hui (金錢會). Yü-huan-hsien in the same prefecture was occupied by Taipings, but only for one day (14-15 December 1861), see Anon: T'ai-p'ing-chün k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien jih-piao pp.215-216.

12. See below, page 201.

13. P'u-chiang was taken by Li Shih-hsien on 27 September (HF11/8/23) after a siege which started on 7 September. Chang Yü-liang himself was not present, although the troops were his; he was later reprimanded for allowing both Yen-chou and P'u-chiang to be surrounded; see Fang-lüeh ch.274 pp.17a-20a. Chang Yü-liang was at Yen-chou at this time, and the commander at P'u-chiang was the tsung-ping Wen Jui (ibid. ch.276 p.25). After taking P'u-chiang, Li Shih-hsien's activities were as follows: I-wu taken on 30 September, Tung-yang on 1 October, Sui-ch'ang and Sung-yang on 14 October, meeting Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Yen-chou on 20 October; he took Hsin-ch'ang on 12 November, Shang-yü on 23 November, T'ai-chou on 2 December, Huang-yeh on 7 December and Ning-po on 9 December (see below p.200).

Notes to Page 200.

1. The town of Fu-yang was not in Taiping hands at this time; it

was not taken until 15 November. Yü-hang was taken on 20 October (HF11/9/17), see Anon: T'ai-p'ing-chün k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien jih-piao p.208.

2. Wang-tsung (王宗) was a Taiping title of the later period, usually given to relatives of the various wangs, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an p.277. (Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.28 lists Li Shang-yang as the 'Tsung Wang', but correctly on p.967).

3. Ch'ü-chou was attacked by Li Hsiu-ch'eng's troops on 5 October, and besieged unsuccessfully until 11 October. There is an illegible character at the beginning of this sentence, deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan, which was probably intended in some way to link this sentence with the previous one; that is to say, to link the defence of Lung-yu with the fact that Ch'ü-chou had not been taken.

4. This sentence was written between the lines, as an afterthought. It refers to T'ien Ti Hui (Triad) members; see note 2 to p.166.

5. See note 11 to page 199.

6. On 9 December 1861 (HF11/11/8). For descriptions of these two men, see below, note 8. Ning-po was surrounded in a pincer movement, one column going from Cheng-hsien over the mountains to Feng-hua and advancing on Ning-po from the south; the other going north from Cheng-hsien to take Shang-yü, Yü-yao, Tzu-ch'i and Chen-hai. "People say," wrote Hsü Yao-kuang with some admiration, "that the rebels use troops like the pincers of a crab. This is true." See T'an-Che p.601. Hsüeh Huan's official report stated that the rebels entered Ning-po [district] by two routes, helped by local bandits, and that there were only 4,000 government troops in the town at the time; see Fang-lüeh ch.280 p.8a.

7. After describing the assistance given to the Taipings in eastern Chekiang by local rebels and by a secret society called the Lien-feng Tang (蓮蓬黨), Hsü Yao-kuang concludes, "though bandits led the rebels to Ning-po, in fact it was the foreigners who yielded it to them." T'an-Che p.602. (Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.116 agrees). On 26 November, according to Kuo: Jih-chih, British merchants visited Lu Shun-te at Shao-hsing and took a letter from him addressed to foreigners at Ning-po, and some Taiping warrants which would ensure protections when Ning-po was captured.

8. After Tzu-ch'i (10-12 miles from Ningpo) had been taken by the Taipings, the British Consul at Ning-po, Frederick Harvey, decided to send the gunboat 'Kestrel' to the Taiping commanders of

each column to find out their attitude to the foreigners at Ning-po and to inform the Taipings as to the policy of the foreign officials towards them. A meeting was called in Ning-po by Harvey, which was attended by William Breck, the U.S. Consul, Leon Obry, Commander of the French Navy steamer 'Confucius' and Lieut. Huxham R.N., who commanded the 'Kestrel'. At this meeting a document was drawn up for presentation to the Taiping commanders. It had four points: (1) That the undersigned were neutral, and would claim compensation for any injury received, (2) that they urged the Taipings 'on grounds of Christianity and humanity' not to commit excesses, (3) that the Taipings should keep away from the foreign settlement at Ning-po, and (4) that the life and property of the foreigners must be respected.

The 'Kestrel' left Ning-po the same day and arrived at Yü-yao the following morning. There the British interpreter met the Taiping commander Huang Ch'en-chung.

> "He received us attired in a yellow silk robe richly embroidered, with a hood of the same material and colour sitting uneasily on his head; contrary to Chinese etiquette and probably with a view to impressing us with his sense of dignity, he presided, rather than sat, at a table at the head of the room, occasionally diverting himself by sipping almond tea and chewing the areca nut.
>
> He is a native of Kwang-se, nearly 40 years of age, and, to judge from his appearance and demeanour, has evidently risen from a very low walk of life to his present high position and command. We found him almost incapable of understanding mandarin, and unable to read several of the characters in the letter we handed to him....
>
> We at once informed Hwang of the object of our visit, and explained to him fully, and sentence by sentence, the four requisitions contained in, and forming the principal subject of, the communication to his address.... To every one of these he gave his unqualified assent, "although," he added, "in the event of the mandarins resisting, and of my having to attack Ningpo, I cannot be responsible for the lives of any of your countrymen who may remain inside the city. Otherwise I will do all I can to prevent their being molested, and will at once behead any of my followers who dares to offer them any annoyance." ....
>
> He seemed to entertain no doubt whatever of being successful in his attack on Ningpo (on which place he intended to advance in a week's time at the latest); indeed, he appeared to think that the mandarins would offer no resistance, though he begged us to urge on them the advisability of surrendering the city without a struggle, should they be inclined to attempt to hold it....

We weighed anchor at Yü-yao at 3 p.m. on Friday afternoon, bringing away with us twenty-one rebel Proclamations for posting on foreign houses, as well as a reply from Hwang to the official communication presented to him in the morning, and reached Ningpo the same night....

Hwang having informed us that another body of troops, also under the She Wang [Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien]'s orders, and commanded by one Fang [Fan Ju-tseng], a General of equal rank with himself, were advancing on Ningpo from the Fung-hwa [Feng-hua] or south-west side, we proceeded up that branch of the river early on Monday morning on the 2nd instant, and found the said insurgents encamped at a place called Pih-too [Li-tu ?], but ten miles from Ningpo.

We went ashore at once, and put ourselves in communication with the leader Fang, a man of only 25 years of age, and a native of Kwang-se. We hastened to represent to him the serious injury to trade that must ensue on the capture of Ningpo by his forces, and the consequent loss that would accrue to foreign interests, besides the danger, in reality no slight one, to foreign life and property, to be apprehended both from lawless characters in his own ranks, and equally so from the bands of unruly Cantonese and Chin-chew men at Ningpo, ever on the look-out for an opportunity for indiscriminate plunder. We ended by eagerly dissuading him from advancing on Ningpo.

To our two objections Fang replied by assuring us that his party were most anxious to keep well with foreigners, who, indeed, were not other than their brothers, inasmuch as both worshipped one God and one Jesus, and that as for trade, that would be allowed to go on as formerly, while he begged us to feel quite at ease as to the persons and property of our countrymen, any molestation of whom would be followed by instant decapitation. Their object being the overthrow of the present dynasty, they could not allow Ningpo to remain in the hands of the Imperialists.

It was with difficulty that we succeeded in persuading Fang to delay his attack on Ningpo for one week; another day was to have seen him there, he said, had we not interposed.

One could not help feeling struck with the earnestness and apparent sincerity of this young leader. Whilst alive to the dangers attending the cause in which he was engaged, he seemed confident that the support of Heaven would carry them through all their difficulties, and that, so aided, they must prevail....

See B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yang-tze-kiang River 1862. Mr. Hewlett to Consul Harvey pp. 108-110.

It appears from this account that the British representative did succeed in getting the Taipings to postpone their attack for a week, although Li Hsiu-ch'eng says that they refused to delay for more than three days. Both Lo Erh-kang (Chien-cheng pp.262-266) and Chien Yu-wen (Ch'üan-shih III pp.1940-2) believe that this was an attempt to play for time, so that measures could be taken for the defence of Ning-po. Whether this is true or not, it appears that 'everything had been done to assist the Imperialists in the defence of the town except the use of force in their favour,....' see Hope to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Dec.22 1861 in B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yang-tze-kiang River p.90. Harry Parkes, in his memorandum on the fall of Ning-po, wrote that 'by foreign assistance the city had been places in a complete state of defence.' (ibid. p.92).

9. I can find no confirmation of this.

10. On 7 December the British Consul in Ning-po wrote: "I have only to add that the advanced bodies of the insurgent army are at the present moment under the walls of the city, and that the fire has already commenced on both sides. The Imperial Commander-in-Chief, Chin, [Ch'en Shih-chang], who lately paid me a visit at the Consulate, stated that it was his firm determination to defend the city as vigorously as his military forces, at present much weakened and reduced, enabled him to fight on behalf of his Imperial Master.' ibid. p.85 (Harvey to Hammond). But on 18 December, Harvey had to report, '...from want of a sufficient number of soldiers, or, more probably, because those soldiers would not fight, this city fell with hardly a blow having been struck in its defence...' (ibid. p.89, Harvey to Hammond). In conversation with Admiral Protet and Captain Corbett, the Taiping commanders said that, 'they had been signally protected by Heaven,... in having had only one man wounded in the attack. On the other hand, the city had been so easily won that they had not killed more than a score or two of their opponents.' (ibid. p.92, Minute of the interview).

This was the first Treaty Port to be taken by the Taipings; for the consequences, see note 8 to page 223.

11. Chen-hai was taken by the Taipings on 7 December, before Ning-po, not after, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng implies. I know of no evidence to suggest that foreigners provided transport, but since this was before the capture of Ning-po, it could have been done without the knowledge of the Consul.

12. See pages 223-4.

Notes to Page 201.

1. Shao-hsing was taken on 1 November 1861 and Hsia-shan on 28 October. At this time Lu Shun-te was not yet the Lai Wang, see Li Hsiu-ch'eng to his Son and Nephew in TPTK II p.740.

2. Lu Shun-te was sent by way of T'ung-lu to take Shao-hsing, having first captured Hsiao-shan in order to avoid relief being sent to Shao-hsing. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's son and nephew were sent later, in case Lu's force was not sufficiently strong. (TPTK II. p.740). The garrison of Shao-hsing consisted primarily of 'braves', who did not fight when the Taipings arrived; see Yin-ming-shih (pseud.): Yüeh-chou chi-lüeh in TPTK VI pp.767-8. Other accounts of Shao-hsing are, Yang Te-jung: Hsia-ch'ung tzu-yü and Lu Shu-jung: Hu-k'ou jih-chi, both in TPTK VI.

3. Wu-k'ang was taken by the Taipings on 23 October 1861; Te-ch'ing was taken on 18 March but recovered by the government two days later, and taken once more by the Taipings on 10 June. Hsiao-feng was taken by the Taipings on 22 March, lost on 29 March, taken again on 4 April, lost on 23 May and taken again by the Taipings on 12 October 1861; An-chi was taken on 10 February 1860, lost on 24 May and taken again on 3 October 1861. See Anon: T'ai-p'ing-chün k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien jih-piao.

4. Shih-men was taken by the Taipings on 10 September 1860, lost on 17 September and taken again on 3 April 1861 (ibid.).

5. Chao Ching-hsien (tzu Chu-sheng 竹生), a former Financial Commissioner, organized a militia force at Hu-chou which numbered six or seven thousand men, see Fang-lüeh ch.274 p.25b. After taking Hang-chou, Li Hsiu-ch'eng sent two messengers to Chao, inviting him to surrender (see TPTK II p.741). Chao Ching-hsien refused to do so and executed the messengers. When Hu-chou fell to the Taipings he was taken to Su-chou (June 1862), where he was well treated and urged to join the Taipings. He continued to refuse and begged to be speedily executed - a fate he claimed to deserve for failing to hold Hu-chou. He was allowed a great deal of freedom in Su-chou, though the Taipings would not release him. He was eventually executed at the order of T'an Shao-kuang (Li Hsiu-ch'eng being absent from Su-chou at the time), because he was suspected of 'Fifth Column' activity. See Hsieh Hsing-yao: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih lun-ts'ung pp.180-1

6. On 1 January 1862. Chang Wei-pang was a fu-chiang. Ch'en Hsi-ch'i: Yüeh-ni hsien-Ning shih-mo chi in TPTK VI p.648 calls him Chang Pang-wei. Fang-lüeh ch.298 p.16a however, confirms Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version. There seems to be an error here: Hai-yen had

been in Taiping hands since 17 April 1861, and Hai-ning was not taken by them until 1 January 1862.

7. Chang Yü-liang came from Fu-yang and arrived at Hang-chou on 7 November, stationing his troops outside the city. Ten days later he was killed, in battle according to the official account (Fang-lüeh ch.280 p.7a); but Hsü Yao-kuang, who was in Hang-chou at the time, says that Chang Yü-liang was accidentally shot by a Ch'ing soldier on the wall of Hang-chou as he was seeing someone off, see T'ang Che p.587.

8. I do not know exactly what Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant by this phrase, in the original: 内外不通 内外押戰. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 内外不通内外夾戰. Hang-chou was cut off from 4 November onwards; see Kuo: Jih-chih, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's letter to his Son and Nephew in TPTK II p.740. Hua Hsüeh-lieh: Hang-ch'eng tsai-hsien chi-shih in TPTK VI p.627 gives the date as 8 November (HF11/10/6).

9. After the Taiping occupation of the region south of T'ai Hu, which cut off Hang-chou from Kiangsu, supplies for the city came from Shao-hsing and Ning-po (Fang-lüeh ch.283 p.28a). When these towns fell in late October and early November, there remained in Hang-chou only enough grain for ten days (ibid. ch.277 p.10b). Unsuccessful attempts were made to send in grain and military supplies from Shanghai by way of Hai-ning (ibid. pp.11, ch.280 p.6). The problem of supply was considerably exacerbated by the presence in the city of more than 100,000 troops, according to Shen Tzu, and of refugees from Shao-hsing. When a census was taken during the siege, the population was found to be 2,300,000. (Hsü Yao-kuang gives the normal population as 600,000, see T'an Che p.588). While there was still grain, people had been obliged to underwrite 1 tan for the troops from each 10 persons; but when this was called for it was not forthcoming and collectors had to be sent. If they found grain the offenders were fined, if they found none they were imprisoned. People were eventually reduced to eating husks, duck-weed, roots, leather and so on. Shen Tzu was informed by someone who came out of the city after it had been taken by the Taipings, that more than 200,000 people had died of starvation; see Pi-k'ou jih-chi pp.110-1. Wang Yu-ling gave the number of dead as thirty to forty thousand; see Fang-lüeh ch.293 p.10b. There are also reports of cannibalism, see Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che p.588 and B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yang-tse-kiang River Inclosure 1 in No.40 p.114. It is not surprising if, as Shen Tzu reports (Pi-k'ou Jih-chi p.99), the people eventually opened the gates to the Taipings.

Notes to Page 202.

1. According to Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.111, Wang Yu-ling's popularity was based on a proclamation he had made when he took up his post, full of fine phrases and promises. People took this to mean that the city would be held, so few fled at the approach of the Taipings, and refugees from Shao-hsing flooded into the city. The population was lulled into a sense of false security by constant announcements of the imminent arrival of a large army of relief, but little was done to defend Hang-chou. Shen's conclusion was that Wang Yu-ling cared for nothing outside the walls of Hang-chou, and that Jui Ch'ang (the Tartar General) cared for nothing outside the walls of the Manchu city, in which there was still grain when the Taipings took Hang-chou.

2. Jui Ch'ang (Bordered Yellow Banner), had been Tartar General (將軍) of Hang-chou since 1853; see Chang Po-feng: Ch'ing-tai ke-ti chiang-chün, tu-t'ung, ta-ch'en teng nien-piao 1796-1811, Peking 1965.

3. Lo Erh-kang believes that this is not true. He argues that if Li Hsiu-ch'eng petitioned 7 days before attacking Hang-chou, that would be on 1 November (i.e. 7 days before Hang-chou was completely surrounded on 8 November, according to Hua Hsüeh-lieh's dating, see note 8 to page 201, above). If the reply arrived within '20+ days', it would have reached Li Hsiu-ch'eng about the end of November, well before Hang-chou fell. Moreover, according to a memorial written by Lin Fu-hsiang, there was not a four-day interval between the fall of Hang-chou and the attack on the Manchu city. See Lo Erh-kang: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng k'u-jou-huan-ping chi k'ao pp.23-4 in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1964 no.4. Lo Erh-kang was falling over backwards in his attempt to prove that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wanted to deceive Tseng Kuo-fan into thinking that he was not a loyal Taiping. His evidence in this matter is rather unconvincing. Li Hsiu-ch'eng (and others) were often very vague about dates, and we cannot be sure that when he said 'seven days before attacking the city' he meant seven days before the completion of the encirclement. Nor, in view of similar acts of clemency, do I see any reason to doubt Li's account of this one.

4. On 31 December 1861 (HF11/12/1). According to Shen Tzu, ten thousand rebels were killed in the attack on the Manchu garrison, but this is probably an exaggeration. (See Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.99). The Manchus eventually set alight to their quarters and many, including Jui Ch'ang, perished in the fire; see Ch'en Hsüeh-sheng: Liang Che Keng Hsin chi-lüeh in TPTK p.622 and Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi in TPTK VI p.636.

5. This is confirmed by Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.99

6. The Military Governor referred to was Chieh Ch'un; see Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.636.

7. According to Lin Fu-hsiang, the bodies of people killed in Hang-chou had been dumped outside the city by the Taipings, see Fang-lüeh. ch.293 p.15b.

Notes to Page 203.

1. According to Hsü Yao-kuang, there were five or six hundred officials below the rank of ssu-tao (司道) in Hang-chou, none of whom managed to get away before the city fell, see T'an Che p.588.

Notes to Page 204.

1. Tseng Kuo-fan changed the character 況 to 曠 ; but the former is correct. K'uang Wen-pang was a tsung-ping, who took over the command of Chang Yü-liang's troops after the latter's death, see Fang-lüeh ch.293 p.10b.

2. According to Shen Tzu, Wang Yu-ling did send a letter to the Taipings, saying, "I defend this place on behalf of the State, because each of us serves his own master. The city has been besieged for two months and the people have nothing to eat. I myself know that the city cannot be held, but what crimes have the people committed? You ought to withdraw 30 li to allow me to release the people during one day, and then come into the city without harming the people." Shen Tzu relates that the Taipings did withdraw, the people flocked out, and afterwards the gates were not closed again; see Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.105. Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yü hui-lu p.151 also says that Wang Yu-ling wrote to the Taipings. Feng Shih: Hua-ch'i jih-chi in TPTK VI p.691 records that people were driven out of Hang-chou in October because of the shortage of food.

3. Wang Yu-ling's suicide is mentioned by Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che p.588 and by Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.636.

Notes to Page 205.

1. Not immediately, but about ten days later, see below, note 1 to page 206.

2. Originally 此出我之心院息, which does not make sense. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to 此出我之心願.

3. Mi Hsing-chao was tsung-ping of Ting-chou. Lin Fu-hsiang (1814-1862) was Chekiang Provincial Treasurer. He was a Cantonese, who in 1841 had raised a force of 'braves' to defend Canton against the British; see Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate pp.39-40

4. According to Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.636, Lin Chih was killed at the fall of Hang-chou. Tso Tsung-t'ang also reported him killed in street fighting, see Fang-lüeh ch.340 p.7a. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that he ran away but was not pursued, see page 205. He was evidently killed soon afterwards.

5. For亦言 read亦然.

6. The Taipings transformed the Governor's yamen in Hang-chou into an 'Office for the Recruitment of Talent' (招賢館), see Fang-lüeh ch.298 p.16a. (For similar establishments, see Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi pp.73-4 and Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I p.279).

7. Wang An-chün's rank was that of t'ien-chiang at this time, see Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.101

Notes to Page 206.

1. Lin Fu-hsiang's story was that he managed to get away after the Taipings captured the inner city of Hang-chou, having collected the bodies of Wang Yu-ling, two other high officials, and his own son, wife and daughter; see Fang-lüeh ch.293 p.13b. But Hsüeh Huan, who investigated the fate of Ch'ing officials in Hang-chou, reported that Lin had gone over to the rebels and had received an official appointment from them; that Lin Fu-hsiang, Mi Hsing-chao and others were in the 'Office for the Recruitment of Talent'. The fact that Lin and Mi could come unscathed through Taiping territory, was very suspicious, Hsüeh Huan said. Enquiries revealed that Lin had been seen to go to banquets at the rebel H.Q. in Hang-chou. He had been well treated by them and ordered by Li Hsiu-ch'eng to live at the residence of the Taiping commander of Hang-chou, Teng Kuang-ming. After Li Hsiu-ch'eng returned to Su-chou

he sent a letter to Hang-chou, according to Hsüeh Huan, enclosing a pass and instructing Lin Fu-hsiang to escort the coffins of Wang Yu-ling and others to Shanghai. Teng Kuang-ming had given a banquet before Lin Fu-hsiang's departure on 14 February (TC1/1/15), he and his companions had been provided with travelling expenses and an escort of 200 soldiers as far as Chia-shan; see Fang-lüeh ch.298 pp.15b-18b. Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao arrived at Shanghai with 10 boats, flying the flag of a Provincial Treasurer, and with an escort of 40 'braves' whose hair had been recently shaved - showing that they were rebels, or had just come out of rebel territory. The suspicious Hsüeh Huan had the coffins opened. The contents were as declared, and Wang Yu-ling was indeed clothed in his official robes.

At least one report says that Lin Fu-hsiang bore a letter from Li Hsiu-ch'eng to Hsüeh Huan inviting him to join the Taipings and offering him a title. Hsüeh is said to have refused, but to have kept Lin Fu-hsiang in Shanghai as a sort of insurance in case the Taipings turned up there. This is spite of the fact that he was urged to deal with Lin and warned that his 40 'braves' were Taiping officers in disguise; see Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.137.

Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao were later executed by Tso Tsung-t'ang at Imperial command; see T'ung Chih tung-hua hsü-lu ch.11

2. Between 11 December 1861 and 9 February 1862.

3. This must be an error for Su-chou. Li Hsiu-ch'eng remained in Hang-chou for about ten days, and left for Su-chou on 7 January, according to Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.636. (Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.107 gives the date as about a week later).

4. Shen Tzu (op.cit. p.105) records the transport of relief grain from Chia-hsing to Hang-chou, and the distribution of food. See also Li Kuei: Ssu-t'ung chi in TPTK IV p.490.

5. On 5 September 1861 (HF11/8/1), when Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in Kiangsi, see above, page 199 note 7.

6. Chien Yu-wen lists eight attempts to do so between April and September 1861, see Ch'üan-shih III pp.1880-1893.
Tai I: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih kao, pp.387-9 clarifies this complicated military situation by delineating six layers of military forces, so to speak, which were (working northwards):

i. The 'water force' of the Hsiang (Hunan) Army, under Yang Tsai-fu, operating in the Yangtse.

ii. The Taiping garrison at An-ch'ing, supported by forts outside the North Gate, five stockades on the south side of Ling Hu, (a small lake outside the north gate, lying between An-ch'ing

and Chi-hsien-kuan) and 13 stockades on the north side of the lake, reached by boat from the city. (According to Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih, VI p.17a, the Taipings used a pontoon bridge).

iii. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's siege works between an inner and an outer moat; the inner, for defence against attack from An-ch'ing, and the outer moat to protect the besieging forces from the attacks of Taiping relief armies.

iv. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's crack troops under Liu Ts'ang-lin at Chi-hsien-kuan.

v. Beyond Chi-hsien-kuan was a Ch'ing force under To-lung-ah, also fighting on two fronts.

vi. The Taiping relief force based on T'ung-ch'eng, Lu-chiang and other places.

Notes to Page 207.

1. i.e. from the side of Ling Hu. I can find no mention of this incident in any other source.

2. Wu Ting-ts'ai entered An-ch'ing on 27 April 1861 (HF11/3/18).

3. Yang Fu-ch'ing did not come north until August (see below, note 7 to page 208).

4. This should be the Ku Wang (顧王).

5. Hung Jen-kan was in charge of this relief expedition, though Li Hsiu-ch'eng does not mention the fact. He probably crossed the Yangtse in April 1861. On 1 May (HF11/3/22) Hung Jen-kan and Lin Shao-chang joined up with the Taipings from T'ung-ch'eng and Lu-chiang, and with a force of about 20,000 (including some Nien), advanced to the region of Lien-t'ang, were defeated on 2 May by To-lung-ah, and retired to T'ung-ch'eng. On 7 May and again on the 7th and the 11th, they attempted unsuccessfully to raise the siege of An-ch'ing. See Kuo: Jih-chih p.749; Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp. 1882-1885; Fang-lüeh ch.263 p.7b.

7. See above p.196 and note 8 to p.197.

Notes to Page 208.

1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote 左 in error for 多 .

2. In the original 困下田筒水中. 筒 is presumable an error for 洞.

3. The Taipings reached T'ung-ch'eng on 19 May with five or six thousand men, see Fang-lüeh ch.266 p.3a.

4. This engagement took place on 19 May (HF11/4/10), according to the official report. The commander of the Ch'ing forces was Wen-te-le-k'e (Deputy Lieutenant General). Two of his ying had taken a short cut and caught up with the Taipings on the bank of a river called Ma-t'a-shih, in front of which the Taipings took up positions, thinking that they had only two enemy ying to contend with. When four others arrived, they were trapped, and after several hours of fighting the survivors had to get across the water as best they could; see Fang-lüeh ch.266 pp.3a-4a.

5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally wrote 該垂到桐 for 該遂到桐; Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to 乃到桐.

6. Pao Ch'ao and Ch'eng Ta-chi (one of Li Hsü-i's officers) arrived near Chi-hsien-kuan on 19 May, and began attacking the stockades which Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had established on the north side of the pass at Ch'ih-kang-ling on the 20th; they were beaten off by the Taipings under Liu Ts'ang-ling; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.776

7. The Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing did not come to the relief of An-ch'ing until 6 August, from Ning-kuo. He joined forces with some of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's troops and went by way of Wu-wei and Su-sung to attack T'ai-hu.

8. Several more attempts were made by the Taipings after the fall of the Chi-hsien-kuan stockades, to bring relief to An-ch'ing. On 7 August three columns approached: Yang Fu-ch'ing and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng from T'ai-hu; Lin Shao-chang and Wu Ju-hsiao from T'ung-ch'eng; and Huang Wen-chin from the east. Lin Shao-chang was defeated by To-lung-ah and the others were unable to make any progress. On 17 August Yang Fu-ch'ing and Ch'en Yü-ch'eng were again defeated near T'ung-ch'eng. Then, between 21 and 24 August Ch'en, Yang, Lin and Huang crossed the pass at Chi-hsien-kuan and established 40 stockades to the south of it. They attacked Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's outer line of defences between 25 August and 2 September but were severely defeated. See Fang-lüeh ch.273 and Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1891-1892. On 28 August the Hunan Army in this battle used 170,000 chin (over 100 tons) of powder and 500,000 chin (over 200 tons) of shot; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.201.

9. The inner moat was about 2 chang (say 23 feet) across and 3-4 chang (35-47 ft.) deep. Chao Lieh-wen compared this favourably

with the moat which Ho Ch'un had dug at Nanking in 1859; see Jih-chi p.204.

Notes to Page 209.

1. There appear to have been Hunan Army gun-boats in Ling Hu at least since 1 May 1861 (HF11/3/22), see Fang-lüeh ch.265 p.23aff.

2. On 3 September Tseng Kuo-ch'üan got complete control of Ling Hu by placing 10 stockades on the north side and four more on the south side of the lake. The same day, his gun-boats intercepted Taiping boats trying to bring grain to the city, and others taking cannon from the city for use outside, see Fang-lüeh ch.273 p.14b. During the night of 4-5 September (HF11/7/30 - 8/1) Hunan Amry troops got into the city after mining the wall at the north gate, according to the official report. All the rebel troops inside the city and in the stockades were killed; ibid. pp.14b-15a. Chao Lieh-wen, who arrived at An-ch'ing immediately after its capture, recorded that 'the defending rebels were all dropping with hunger and could not resist.' More than 10,000 were killed, (20,000 according to the official report, Fang-lüeh ch.273 p.7a), and all adult males in the city were executed. Ten thousand women were carried off by the soldiers. Chao noted that everything removable was looted, everything else was destroyed. He and several other contemporaries report cannibalism in the city. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.201.

The most detailed account of the capture of An-ch'ing is that by Chu Hung-chang, one of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's commanders. Chu records that after the Taipings relief force was beaten off, the Taipings in the city 'set it alight and escaped by tunnels,' so that when the Hunan Army troops entered An-ch'ing it was empty of rebels. See Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-chün jih-chi p.29a. Neither Chu Hung-chang nor Wang K'ai-yün (Hsiang-chün chih V p.8a) make any mention of the wall having been breached by tunnelling. The North China Herald reported at the time that 'three regiments or separate bands of rebels gave themselves up to the Imperialists as prisoners of war under the impression that their lives would be spared, but they were slaughtered to a man and their bodies thrown into the river.' Quoted by Lindesay Brine: The Taeping Rebellion in China, London 1862 p.320, and repeated by Lin-Le (A.F.Lindley): The Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.358-9. Chien Yu-wen concludes that the story that the wall had been mined was invented by the Hunan Army commanders, and that the Taiping garrison had in fact surrendered. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1897-1900. I am not convinced.

3. Chang Ch'ao-chüeh was later made Li Wang; but he does not seem to have played an active role in the rebellion thereafter; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1893.

4. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng withdrew to T'ung-ch'eng when An-ch'ing fell, and then to Shih-p'ai when T'ung-ch'eng was taken by To-lung-ah on 7 September, thence to Su-sung when To-lung-ah gave chase. On 12 September he withdrew from Su-sung and began to move along the Anhwei-Hupeh border in the direction of Te-an and Hsiang-yang. He moved back towards Lu-chou from somewhere near Ying-shan.

5. He reached Lu-chou in the middle of September 1862.

6. In a letter to Lai Wen-kuang and others dated TT12/1/14 (23 February 1862), Ch'en Yü-ch'eng explained that he had been cashiered for having withdrawn from T'ai-hu and from An-ch'ing, for having missed the rendezvous at Kua-ch'e-ho (this refers to the attempted relief of An-ch'ing in May), and for the Chang Wang Lin Shao-chang having retreated from T'ung-ch'eng, Lu-chiang, Wu-wei, San-ho and other places; see TPTK II p.744. Hung Jen-kan was also cashiered at this time, ibid. pp.846-7.

7. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to read 'General To' i.e. To-lung-ah.

8. Lu-chou was attacked by troops under To-lung-ah on 28 February 1862 (TC1/1/30). By this time the greater part of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's army, said to number 1,240,000 men at this time (Tao-k'ou yü-sheng [pseud.]: Pei-lu chi-lueh p.202) had already departed on a new Northern Expedition. By the time that the siege of Lu-chou became really serious, the three advance columns of this expedition were already far away. The centre column, under Ma Jung-ho, Chang Lo-hsing and others, was in northwestern Anhwei, and crossed into Honan on 1 April. The western column, under Miao P'ei-lin, was in the region of Shou-chou, but Miao had secretly turned coat once again, and was in contact with Sheng Pao (see below, note 9). Ch'en Yü-ch'eng had evidently lost conact with these columns; the three despatches he wrote to some of the commanders in February all fell into enemy hands. Nor does he seem to have been aware of Miao P'ei-lin's treachery, partly because his own delegate with Miao's force had turned coat as well. Lu-chou held out until 13 May (TC1/4/12). Ch'en Yü-ch'eng broke through the encirclement and made north. See Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's deposition in Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi pp.201-2.

9. Miao P'ei-ling, a hsiu-ts'ai of Shou-chou, was formerly a Nien rebel. He deserted them in 1856 to form his own militia band, which developed into a large and disorderly force. In 1857 Sheng

Pao persuaded him to accept official rank and made him commander-in-chief of militia in the area to the north of the Huai River. Thereafter he was Sheng Pao's protege, and one of the causes of the latter's downfall. In 1860 he rebelled against the government again and allied himself with the Taipings and Nien. In November 1861 he captured Shou-chou, but on 23 March the following year, once more went over to Sheng Pao, when he saw the declining influence and power of the Taipings and the advance of the Hunan Army against them north of the Yangtse. He was extremely unpopular with Ch'ing officials in general and knew that Sheng Pao was the only one who would defend him. Early in May 1862 he helped Sheng Pao to recover the town of Ying-shang and then returned to Shou-chou and wrote to Ch'en Yü-ch'eng in Lu-chou. He knew that it was Ch'en's ambition to take K'ai-feng (Honan) and now offered to help him do so. The letter was carried to Ch'en Yü-ch'eng by a beggar, concealed in his bamboo stick.

On 15 May (YC1/4/17) Ch'en Yü-ch'eng entered Shou-chou. Accounts differ as to the exact method employed to capture him, but it is evident that Ch'en took only a small force, possible his bodyguard alone, and left the others outside the town. There seems to have been no fighting. One account is that Miao P'ei-lin's nephew, Miao T'ien-ch'ing, knelt to Ch'en Yü-ch'eng and said that his uncle, realizing that the future lay with the Ch'ing dynasty, begged him to come over too. To this Ch'en replied, "Your uncle is a miserable vagabond! He is like grass growing on the top of a wall, bending both ways with the wind. When the dragon is winning he helps the dragon, when the tiger is winning he helps the tiger. He will not even make a name for himself as a rebel. If this is how things are, then do your worst! I can only be killed, not humiliated!" Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was then sent to Sheng Pao's headquarters. The Taipings greatly despised Sheng Pao, and gave him the nickname Sheng 'hsiao-hai' (賸小孩), because he played with troops like a child, or, instead of Sheng Pao (賸保) they called him Pai Pao (敗保). Whenever he fought with Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, it was said, he was beaten, and this had happened forty times. Therefore, when Ch'en was ordered to kneel to Sheng Pao, he retorted, "You Sheng hsiao-hai, are nothing but the number-one incompetent lackey of the Imp Dynasty! I am one of the honoured founder of the T'ien Ch'ao. You always fled on meeting me in battle...At Pai-shih-shan I smashed 20 of your ying and wiped out your whole force, and you fled cringing with a dozen horsemen. I ordered your life to be spared. How can I deign to kneel to you, you shameless object!"

Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was ordered to be sent to Peking, but was executed at Yen-ching in Honan on the initiative of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in on 4 June 1862 (TC1/5/8). (Sources for this note are, Tao-k'ou yü-sheng (pseud.): Pei-lu chi-lüeh p.213; Fang-lüeh ch.303 pp.9a-11b; Teng Ssu-yü: The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare pp.100-106.

Notes to Page 210.

1. Ch'en Te-ts'ai and the western column of the Northern Expedition reached Shensi in April 1862, took several towns and threatened Sian. They turned back on 25 May to come to the rescue of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng. Li Hsiu-ch'eng then sent him again to Shensi, possibly to take advantage of the Moslem unrest there. In 1864, when Nanking was in danger, he started to come east in three columns, but was held up on the border between Hupeh and Anhwei in June. When Nanking fell, his force was gradually surrounded; Ma Jung-ho went over to the enemy and Ch'en Te-ts'ai took poison. See Lo: Shih-kao pp.430-1.

2. This is an error for 'the 12th Year' [1862].

3. See above, page 193.

4. Any comment on this would involve an examination of the whole complicated question of Taiping administration in the Su-chou region, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. I intend to make a separate study of this.

5. Ch'en K'un-shu was appointed wang at the beginning of the Spring of 1862.

6. This is born out to a certain extent by the fact that Ch'en K'un-shu and T'ung Jung-hai were the first of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's subordinates to be made wang. Their achievements were by no means outstanding; their subsequent actions and Li Hsiu-ch'eng's opinion of them (see pages 166 & 211), show that they were not appointed on his recommendation. T'ung Jung-hai went over to the enemy (p. 212), Ch'en K'un-shu nearly did (see note 3 to p. 227) The policy of appointing many wangs is discussed by Li Hsiu-ch'eng in greater detail below, pages 234 ff.

Notes to Page 211.

1. In this sentence the character 家 may be an error for 稼 ; in which case Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably meant, 'I ordered that land which had not been planted was to be cultivated immediately.' The sentence is omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

2. Mid-April to mid-May 1862.

3. See note 1 to page 191 and note 4 to page 210.

4. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

5. In deleting this passage, Tseng Kuo-fan may well have been concerned to avoiding encouraging invidious comparison with his own position.

Notes to Page 212.

1. T'ung Jung-hai surrendered on 16 July 1862 (TC1/6/20). According to Shen Tzu, he was discontented with Li Hsiu-ch'eng, whose merit, he thought, was not as great as his own in the capture of Hang-chou. T'ung was given the title of Pao Wang, but Li Hsiu-ch'eng had kept it a secret. Shen Tzu presumably means that Li did not announce the promotion or inform T'ung of it. Instead, he had Ch'en Ping-wen, one of his favourites, promoted to T'ing Wang. As a result of this, T'ung Jung-hai left Hang-chou on 25 March with 2,400 men for the purpose of campaigning in Kiangsi; but in fact he remained at Yü-hang, where his troops engaged in depredation. See Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi pp.211-2. (The details of this account are not confirmed by other sources as far as I know).

When Pao Ch'ao attacked Ning-kuo in June 1862, T'ung Jung-hai was sent with a relieving force; but instead of fighting he immediately entered into negotiations with Pao Ch'ao, offering to give up Ning-kuo and deliver Yang Fu-ch'ing, the garrison commander, in return for a free pardon and permission to retain his force intact. Before the negotiations were completed however, Ning-kuo fell to Pao Ch'ao. T'ung Jung-hai then went to Kuang-te, which he took over when Yang Fu-ch'ing and Hung Jen-kan withdrew from the town. He then offered to give up Kuang-te and come over with 60,000 men. The matter was referred to Tseng Kuo-fan, who believed that T'ung could be trusted because he was already suspected by the Taiping leaders of disloyalty, having killed some Taiping officers in February. He eventually surrendered to Pao Ch'ao, having killed the officer sent by Li Hsiu-ch'eng to command the garrison at Kuang-te. He was rewarded with official rank; but Tseng Kuo-fan thought his force too large, and all but 3,000 were disbanded. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.16 p.16a and p.21.

2. After the fall of Su-chou to the Taipings, many gentry took refuge in Shanghai, and constituted a powerful lobby for the opening of a 'second front' against the Taipings in Kiangsu. Feng Kuei-fen (see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.241-3) played a prominent part in urging their case upon Tseng Kuo-fan. The capture of An-ch'ing by the Hunan Army in September 1861 was undoubtedly the most important single factor which allowed Tseng Kuo-fan to consider

the idea at all; but the rich source of revenue to be obtained from Shanghai was a vital consideration.

The anxiety of the refugee gentry from inland Kiangsu was aggravated when the Taipings over-ran Chekiang and captured Hang-chou. The local troops at Shanghai did not inspire confidence; Ward's force was small and expensive. Although Hsüeh Huan opposed the invitation of Tseng Kuo-fan to campaign in the area, his subordinate Wu Hsü, who held the purse strings, was in favour, and so were the foreign merchants.

In the winter of 1861 a representative of the Kiangsu gentry lobby, Ch'ien Ting-ming, saw Tseng Kuo-fan in An-ch'ing, perhaps after meeting Li Hung-chang and pointing out to him the financial advantages of having a base at Shanghai. Tseng Kuo-fan was evidently convinced by Ch'ien's eloquence and Li Hung-chang's interest in the idea, although he remained doubtful of the military value of sending troops into the Yangtse delta.

Once the decision was made, Tseng Kuo-fan began to pave the way for the replacement of Hsüeh Huan as Governor of Kiangsu by one of his own men. It was not difficult to convince the court that Hsüeh Huan should be removed, and Li Hung-chang was designated to take his post. In the meantime, Li Hung-chang united local militia units in Anhwei to form the Huai Army, which moved to An-ch'ing early in 1862. At the same time, pressure from the Shanghai lobby began to be applied to Tseng Kuo-fan through the court, and he was repeatedly urged to send troops to Chen-chiang and Shanghai. He hesitated for some time between a land expedition to Chen-chiang and the dangerous river voyage to Shanghai, until the arrival of steamers fired from foreign firms in April 1862 facilitated his decision. Li Hung-chang and his 2,500 troops of the Huai Army arrived in Shanghai on 8 April, by May the full complement of 6,500 had joined them. Li Hung-chang was appointed Governor of Kiangsu on 25 April (TC1/3/27). Although his orders were to proceed to Chen-chiang at once, he excused himself on the grounds of 'unfinished business.' Tseng Kuo-fan supported him in this, realizing the importance of his protege intrenching himself in Shanghai in order to tap its revenue. See Stanley Spector: Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, Washington 1964 pp.28-51.

3. The Shanghai customs revenue was about 200,000 liang per month at this time, according to Spector: op.cit. p.54. Hope to Admiralty, May 31 1862 gives more than £700,000 in 1861, which is more than 200,000 per month; see Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.42.

4. The origin of Ward's 'Foreign Rifles' is discussed in note 9 to page 188, and events previous to their attack on Chia-ting in note 2. After his defeat at Ch'ing-p'u in August 1860, Ward

spent some time consolidating his position in Sung-chiang and looking after his wounded. He was at this time very unpopular with British and French officials in Shanghai, and especially with the naval commanders, because his recruiting encouraged desertion from foreign ships. His Chinese backers were disappointed with his lack of success. Because of this, and in order to get surgical treatment, Ward left for France. When he returned several months later he intended to recruit Chinese rather than foreigners; but when he put his plan to Rear Admiral Sir James Hope, he was promptly arrested. Ward evaded the law, however, by claiming Chinese nationality, and was consequently discharged by the American Consular Court. In spite of this Sir James Hope continued to keep Ward prisoner on his flag-ship. Ward's 'army' defied Hope's move to disband it by force, and soon Ward himself escaped from custody. When he again put his plan to Hope for recruiting and drilling Chinese, and not encouraging deserters, it was approved. By February 1862 there were about 1,000 Chinese and 200 Manilamen in the force.

The previous year in March, Sir James Hope had led an expedition up the Yangtse to Nanking for the purpose of 'establishing an understanding with the rebel leaders'. One of the results of this was that the Taipings had agreed not to come within two days' march (about 30 miles) of Shanghai; see B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yangtze-kiang River, pp. 10-15. The Taipings later claimed that they had only agreed to keep this truce for one year, though Parkes denied this (ibid.p.103). In any case, during February the Taipings began to drawn in on Shanghai, and Sir James Hope decided to clear the 30 mile radius; see B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China pp.1-6. In view of the military need and of Ward's new recruiting policy, Hope became progressively more co-operative, and after the 'Foreign Rifles' had distinguished themselves in an engagement west of Shanghai in February, joint actions began, in which Ward's force fought in concert with British and French naval and military units. The British army commander, Sir J.Michel, formed a fairly favourable opinion of Ward's force, and considered that if it was supported, it could be 'the military nucleus of better things', (ibid.p.22). The first joint action was at P'u-tung, Shanghai on 15 February.

Aggressive action to clear the 30 mile radius began on 21 February, when Ward's force, supported by 700 British and French troops, attacked the town of Kao-ch'iao (Kajow), which was held by the Taipings. The attack was successful. On 27 and 28 February, the same force marched to Min-hang and engaged the Taipings at Hsiao-t'ang, at Ssu-ching on 14 March, at Lo-chia-kang in early April, and at Ssu-ching and Ch'i-pao on 17 April.

(This note is based on sources cited, and on Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer pp.137-172; Kuo: Jih-chih; and Wilson: The "Ever Victorious Army, Ch.VI.

5. The decision to occupy Chia-ting (Kading) and Ch'ing-p'u (Tsing-poo), together with Sung-chiang (Sung-keong), Nan-ch'iao (Najaor) and Che-lin (Tsao-lin) was taken by Sir James Hope, Brigadier-General Staveley, and Contre-Amiral Protet on 22 April. The document which they drew up reads:-

Agreed:-

1st. That it is necessary for the defence of Shanghae to occupy Kading, Tsing-poo, Sung-keong, Najaor, and Tsao-lin, by which means a district of country will be secured sufficient in extent to afford the supplies requisite for the support of its numerous population, and to keep the rebels at a distance, which will preclude the continuance of that state of alarm which has prevailed during the last few months, and which has been so detrimental to its commerce.

2nd. Colonel Ward at present occupies Sung-keong, and he undertakes, as soon as Tsing-poo is taken, to establish his head-quarters there, and to hold it. The Chinese authorities have undertaken, and will be required, to furnish sufficient garrisons for Kading, Najaor, and Tsao-lin, in each of the two first of which it will also be expedient to place 200 troops, half English and half French, in support of the Chinese, until Colonel Ward's force is sufficiently augmented to enable him to replace them by 300 of his men.

3rd. Previous to the capture of Kading and the other towns from the rebels, proper arrangements shall be made to prevent any men leaving their ranks for the purpose of pillage; and, subsequently, to collect whatever may be of value, in order to [ensure] its fair distribution amongst the troops, to whom the same is to be made known before the commencement of the operations.

4th. After the proposed operations have been brought to a successful conclusion, it is intended to retain at Shanghai 500 French Infantry; and of English, a half battery of Artillery, 250 European 350 Native Infantry.

(Signed) J. Hope, Vice-Admiral
C. Staveley, Brigadier-General
A. Protet, Contre-Amiral.

B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.27.

6. This would be about June 1862; in fact these events took place between the 2nd and 3rd Months by the Taiping calendar.

7. A detailed account of the capture of Chia-ting is given in Staveley's report to the War Office, dated 3 May 1862; see B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.28. Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer p.177, quotes the following from the account of

an eye-witness: "The scene was now most picturesque. A shell had set fire to part of the city close at hand. The early morning sun was shining pleasantly upon the fields, rich with ungathered crops. The French band played as the troops scaled the walls."

Ch'ing-p'u was taken on 13 May. Staveley's report is in B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China pp.33-4

8. This is an error; there were no foreign units present in this attack on T'ai-ts'ang (Taitsan), which was launched at the order of Hsüeh Huan on 17 May (TC1/4/19), and made by 'braves' under the command of the Prefect Li Ch'ing-ch'en; see Fang-lüeh ch.304 p.15a.

9. This was changed in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition to read "Ch'ing troops"; all other editions follow.

Notes to Page 213.

1. This possibly refers to events after the capture of Chia-ting, since foreigners did not take part in the attack on T'ai-ts'ang. At Chia-ting, according to the eye-witness quoted by Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer p.174, "An immense quantity of loot, consisting of silver, precious stones and fine clothing, was found... The British said that most of the looting was done by the French: 'Who seemed to be in the very best of humour that day, for they carried off everything that could be got away. It was a romantic sight to see the soldiery leaving the city, followed by bullocks, sheep, goats, boys and women - all considered as loot. One scene especially took our attention, a soldier of the Fifth French Regiment d'Afrique, dragging a donkey saddled in the Chinese way, loaded down with bundles of clothing and a young Chinese lady with small feet riding the same donkey. In fact the French troops showed a bad example to the new Chinese levies, committing all sorts of cruelties which were laid to Ward's force.'"

In a letter to Tseng Kuo-fan dated 19 April (TC1/3/21), Li Hung-chang complained that when they operated with government troops, the foreigners 'freely insulted and arbitrarily ordered them about - behaviour which the Hunan and Huai army troops are not likely to tolerate.' See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.1 p.13

2. The Taipings did however employ many individual foreigners, the best-known being A.F. Lindley. Other names are given in Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix pp.175-178.

3. For 四境 read 泗涇.

4. For 保 read 宝 .

5. In fact there were no foreign troops in Ssu-ching or Pao-shan.

6. In the first of Li Hung-chang's memorials which mention this operation, he reported the loss of the commander and of several officers, and that there were 'more than a hundred thousand' rebels; see Fang-lüeh ch.304 p.15a/b. Later he memorialized that more than half of Li Ch'ing-ch'eng's force of 5,000 men, had been destroyed; ibid.ch.306 p.10a. Sir James Hope wrote of this operation:

> ...Sich [sic, for Hsüeh Huan] the late Viceroy, collected a force stated at from 7,000 to 10,000 men, formed by withdrawing the troops encamped at Bissoo [Ch'i-p'u] and Takiteen [?] and part of the garrison at Paosham [Pao-shan], and advanced upon the town of Yaetnean [T'ai-ts'ang], about eighteen miles to the north-west of Kading [Chia-ting], with a view to effecting its capture.
>
> This operation was undertaken without communicating with the allies, and as the present Governor [Li Hung-chang] acquainted me, against his strong remonstrances to the contrary. The result was such as might have been expected; the Imperialist troops were defeated, and driven, with great loss, past Kading nearly to Paosham, to which a few returned, the remainder having dispersed.

See B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.42 The remainder of the Ch'ing troops who fled to Wu-sung were only saved by the presence of a British gun-boat, which 'repelled the pursuing Tae-pings with her shot and shell.' ibid. p.11, Medhurst to Bruce.

7. On 21 May the Taipings occupies Nan-hsiang, and cut communications between Chia-ting and Shanghai. 'Between that day and the 25th, when the greater part of their force moved off to the westward, the town [Chia-ting] was more or less surrounded by a large number of rebels estimated at not less than 25,000, and was attacked on several occasions, but without effect; ibid. p.53.

8. This is incorrect. The relief force, commanded by Brigadier-General Staveley, came from Che-lin and Nan-ch'iao by way of Shanghai, see below, note 1 to page 214.

9. I have guessed at the meaning of 具是和战.

Notes to Page 214.

1. Staveley left Shanghai on 24 May to relieve Chia-ting, where

provisions and ammunition were running short, and arrived at Nan-hsiang on the same day, where he was surrounded by a considerable force of Taipings, who were on their way to Ch'ing-p'u. "...the circumstances so convinced General Staveley of the imprudence of keeping any of his troops isolated in a city so easily cut off, that he determined on evacuating it at once. The garrison was accordingly ordered out, and the entire force returned to this place [Shanghai] shortly after. ... The authorities are much disappointed by the evacuation of Kading, and scarcely know what to make of it. The civil and military officers who had been placed in charge positively refused to leave the city, and had to be taken prisoners and forced to come away with the foreign garrison..." B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.12. A very prolix account of the event by Staveley follows, ibid. pp. 14-15. For Li Hung-chang's comment on this, see Tsou-kao ch.1 p.19.

2. The Taiping attack on Ch'ing-p'u began on 28 May (TC1/5/1).

3. The Taipings attacked Chia-ting on 28 May. The town was defended by local 'braves' and by 1,500 of the 'Ever-Victorious Army' (E.V.A.), as Ward's force was now called, under 'Colonel' Edward Forrester. Li Hsiu-ch'eng does not make it clear that two relief forces were sent, one on 29 May (see note 4, below) and one on 10 June (see note 5, below).

4. This evidently refers to Ward's first attempt to relieve Ch'ing-p'u. "Colonel Ward went to Tsing-poo [from Sung-chiang] with the intention of placing some ammunition in that town. I accompanied Colonel Ward with a view to ascertain [sic] the state of affairs at Tsing-poo. The expedition failed in consequence of the only gun that Colonel Ward could get into position bursting after the fourth round." Captain Montgomerie to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, June 7, 1862 in B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.20. Li Hung-chang memorialized that Ward had gone to the relief of Ch'ing-p'u with two steamers, and on 29 May had begun to shell the town; but after three rounds the cannon blew up. Twenty-thousand rebels swarmed up, and Ward had to withdraw. See Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.1 p.20a.

5. The second attempt to relieve Ch'ing-p'u was on 10 June, when "200 men of the 31st Regiment under Colonel Spence, the naval brigade under Admiral Hope, and Ward himself with two steamers and some of his men, went up to relieve Singpoo and withdraw its garrison." See Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.86. Ch'ing-p'u was abandoned at the insistence of Admiral Hope, although both Ward and Forrester were willing to hold on. It seems that the garrison might have made their escape unnoticed had not the order been given to fire part of the town in order to put up a smoke-screen.

"This gave notice to the Taipings that their enemies were retreating and they rushed the city. The retreat was turned into a running fight. In crossing the unbridged ditches and canals around Tsingpu, Ward's men lost heavily. The confusion of the retreat was so great that no one knew just what was happening." Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer p.188.

6. According to the official record, Ssu-ching was taken by the Taipings on 5 June, before the recovery of Ch'ing-p'u, see Kuo: Jih-chih p.905.

7. The Taiping attack on Sung-chiang began on 30 May. The stockades outside the town, manned by Ch'ing troops, were taken on 2 June; see below, note 9.

8. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads 'more than ten'.

9. An account of this engagement from the British side is quoted extensively below for the purpose of comparison.

> Colonel Ward returned to Sung-keong on the afternoon of the 30th ultimo [May]. On the morning of that day, about 5.30 a.m., the rebels attacked Sung-keong with considerable determination on the north-east side with a force of about 1,500 men, but were successfully repulsed by the "Centaur's" men, who were the only people on the wall at the time of the attack. One rebel succeeded in scaling the walls; he fired a double-barrelled gun at Robert Stephens, seaman, who shot him. To this man's conduct, and the quick manner the "Centaur's" men came to the walls, I attribute the success of the repulse without casualties on our side, and a loss to the rebels of about 100 men. Among the killed were two Europeans; three were seen. The rebels were armed with rifles and gingalls. Their method of scaling was, two bamboos secured together at either end, about two feet apart, placed against the wall; the man coming up was assisted by two men below shoving him up the centre with another bamboo, the scaler helping himself with the uprights. ...
>
> I visited Colonel Ward, on the 31st May, the Imperialist camps being formed on the creek leading to the river. On the following day, these camps were in a very defensible state, with guns in position and men tolerably well armed.
>
> On the 1st June, owing to the near approach of large bodies of rebels, the suburbs were fired to a considerable extent round the walls. This work was performed by men protected by covering parties outside and men on the walls.
>
> On the 2nd June, about 3.30 p.m., I observed that the Imperialists were driven out of their camps by the rebels, and shortly

afterwards I made out that my second gig was in their hands, as also several of Colonel Ward's gunboats, some of which were laden with muskets and kegs of gunpowder. A sortie party was formed; I took about 150 of his men, and went out by the south gate, proceeding to that part of the creek where the capture had been made. On our approach with a fire from the rifles and the field-piece as soon as it could be got into position, the rebels began to move away rapidly, and the boats were recaptured. The rebels, of whom several were killed and wounded, were followed up a short distance. They dropped a considerable number of captured muskets; they, however, succeeded in carrying off between 300 and 400 muskets out of 560, and 36 kegs of powder out of 218. Getting dusk, I returned to the city, keeping up a fire to the rear, as the rebels continued to fire on us. I could not find any trace of the gig's crew. About 9 o'clock, I succeeded in getting all the boats into the city by the west Water Gate.

On the 3rd June I heard of the safety of the gig's crew and some Europeans who were in the gun-boats.

On the 3rd, 4th and 5th of June, several attempts were made to storm the city, and a battery was thrice erected by the rebels outside the West Gate, with which they opened fire in the morning, but on each occasion they were successfully destroyed by guns from the city.

On the morning of the 5th June, Chung Wang sent a letter to Colonel Ward, demanding that the city might be delivered up to him, to which of course no answer was made....

In the evening, large bodies of rebels were observed moving northward in the direction of Su-keen.

See B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China, p.20 Montgomerie to Hope.

Notes to Page 215.

1. At this time the British did indeed stop operations in the vicinity of Shanghai. The reason which Staveley gave to Hope was 'the utter inability of the Chinese authorities to provide garrisons for the town captured from the rebels - the principal condition on which our agreement [to clear the 30 mile radius] was based, and as the force at my command is insufficient to hold them, even if assisted by out French allies, I shall confine myself especially, now that the hot season has set in, to the immediate defence of Shanghai.' (Staveley to Hope, Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China, p.29). But the Taipings were not alone in thinking that 'the foreign devils did not dare to do battle...'

Tso Tsung-t'ang wrote to Tseng Kuo-fan, and the latter repeated to the court, that the foreigners' withdrawal from Ch'ing-p'u and Chia-ting 'shows that they are just as frightened of the rebels as we are.' See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.16 p.9b. Li Hung-chang also commented that the foreigners dared not come out and fight the rebels, see Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.1 p.20a.

2. At this time Li Hung-chang considered that Shanghai might be held, but not Ch'ing-p'u and Sung-chiang, see Lo: Chien-cheng p.283.

3. The dates of the capture of these places by the Hunan Army are as follows:- Wu-hu on 20 May 1862, Ch'ao-hsien on 18 April, Wu-wei and Yün-ts'ao about 24 March, Tung-liang-shan on 19 May (the day Tseng Kuo-ch'üan crossed the Yangtse), Hsi-liang-shan on 22 April, T'ai-p'ing-kuan (i.e. Chin-chu-kuan in T'ai-p'ing-fu) on 19 May and Ho-chou on 20 April.

4. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan took Mo-ling-kuan [see Map IV] (whose garrison surrendered) on 28 May, and on 30 May, with a force of a little over 10,000 men, supported by the river force of the Hunan Army, began to fortify positions at Yü-hua-t'ai, about 4 li from Nanking; see Kuo: Jih-chih pp.902-3. The speed of this advance came as a surprise to the Taipings, according to Hung Jen-kan: Deposition p.854 in TPTK II, and Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-chün chi-lüeh p.29b.

At this time the troops under Tseng Kuo-fan's general command were as follows:-

(1) On the southern front: Tso Tsung-t'ang in Chekiang commanding a force of something over 10,000 men.

(2) Eastern front: Li Hung-chang, based on Shanghai, with 6,500 Huai and Hunan Army troops, Kiangsu troops, and the E.V.A.

(3) Eastern front: four ying of the Hunan Army water force in Kiangsu, co-ordinating with Li Hung-chang.

(4) Centre: Tseng Kuo-ch'üan commanding between 10,000 and 20,000 (later rising to 50,000) besieging Nanking.

(5) Centre: the main Hunan Army water force in the Yangtse, supporting the siege of Nanking.

(6) Centre: units of the Hunan Army under Tseng Chen-kan (a younger brother of Kuo-fan), sent from An-ch'ing first to take Wu-hu and then join Tseng Kuo-ch'üan.

(7) Centre: Hunan Army units (called the T'ing Chün) under Pao Ch'ao in southern Anhwei, moving to attack Ning-kuo.

(8) Rear: Hunan Army units under Chang Yün-lan and others in southern Anhwei, to cut off Taiping relief for Nanking.

(9) Northern front: Hupeh troops under To-lung-ah attacking Lu-chou.

(10) Northern: Hunan Army units under Li Hsü-i in Northern Anhwei.

(11) Troops under Yuan Chia-san co-operating with To-lung-ah.
(12) Li Shih-chung's troops holding Chiang-p'u.
(13) Tu-hsing-ah commanding the garrison at Yang-chou.
(14) Troops under Feng Tzu-ts'ai holding Chen-chiang.

The rapid advance of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to Nanking was made possible by the weakness of the Taipings in northern Anhwei after the departure of their Northern Expedition. Ch'en Yü-ch'eng was besieged in Lu-chou, (see note 8 to page 209). Miao P'ei-lin had gone over to the enemy and Chang Lo-hsing was not a serious threat. On the south bank, Huang Wen-chin, Liu Kuan-fang and Yang Fu-ch'ing were all held in check by Pao Ch'ao, as was Li Shih-hsien by Tso Tsung-t'ang in Chekiang. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was occupied with his campaign in the Shanghai region. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.2185-2188 and Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.133.

5. Tseng Kuo-fan presumably deleted the four characters 何人敢違 to avoid drawing attention to the fact that he frequently disobeyed imperial edicts.

6. On 17 June 1862 (TC1/5/21) Li Hsiu-ch'eng launched his third attack on Shanghai with fifty or sixty thousand men, but after being defeated on 22 June, his army withdrew on the following day, both from Shanghai and from Sung-chiang, leaving only small garrisons at Chia-ting, T'ai-ts'ang and Ch'ing-p'u; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III. p.2016.

7. According to Hsü Yao-kuang, Li Hsiu-ch'eng held a military meeting at Su-chou on 22 June, which was attended by Ch'en Ping-wen, T'an Shao-kuang, Kao Yung-k'uan, Hu Ting-wen, T'ang Cheng-ts'ai, Li Ming-ch'eng and others. Another meeting was held on 6 August (TC1/7/11), attended by Mo Shih-k'uei, Liu Kuan-fang, Ku Lung-hsien, Huang Wen-chin, Fan Ju-tseng and Lu Shun-te. Li Hsiu-ch'eng implies in this paragraph that at the first of these meetings his plan for raising the siege of Nanking in two years' time was discussed. The second meeting was necessitated by the arrival of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's messenger, Mo Shih-k'uei, and the plan for the immediate relief of the capital was drawn up. Hsü Yao-kuang mentions that a record of these meetings was published by the Taipings, with a preface by Li Hsiu-ch'eng. This is confirmed by Tseng Kuo-fan. Unfortunately, though Hsü saw the book, no copies have come to light. See Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che p.584; Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi TC1/9/20 p.1431; Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi pp.88-90 and Kuo: Jih-chih pp.911-2.

8. In the tops margin at this point, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote, 'That is, Ma Jung-ho.' This refers to the centre column of the Taipings' 1862 Northern Expedition, led by Ma (see note 8 to page 209). But

Li Hsiu-ch'eng was presumably referring more particularly to Ch'en Te-ts'ai, whom he had sent to the northwest to collect troops, see note 1 to page 210.

9. In the original:正當議楚... The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has 正當議定

Notes to Page 216.

1. For 莫仕蔡 read 莫仕睽 . Mo Shih-k'uei, the Pu Wang, was formerly a shih-wei (Imperial Bodyguard). At this time he was head of the Taiping Board of Punishments (刑部), see Lo: Chien-cheng p.284.

2. In the original 無心在揚, which is probably an error for 心不在焉

3. In fact Li Hsiu-ch'eng had, up to this point, only written 25,156 characters, see page 38.

4. The last two characters on this page of the manuscript do not, as Lü Chi-i assumes (see Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen, typeset edition p.83) join up with the next page. Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably continued the sentence on the back cover of the first notebook, which may have been removed when the two sections were bound together. It is unlikely that anything very much is missing here, since Li Hsiu-ch'eng complained in this passage that his brush was ruined, and the next page was obviously written with a new brush.

5. For 覓 read 覽 .

6. For 紉 read 幼 .

7. This is not entirely accurate, see above page 143.

8. For 不故 read 不過 .

Notes to Page 217.

1. Perhaps this is the sense of the four characters 不知不及 written between the lines.

2. The plan for the relief of Nanking was that Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself should lead the main column in a direct attack on Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's positions; another column under Huang Wen-chin and

other would attack Ning-kuo in order to immobilize Pao Ch'ao's army, while the thirdTaiping column under Ch'en K'un-shu, would march east from Ch'ang-chou, making for Wu-hu and Chin-chu-kuan, in order to cut communications between Tseng Kuo-ch'üan and Ning-kuo. See Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo p.359.

3. Particularly to T'an Shao-kuang and Ch'en Ping-wen.

Notes to Page 218.

1. This section, punctuated and not marked for deletion by Tseng Kuo-fan, was omitted in the printed edition, and overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

2. The 8th Month in the Taiping calendar was from 12 September to 11 October. In fact Li Hsiu-ch'eng set out from Su-chou on 14 September 1862 (TC1/8/21).

3. There are various estimates as to the size of the Taiping force in this operation. They are discussed in Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.2216. The most likely figure is about 200,000, which is the estimate most frequently given by Tseng Kuo-fan; see, for instance, Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao pp. 92, 93, 94. Hsü Yao-kuang: T'an Che p.594, mentions the figure of 600,000. This refers to the whole force Li Hsiu-ch'eng could command for the relief of Nanking, and is probably exaggerated. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's force numbered about 30,000; see Wang K'ai-yün: Hsiang-chün chih V p.15a.

4. Tseng Kuo-fan added 餘 after 三四十. The Taipings established stockades between Fang Shan (T'ien-yin Shan) and Pan-ch'iao, Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.2217; their attack began on 13 October (TC1/intercalary 8/20) and lasted until 26 November (TC1/10/5) - about 45 days.

5. This presumably refers to bridges over the various moats which formed part of the 'besieging works'. These are described in a report by C.G. Gordon on his journey up the Yangtse, summarized in Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army" pp.282-3. There was also a roadway about three miles long, made of brushwood and fascines, crossing a morass to the northeast of the city, according to Gordon.

6. That the Hunan Army was better armed at this time is not born out by contemporary accounts. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan claimed that 20,000 of the Taipings were equipped with foreign muskets (or rifles), see his letter to Kuo K'un-t'ao, quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng

p.287. Tseng Kuo-fan went even further, and in several letters referred to a force of 200,000+ rebels, 'none of them without foreign arms' (洋人火器無一不備); see Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao pp.100, 104, 106, or '...using entirely foreign guns [muskets or rifles] cannon and shell' (ibis. p.97). Both these claims would seem greatly exaggerated; but we do know that the Taipings had captured foreign weapons in considerable quantities (see note 9 to page 214), and that they had been buying foreign arms for some time (see Fang-lüeh ch.221 p.14a). As to the weapons of the Hunan Army, even in 1864 Gordon noted that 'the men looked well, strong and healthy, and seemed to be in good spirits, but were not well armed, spears and Chinese lances being far more numerous than muskets.' (Gordon's report of a journey up the Yangtse, 30 June 1864. Manuscript in the British Museum).

7. This is hardly an adequate explanation for Li Hsiu-ch'eng's failure in this campaign, in which the odds were so unequal. The lack of winter clothes and supplies point to a deficiency in organization (since the Taiping supply lines were not long) which may have been connected with Li Hsiu-ch'eng's general lack of enthusiasm for the task which Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had obliged him to undertake. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this failure was symptomatic of the period of Taiping decline, in which huge rebel armies, no longer united and disciplined, were unable to make headway against smaller and more determined enemy forces.

In this operation the Taipings had a numerical advantage of over six to one (see note 3 above). In fact this advantage was considerably greater, since the Hunan Army in southern Anhwei was at this time severely stricken with the plague. In Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's army too three out of ten died of the plague, and half of the remainder were convalescent at the time of the Taiping attack; see Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's letter to Kuo K'un-t'ao, quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng p.287, and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.16 p.27a/b. Nearly ten thousand of Pao Ch'ao's men were down with the plague, see Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao p.92. But there is no record of the Taiping armies having been affected at this time. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was moreover, supported by an army under Li Shih-hsien, which set out on 7 October from Chekiang (Kuo: Jih-chih). The Taipings had the advantage of superior armament; they had the initiative in attacking an enemy in fixed positions, and in attacking both from Nanking and from outside. They had experience of previous sieges of this kind and must have known the territory much better than Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, who had only arrived a few months previously.

The Taipings attacks were made by direct assault, concentrated mainly on the eastern and western flanks, and by mining in order to breach the Huan Army defence works. All their attempts were fruitless and the Taipings must have become thoroughly discouraged

by the obstinate resistance of their enemy. On 3 November they suffered six or seven thousand casualties (the figure is Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's and probably exaggerated), and after about 11 November, Taiping attacks during the daytime eased off, though they still tried to wear out the enemy at night by mining and skirmishing (see Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao p.100). It appears that at this time it was their intention to reduce the enemy by attrition, by attacking day and night for three months; see P'eng Yü-lin's letter to Tseng Kuo-fan in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.234, based on the reports of captured Taipings.

Li Hsiu-ch'eng evidently abandoned the campaign because of the defeat of his commanders (T'an Shao-kuang, Ch'en Ping-wen, and Huang Tzu-lung) at Shanghai on 13 November. On 25 November Li Hsiu-ch'eng withdrew sixty or seventy thousand troops from Nanking and sent them back to defend his home base in the Yangtse delta; on the following day he abandoned the attempt to raise the siege of Nanking by direct assault. The official record claimed a great military victory for the Hunan Army on this day, but Chu Hung-chang, who was there, does not mention a battle (see Ts'ung-chün chi-lüeh).

It is clear from the tone of Tseng Kuo-fan's letters that he was extremely worried for the safety of Teng Kuo-ch'üan and his army, and at one time even urged his brother to withdraw to Wu-hu; see Hail: Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion pp.273-4.

For a detailed description of the whole campaign, see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.2214-2226. Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial reporting the attack is in Tsou-kao ch.17 pp.9b-11b.

8. The exact nature of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's demotion is not clear.

9. In spite of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's expressed unwillingness to undertake this campaign, its fundamental concept does not seem to have differed greatly from his own belief that a direct confrontation with the siege force at Nanking should be avoided. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's orders were for him to regain the rich rice-growing area of Wu-wei, Lu-chou and Ho-chou, while Li Shih-hsien was to attack Wu-hu, Chin-chu-kuan, in order to get the grain from the region of T'ai-p'ing and Ning-kuo; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.8. At the same time the Taipings undoubtedly wanted to take advantage of the comparatively small government forces to the north of the Yangtse (ibid.ch.17 p.13b), and of the presence of their Nien allies and the Taipings troops on the Norther Expedition.

10. Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself did not cross the Tangtse until late March 1863. Between the end of the 45-day battle to relieve Nanking (26 November 1862) and this date, little is known of his precise movements. He is said to have returned to Su-chou on 11

January, according to Kuo: Jih-chih, although Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.236, gives the date as 4 February. On 19 January he went to attack Ch'ang-shu (Kiangsu), the Taiping commander of which, Lo Kuo-chung, had surrendered the town to the enemy on 16 or 17 January. On 14 February he was at T'ai-ts'ang, where the 'Ever-Victorious Army' had just been defeated. Between 16 and 22 February he was laying siege to Ch'ang-shu once more.

Notes to Page 219.

1. P'u-k'ou was taken by Wu Ju-hsiao and Huang Ch'ung-fa on 22 March 1863 (TC2/2/4) and Chiang-p'u on 3 April (TC2/2/16). In fact Li Hsiu-ch'eng crossed after the capture of P'u-k'ou but before that of Chiang-p'u. According to Tu-hsing-ah, he had seventy or eighty thousand troops, see Fang-lüeh ch.327 p.13ff.

2. On 1 December (TC1/10/10) a Taiping force under Lin Shao-chang, Hung Ch'un-yuan, Kao Yung-k'uan and Li Hsiu-ch'eng's son Jung-fa, began crossing the Yangtse from Nanking to Chiu-fu-chou, where they remained hidden in the reeds until 8 December, and then launched an attack on Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou)'s positions at P'u-k'ou and Chiu-fu-chou. Taiping troops continued to cross while this attack was going on, and advanced towards Ch'ao-hsien. On 18 December Hung Ch'un-yuan took Han-shan, while Li Jung-fa attacked Chiang-p'u; on the following day Hung took Ch'ao-hsien and on 21 December, Ho-chou. On the same day Li Jung-fa gave up his attack on Chiang-p'u and moved eastwards, On 27 December Hung Ch'un-yuan took T'ung-ch'eng-chia; on 29 December he attacked Yün-ts'ao and on 13 January, Wu-wei. After this however, reinforcemeents were sent by Tseng Kuo-fan and Hung was beaten back, on on 9 February was forced to give up T'ung-ch'eng-chia.

Tseng Kuo-fan reported the number of Taiping troops involved in this campaign as fifty or sixty thousand; see Tsou-kao ch.17 p.17a; Tu-hsing-ah reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had crossed with seventy or eighty thousand (see note 1 above); Li Shih-chung reprted that the enemy was eighty or ninety thousand strong, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.17 p.17b.

3. Before Li Hsiu-ch'eng's arrival on the north bank in March, he had sent another force across on 27 February under Ch'en K'un-shu, Wu Ju-hsiao and Huang Ch'ung-fa. This force attacked Li Shih-chung's positions at Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou on 16 March, see note 1 above. Li Hsiu-ch'eng arrived at Ch'ao-hsien on 31 March 1863.

4. Wang Hung-chien was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's secretary before the capture

of Su-chou, after which he was in charge of the administration of Wu-hsien. On this expedition he was responsible for supplies; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.290.

5. This implies that the despoiling was done by the previous occupants, the Hunan Army. There is evidence that this was the case, and that here, as was often the case with other regions, the process of suppression was the most destructive part of the rebellion. The whole question of the responsibility for the very considerable destruction which resulted from the Taipings rebellion and its suppression, is discussed in Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao ch.17, and in Lo: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-chi tsai-ting miu-chi, Peking 1955 pp.9-46. Both authorities conclude that Tseng Kuo-fan employed a 'scorched-earth' policy, as does Ho Ping-ti: Studies in the Population of China, 1368-1953, Harvard 1959, p.237. In a memorial of TC2/2/27 (14 April 1863) Tseng Kuo-fan accused the Taipings of being to blame for the state of devastation in Anhwei, but his remarks give grounds for suspecting that the destruction may have been caused by those who benefitted from it: "When the rebels campaign in regions bereft of people, they are like fish in places where there is not water; when they occupy land where there is no [longer any] cultivation, they are like birds on a treeless mountain." See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.9a.

6. Shih-chien-pu was held by Hunan Army units under Mao Yu-ming and Lu Lien-chien. The Taipings attacked on 18 April, according to Tseng Kuo-fan, ibid. ch.18 p.11b.

7. They may have been infected with the plague which had previously ravaged the Hunan Army, see note 7 to page 218.

8. When Shih-chien-pu was cut off by the Taipings, Tseng Kuo-fan sent Pao Ch'ao to its relief, and Tseng Kuo-ch'üan sent five ying from Nanking; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.11. Pao Ch'ao arrived at Wu-wei on 5 May 1863 (TC2/3/16) and at Shih-chien-pu on the following day. By this time however, the relief force sent by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, under P'eng Yü-chü and Hsian Ch'ing-yen, had arrived, together with units of the Hunan Army water force, and the garrison at Shih-chien-pu broke out of the Taiping encirclement, destroyed their stockades, and joined up with the relief force. Pao Ch'ao did not take part in this engagement, but re-embarked, intending to make for Kiangsi; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.15b. An account of the Taiping siege of Shih-chien-pu, in Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh lüeh (Chien-chi I) p.394, confirms that the Ch'ing troops were at first ordered to 'hold firm in their stockades and see what moves [the rebels] would make'.

9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's advance guard arrived at Lu-chiang on 29 April

(TC2/3/12), and the Taiping attack, which only lasted one day, was on 6 May (TC2/3/19). Shu-ch'eng was attacked on 8 May. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's vanguard arrived at Liu-an on 10 May, the main army on the 11th, and the attack began on 12 May (TC2/3/25).

10. When Tseng Kuo-fan heard that on withdrawing from Shih-chien-pu, Li Hsiu-ch'eng had not returned to Ch'ao-hsien, but had moved on Lu-chiang, he hastily ordered Pao Ch'ao to the relief of the town. By this time Tseng Kuo-fan had acquired some Taiping despatches, from which he learned that it was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's intention to go by way of Shu-ch'eng and Liu-an to Ying-shan, Ho-shan, Ma-ch'eng and Sung-pu, then to divide into two columns, one to attack Huang-chou and the other Hankow, in order to relieve pressure on Nanking; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 pp.15b-16a. Chao Lieh-wen gives slightly more detail of these captured Taiping documents, which were from Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Jen-kan. In them this operation was called 'advancing in the north in order to attack in the south' (進南攻北). There was very little grain in the capital, according to these despatches, and the Taiping intended to press on beyond Wu-han to Ching-chou and Hsiang-yang, for recruiting purposes. After the departure of this expedition the Taipings expected to be attacked at Ho-chou, Han-shan and Chiu-fu-chou; this did not cause much anxiety because Tseng Kuo-fan's troops were considered to be adequate in defence but weak in attacking. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.268. For Tseng Kuo-fan's comment on this assessment, see Shu-cha ch.21 p.12

11. In his attack on Liu-an (begun on 12 May), Li Hsiu-ch'eng was joined by units under Ma Jung-ho and Chang Ch'ung. The attack was abandoned on 19 May. For a description of the fighting, see Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chien-lüeh p.395.

Notes to Page 220.

1. See note 1 to page 210.

2. On 19 May 1863 (TC2/4/2).

3. In the manuscript this sentence reads 食草充饑如何為力. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition the character 草 is replaced by 不 .

4. After their withdrawal from Liu-an, the Taipings were harassed by Ch'ing troops under Pao Ch'ao and Liu Lien-chien, and entered the district of T'ien-ch'ang on 2 June.
On 12 June (TC2/4/27), Tseng Kuo-ch'üan captured the stone forts

at Yü-hua-t'ai and outside the Chü Pao Gate of Nanking. According to Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial of TC2/5/12, Kuo-ch'üan attacked these strongholds at the request of Li Hung-chang, who feared that Li Hsiu-ch'eng's whole force would attempt to relieve the pressure on Su-chou. Tseng Kuo-ch'üan himself hoped it would prevent Li Hsiu-ch'eng from attacking Yang-chou and penetrating Li-hsia-ho (裡下河), the part of Kiangsu north of the Yangtse and east of the Grand Canal. The Tseng brothers were indeed surprised that he did not do so, and questioned him about it after his capture; see Appendix I, page 263. For descriptions of the Taiping forts at Yü-hua-t'ai, see T'iao-fu tao-jen (Pseud.): Chin-ling tsa-chi p.633 and Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.262.

5. The Hunan Army recovered Tung-kuan in Wu-wei on 27 May, Ch'ao-hsien on 8 June. Hung Ch'un-yuan retreated to Ho-chou. On 10 June, Pao Ch'ao took Han-shan and on the following day (TC2/4/25) took Ho-chou, after the withdrawal of the Taipings.

6. Li Hsiu-ch'eng received this order at T'ien-ch'ang on 10 June 1863, according to Kuo: Jih-chih, p.995.

7. P'u-k'ou was given up by the Taipings in the general panic following the loss of Ch'ao-hsien, Han-shan, Ho-chou and Yü-hua-t'ai. The Taiping garrison at Chiang-p'u offered to surrender, but Pao Ch'ao and Liu Lien-chien feared a trick and attacked on 24 June; the garrison then fled. See Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lüeh p.398.

8. Chiu-fu-chou was normally flooded during the summer months.

9. Tseng Kuo-fan changed 'Chiu-shuai' to 'General Tseng'; only he, not his younger brother, could give orders to the river force.

10. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this was changed to read: 'Just at this time the river troops under Yang [Yueh-pin] and P'eng [Yü-lin] came to the attack'.

11. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has, 'Hsia-kuan was also taken by the water forces'. A.F.Lindley, who was near Nanking at the time, wrote: "During several days preceding the arrival of the remnant of the Chung Wang's troops, the enemy had maintained an incessant attack upon the batteries and forts commanding the passage of the river, and had particularly concentrated their efforts against a large fort on the opposite side, the capture of which would have paced the whole north bank in their hands, and would have cut off all retreat". see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.620. The decision to attack the Taiping positions at Hsia-kuan was taken 'because

Chiu-fu-chou was in the midst of a torrential flood and the rebel fort would be very difficult to take by surprise'. The eight Taiping stockades at Hsia-kuan and Ts'ao-hsieh-chia were taken on 28 June 1863. See Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lüeh p.398.

12. The following is P'eng Yü-lin's account of this debacle:

> After the stone forts at Yü-hua-t'ai had all been taken, the rebels feared that the government troops would launch a big attack against the city [Nanking]; also, because of the loss of K'un-[shan] and Hsin-[yang], they feared that troops from Shanghai would lay siege to Su-[chou]. Li Hsiu-ch'eng and the other rebel wangs hurriedly changed their plans and decided to mount a relieving expedition from Chiang-pei, to relieve both nearby Chin-ling and distant Su-chou. Consequently the [rebel] sieges of T'ien-ch'ang, Liu-an and Lai-an were raised one after the other, and the mobs crossed over the the south. The rebels who were stationed at Ch'iao-lin and Hsiao-tien, on the 5th Day of the 5th Month [20 June], seized boats in the pouring rain and dashed across, so that there was a constant clamour of shouting in the river. Hsiao Ch'ing-yen, judging that the rebel mobs at Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou were not very resolute, sent cavalry to attack them. But half-way there they heard that the rebels at P'u-k'ou had already given up the town and fled. The rebels at Chiang-p'u sent a letter to the camp offering to surrender, but Pao Ch'ao and Liu Lien-chien suspected a trick, and on the 9th Day [24 June], led their forces to the attack. Hsiao Ch'ing-yen came by way of Wu-chiang and joined up with the various river units, meeting Li Ch'ao-pin's river detachment from T'ai-hu, which was on its way to Shanghai and going past Chin-ling at the time. On the 10th Day [25 June], Li Ch'ao-pin sent his officers Wu Kuei-fang, Li Chu-fa and Chiang Fu-shan to take boats and dash down-river, first to occupy P'u-k'ou and wipe out the remainder of the rebel Chung [Wang]'s force which had not crossed. Your Official Yü-lin took three ying...[names omitted] into the inner rivers, but unexpectedly, when the units reached Chiang-p'u [they found that] the rebels had got wind [of their approach] and had fled. Joining up with the infantry, they then recaptured Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou, pursued and got in front of the fleeing rebels, who made for Chiu-fu-chou but were not admitted into the rebel fort on the island. Our gun-boats blocked the river and attacked them so that they could not cross. In fear they attempted to hide or escaped amongst the reeds, not knowing that in the thickest part of the reeds the water is ten feet or several tens of feet deep, because of the canal dug there in the Tao Kuang period [to defend] against the barbarians, and that dug by Chang

> Kuo-liang against the rebels, which criss-crossed [the island]. Men and horses rushing there were all drowned, their bodies amounting to the number of several myriad. On the 11th Day [26 June] the surviving rebels were moaning with hunger on the river bank. Cut off by the new canals, they could not return to the north bank, and cut off by the Yangtse, they could not cross to the south bank. The water forces then landed and kept attacking them the whole day. Half of their number ran upon our swords and were killed, the remainder jumped into the water and were drowned. ... This is what happened at the capture of Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou on the 10th Day of the 5th Month [20 June].

See P'eng Kang Chih Kung tsou-kao ch.1, quoted in Lo:Chien-cheng pp.292-3.

A.F.Lindley, who assisted the Taipings in this crossing, gives a vivid description of the event in Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.619-626. According to him, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force had numbered 50,000 men, 'while numberless refugees, prisoners, coolies, and others, far more than doubled these figures'; but only 15,000 'effective men' survived the attempted crossing.

Notes to Page 221.

1. This does not do the foreign mercenaries an injustice. A. E. Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.8 wrote:

> They did not fight for country, for honour, for glory. They fought for money, plunder, loot, whatever they could get out of the scramble. If the rebel chief had offered them a better price they would have taken it and fought on the other side with pleasure. They had nothing to lose: their past would hardly bear minute inspection, and as for their future, they did not care for that. Few would have hoped for a decent death; and to many the prospect of a pair or gallows must have looked quite honourable and inviting.
>
> But there was no need for them to join the Heavenly King [Hung Hsiu-ch'üan]. They had it all their own way. They attacked the outlying rebel holds, and when they had beaten out the enemy, they simply helped themselves: they grabbed anything and everything they could lay their hands on, stores, treasures, provisions, arms, even gongs and musical boxes. They desecrated the temples. They tore the jewels from the idols, and kicked the fallen gods into the streets. And when they returned from a raid, they did not politely hand over these perquisites to their masters, they did not give them away. Not at all. They kept all they could, and sold the rest. And if there was anything over they burnt or threw it away.

2. For 言後 read 然後.

3. In the autumn of 1863, see page 227.

4. This was added by Tseng Kuo-fan.

5. According to information received by Li Hung-chang, there was only enough grain in the Taiping capital to last through the 1st. or 2nd. Months of TC 3 (i.e. until about the end of March 1864), see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.24a.

6. This proposal was made, according to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, in the 11th Month of the 13th Year, that is, between mid-December 1863 and mid-January 1864. Later in the deposition (see page 228), Li Hsiu-ch'eng referred to the loss of Su-chou (6 December) and of Wu-hsi (12 December), after which he returned to Nanking by night and petitioned on the following day, 21 December, in these terms. News of his proposal reached the government side, and Chao Lieh-wen recorded in his diary on TC2/11/19 (29 December) that Tseng Kuo-ch'üan had informed him that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had strongly urged the T'ien Wang to give up 'their lair' [Nanking] and go elsewhere; but Hung had refused. Li Hsiu-ch'eng then 'wanted to go off alone from the city, some say to start by attacking Chin-chu-kuan, some say that he intended to go to the Chien-p'ing, Kuang-te region in order to encroach upon the Anhwei-Kiangsi border; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.302. Tseng Kuo-fan reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had urged the abandonment of the rebel capital and commented that in his opinion Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was unlikely to agree, see Tsou-kao ch.19 p.27a. About this time also Li Hung-chang wrote to Tseng Kuo-fan, saying that the Na Wang Kao Yung-k'uan, who had surrendered at Su-chou (see page 227) and the Ch'ao Wang Huang Tzu-lung, captured at Wu-hsi, had testified that Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended to go by way of Ning-kuo and Ch'ang yü-shan into Kiangsi, thence into Hupeh, in order to meet up with Ch'en Te-ts'ai; see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.24a.

The first of these accounts hints at, the second states clearly, that Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended to reach Hupeh and join up with Ch'en Te-ts'ai by taking the route south of the Yangtze. This presumably was a point of dispute with Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, who ordered Li Hsiu-ch'eng to take the northern route (see page 223). But from neither account can we tell what specific proposals were made if the Taiping capital was to be given up and a new base found. Lo Erh-kang has equated the two proposals - that Nanking was to be given up and that a junction be effected with Ch'en Te-ts'ai - he has assumed that the new base was to be somewhere in the northwest and that the new plan mentioned by Li Hung-chang involved the abandonment of Nanking; see Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng p.294. There appears to be little justification for this. The possibility that the two questions may have been entirely separate is suggested by the fact that Hung Hsiu-

ch'üan evidently agreed with the necessity of joining up with Ch'en Te-ts'ai, though by the northern route, and not with the abandonment of Nanking.

A.F.Lindley, who claimed to have inside knowledge of Taiping deliberations on the question (though this is open to doubt), wrote that,

> But one impediment prevented the Commander-in-Chief [Li Hsiu-ch'eng] from acting with his usual brilliancy of conception and wonderfully successful rapidity of execution; it was the Tien-Wang, who refused even to listen to any proposal to abandon his capital.
>
> Different people will view this ruinous obstinacy of the Ti-ping king in various ways. Some will look upon it as sheer, downright folly; others, as the useless, fanatical sacrifice of a bigot; wile some may consider that that great, heroic, noble-minded man, having once established the capital of his dominions and the centre of his religio-political movement at Nankin, did right and gloriously in meeting death rather than turning backwards on the grand path. If we ascribe to the Tien-wang motives partaking equally of the three traits - nobleness, fanaticism, and rashness - we shall probably be pretty near the truth.
>
> At all events, the Tien-wang passionately refused to entertain the only plan by which the existence of the Ti-ping power, and the perpetuation of his dynasty, seemed possible. All the court officers, cabinet ministers, and other high authorities of Nankin, were blindly subservient to the will of their king, and equally infatuated with his religious and temporal command. Besides, many of those about him were of the Hung family, and, being nearly related to their chief, not only followed him implicitly, but formed themselves into a clique about him, to the prejudice and exclusion of other more capable and independent officers.
>
> See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.772-3.

This would seem to be a fair judgement, though in recent discussions about Li Hsiu-ch'eng in China, in which there has been a marked tendency to denigrate everything he ever did, the view that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was in any way to blame or that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had the interests of the Taiping movement at heart, has been questioned; see, for instance, Yü Ming-hsia: Kuan-yü Li Hsiu-ch'eng ti chan-chi p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Li-shih Yen-chiu No.2 pp.38-40.

7. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to read 'great anger'.

8. Tseng Kuo-fan changed 'Chiu-shuai' (九帥) to 'General Tseng' (曾帥).

9. See note 4 to page 194.

Notes to Page 222.

1. Read Ch'i-weng-ch'iao (七甕橋), see note 5 to p.151.

2. In the original '△道絶門', the first character being illegible. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '糧道已絶' - 'the grain routes were already cut.'

3. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

4. Hung Hsiu-ch'üan considered himself to be the younger brother of Jesus.

5. Left blank by Li Hsiu-ch'eng; Tseng Kuo-fan added the character 妖 - 'imp' or 'demon'.

6. Hung Jen-ta was formerly the Fu Wang, later his title was changed to Yung Wang.

7. See note 2 to page 178.

8. For 屎 read 殿 .

Notes to Page 223.

1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng omitted the character 不 .

2. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

3. For 往 read 住 .

4. New Year's Day for the 14th Year by the Taiping calendar was on 2 February 1864 (TC3/1/5).

5. For 龍由 read 龍游.

6. Notes 7, 8, 9 to page 196 give information on some of the previous activities of Tso Tsung-t'ang. He was sent with his army into Chekiang from southern Anhwei in the middle of February 1862 in order to clear the province. His immediate task however, was to prevent the Taipings in Chekiang from coming to the relief of Nanking, which Tseng Kuo-fan was then planning to besiege. Direct confrontation with Li Shih-hsien's armies began early in March. By April Tso Tsung-t'ang was firmly established in Chü-chou, the base

from which he intended to advance into the rest of Chekiang. Fighting near Lung-yu began about 8 June, when Li Shih-hsien withdrew to Chin-hua. Failing to attack effectively in Tso's rear (at Sui-an), Li Shih-hsien then prepared for a long campaign and concentrated his troops in the region of Chin-hua, Lan-chi, Lung-yu and Wu-i. Tso Tsung-t'ang attacked Lung-yu from 11 August onwards, but by the end of September had still not advanced further west than Ch'ü-chou. Afterwards, two events changed the situation considerably: first, Li Shih-hsien left for Nanking on 6 October (he had been summoned to the relief of the capital several months earlier, but had postponed his departure in order to deal with Tso Tsung-t'ang), and secondly, Tso Tsung-t'ang received a reinforcement of 8,000 Hunan Army troops from Kwangsi. As a result of this, the balance of strength changed and the Taipings had to withdraw from Lung-yu on 2 March 1863 (TC2/1/12) and from Chin-hua, Wu-i and Wu-k'ang on the following day. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.2101-2.

7. See above, page 200.

8. At Ning-po Consul Harvey complained with increasing bitterness of 'the withering and blighting institutions of Tae-pingdom'. But from the beginning to the end of the Taiping occupation of Ning-po his reports are full of contradictory statements, and it is difficult to take seriously his earnest denials that he was prejudiced. (This point is well made in Lin-Le: Ti-ping Tien-kwoh pp.522-525). Until the middle of April however, an uneasy tranquility prevailed. Then, on 22 April, Commander Craigie of the 'Ringdove', the senior British naval officer at Ning-po, complained that,

> a little after 10 o'clock I heard a rifle shot fired from the wall abreast of the ship, and on using a glass observed three or four men armed with fire-arms, who took deliberate aim from the top of the wall and fired at the ship, one bullet falling close to the ship and another passing over her.

(See B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China 1862, p.44). To this complaint the Taiping commander, Huang Ch'en-chung replied on the same day that,

> The conduct of those persons who fired on your ship, with the evident intention and desire of bringing about a breach in the friendly relations at present existing between our respective countries is detestable in the last degree... On forwarding you this reply, I beg to assure you that, as soon as I have discovered the offenders, I will punish them very severely. I hope, then, that you will think no more about the matter.

(ibid.). On receiving news of this incident, and before waiting

for a reply from the Taiping commander, Sir James Hope sent Captain Roderick Dew in the 'Encounter' from Shanghai with instructions to answer the Taipings in a manner which can only be described as exceedingly arrogant and bellicose (ibid.pp.44, 45).

Dew arrived at Ning-po on 27 Arpil, and not considering the Taiping reply of the 22nd. (quoted above)as an adequate apology, addressed a communication to the Taiping commander demanding an ample apology and the removal of a battery 'in the course of construction at a point outside the city wall,... [which] may be for the purpose of repelling attack on the city, but...will be equally ready to open fire on the foreign settlement, which it commands'. (ibid. p.46).

On the same day however, Dew received from Craigie two communications from the Taipings, one of which explained that the two bullets which had missed the 'Ringdove' were due to an accidental discharge whilst firing a salute. To these letters Dew replied:

> Both these [communications] are so satisfactory, and tend so much to impress on us your wish to maintain friendly relations with the English and French, that we beg to inform you that we shall not insist on the demolition of the battery at the point, but we still do [insist] that you remove the guns, as the same lawless soldiers who fire musket-balls at us, may fire the great guns...

The letter ends by stating that,

> If any shots are fired from the walls on our ships, I shall immediately give orders to knock down with shell the portion whence the shots issued; but you will not look on this as an act of hostility, but rather as a punishment of those lawless men who provoke the attack. (p.48)

A Taiping letter, also dated 27 April, though not in reply to the above, quoted the instructions the Taiping commanders had received from the T'ien Wang, that

> ...friendly relations having been concluded (between the respective countries), you must in every matter make a point of being respectful in your deportment (towards foreigners), and must not lose sight of good faith and right principles. Let their trade continue as formerly, but the people must revert to our rule (lit. it is our dynasty which must give peace and consolation to the people). Respect this! (ibid.p.47).

The Taiping leaders replied with some dignity to Dew's threats, though Harvey thought that 'the tenour of their letters was as bad and sarcastic as it was defiant'. (ibid.p.38). They wrote:

> With regard to that part of your letter having reference to a probable outbreak of hostilities (we

would inform you) that we are not in the least degree concerned thereat, (lit. we are not apprehensive, nor do we take offence thereat); we could not bear to break the oath of friendship we have sworn. We cannot remove the fort or the guns; should you proceed yourselves to remove the same, then it is evident that you have the intention of quarrelling with us. You can if you please lead on your soldiers against this city; you can if you please attack us; we shall stand quietly on the defensive (lit. we shall await the battle with hand in the suff; i.e. we shall not strike the first blow). We shall certainly let you take the initiative before we commence operations against, and try conclusions (orig. Text, determine which is the male and which is the female bird) with you. (ibid.pp.46-47).

This was not at all well-received. Harvey wrote,

...perhaps the most objectionably and inadmissible passage, and one showing particularly the animus of these men, was that having reference to this settlement, which they declared was theirs and not ours...

On receiving these plain and palpable intimations of bad faith and feelings towards us from the Tae-ping Chiefs, Captain Dew thought it prudent to order at once all foreign ships to move down two miles below the usual anchorage, as a measure both of precaution and necessity; for, after the above declaration, it was really impossible to judge, or to tell, when we might not be attacked on our "concession". (ibid. p.38,Harvey to Bruce).

On 2 May Dew wrote again to the Taiping commanders demanding, if they wished to avoid a blockade of the port,

1. an ample apology, 2. Removal of all guns from battery and walls opposite our ships, 3. That an officer shall be speedily appointed, and the proper measures, by means of guards, shall be taken to prevent anybody whatever coming on the wall opposite the ships or into the battery. (ibid. p.49).

The Taiping leaders replied on 3 May to the effect that they had been unable to find the actual offenders who had fired the two bullets, but that everyone had been cautioned. They wrote that the guns in the battery were meant for protection and would not be fired unless the Taipings were attacked by government troops, but that,

under the circumstances stated by you, we agree to stop up the port-holes of all the guns bearing on Keang-pih-gau [the foreign settlement], and to remove all the shot and powder from thence, so as to manifest to you our desire for lasting amity.

They pointed out that strict control was exercised and that no one but the men in charge of the guns was allowed on the walls (ibid.p.49).

In this atmosphere of increasing tension, Consul Harvey received a request from the former Prefect of Ning-po, Chang Ching-ch'ü, for British and French assistance as he was about to attack Ning-po.

> This extraordinary, but fortunate coincidence, occurring just at the point when our correspondence with the Chiefs had become as angry as it could well be without our actually coming to blows, was deemed by us far too good an opportunity to be thrown aside and lost, as it might, by strengthening our hands, enable us to obtain our just demands, without being compelled to resort to force. (ibid.p.38, Harvey to Bruce).

When Chang Ching-ch'ü visited the 'Encounter' on 6 May, he was informed by Dew that "in consequence of the rebels refusing certain demands we had made, I should have no objection to their passing up [the river to attack Ning-po], but that they were not to open fire till well clear of our men-of-war". (ibid. p.50). On 8 May therefore "about thirty heavy Imperial junks moved up to within two miles of the settlement", and Dew sent a final communication to the Taiping leaders:

> This is to inform you, on the part of the English and French Senior Naval Officers, that had you agreed to their demands, and removed your guns from the walls, they should have felt bound in honour to have acted up to their promise, and have prevented an attack on you on the Settlement side by the Imperial forces, which in countles numbers and heavy-armed ships advance to attack you.
>
> We now inform you that we maintain perfect neutrality, but if you fire the guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite the Settlement, on the advancing Imperialists, thereby endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign Settlement, we shall then feel it our duty to return the fire, and bombard the city.
>
> We would implore you, as your cause is hopeless, to leave Ning-po, thereby preventing much effusion of blood on both sides, more expecially of the harmless tillers of the soil, who on the one hand will lose their heads if they are not shaved, and on the other will lose them if they are shaved. (ibid. p.51).

Since the battery in question commanded both the Settlement, 'and the reach of the river up which the Imperialists would have to advance', (Wilson: The 'Ever Victorious Army' pp.97-8) the Taipings could not defend themselves from attack without

firing 'guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite the Settlement'.

> A little before 10 o'clock on the morning of the 10th instant [May], a volley of musketry having been fired by the rebels from the city walls upon Her Majesty's ship 'Encounter,' anchored under those walls, the signal to clear for action was immediately given to all the ships, English and French, in the river, and a general bombardment of the city of Ning-po was thereupon commenced. Shot and shell were poured into this large city, with very little intermission, for a period of five hours, by the combined fleet, at the end of which time the walls were scaled, and the Tae-ping forces were at once completely routed and dispersed, and entirely driven out of Ningpo. (ibid.p.39 Harvey to Bruce).

The government troops played a passive role in the operation until the British and French had smashed the defences of the town.

> Apak [the ex-pirate Pu Hsing-yu] and Chang [Ching-ch'ü], with their Imperialist war-junks, let down their anchors at the first shot, being satisfied with the honour of opening the ball. As the running spring-tide effectually prevented them coming up the river, the Kestrel was sent to tow them up; but this aid the steadily declined, urging paltry excuses, such as having no powder. (See Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.99).

9. Yü-yao was attacked at the end of July by a force consisting of the British gun-boat 'Hardy', forty men from the 'Encounter', five hundred men of the E.V.A., the French steamer 'Confucius', four hundred members of the Franco-Chinese force, and fifteen hundred Cantonese 'braves' in a dozen armed junks which had been fitted out bu citizens of Ning-po. This force succeeded in taking the town on 3 August 1862, having suffered considerable losses on the previous day. It was then garrisoned by the E.V.A. and the Franco-Chinese force; see Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' pp.105-107, and B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China, Harvey to Bruce p.124.
The Taipings withdrew from Ch'eng-hsien on 26 November.

10. Shao-hsing was attacked towards the end of January 1863 by Le Brethon and a detachment of the Franco-Chinese force. Le Brethon, a French officer, was killed by an exploding gun. After this Dew sent some units of the Anglo-Chinese force which, on 19 February, suceeded in breaching the wall of the town.

But the attack was beaten off and the breach repaired during the night. The siege continued until 18 March, when the Taipings withdrew. See Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' pp.116-120.

Notes to Page 224.

1. 'Much money' was added in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition. It was usual at this time for the E.V.A. to receive between £15,000 and £20,000 for each city they captured, the sum being agreed in advance; see Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.129. This would be equivalent to 45,000 to 60,000 taels.

Foreign mercenaries were not involved in the capture of Ning-po. Only after the town had been taken did 400 men of the E.V.A. arrive from Shanghai to guard the gates. They did not remain long because 'the temptation to squeeze the Chinese going in and out of the city was too great for Ward's men, and sometimes even for his officers, to resist and at last French and English men-of-war's men were placed at the gates, ibid. p.104. After the capture of Ning-po a force of 1,000 'disciplined Chinese' was raised, 'the higher officers receiving £1,800 and £1,000 a year and the captains £100, which was an inducement to respectable men, and even to English officers, to serve', ibid. p.114. The Franco-Chinese force was raised at the same time, with instructors from Shanghai.

2. Tseng Kuo-fan changed the character ' 瞞 ' (embezzled) to ' 滿 ' (had plenty of...).

3. The Taipings lost Chin-hua on 2 March 1863 (TC2/1/13); Lung-yu on 1 March; Yen-chou on 2 January 1863. In the prefecture of Wen-chou, the prefectural town, Yung-chia was never occupied by the Taipings (see note 11 to page 199), Lo-ch'ing-hsien was held by the Taipings from 8 March 1862 to 17 May 1863, P'ing-yang-hsien from 4 January 1862 to 1 February 1862, and Yü-huan-hsien from 14 December 1861 to 15 December.

In T'ai-chou Prefecture, the prefectural town, Lin-hai, was given up by the Taipings on 8 May 1862 (TC1/4/10), Hai-yen, Ning-hai, T'ai-p'ing and Hsien-chü were all lost in the first part of May 1862. See Anon: T'ai-p'ing-chün k'e-fu Che-chiang ke hsien jih-piao.

4. Tso Tsung-t'ang attacked Fu-yang from 24 March 1862 to 20 September 1862.

5. Fu-yang was finally taken on 20 September 1862 with the help of

the Franco-Chinese force under Lieutenant de Vaisseau D' Aiguibelle; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih pp.2109-2110 (Vol.III). Tso Tsung-t'ang's memorial reporting the capture does not mention foreign assistance, see Fang-lüeh ch.352 pp.15b-18b.

6. Hsiao-shan was recovered by government forces on 20 March 1863.

7. The character '掠' in the original is changed to '據' in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

Notes to Page 225.

1. Wang Hai-yang was formerly one of Shih Ta-k'ai's commanders. He deserted Shih in Kwangsi in the autumn of 1859 and joined Li Hsiu-ch'eng's command; see note 6 to page 199. He was made K'ang Wang after the second capture of Hang-chou by the Taipings. After the fall of Hang-chou Wang Hai-yang went north into Anhwei and then into Kiangsi. After the fall of Nanking in 1864 he campaigned in Kiangsi and Kwangtung, where he was eventually killed on 1 February 1866, at Chia-ying. See Lo: Shih-kao pp.420-2

2. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this was changed to read: 'Then the [Kiang]-su troops took the [foreign] devil soldiers to attack...'

3. Cha-p'u on 22 December 1863, P'ing-hu on 18 December and Chia-shan on 7 January 1864.

4. Su-chou on 6 December 1863 (see below, page 227), T'ai-ts'ang (Taitsan) on 2 May 1863, K'un-shan (Quinsan) on 31 May and Wu-chiang on 29 July.

5. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

6. Ward was killed on 22 September 1862 at Tz'u-ch'i in Chekiang. 'Colonel' Forrester, his second-in-command, was then offered the command of the E.V.A., but he refused. Henry Andrea Burgevine, an American adventurer, accepted. Burgevine however, did not get on with Li Hung-chang, who applied to Brigadier-General Staveley to have him removed and replaced by a British officer. This was not possible at the time because Staveley was unwilling to intervene, and in any case, British officers were not allowed to serve under the Emperor of China as long as Britain maintained a policy of neutrality. A crisis blew up in January 1863. The banker of the E.V.A., Yang Fang (called Ta-kee, see note 9 to page 188), prevar-

icated about the payment of money due, and Burgevine broke into his house, slapped Yang Fang's face and took the money. Li Hung-changd then dismissed Burgevine, and Captain Holland R.M. of Staveley's staff was put in temporary command. Staveley recommended Captain C.G.Gordon R.E. to permanent command, on conditions that the British government would agree. Permission arrived in February 1863 and Gordon assumed command of the E.V.A. on 24 March. See Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' pp.91-94, 125-126 and Spector: Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army pp.61-62.

7. On 20 August 1863. Yin-tzu-shan, near Shang-fang-men, southeast of Nanking, was the site of one of the great forts established by Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, who 'built forts like towns and dug moats like rivers', see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.19 p.11b. A Taiping force under Li Hsiu-ch'eng failed to recover it on 22 August (TC2/7/9).

8. This sentence is interlinear.

9. This story is confirmed by a report given in a letter from Li Hung-chang to Tseng Kuo-fan dated TC2/10/11 (21 November 1862). Li Hung-chang had captured Taiping documents which included a letter from the Secretary of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's Board of Revenue (Li Sheng-hsiang), to the effect that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been obliged to pay out 70,000 liang of silver before being allowed out of Nanking; see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.20b. In an earlier letter, dated TC2/6/16, to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, Li Hung-chang reported the sapture of 'several hundred rebel documents', the majority of which were plaintive appeals to Kiangsu and Chekiang for money and rice, ibid. ch.3 p.38a.

10. Li Hsiu-ch'eng returned to Su-chou from Nanking on 23 September 1863,

11. Kao-ch'iao-men, East of Nanking, was taken on 3 November 1863. It was one of the few remaining outer defences of the city. The engagement is described in Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.19 pp.21a-22b.

Notes to Page 226.

1. The E.V.A. had at its disposal at one time or another, five or six steamers, the most useful of which was the 'Hyson', '... a species of amphibious boat, which possessed the power of moving upon land as well as upon water, for she could drive over the bed of a creek upon her wheels when there was not sufficient water to

keep her afloat'; Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.150. The next most useful was the 'Firefly', 502 tons, built in 1854. Others were the 'Tsatlee' or 'Tsatlow', under charter from Messrs. Russell and Co., the 'Kajow', the 'Cricket'. The 'Firefly' was captured by A.F. Lindley and other foreign sympathizers and handed over to the Taipings on 13 November 1863; see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.652ff., the 'Kajow' was also siezed, and the 'Gretchen' (a silk steamer belonging to a Gernam firm), but these were recovered.

2. Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' pp.148-9 remarks that, 'Except in a few lines, there are no conveniences for transit by land but narrow footpaths, where people can only go in Indian file; but the network of waters affords great facility for the movement of boats and small steamers'.

3. Gordon assumed command of the E.V.A. in March 1863. After this, its first engagement was connected with the relief of Ch'ang-shu (Chanzu), the Taiping commander of which had gone over to the government on 11 January, The Taipings then attacked Ch'ang-shu for about two months. The siege was raised when government forces and the E.V.A. captured Fu-shan on 5 April (TC2/2/18). Then the E.V.A. helped in the recovery of T'ai-ts'ang on 2 May (see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.2131-2), but was so demoralized by plunder that Gordon ordered the army back to Sung-chiang for reorganization, see Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.158.

The next operation was an attack on K'un-shan (Quinsan), '... a place of immense importance, being the key to Soochow, and a point the possession of which would completely protect both Sungkiang and Taitsan', (ibid). The attack on K'un-shan was begun on 18 May by detachments of Li Hung-chang's troops under Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i ('General Ching'), who had formerly been a Taiping (see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.115-6), and the E.V.A. After several attempts to break the defences of K'un-shan, Gordon cut the town's communications with Su-chou by using the steamer 'Hyson' to take the town of Cheng-i (Chunye). K'un-shan fell on 1 June. The Taipings had an arsenal there, run by two Englishmen, (See Wilson, p.163).

Li Hung-chang's plan was for an attack on Su-chou by three columns, the south column to attack Wu-chiang (Wokong) and P'ing-wang, thereby cutting Su-chou's communications with Chekiang. The centre column (under Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i) would make a direct attack on Su-chou from K'un-shan; the north column would move on Chiang-yin (Kongyin) and Wu-hsi (Wusieh) from Ch'ang-shu to prevent relief from coming from Nanking; see Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.3 p.53. (J.C.Cheng: Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion 1850-1864, Hong Kong 1963, p.117 has a translation of the relevant passage).

Gordon's plan was to attack Su-chou by water, '...to isolate it from all possible assistance, to cut off and master all its communications and approaches. Ten miles south of it lies Kahpoo

[Cha-p'u], where the rebels had two strong forts. These it was of especial importance to take; first, because they secured a good junction between the Grand Canal and the Taho [T'ai Hu], a lake some fifty miles across; and next, because they commanded the direct road from Soochow to the Tai-ping cities of the south. At Kahpoo, therefore, and at Wokong [Wu-chiang], three miles south of Hakpoo, and like it a key to the rebel positions, did Gordon resolve to strike a first blow.' See Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon pp.91-2. Cha-p'u was taken on 28 July, and Wu-chiang on the following day.

Taiping operations north of Su-chou failed because of dissension amongst the commanders (Li Shih-hsien, Lin Shao-chang, Ch'en K'un-shu and Huang Tzu-lung), who ceased to co-operate after 23 July; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.2137, allowing Li Hung-chang to take Chiang-yin on 13 September and attack Wu-hsi.

On 28 September the E.V.A. took Pao-tai-ch'iao (Patachiaou), south of Su-chou, destroying by mistake twenty-six of the fifty-three arches of the bridge there; see Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon p.104.

The bitterest fighting of the campaign took place outside the Lou Gate (Low Mun) of Su-chou, where on 27 November the E.V.A. suffered considerable losses attacking the Taiping forts and outer defences; they nevertheless succeeded in taking them the following day. After this there was little further fighting, and the city was taken by other means, see below.

4. According to Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.187, Li Hsiu-ch'eng 'had 18,000 men stationed at Mahtanchiao [Ma-t'ang-ch'iao], a place situated between Wusieh [Wu-hsi] and Soochow, and from which he could assist either city, and could also attack on the flank any advance made by the Imperialists on the Grand Canal, the only great water and road line of communication left to the Tai-pings'.

5. Gordon wrote of T'an Shao-kuang:

> MOH WANG or Tan Shao-wang [sic], a native of Kwangsi, was thiry five years old when assassinated on 4th December, 1863. Of middle size, he was considered the most astute of all in Soochow, and though merciless to his Chinese followers, he was forbearing with foreigners; on one occasion when abused by Burgevine he took no notice of it (and continued to treat him well). Of an active disposition, he devoted all his energies to the defence of the city, and though disliked by Chung Wang, was much trusted by him. He was disliked by most of the other wangs for his harshness to their men and favouring those of his own province. (From a manuscript in the Gordon Papers, now in the British Museum).

According to Lo Erh-kang (Chien-cheng p.300), T'an was a native of Chin-t'ien.

6. Gordon's notes on Kao Yung-k'uan (or Yün-k'uan), Wang An-chün (汪安均 not 汪安鈞), and Chou Wen-chia (周文佳 not 周文嘉) are as follows:

> LAR WANG [Na Wang], whose family name was Kou Yuen-kuon [sic], a native of Hupeh, was thirty three years old at the time of his death in December, 1863, and had been a rebel for eleven years, and a Wang for three years, having command of fifty thousand men. He was about 5ft. 8in. high, had an olive complexion, a small black moustache, a very quiet, pleasing manner, and was always very polite.
>
> KONG WANG [K'ang Wang] or Wan Nan-tuen [sic]. a native of Hupeh, was a Rebel for eleven years and a Wang for one year when executed at Soochow, aged twenty eight. A short, good looking man, but with a cast in his eye and a somewhat sinister expression, he was an opium smoker. With Sing [Ning] and Tai [?] Wangs he had a great share in the defection of Lar [Na] Wang. These three had been disappointed in not rising to higher rank, thought they were neglected, and expected to become great men by passing over to the Imperialist side. Kong [K'ang] Wang] had been sent away from Nanking not long before his death, on account of fighting between his men and those of Kan Wang, the second in command at Nanking, who got a letter from the Tien Wang degrading Kong, though this was not put into force.
>
> SING [Ning] WANG, or Che Wang-cha [sic], a native of Honan, was thirty five years old, when beheaded at Soochow, and had been twelve years a Rebel and one year a Wang, with the command of ten thousand men. A tall thin man with a rolling gait, he had a dreadful squint, which caused him to be known as Cockeye. He did not have the usual Chinese manners, for he talked in a loud voice, gesticulated a good deal, and seemed a harum-scarum sort of fellow. He was a very good leader, defended Shoahing [Shao-hsing] in Chekiang for three months, and when allusion was made to this, used to say that without foreign aid the Imperialists would never have won it.
>
> (See Gordon Papers in the British Museum).

7. The eighth Taiping leader who surrendered at Su-chou, not mentioned by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, was the Pi Wang Wu Kuei-wen (比王伍貴文), see Lo: Chien-cheng p.300.

Notes to Page 227.

1. Omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition and overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

2. The circumstances of this event were as follows: On 28 November Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i informed Gordon that certain Taiping leaders in Su-chou were willing to change their allegiance and give up the city. The negotiations had been started by Wang An-chün, who had secretly met Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i outside the city. It was agreed that when the Government troops and the E.V.A. attacked on the following day, and T'an Shao-kuang made a sortie, the gates would be closed to prevent his return and the city given up. This plan failed because Li Hsiu-ch'eng returned to Su-chou that night. On 2 December, at Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i's insistence, Gordon met Kao Yung-k'uan and told him that he should give up a gate, fight, or else vacate the city, but that neutrality was not enough because Gordon would not be able to prevent his troops from looting indiscriminately once they entered the city. The following day Kao Yung-k'uan sent a message to Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i and Gordon saying that the other commanders had agreed to surrender, that he himself only wanted to go home with his possessions, but that some of the others wanted to get commands of various kinds. At this time, according to Gordon, the arrangement was that T'an Shao-kuang was to be induced to go up on to the wall of the city, and from there he would be thrown down and handed over to Gordon as a prisoner. But in the afternoon of 4 December, after a meal in his palace with the various commanders, T'an Shao-kuang in speaking to them, seems to have commented unfavourably on the loyalty of men from other provinces compared with that of the men of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. In the altercation which followed Wang An-chün stabbed T'an Shao-kuang, who was then decapitated.

Gordon, having obtained a promise of one month's extra pay for his men as compensation for being excluded from the looting of the city, ordered the E.V.A. back to K'un-shan, its headquarters; but himself remained at Su-chou. At about noon on 6 December, the eight Taiping leaders came out of the city to call on Li Hung-chang before giving up the city. Once in the Ch'ing camp they were summarily executed. Gordon eventually discovered this and obtained custody of Kao Yung-k'uan's son (or adopted son), a boy of eighteen, and, according to Gordon's account, at the boy's request, Kao Yung-k'uan's head. Gordon then wrote to Li Hung-chang in a state of something near to hysteria, telling him that he should at once resign his post as Governor of Kiangsu and hand over his seals of office to Gordon until an Imperial edict arrived. Failing this the E.V.A. would take the field against him and restore to the Taipings all the places it had captured from them.

With some difficulty Gordon was finally mollified, a process in which Robert Hart played an important part; but it was about two months before he was willing to take the field at the head of the E.V.A. again.

Long accounts of this affair are to be found in the following works: Lin-le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh pp.710-742 (which gives in full Gordon's report and some newspaper accounts, and is strongly critical of Gordon); Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon, pp.124-158; Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' pp.193-208; D.C.Boulger: The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney K.C.M.G., London 1908 pp.92-122. Li Hung-chang's version of the affair and its aftermath may be found in his memorials and letters, the relevant passages of which are translated in Cheng: Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion pp.124-132. Other Chinese sources do not add very much to our understanding of the affair; some explain Gordon's anger by attributing it to Li Hung-chang's refusal to allow the E.V.A. to take part in the looting of Su-chou; see Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi pp.285-6; Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.322; Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.303, 305.

Li Hung-chang's ruthless action was undoubtedly motivated in part by fear of the power of these Taiping leaders if they were allowed to surrender and keep their military forces intact. Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i, himself an ex-Taiping, may well have been determined to see the removal of powerful potential rivals.

3. Li Hung-chang admitted this in a letter to Tseng Kuo-fan. 'Since the execution of the rebel leaders after the recovery of Su-[chou] and [Wu]-hsi, the Yüeh rebels fight to the death with no thought of surrender. The rebel Hu [Wang, Ch'en K'un-shu] at Ch'ang-chou long wanted to surrender, but now he has assembled fierce confederates from Kwangtung and holds desperately on to the town'. See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.29b. At Wu-hsi the Taiping commander Huang Tzu-lung's resistance was said to have been stiffened by the fate of the surrendered Taipings of Su-chou; see Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh p.303.

4. According to Tseng Kuo-fan (Tsou-kao ch.19 p.28a), when Su-chou fell, Li Hsiu-ch'eng escaped with 'several myriad' of troops, which he stationed at Tan-yang, Chü-jung, Lung-t'an and Shih-pu-ch'iao. Li Hung-chang in his memorial announcing the capture of Su-chou, reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng left the city on 6 December on seeing the failure of morale, with 'over ten thousand of his troops'. See Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.5 p.15b. But in a letter, according to Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.303, Li Hung-chang had written that 'Li Hsiu-ch'eng left the city with no more than several thousand crack troops'.

5. Wu-hsi was under attack by government forces from 24 September

1863 (TC2/8/12) until 12 December (TC2/11/2), when it fell. According to A.F.Lindley, the Taipings abandoned the town because it was untenable after the loss of Su-chou and other places; see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.677. According to another account, ten thousand Taipings surrendered or dispersed during the siege, and about a thousand were killed. There was considerable looting and destruction after the capture of the town by the government forces: 'When the town was recaptured seven or eight out of ten of the houses were still standing, but half of them were burned when the government troops recovered the town, and only two out of ten remain.' See Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh pp.303, 306. See also Hua I-lun: Hsi Chin t'uan-lien shih-mo chi p.129 in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tzu-liao.

6. The implication here is that Li Shih-hsien suggested that they desert the Taipings and take independent action, like Shih Ta-k'ai.

Notes to Page 228.

1. 輕奇 in the original.

2. Tseng Kuo-fan added in the margin here, 'This was in the 11th. Month of the 13th. Year', that is, between 13 December and 12 January 1864. According to Tseng's memorial of TC2/11/27, Li Hsiu-ch'eng entered Nanking from Tan-yang on 20 December (TC2/11/10) with several hundred cavalry; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.19 p. 28a.

3. See note 6 to page 221.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng did apparently leave Nanking briefly; he was reported to have led an attack on Pen-niu-chen from Chin-t'an and Li-yang on 15 January (TC2/12/7) in an attempt to relieve Ch'ang-chou; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.1044.

5. Ch'ang-chou came under direct attack from government forces on 25 December 1863 (TC2/11/15). At this time the E.V.A. was in K'un-shan, pending the settlement of the political questions arising out of the Su-chou incident (see note 2 to page 227 , above). Gordon was eventually persuaded to take the field again, after Li Hung-chang had issued a public statement absolving him from any responsibility for the execution of the Taiping wangs. (The circumstances are related in detail in Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon pp.151-170 and in other biographies of Gordon). Gordon visited Li

Hung-chang on 2 February 1864 and discussed the future operations of the E.V.A. It was decided that its main role would be to help to cut the communications between Nanking and Chekiang by attacking the towns of I-hsing (Yesing) and Li-yang to the west of T'ai Hu. On 19 February the E.V.A. set out from K'un-shan to I-hsing by way of Wu-hsi. I-hsing had been under attack by government troops since January, without much effect. The E.V.A. arrived on 27 February and by attacking Taiping positions outside the town made the garrison withdraw on 2 March (TC3/1/24). On 4 March the E.V.A. moved against Li-yang, where 15,000 Taipings surrendered and gave up the town on 8 March (TC3/1/24).

During this time Ch'ang-chou was still being besieged. In the middle of March, other attempts to raise the siege having failed, the Taipings launched an attack on Ch'ang-shu (15 March) and took Fu-shan (18 March), turning the flank of the government forces attacking Ch'ang-chou. This made Li Hung-chang send for Gordon and the E.V.A., who had been attacking Chin-t'an since 15 March. But Gordon did not dare to leave Chin-t'an lest the Taipings took heart, and launched a hasty attack in which his army was repulsed with considerable losses and Gordon himself was shot through the leg. On 24 March the E.V.A. was at Li-yang, from which Gordon left for Wu-hsi with a force of about 1,000, thence to the relief of Chiang-yin and Ch'ang-shu, which were threatened by the Taiping diversion intended to relieve pressure on Ch'ang-chou. At Hua-shu (Waisoo) on 31 March the E.V.A. was severely defeated and routed with considerable loss; but on 12 April it was able to inflict a defeat on the Taipings between Chiang-yin and Ch'ang-shu, after which Gordon joined up with the numerous government forces attacking Ch'ang-chou. The town fell on 11 May (TC3/4/6).

Lindley's account, based on contemporary China-coast newspapers, (he had left China by this time), confirms that the Taiping garrison fought virtually to the last man, and that the populace, numbering about 12,000 was massacred; see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.757-8. Li Hung-chang however, reported in his memorial that when his troops entered the town they found that there were so many rebels that it was not possible to execute them all; pardon was promised to all who prostrated themselves and gave up their arms, and sixty or seventy thousand rebels of all ages surrendered; see Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.6 p.46b. Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon p.192, says, 'The garrison was 20,000 strong. The slaughter was proportionately great.' Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.240 says that only 1,500 men of the garrison of 20,000 were killed after the capture of the town.

After this, partly because most of Kiangsu except Nanking was now clear of Taipings and the Tseng brothers did not want any help in their siege, and partly because the withdrawal by the British government of the Order in Council permitting British officers to serve

under the Emperor of China, it was decided to disband the E.V.A. This was done in May 1864 at K'un-shan, (ibid. pp.241-2).

(This note is based on the sources cited above, and on Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.2166-2179).

6. Tan-yang was abandoned by the Taipings on 13 May 1864 (TC3/4/8).

7. Chia-hsing was taken by Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i on 25 March 1864 (TC3/2/13); Ch'eng was wounded at this time and died on 15 April.

8. According to the answer Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave in interrogation after his capture, this expedition into Kiangsi was made at his order with the purpose of collecting grain; see Appendix I page 261, and Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha (to Tso Tsung-t'ang) ch. 24 p.4a.

The Taiping advance was made by four columns:-

The first, (under T'an Hsing, Li Jen-shou and Li Cheng-yang) entered Kiangsi at Yü-shan from Chekiang in March 1864 and took Nan-feng on the 26th. Thereafter this column seems to have engaged in desultory fighting on both sides of the Kiangsi-Fukien border until it disappears from the historical record in the summer of 1864.

The second column, (under Ch'en Ping-wen, Wang Hai-yang, Chang Hsüeh-ming, T'ao Chin-hui and others) moved into southern Anhwei after the loss of Hang-chou on 31 March 1864, and into Kiangsi on 22 April. During the summer, these Taipings were in the region immediately south of Po-yang Lake; in August the principal commander, Ch'en Ping-wen, surrendered to the government.

The third column, (under Li Shih-hsien, Lu Shun-te, Huang Ch'eng-chung and others) crossed into Kiangsi at Yü-shan from K'ai-hua (Chekiang) on 29 April, hoping to join up with the first column. They took I-huang and Ch'ung-jen at the end of May, and then joined up with the fourth column.

The fourth column, (under Liu Chao-chün, Chu Hsing-lung, Huang Tsung-pao, Li Jung-fa, Ch'en Ch'eng-ch'i and others) set out from Tan-yang on 7 May, and crossed into Kiangsi (Te-hsing) on the 18th. After being defeated at I-yang late in May, they joined up with the third column. After this the main fighting was in the region of Ch'ung-yang.

Because of this new threat to Kiangsi, Tseng Kuo-fan sent Yang Yüeh-pin and Pao Ch'ao's army to help clear the province. They arrived at Nan-ch'ang on 16 July and won their first victory at Hsü-wan (Fu-chou) on 5 August, after the fall of Nanking. See Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.2205-2209.

Notes to Page 229.

1. Interlinear. According to Li Hung-chang's letter to Tseng Kuo-

ch'üan, dated Tc2/6/16 (31 July 1863) in P'eng-liao han-kao ch.3 p.38a, which was based on captured Taiping documents, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had abdicated in favour of his son, and Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been made Commander-in-Chief, over all the other wangs. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's despatches addressed to Ch'en K'un-shu and to Huang Tzu-lung, dated TT13/9/29 (10 November 1863) show that he was indeed chün-shih (軍師) or generalissimo; see TPTK II pp.764-5. But T'ien Ch'ao chüeh-chih ch'eng-wei (TPTK II pp.700-702), written in 1862, lists eight chün-shih, including the 'Young Tung Wang', who did not exist; but Hung Jen-kan was certainly a chün-shih (though not listed), see TPTK II p.727, so the number was still eight. Of them, the Young Hsi Wang, the Young Nan Wang and Hung Jen-kan probably took precedent over Li Hsiu-ch'eng. Li Hung-chang was therefore wrong in saying that Hsiu-ch'eng had just been made a chün-shih; but it is probably true that he was in overall command, in fact if not in theory.

2. This sounds as if Li Hsiu-ch'eng raised a personal army or bodyguard in the capital, to which he had come with only a small force, see note 2 to page 228.

3. Between 13 December 1863 and 12 January 1864.

4. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition several words were added, to make this sentence read, 'In the capital only the rich and powerful and the soldiers had anything to eat; the poor...'

5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote 叶露, which Tseng Kuo-fan changed to 甜露, literally 'sweet dew'. If Hung Hsiu-ch'üan had biblical precedent in mind, 甜露 is probably correct, this being the felicitous term used by Medhurst and Gützlaff for 'manna' (Exodus xvi) in their translation of the Bible, which the Taipings used and partially reprinted. However, the Ming Famine Herbal Chiu-huang pen-ts'ao (救荒本草), compiled by Chou Ting-wang, lists 甘露兒 as an edible root; see Hsü Kuang-ch'i: Nung-cheng ch'üan-shu (Peking 1956 reprint) Vol.II p.1368. Read gives 甘露子 as S. Sieboldi Miq., Chinese artichoke (also called 地瓜兒 or 草石蠶); see Bernard E. Read (with Liu Ju-ch'iang): Chinese Medicinal Plants from the 'Pen Tshao Kang Mu' A.D.1596, Peiping 1937, p.289. If 甘露 was known as a famine food, and this is what Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was not so stupid as he thought.

Notes to Page 230.

1. This sentence was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

2. For 保壢 read 宝壢; in Tan-yang-hsien, about 90 li from Nanking.

This was an important point in the supply route of the Taiping capital, at which grain was unloaded from boats and transferred to Nanking by road. There was a Taiping garrison there to guard the grain stores; see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao (letters to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan of TC2/7/3 and TC3/6/16) ch.4 p.2a and Ch.3 p.38a (quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng pp.308-9), also Ch'en Nai's letter to Tseng Kuo-fan of TC2/6/19 in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.245 in Chien-chi VI.

3. The character 賣 is missing here.

4. Chao Lieh-wen wrote in his diary on 6 September 1863:

> I saw two rebel proclamations from the city; one of them forbade rumour-mongering and disturbing the morale of the troops. It stated that members of officials' families in the capital were leaving for other places only in order to obtain grain, and that the brethren and sisters were not to be alarmed. The other proclamation stated that amongst the people in the capital there was inequality of wealth and poverty, and that the poor were ordered to come to his palace to collect the sum of ten string of cash, [or] two tan of rice, as capital for small businesses or grain-shops, to be repaid in one year. The proclamations were both in the name of the rebel Chung [Wang].

See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.284.

Ch'en Ch'ing-chia, who was in Nanking from May 1862 to September 1863 and wrote a series of poems about his enforced sojourn there, refers to the 'false benevolence' of 'the smiling cat Li [Hsiu-ch'eng]', thanks to whom the road leading to the T'ung-chi Gate was crowded with people carrying back grain which they had bought. In a note, Ch'en Ch'ing-chia remarks that Li Tzu-ch'eng [sic] had 'at Hsieh-ch'i [sic, for Chieh-ch'i], Hu-shu and other places, ordered the erection of mat sheds for grain markets, from which grain was taken to Nanking as capital for traders, who were also given loans of money; see Ch'en Ch'ing-chia: Chin-ling chi-shih shih p.404 in Chien-chi VI (quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng p.308).

After the establishment of the Taiping capital at Nanking no commerce was allowed in the city. This seems to have been firmly enforced, and G.J.Wolseley, who visited Nanking in 1861, commented that:

> It would appear almost as if they wished to abolish altogether the use of coin, and reduce society to that patriarchal state in which the people receive their daily food, clothing, etc., and have all the wants of nature supplied by the master under whose banner they served. Such, at least, is the system now in practice within Nankin.

> There are elevent kings, to one or other of whom every man is attached, the name of each man being duly registered at the public office, over which his king presides, and from whom he receives a daily allowance of food. .... No shops of any sort whatever are permitted within the walls of Nankin. There are, however, one or two insignificant markets in the ruined suburbs, where a small quantity of vegetables and fish are daily exposed for sale.

See G.J.Wolseley: Narrative of the War with China in 1860, London 1862 pp.336-7.

The same year however, the British interpreter R.J.Forrest reported that:

> We arrived at Nanking soon after an Edict had been passed prohibiting trade in the city. The reason given was, that as Tien-kiang [T'ien-ching] was the Imperial residence, it should not be disturbed by the clamour of tradesfolk, and that bad characters had come in as traders. Fourteen unfortunates, who tried to make a little gain in spite of the Edict, were at once executed; a brisk trade has consequently sprung up outside the several gates. The market at the south gate is particularly busy and crowded, nor are there houses enough in the suburbs to meet the demand.

See B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting the Opening of the Yangtze-kiang River to Foreign Trade p.28 (Report by Mr. Forrest of Journey from Shanghae to Nanking).

The edict to which Forrest refers, was not of course the first one prohibiting trade in the city, and was therefore made, one must assume, because trade had started in spite of previous orders. It is not possible to say how far this prohibition was enforced. The missionary Lobschied, who visited Nanking in 1863, notes 'a brisk trade carried on outside the city of Nanking', but also mentioned that in the capital itself 'new shops and fine buildings were in the course of erection'. See W. Lobschied's letter to the Editor of the Daily Press, Hong Kong, 10 June 1863, quoted in Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.602.

Li Ch'un believes that a very considerable trade had grown up inside the city during the final years of the Taiping regime, and that thousands of people who were let out of Nanking in the last year (see page 237) were those who had been dependent on this trade; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.505-506. If this is so, it would indeed point to a widespread and by no means sudden growth of private trade, which would have brought Nanking into line with other towns under Taiping control as far as this matter was concerned. However, the grounds for assuming that all or most of the people released from Nanking were small traders seems very flimsy.

Notes to Page 231.

1. Interlinear.

2. San-ch'a-ho is south of Chü-jung, Lung-tu and Hu-shu are southeast of Shang-yuan-hsien, Hsi-ch'i is probably an error for Chieh-ch'i; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.309. This must refer to events before the summer of 1863, since Hung Ch'un-yuan was executed for the loss of Yü-hua-t'ai in June, see note 6 to page 166.

3. The character 灰 is added in this sentence by Tseng Kuo-fan in place of an illegible character (perhaps 辞).

4. 風流 in the original; Tseng Kuo-fan changed to 所為 .

5. This whole deleted passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

Notes to Page 232.

1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to have been mistaken as to the date of this new rule, which must in fact have been made in the spring of 1861. Several Taiping edicts dated after TT11/2/17 (28 March 1861), have the dedication '天父天兄天王', see TPTK II pp.676-686. Wolseley wrote after a visit to Nanking, '...with even the smallest matters, from 'the Heavenly Palace' down to the very ink with which they write, all are called "Heavenly"'; see Narrative of the War with China p.344; see also Lo: Chien-cheng p.312.

2. This is not born out by existing evidence. A relatively large number of surviving Taiping documents, eighteen out of fifty four, dating from the period after the beginning of 1861, do not carry this formula. This includes 4 documents emanating from Li Hsiu-ch'eng out of a total of ten which are dated. About half of the documents under the name of Ch'en Yü-ch'eng have the inscription, half do not. The only despatch under the name of Li Shih-hsien which survives (in translation only), does not use this formula; see B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.109. For other documents, see TPTK II, Shih-liao pp.129-184 and Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao No.34 1964 pp.1-6.

3. For 言後 read 然後.

4. I have been unable to find any further information on Li Shih-

hsien's demotion.

5. i.e. religious arguments.

6. This may have been an attempt to counteract the divisive tendencies of the last years of the Taipings, when various commanders such as Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Li Shih-hsien, Ch'en K'un-shu and others built up their own spheres of influence at the expense of Taiping unity.

Notes to Page 233.

1. In the passage which follows Li Hsiu-ch'eng complained of the proliferation of wangs; but he started by saying that the titles of the wangs were changed (又改名王之等). This may have some connection with the fact that Yang Hsiu-ch'ing had previously insisted, according to T'iao-fu tao-jen (pseud.): Chin-ling tsa-chi p.645, that there should be no more than the original seven wangs, and consequently Ch'in Jih-kang and Hu I-huang's titles were changed from wang to chüeh. The subsequent appointment of wangs may have started when these two men's titles were changed back to wang.

2. For Hung Jen-kan's arrival at Nanking, see note 1 to p. 177. This sentence was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

3. See note 1 to page 229.

4. Hung Jen-kan was not the first to be made a wang after the internal strife of 1856. Hung Jen-fa and Hung Jen-ta were given the titles of An Wang and Fu Wang that year, but their titles were later taken away because of discontent at court; see Appendix I page 259. Hung Jen-kan arrived at Nanking on 22 April 1859 (TT9/3/13) and was made Kan Wang on 11 May (TT9/4/1), that is, just over half a month later. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in TPTK II p.846.

5. It is, of course, quite untrue that Hung Jen-kan did not produce any plans. The question of his contibution to military planning is touched upon in note 1 to page 177. Between 1859 and 1861 Hung Jen-kan's works include: Tzu-cheng hsin-pien (資政新编) - A New Treatise on Aids to Administration, Li-fa-chih hsüan lun (立法制喧論) - A Proclamation on the Enforcement of the Law, Ying-chieh kuei-chen (英杰归真) - A Hero's Return to the Truth, Ch'in-

ting chün-tz'u shih-lu (欽定軍次實錄) - Imperially Approved Veritable Records of Military Campaigns, and Chu-yao chi-wen (誅妖檄文) - Proclamation on the Extermination of the Demons. Parts of Tzu-cheng hsin-pien are translated in Cheng: Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion pp.45-60. For evaluations of Hung Jen-kan's contribution to the Taiping cause, see Li Ch'un: Hung Jen-kan, Shanghai, 1957; Michael: The Taiping Rebellion pp.134-168; So Kwan-wai, E.P.Boardman and Chiu P'ing: Hung Jen-kan, Taiping Prime Minister 1859-1864 in Harvard Journal of Asian Studies XX (1957) pp.262-294.

6. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy. The sentence is somewhat confuded.

7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote '對我不能'. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '對我不住'.

8. In the winter of 1859, see pages 173-4.

Notes to Page 234.

1. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to, '[even] observing from outside'.

2. Tseng Kuo-fan changed 'him' to 'the Ch'ing'.

3. i.e. 'Imperial Bodyguards'; there were 72 such officials attached to Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's court; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an p.134.

4. The original is far from clear; I believe that it is '拿來之時'; the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '拿來觀時'.

5. Overlooked by Lü Chi-i. Ma Yü-t'ang had been a Taiping officer; on 23 October 1861 (HF11/9/20) his treachery enabled Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to take Wu-wei. Tseng had been able to contact him through his wife, who had been taken prisoner but not harmed, at Anking; see Chien: Ch'üan-shih III p.1907. Ma Yü-t'ang was subsequently used by Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to contact Taiping leaders and persuade them to surrender; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.307. I do not know whether this is the same Ma Yü-t'ang who was given the rank of Prefect for work in suppressing bandits in Tibet in February 1865; see Shih-lu (T'ung-chih) ch.195 p.34.

6. This is at variance with what Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written earlier in the deposition (see page 175): 'In T'ien-ching my mother and wife were held as hostages...' Lo Erh-kang, who has always insisted

that Li Hsiu-ch'eng deliberately invented or exaggerated his disagreements with Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, believes that the second version - that Li's family was in P'u-k'ou - is the true one; see Lo: Chien-cheng pp.109-110. His arguments are unconvincing; the contradiction might be explained by a mere slip of the pen, P'u-k'ou for T'ien-ching, in the second version.

7. See note 7 to page 175.

Notes to Page 235.

1. At the end of 1862 there were not more than about 15 wangs; but by the spring of 1863 there were more than 90; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.9a. Eventually there were more than 2,700 wangs, according to Huang Wen-ying's Deposition in TPTK II p.857.

2. For 言後 read 然後.

3. This might perhaps be translated 'other wangs'.

4. This passage, the grammar of which is unclear, was not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan, who wrote beside it, 'Move these words to the end, where he concludes [the theme]'. This was done in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

5. This character was originally a replacement for the surname 王, which was prohibited; see Ch'in-ting ching-pi tzu-yang in Yin-shu vol.XX. The exact order of precedence of the various wangs is not clear. The T'ien Ch'ao chüeh-chih ch'eng-wei (Titles and Ranks of the Heavenly Dynasty), which is appended to the Ch'in-ting ching-pi tzu-yang, gives only two categories; 'special' (特爵), including the Young Tung Wang, Young Hsi Wang, Young Nan Wang, the I Wang, Chung Wang, Ying Wang, Shih Wang and Fu Wang; the Kan Wang was omitted presumably because he was the author; and 'others' (列爵), including the Young Yü Wang, and the Hu, Hsiang, T'ing, Mu, Lai, Na and Tsou Wangs.

Huang Wen-ying in his deposition (TPTK II p.857) lists five grades of wang, but like the work quoted above, does not mention the rank of '半', or its place in the hierarchy. It is not clear from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remarks whether the use of the title 半 meant a further division of the lieh wang, or whether a new, lower grade was added. If Shen Mou-liang: Chiang-nan ch'un-men-an pi-chi p.434 can be taken as reliable evidence (see note 5 to page 139), the latter would seem to have been the case.

For discussion of these questions, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, pp.233-237, and Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I pp.36-44. All known wangs are listed in Kuo: Jih-chih (Appendix) and in Lo: Shih-kao ch.6.

6. 格㕛 in the original, a Kwangsi dialect expression. Tseng Kuo-fan changed it to '更'.

7. This was noted by Li Hung-chang, who wrote to P'eng Yü-lin that because of the power of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Li Shih-hsien and Yang Fu-ch'ing, who did not co-operate with each other, the T'ien Wang had nominated many wangs, and this was the beginning of incurable discord; see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.1 p.44b. Tseng Kuo-fan made similar comments, see Tsou-kao ch.18 p.9a. Someone in the Taiping capital wrote the following couplet mocking the proliferation of wangs, '天朝一统四十二里半 文武各官三百六十行'; he was found out and executed; see Anon: Shih-wen ts'ung-lu, p.80 in Chien-chi V.

Notes to Page 236.

1. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy. In place of this deleted passage Tseng Kuo-fan added, 'The T'ien Wang formerly...'

2. 陳玉成. There is no mention of this in Ch'en Yü-ch'eng's deposition (see Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi p.201); but it is confirmed by Hsieh Ping: Chin-ling K'uei Chia chi-shih lüeh, quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng p.314.

3. i.e. 李以文.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was evidently mistaken as to the date when he began to use the name Hsiu-ch'eng. He is already referred to by this name in a memorial by Sheng Pao dated HF8/7/23 (31 August 1858); see Lo: Chien-cheng p.314.

5. This passage was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

6. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this passage reads, 'The T'ien Wang formerly selected the men he employed; later, he brought chaos. General Tseng's troops...'

7. The original reads '又不資云'; the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '又不均匀'.

Notes to Page 237.

1. '不体国体' in the original, perhaps an error for '不顧国体'.

2. A Refugee Office (難民局) seems to have been started early in 1864 near Nanking. A long letter from Chao Lieh-wen to a friend, dated TC3/3/6 (11 April 1864) describes its operation, and the increase in the numbers of the refugees as the siege of Nanking tightened; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.326-7 and Wang Yung-nien: Tzu-p'in-kuan shih-ch'ao, ch.1 p.397 in Chien-chi VI.

3. For 久 read 救.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally wrote '三四萬' (thirty or forty thousand). The character 十 was added later to make this 'a hundred and thirty or forty thousand'; but it is not possible to say by whom. The only reason for suspecting that it might have been added by someone other than Li Hsiu-ch'eng is that it is written to the left of the line in front of the character ; whereas all Li's additions in the manuscript are written to the right. If the character was added by someone else, it may have been done in order to confirm a previous report, perhaps exaggerating the number of refugees for the purpose of embezzlement.

5. Tseng Kuo-fan's memorials of TC3/2/27 and TC3/3/12 confirm that women and children and old people were let out of Nanking by the west gates. The former memorial gives the figure of 'more than ten thousand' to that date, the latter gives no estimate; see Tsou-kao ch.20 pp. 6b, 7a, 9b. Gordon reported that 3,000 women and children had been released, see note 4 to page 241.
It is difficult to see how Li Hsiu-ch'eng could have 'secretly' permitted such an exodus, unless there was a general conspiracy to conceal matters from the T'ien Wang. Wang Yung-nien: Tzu-p'in-kuan shih-ch'ao p.397 records that Li Hsiu-ch'eng petitioned the T'ien Wang to allow these people to leave.

6. The character 東 was added by Tseng Kuo-fan.

7. The original reads '不修正事'; Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to '不修政事'. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition '不取政事' - '取' is evidently a typographical error.

Notes to Page 238.

1. This was on 15 December 1863 (TC2/11/5). Kuo: Jih-chih p.1039

says that this attempt at mining the wall was at the Shen Ts'e Gate, on the north side of the city; this is contrary to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version. The only other source, as far as I know, which gives the Shen Ts'e Gate as the location is Li Pin: Chung-hsing pieh-chi ch.60 p.6a; but this too is a secondary source. Tseng Kuo-fan mentioned the incident, but not the location in his memorial of TC2/11/12 (see Tsou-kao ch.19 p.26b) and his letter of the same day to Tseng Kuo-ch'üan (Chia-shu ch.7 p.210, Shih-chieh Edition). Chao Lieh-wen however wrote quite a detailed account in his diary for TC2/12/2, according to which, the tunnel was located near the Chü Pao Gate (south of the city) and had been started about six months earlier. It had been completed during the second week of December, but had been discovered by the Taipings who had counter-tunnelled down to it. A subterranean battle, lasting a whole day, had then ensued. The government troops succeeded in driving the Taipings out by pumping in with the aid of bellows the smoke of burning capsicum. The Taipings responded by pouring water and filth into the tunnel, the mouth of which the government troops then blocked by stuffing it with huge quantities of bedding. Behind this defensive barrier they then dug a branch tunnel to a point under the city wall a little distance away, this was mined, and the explosion on 16 December (Tseng Kuo-fan gives 'the night of [the 15th]') knocked down a part of the wall. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.306.

2. This refers to the Ch'in-huai River, which flowed along the south side of the city, see Map II.

3. In the original 無人可甲. This reads 無人可靠 in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition. For a discussion of the number of Taiping troops in the capital at the time of its fall, see

4. A Taiping Traitor called Hsü Lien-fan, who tried to let the enemy into the city in April 1863, was pounded to death in a stone mortar; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.317.

5. Hsiao Fu-ssu (蕭孚泗), the highest ranking officer under Tseng Kuo-ch'üan at Nanking.

6. For 朱兆英 read 朱逆英; see Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.24.

Notes to Page 239.

1. Added by Tseng Kuo-fan.

2. Ch'en Te-feng was taken prisoner after the fall of Nanking. When he was brought to the Hunan Army headquarters and saw Li Hsiu-ch'eng, he knelt and paid obeisance to him. This was reported to Tseng Kuo-fan, and it was one of the reasons he gave the court for executing Li at Nanking rather than sending him to Peking. Tseng Kuo-fan expressed disgust at this demonstration of the loyalty which Li Hsiu-ch'eng could still command (惡其黨羽尚堅), and at his popularity with the people, shown by the revenge they took upon his betrayers; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3a. Ch'en Te-feng's gesture possibly cost him his life.

3. The character '云' is omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.

4. In the original '廿頂子', sometimes called 'the blue plume', an honour conferred on officials below the 6th rank. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to '紅頂子', 'the single-eyed peacock feather' (or花翎); see Brunnert and Hagelstrom: Present Day Political Organization of China, Shanghai 1912 p.498. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition however, it is '水晶頂子', a 'crystal button'. It is impossible to say which of these version is correct since we cannot identify the man.

5. I have not been able to find any identifiable reference to these particular negotiations from the Ch'ing side. Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.351 mentions that a trusted Lieh Wang under Li Hsiu-ch'eng, called Fu Chen-kang (傅振綱) was in secret communication with a secretary of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan's staff called Ch'en Fang-hsien (陳舫仙). Fu Chen-kang was related to a Hunanese from Hsiang-hsiang called Hu Yüeh-hsi (胡悅喜). This may have something to do with the events which Li Hsiu-ch'eng mentions, though it is not possible to be sure without further investigation. A man who claimed to be Li Hsiu-ch'eng's wife's uncle was captured an executed on TC1/2/17 (17 March 1862); see Yao Chi: Hsiao-ts'ang sang-chi p.492 in TPTK VI.

Notes to Page 240.

1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote nine characters in the margin here and then crossed them out; they read: '我天朝勤勞本忠於他' - 'active and hard-working men in the Kingdom were formerly loyal to him'.

2. This may mean that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had established a temporary of emergency headquarters on the city wall.

3. This whole passage was omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition and was overlooked by Lü Chi-i. A revised version of it in that edition (followed in all other editions) gave the date of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's death (by suicide) as the '27th Day of the 5th Month' (see note 2 to page 241). There are two other contemporary sources which give the date of Hung's death, the deposition of Hung Yu-fu, the Young Sovereign, who said that his father died on the '19th Day of the 4th Month (Taiping calendar), see TPTK II p.856, and Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial of TC3/7/7 (Tsou-kao ch.20 p.28a), which gives the date as the '27th Day of the 4th Month'. We have therefore four versions:

i. Li Hsiu-ch'eng: TT14/4/21 = 3 June
ii. Hung Yu-fu: TT14/4/19 = 1 June.
iii. Tseng Kuo-fan: TC3/4/27 = 1 June.
iv. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition gives 'the 27th of the 5th Month. By the lunar calendar this would be 29 June, or by the Taiping calendar, 9 July. But both dates are impossible, being after the fall of Nanking. Since additions to the deposition would be made in accordance with Tseng Kuo-fan's version, we may assume that this is a simple error for TC3/4/27 = 1 June.

Hung Yu-fu was presumably in a better position to know the exact date of his father's death than Li Hsiu-ch'eng, so we may take 1 June as the correct date.

Hung Hsiu-ch'üan's death was known outside Nanking as early as 9 June, and Chao Lieh-wen recorded in his diary that according to intelligence reports Hung had died of illness; there was no mention of suicide; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.353. It is possible however, judging from information given after the fall of Nanking, that rumours were rife and that some said that the T'ien Wang had taken poison (see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.372, giving Ch'en Te-feng's information). In any case, possibly assuming that he would give more pleasure to the court in reporting the ignominious suicide of the rebel king, Tseng Kuo-fan chose to report that Hung had died by his own hand; see Tsou-kao ch.20 p.27a. The changes made in the deposition of Li Hsiu-ch'eng were in order to make it agree with previous reports.

Notes to Page 241.

1. Tseng Kuo-fan changed '洪有福' to '洪瑱榘'. The former was his correct name, but on his official seal the two characters '真主' (the true Sovereign) were misread on the government side as '瑱', and he was consequently known as Hung Fu-chen; see his deposition in TPTK II p.860.

2. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this section (starting from the end of the third sentence in the final paragraph on page 240) reads:

> Because General Tseng's troops were everywhere tunnelling towards the city, the T'ien Wang was very worried. He became more anxious every day and on the 27th of the 5th Month he took poison and died. After the T'ien Wang had died, General Tseng's troops were pressing us hard and we were in a desperate plight. Then the T'ien Wang's eldest son Hung Fu [sic] ascended the throne in order to put all the people at their ease. General Tseng made many tunnels...

3. According to Tseng Kuo-fan (Tsou-kao ch.20 p.26a), more than thirty unsuccessful tunnels had been dug. Some of these probably failed for technical reasons, but most of them were destroyed by the Taipings. When the tunnels were long there was a strong probability that the Taipings would be able to locate them, partly by watching for abnormal activity, or sometimes when the vegetation directly above the tunnels (which cannot have been very deep) turned yellow; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.367. But after the capture of the Taiping fort at Ti-pao-ch'eng on 3 July, which was only about 100 feet from the city wall, the task of tunnelling was made much easier. Not only because the distance was very short, but because Tseng Kuo-ch'üan placed a hundred cannon on the side of Lung-po-tzu Shan, which kept up a barrage of fire day and night for ten days. This kept the Taipings off the wall and allowed the tunnellers to work undisturbed. The two successful tunnels were completed in only 5 days. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi p.1845.

4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng should have written 'by the 5th Day...', that is, July 18th, the day of the final sortie. Nanking fell on 'the 6th Day', 19 July. C.G.Gordon, who visited the Nanking siege works a month earlier described them in a report:

> Chinkiang [Chen-chiang] was left on the 16th in the Revenue S.S. "Elfin", and after anchoring south-west off Nanking for the night, moved alongside the landing place the next day. There we met a Titu [Provincial Commander-in-Chief], who had been three days awaiting us, and had chairs and ponies ready to take us to Tseng Kuo-tsuen, Futai of Chekiang and brother of Tseng Kuo-fan, who commands all the troops around Nanking. Starting at 10.00 am., we passed along for three miles a road constructed through a morass, in itself a wonderful work and which, according to our escort, was daily visited wet or fine by Tseng Kuo-tsuen

during its construction. His house is on a hill behind the Porcelain Tower Hill, and to his house, some two miles from the end of the road, the route was lined with troops who occupied the very numerous stockades here. The men looked well, strong and healthy, and seemed to be in good spirits, but were not well armed, spears and Chinese lances being far more numerous than muskets.

Tseng Kuo-tsuen met us at the entrance to his stockade; he is about forty two years old, apparently active, and had a pleasing manner, but did not seem very clever. We dined with him and he told us that sixteen galleries were being driven towards the city wall around the city in different places, that he hoped to have them loaded and tamped in ten days, and that by a simultaneous explosion and attack on all sides to carry the city. Two months previously he had had a mine exploded, but it had had only a partial effect, owing to which, although the troops got in, they could not maintain themselves, and were driven out with the loss of four hundred men. He also said that the rebels countermined, and on the previous day broke into one of his galleries, killing eight or ten men. He seemed quite satisfied with the position, saying when asked why he did not get more muskets, that his men did not know how to use them, and when asked if he would not get three or four small field pieces to take into the city, that another attempt would be made in their own way, and if that failed, they would soon take the place by famine. The Rebels, he said, were very badly off; some months before they had sent out some three thousand women and children whom he had put in stockades, and allowed the country people to take as wives any who so desired. It may be remarked here that it was in this way that he took Anking by starving it. He seemed very anxious to be informed of the qualifications of the various Kiangsu military mandarins personally known to him, and also showed that he was well acquainted with what had been occurring in Kiangsu and Shanghai, but it was evident, in spite of efforts to convince him, that he neither wanted nor saw any advantage to be gained by any change in his method, or by improving the arms of his men. We therefore ceased to press him on the subject, and left him at 3.00 pm., arranging to visit the [siege] works the next day.

Accordingly, accompanied by Tseng's orderly, a start was made at 9.00 a.m. for the hill above the Porcelain Tower, which is now a heap of ruins. This hill, which is not more than seven hundred and fifty yards from the [city]wall, commands a splendid view of the city and of the siege works; on it is a very large stone fort captured last year after

several repulses. It is a marvel that it was taken, and the untiring way in which it was managed is extraordinary; it seems that stockades and breastworks were constructed all around it and thus, by isolating it, the Rebels were caused much annoyance as to compel its evacuation. The hill and fort have the name E-fan-tay [Yü-hua-t'ai], and are held by two titais, with whom some conversation was held. Their feelings and desires for improvement were found to be the same as those of Tseng Kuo-tsuen; young men, twenty five to twenty six years old, better things might have been expected of them, and they showed that they were jealous of the reputation the late General Ching [Ch'eng Hsüeh-ch'i] had gained, and abused him for having been a rebel.

From the summit of the hill Nanking can be seen to perfection, the palaces being plainly distinguishable, and the back of the wall for a great distance. The quantity of waste ground if very large and, strange to say, the Rebels do not seem to have any stockades inside. For miles the wall is deserted entirely, only here and there is a single man seen, miles from any support; the houses in the city are good, but there seems to be a deathlike stillness hanging over it; there is not a flag visible or anyone cultivating the waste ground, as might be expected if the Rebels were pressed for food.

The wall is some forty feet high and thirty feet thick, revetted on the inside, and should the Imperialists place their charges under its centre, a clear breach through would be made. It was to the left of E-fan-tay that the old breach was made, and it appears that the charge took effect in the face of the wall, and merely blew off the outer skin. The Imperial stockades are not a hundred yards from the wall at this point; four or five Rebels were let down by a rope, while we were present, and gathered a sort of lentil between it and the ditch, quite unmolested by the Imperialists who were not more than eighty yards from them.

From E-fan-tay the besieging works can be seen for miles; they consist of a double line of breastwork connecting a hundred and twenty to a hundred and forty mud forts, spaced at a distance of from five hundred to eight hundred yards, and each containing five hundred men. The front breastwork faces the city, the rear one looks back, with an intervening space of three hundred yards between them; in some places the mud forts are nearer each other, and the breastwork is triple or even quadruple; it looked neglected, but there were parties working on it, Tseng Kuo-fan's arrival being evidently expected. Both the forts and the breastwork were much inferior to those constructed by the late General Ching,

and especially where the Tayan [Tan-yang] road emerges, the line is very weak. The forts are surrounded with sutler shops, and there did not seem to be any sentinel posted, a general picnic appearance being presented.

The Ming Tombs were then visited, and there we met Titai Wu Ming-liang, in charge of the mining operations at this section. Here there is no ditch and we went down to the mines and found a gallery driven a hundred and fifty yards fifteen feet below the ground, four to five feet wide and about seven feet high; it then divided into branches twenty yards from the wall, and had small shafts at intervals for ventilation. The gallery was framed with wooden supports and brushwood, some fifteen feet being driven each day. Two or three Rebels were looking over the top of the wall, and must have known what was being done by the earth thrown up from behind the stockade from which the gallery started.

(From a manuscript now in the British Museum, Gordon Papers).

5. "During the night of the 15th [of the 6th Month: 18 July] at the 4th watch [1-3 a.m.], while the tunnel was being charged with explosive, and Tseng Kuo-ch'üan and Li Ch'en-tien were discussing matters at the entrance to the tunnel, the rebel chief Li Hsiu-ch'eng made a sudden sortie with several hundred determined followers, from the foot of the wall at the T'ai-p'ing Gate, and made straight for the large stockade where the tunnel started. Several hundred others, in the uniforms and with the banners of government troops, came out from the eastern corner at the Ch'ao-yang Gate. Their incendiary shot set fire to the gun-emplacements and to reeds and brushwood nearby. The government troops were tired and [the rebels] took advantage of this and of the deep night. Fortunately [officers' names given] ... held firm on the left, killing innumerable rebels, while [other names[blocked the right and also captured and executed many, and fortunately protected the entrance to the tunnel". See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.25b.

6. Changed in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition to, "The troops had no rest all day and all night".

7. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition: "...and at dawn they all went back to barracks".

8. The final attack began at down on 18 July near the T'ai-p'ing Gate. The mined tunnel went off at noon, blowing up some two hundred feet of the wall opposite Ti-pao-ch'eng, and a Hunan Army assault force fought its way with considerable losses into

the city. Once inside, some of the Hunan Army units, under Chu Hung-chang, fought their way towards the T'ien Wang's palace, others towards the Shen-ts'e Gate to meet up with the troops from outside, who scaled the wall with ladders. These troops, having joined up, took control of the Ch'ao-yang Gate and the Hung-wu Gate, after which Taiping resistance began to crumble. The Chü-pao Gate and the T'ung-chi Gate were taken from the outside, and attacks were launched on the Shui-hsi and Han-hsi Gates; see Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lüeh p.409.

Notes to Page 242.

1. For 不故 read 不過.

2. For 劬 read 幼 .

3. This is a hill inside the city, near the Ch'ing-liang Gate on the west side. Li Hsiu-ch'eng presumably used this as an assembly point, from which one could see what was happening and decide on an escape route. According to Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chüeh Hsiang p'ing Yüeh-ni chieh-lüeh p.409, Li Hsiu-ch'eng and a band of 'determined rebels' attempted to charge out by the Han-hsi Gate, but were beaten back and returned to Ch'ing-liang Shan. The Young Sovereign stated in his deposition that,

> On the 6th Day of the 6th Month [19 July] at the 5th Watch [3-5 a.m.] I dreamed that the government troops had blown up the wall and charged into the city. After mid-day I was with four young queens [his wives] watching from a tower, and saw the government troops enter the city. I tried to run away but the young queens would not let me go. I said I was going down to have a look and would come back at once, and then I ran straight to the Chung Wang's palace. The Chung Wang took me to several gates but we were not able to charge out of any of them. At the first watch however, we dressed as government troops and charged out through the breach with only a thousand men or so.

See TPTK II p.856.

4. For 金言 read 雖然.

5. For 得 read 德 .

6. For 不故 read 不過.

Notes to Page 243.

1. For 蘇 read 麻 .

2. Originally Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written that the break-out was made at 'the first watch' (初更時), that is 7-9 p.m., but the character '四' was written over the character '初' in black ink, making it 'the fourth watch'. It is not possible to say who made this change, but it does not look like a correction made by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself and we are probably justified in assuming that this was part of the falsification of the deposition.

Which version is the true one? Chao Lieh-wen, who was at Nanking at the time, wrote in his diary that:

> At the end of the Hsü Hour [戌時, 7-9 p.m.] I saw firing from Lung-po-tzu and as far as Hsiao-ling-wei, and knew that rebels had broken out. ... At the fourth watch [四鼓時- 1-3 a.m.] a report came from north of the city that two hundred rebel cavalry and several thousand infantry, wearing government uniforms and accompanied by women and children, had charged out through the breach.

See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.370. The Young Sovereign (Hung Yu-fu) in his deposition, also stated that the break-out had taken place at the first watch; see TPTK II p.856. The falsification was made in order to make the deposition agree with the official report, to conceal the fact that the preoccupation of the Hunan Army with looting had virtually destroyed all their discipline and vigilance. It was also connected with the early return of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to his camp before the satisfactory completion of the capture of the rebel capital, see pages 46-7.

3. Omitted in Lü Chi-i's copy.

4. In fact he did get away, but was captured on 25 October 1864 near Shih-ch'eng in Kiangsi, and executed; see Shen Pao-chen's memorial in TPTK II pp.861-2.

Notes to Page 244.

1. This was at Fang Shan (see Map IV). The villagers who appeared were from Chien-hsi-ts'un (澗西村) according to Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng: Yung-an pi-chi ch.2; but Lo Erh-kang was told by a local man in 1953 that people from the two villages of Ting-ts'un (丁村) and Chien-tung-ts'un were involved; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.325.

2. Perhaps because he had been wounded at the fall of Nanking, according to Tseng Kuo-fan: Wei-k'an hsin-kao p.234

Notes to Page 245.

1. The Taipings of course wore their hair long, so the first step in concealment was to shave it off. But this was often not enough, and many ex-Taipings were executed because, although their heads were shaven, the sun had not yet had time to bronze their scalps, the whiteness of which betrayed their recent allegiance.

2. In the original '我亦不能復語', which I take to mean something like 'in that case there is nothing I can say [and having a shaved head could not do me any harm]'. The Chiu Ju T'ang editors evidently had difficulty as well in deciphering the sentence, and changed it to '我活不能復活' - 'I would not be able to live again', which means approximately the same in the end.

3. For 言後 read 然後.

4. The sentence was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan and added later, after 'not by anyone else', which was cut.

5. For 雖 read 遂.

6. For 兩国 read 兩個.

7. In place of this deleted sentence Tseng Kuo-fan added, 'and was captured by General Tseng's troops who were sent in pursuit'. Chao Lieh-wen recorded in his diary on TC3/6/20 (23 July) that Tseng Kuo-ch'üan had 'ordered a letter to be written to Chung T'ang [Tseng Kuo-fan] saying that Hsiao Fu-ssu had pursued [Li Hsiu-ch'eng] and made the capture. In fact it was the local people of Fang Shan who had taken him'. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.373. Later he noted that a man called T'ao Ta-lan had taken Li Hsiu-ch'eng bound to Hsiao Fu-ssu's camp. But Hsiao claimed that troops he had sent had made the capture. Since Tseng Kuo-ch'üan did not enquire into the matter, the local people got no reward at all. Worse still, Hsiao Fu-ssu 'suspecting that he [T'ao Ta-lan] had hidden the rebel chief's property in his home, sent troops who arrested his whole family and brought them to camp. The neighbours were also implicated. They were interrogated so oppressively about hidden treasure that everyone went into hiding, leaving the village deserted'. (ibid. p.376).

Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng: Yung-an pi-chi ch.2, Li Hsiu-ch'eng pei-ch'in chi, gives a somewhat different version: T'ao Ta-lan, the man who had detained Li Hsiu-ch'eng, had a relative in Li Ch'en-tien's force outside the T'ai-p'ing Gate, and was on his way to report his capture when he stopped at Hsiao Fu-ssu's camp at Chung Shan to rest. Here he was indiscrete enough to mention his achievement to a cook whom he knew, and the news was quickly passed on by one of the bodyguards to Hsiao Fu-ssu himself. Hsiao ordered T'ao to be entertained with food and wine, and secretly sent a hundred of his personal troops to Chien-hsi-ts'un to bring Li Hsiu-ch'eng back.

Another claimant for the credit for taking prisoner the Chung Wang was Chu Hung-chang, who wrote much later that when the rebels broke out of the unguarded breach in the wall of Nanking he, as well as Tseng Kuo-ch'üan, had sent troops in pursuit of them. His men, he claimed, had chased the rebels as far as Hsing-huang-chen, and had captured Li Hsiu-ch'eng. See Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-chün chi-lüeh pp.49a,b. I know of no other evidence to support Chu's claim.

Notes to Page 246.

1. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition the words 'for surrender' (投降) were added after 'assemble' (收全).

2. This whole section was overlooked by Lü Chi-i.

Notes to Page 247.

1. This sentence is interlinear and the sense is somewhat obscure. The original reads '我不能衛同其害民皆我之罪也'. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads '我不能衛國又聽我兵害民皆我罪也, which means, 'I cannot defend the Heavenly Kingdom, and moreover allow my troops to molest the people - these are my crimes.'

2. For 敢帶 read 感戴.

3. In the original this sentence reads '若我能此本事收復恐我他心仍祈刑正国法'. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '若我有此本事收降我之部众再有反復他心仍祈正国法.

4. Tseng Kuo-fan added '若' - 'if'. The original is '恐半堂不信我

[cont'd.]

有此為仍鎖在禁密我亦為'. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has: '若中堂不信我有此本事仍鎖在禁密我寫信付去我可 ...' ('If the Grand Secretary does not believe that I have the ability to do this, then keep me locked up and let me write letters which can be sent...').

5. For 因 read 思 .

6. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition the following words are added after '...both sides of the river': ' I request the Grand Secretary to express his opinion on this.' The edition ends with Tseng Kuo-fan's colophon (批記), which reads:

> The above was all written by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself in his prison cage between the 27th Day of the 6th Month [30 July] and the 6th Day of the 7th Month [7 August]. Every day he wrote about seven thousand characters. The wrongly written characters have been corrected, his flattery of the Ch'u [Hunan] Army has been expunged, idle words and repetitions have been cut, his specious pleading for life and requests to [be allowed to] expiate his guilt by obtaining the surrender of the various rebel [bands] in Kiangsi and Hupeh, together with the ten requests concerning this surrender and the ten disasters leading to the defeat of the rebel Hung, have all been cut. The remainder, though it is ungrammatical, and not in accordance with the facts, has not been cut, in order to preserve its authenticity.
>
> Recorded by Governor-General of Liang-chiang, Tseng.

Notes to Page 248.

1. 代我帶民前往, in the original. 民 is an error for 交 .

2. For 代 read 待 .

3. Li Shih-hsien had been refused admittance to Li-yang by his own second-in-command, Wu Jen-chieh, when Li-yang was threatened by government forces and the E.V.A. On 8 March Wu surrendered the town. "Just as Major Gordon was going into the city he was called back by some rebels to a large boat where the She [Shih] Wang's mother, a woman of seventy, his wife, a woman of twenty-five, his aunt, and son, a small boy of seven years old, were kept prisoners, and whom the rebels wanted to kill, as the She Wang had been very cruel to them in many ways,

and in which he had been aided and abetted by his mother. ... Kwosingling [Kuo Sung-lin] wanted to take the family and send them to the Futai [Li Hung-chang], but Major Gordon would not allow it, and gave them over to General Li [Heng-sung ?] to send down to Quinsan for safety. The old lady was very obstreperous and violent". Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.422.

When eventually this part of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition was sent to the court, this remark about Li Shih-hsien's family provoked an enquiry from the Grand Council to Li Hung-chang, who replied that the Shih Wang's mother and elder sister had since died, his wife had been sent back to her native place; see Shih-lu ch.128 TC4/1/30 (25 February 1865) p.44a. Tso Tsung-t'ang however, reported on TC4/3/29 (24 April 1865) that he had taken prisoner an American called 花耳 (Ward?), who had been sent to Shanghai by Li Shih-hsien to bring back his family; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.329.

4. At the end of TC2 (1863) Ch'en Ping-wen was said to be contemplating surrender to the government; see Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.641 in TPTK VI. He did so in August 1864, not long after the execution of Li Hsiu-ch'eng. His letter to Pao Ch'ao offering to do so is in TPTK II pp.772-774.

Notes to Page 249.

1. In fact he did not do so when Ch'en Ping-wen surrendered, see note 1 to page 225.

2. Chu Hsing-lung surrendered in 1865 at Chia-ying-chou in Kwang-tung; see Lo: Shih-kao p.87. Lu Shun-te was seized by a Taiping traitor at Ch'eng-lo-hsien in Kwangtung in the autumn of 1865 and handed over to the government; ibid. p.408.

3. I have followed Tseng Kuo-fan's interpretation in translating this sentence. The original reads: '不當該在外許廣野而無別計者乎'. Tseng Kuo-fan's edited version reads: '豈在外廣野而無別計者乎'.

4. The question of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's opinion as to the fate of the Young Sovereign is discussed in Chapter VIII pp.

5. For Ma Yü-t'ang see note 5 to page 234. I know nothing of Chao Chin-lung.

Notes to Page 250.

1. Huang Wen-chin took charge of the Young Sovereign at Kuang-te after the latter's flight from Nanking, and took him to Hu-chou. Huang died of illness near Ning-kuo on his way into Kiangsi in the summer of 1864; see Lo: Shih-kao p.425.

2. The character 共 is missing between 齊 and 餘 . For 記 read 寄 .

3. For 抯 read 恤 .

4. For 穩 read 捻 .

5. Changed to '9' by Tseng Kuo-fan, who had deleted the whole of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's ninth request.

6. The five characters '如行者求行', were deleted at this point. The sense is not clear; but Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably meant that messengers should be sent to all parts like monks (行者) on their travels.

Notes to Page 251.

1. This phrase is unintelligible - '罪孤何此事...' '孤' is probably an error for ' 辜 '.

2. In the original '未逢明良'. Compare page 183 top paragraph, where the original reads '未逢明主'.

3. The significance of this passage is discussed in Chapter V pp. 61-2.

4. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to '9'.

5. The Taipings Northern Expedition, commanded by Lin Feng-hsiang, Li K'ai-fang and others, (Chi Wen-yuan was probably an important, some suggest, the main commander; see Ma T'ien-tseng: Wen-t'i chieh-ta in Shih-hsüeh yüeh-k'an 1957 No.3 p.35), set out from Yang-chou on 8 May 1853 with a force of about 20,000. After taking P'u-k'ou on 13 May, they went northwest into Honan, taking Kuei-te on 13 June. They then intended to cross the Yellow River to the north, but being unable to obtain any boats there were obliged to move westward along the river, through K'ai-feng and

Cheng-chou to Ssu-shui. Here they found boats and started the crossing on 28 June. But they had already lost 22 valuable days by failing to cross at Kuei-te. Then, because of government resistance at Huai-ch'ing in August, they had to pass into Shansi, making a long detour before re-entering Honan at Wu-an. By mid-October they were 60 li from Pao-ting and there was consternation in Peking. Thirty thousand people left the capital and the Emperor was on the point of fleeing. But instead of continuing to advance north the Taipings thought to take advantage of the reported weakness of Tientsin, and moved to attack it. They reached a point about 50 li from the city but were prevented from advancing further by flood water. The Taipings then dug in and prepared to spend the winter, having possibly miscalculated the strength of the resistance which their proximity to the capital would produce. There followed a desperate campaign which lasted for three months. The Taipings suffered considerably from the cold and from shortage of supplies. Their numbers, augmented by recruits made on the march, were now about 40,000.

On 4 February their food supplies ran out and they began to withdraw down the Grand Canal, hoping to meet up with the relief force which had been sent (see note 7 below), too little and too late. Lin Feng-hsiang was defeated and captured at Lien-chen on 7 March 1855; Li K'ai-fang, besieged at Kao-t'ang-chou, broke out with only 800 men and was captured on 31 May.

The fundamental reason for the failure of the Northern Expedition was that the Taipings, having sent out the Western Expedition and having at the same time to protect their capital, did not have the means to support such a deeply penetrating expedition to the north, which posed considerable problems of supply and reinforcement. (This note is based mainly on Mou: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo pp.129-139).

6. His formal name was Hsü Tsung-yang (許宗揚).

7. According to Huang Sheng-ts'ai, he himself was the senior commander of this relief expedition; see his deposition in Shantung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao pp.5-11. The force, which consisted of only 7,500 men (ibid. p.18, Yüeh-fei nan-pei tzu-jao chi-lüeh), set out from An-ch'ing, entered Honan, then crossed into Kiangsu near Feng-hsien and passed into Shantung. Li-ch'ing was occupied on 12 April 1854; but the retreating government forces had destroyed all food supplies and the Taipings were unable to remain there. When they withdrew they were defeated, on 27 April. Tseng Li-ch'ang and Ch'en Shih-pao were killed, Huang Sheng-ts'ai was taken prisoner. Only Hsü Shih-pa (Hsü Tsung-yang) returned to Nanking, where he was imprisoned for his part in the debacle. Nothing is known if him after the internal

dissension in the Taiping capital.

This relieving force was very small, but was augmented by recruits enlisted on the march, whose indiscipline seems to have contributed to the failure of the campaign.

Notes to Page 252.

1. According to TCHT p.50, Ch'in Jih-kang was sent to the relief of the Northern Expedition after the defeat of the first relief column; but he complained to Yang Hsiu-ch'ing that the government troops were too numerous in the north. On this pretext he turned back from the region of Feng-yang and Lu-chou, and was defeated by militia forces at Yang-chia-tien, between Shu-ch'eng and Liu-an. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.332

2. The Taipings' Western Expedition began in May 1853 with the capture of Ho-chou and An-ch'ing. Part of the force then crossed into Kiangsi, and from 24 June laid siege to Nan-ch'ang until 24 September, when they desisted. After capturing Chiu-chiang [Kiukiang], this force divided into two columns, one under Shih Hsiang-chen and Wei Chih-chün went along the Yangtze westwards from Chiu-chiang, the other column (under Hu I-huang and Tseng T'ien-yang) campaigned in northern Anhwei. Shih Hsiang-chen's column thrust into Hupeh and in October occupied Han-yang and Han-k'ou; but withdrew the following month because of government pressure on Yang-chou. After the victory at San-ch'a-ho, they came back to Hupeh with additional troops and more commanders, including Lin Shao-chang, who was at that time ch'un-kuan yu-fu ch'eng-hsiang. On 16 February 1854, the Taipings once more occupied Han-yang and Han-k'ou, and leaving garrisons there, went into Hunan, taking Yüeh-chou on 27 February, Ch'ing-kang on 7 March, intending to gain control over the outlying districts of Ch'ang-sha in order to isolate the city. But they were pushed back and forced to withdraw from Hsiang-yin on 19 March and from Yüeh-chou on 21 March. After this however, the Taipings brought up reinforcements, recovered Yüeh-chou on 4 April, and once again moved on Ch'ang-sha. As before, they did not intend to make a direct assault, and while Shih Hsiang-chen held Ch'ing-kang, Lin Shao-chang took Hsiang-t'an on 24 April. Here he was immediately attacked by land and water by units of Tseng Kuo-fan's newly formed Hunan Army, and severely defeated between 28 April and 1 May 1854 (HF4/4/2-5). Taiping losses were said to have been about ten thousand killed, and many times that number scattered; see Wang Ting-an: Hsiang-chün chi, ch.2 p.7a.

The remnants of the Taiping force retreated into Kiangsi. Lin Shou-chang was cashiered (see page 161); Li Hsiu-ch'eng said in interrogation that he 'did not have much ability, but could withstand much hardship;' see Appendix I page 257). This was the first major defeat for the Taipings and the first major victory for the Hunan Army.

The main reasons for the Taiping failure were: first, their forces were somewhat scattered, Shih Ta-k'ai in the region of Ching-kang, Tseng T'ien-yang in Hupeh. Tseng Kuo-fan on the other hand, realized the importance of Hsiang-t'an and concentrated his forces there. Secondly, Lin Shao-chang was an incompetent commander and lost the initiative. Tseng Kuo-fan remarked that in each of the ten or more engagements, it was the Hunan Army which took the initiative. Once defeated, the Taipings would not undertake a strategic retreat. Thirdly, the Hunan Army, especially the water force, made good use of foreign cannon (according to Tseng Kuo-fan).

As a result of this defeat the Taipings were not able to take Ch'ang-sha and were prevented from meeting up with the reinforcements (mainly members of the T'ien Ti Hui) from Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The opportunity was lost for smashing the Hunan Army, which was only about two months old at this time.

(This note is based mainly on Chien: Ch'üan-shih III pp.1093-1102).

3. See pp.141-2.

4. In the original '君臣而忌'. Tseng Kuo-fan changed 而 to 相 ; but Lü Chi-i considers that it ought to be 疑 .

5. See p. 142.

6. ibid.

7. See pp.233 ff.

8. In place of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's final point which, together with the sentence summing up the disasters, was circled for deletion by Tseng Kuo-fan, the following sentence was written between the lines: '[The tenth] disaster was that [we] should not have concentrated on defending T'ien-ching by withdrawing troops from other parts', (不应傳保天京抽動各處兵馬). A reproduction of the whole page can be seen on page 507, above; a comparison of handwriting is made on page 76 , and this interpolation is dicussed in Chapter VI, page 75.

9. Kuo Mo-jo believes that the sentence '憒国憒命者因十憒之由而起而性命無涯' should read '憒国憒民者因十憒之由而起而憒民無涯; in both cases 命 being an error for 民 , and the last character but four being 憒 not 性 . I see no reason for supposing that 命 is an error for 民 , since nowhere else in the deposition does such an error occur, and in any case, 命 still makes sense. But Kuo Mo-jo's theory about the character seems reasonable, since the other examples of the character 性 on the same page bear a close resemblance to 性 . (See Kuo Mo-jo's preface to Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen).

Notes to Page 253.

1. In the original '興天王及過'. 及 is perhaps an error for 敍 .

2. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote: '事成平定天下矣笑'. Lü Chi-i gives as his reading '事成平分天下矣笑'. Tseng Kuo-fan wrote beside this sentence, '若與洋鬼同分...', which gives his understanding of what Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant. I have followed the general sense of these interpretations.

3. In the original, '今上少我国尾'. For 上 read 尚 . Tseng Kuo-fan added the character 欠 at the end.

4. Lo Erh-kang seems to take this story more or less at its face value, regretting only that Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not specify which 'barbarians' offered to share the empire with the Taipings and when. He quotes three contemporary sources (a letter from Chou Sheng-hu to Tseng Kuo-fan, Chao Lieh-wen's diary, and Huang Wan [Wang T'ao]'s letter to Liu Ch'ao-chün), presumably as corroboration of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's story; but in fact none of them do more than tell us that Sir James Hope and Harry Parkes visited Nanking because of the unsatisfactory state of relations between the British and the Taipings. See Lo: Chien-cheng pp.335-6 (Lo's note on this question was first published in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1956 No.3 p.26). Hope and Parkes visited Nanking in late December 1861, but there is nothing in the official record to suggest that they demanded to share China with the Taipings; nor is there anything in official Taiping replies to British communications which refers to such a demand, (see B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yangtze-kiang River, pp.97-104). This is not surprising, since such a demand was not in accordance with British policy towards the Taipings, for which see J.S.Gregory: British Intervention against the Taiping Rebellion, in Journal of Asian Studies xix 1959-60 pp.11-24, and the same

author's unpublished thesis, British Attitudes and Policy towards the Taiping Rebellion in China,(1850-1864).

Searching for the germ from which this rumour grew, the only suggestion I can make is that the British demands, reiterated by Hope and Parkes in Nanking in 1861, that the Taipings should not approach nearer than 100 li (30 miles) to the treaty ports, was misunderstood, or became garbled by repeated rumour into a territorial demand.

5. Tseng Kuo-fan added the character 趁 .

6. This was preaching to the converted. Tseng Kuo-fan had been getting foreign cannon from Canton for several years, and even attributed the first victory of the Hunan Army at Hsiang-t'an to the foreign cannon with which his water force was armed, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 3 p.3a. He had received at least 100 cannon from Canton three months earlier, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu (HF4/4/21) ch.10 p.7.

Notes to Page 254.

1. The sense of this phrase is somewhat obscure; Tseng Kuo-fan presumably deleted it because he found it unintelligible. The original reads, '而何將砲而制計保水面之堅'.

2. For 上 read 尚 .

3. It is not clear whether Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant that Tseng Kuo-fan should employ ex-Taipings, or merely that Chinese be found who had the necessary skill.

Notes to Page 255.

1. The sense is obscure. The original reads: '此處要用者亦被[彼?]處之來到廣東鄉巷[香港]所買[Tseng Kuo-fan added: 之甚] . Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in the top margin at this point '此條可采' - 'This suggestion can be adopted'.

2. Or 'jingal' (抬槍), a heavy musket fired from a rest.

3. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote '手槍' - the modern term for a pistol; but I assume that he meant rifles (or muskets) as opposed to gingals.

4. The manuscript breaks off at this point, at the end of a line and at the end of a page. The sentence at least was presumably finished, but it is not known how much more Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote before his execution, see page 36.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

(For abbreviations, see p. 269)

Anon: Chin-ling pei-nan chi 金陵被難記 in TPTK IV.

Anon: Keng Shen pi-nan jih-chi 庚申避難日記 in Chien-chi IV.

Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lüeh 平賊紀略 in Chien-chi I.

Anon: T'ai-p'ing-chün k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien jih-piao 太平軍克復浙江各縣日表 in Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao, 1963 No.1.

Anon: Tung-nan chi-lüeh 東南紀略 in TPTK V.

Anon: Yüeh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lüeh 粵匪犯湖南紀略 in Chien-chi I.

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世臧名自古及今观承謨見效容人
而定天下者大義智廣而成弘毅今有人
未果爭國之誠我主國本無嫌兼直心虛
見義而從利無他也我國一心為我
天主國而今日甘文妻宠失敬不忠早知
他亟宠有他意無有相引之門故
而真至于見中堂中堂大人量廣
故而直誌真情我昔于中堂中堂此
力凡是天國之人無不敬服中堂中堂大
人豈陰我患代收此人豈美于陰有是
是好事我要國之收齐此衆免乱世
天平我之心而為百姓得中堂中堂
將免劳免貧國之財貨此是救難
承思君子代直心無非而有別意是誌
揣之使知的实我說我非我不忠國已
聖言真語盡該周詳容已不容皆

MAP I


SHAN-JEN-TS'UN
TA-LI
YUNG-AN RIVER
WU-HSÜAN
SHUANG-CHIEH SHAN
SSU-WANG
KUAN-TS'UN
TA-CHIANG-KOU
CHIN-T'IEN
HSIN-HSÜ
PING-NAN
LIU CHIANG
HSÜN RIVER
MENG RIVER
KUEI-P'ING
T'IENG-HSIEN
PAI-SHA
KUEI-HSIEN
N
KWANGSI
Based on map in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao
0
50 km.


MAP II
Approximate Scale
0
5 KM
CH'I-LU-CHOU
YEN-TZU-CHI
KUAN-YIN-MEN
P'U-K'OU
SHANG-YUAN-MEN
YAO-HUA-MEN
LAO-CHIANG-K'OU
TIENTSIN
YANGTZE
CHIU-FU-CHOU
I-FENG MEN
CHIN-CH'UAN MEN
SHEN-TSE MEN
KUAN-YIN MEN
HSIEN-HAO-MEN
CHUNG SHAN
T'IEN-PAO-CH'ENG
MING TOMBS
CHIANG-P'U
CHIN-HUAI-RIVER
T'AI-P'ING MEN
LIN-CH'I
HSIN-HO
CH'ING-LIANG SHAN
SHANG-KUAN
HAN-HSI MEN
CH'AO-YANG MEN
TS'ANG-PO-MEN
CHIANG-TUNG MEN
SHUI-HSI-MEN
T'UNG-CHI-MEN
HSIAO-LING-WEI
HUNG-WU MEN
AN-TE-MEN
KAO-CH'IAO-MEN
YÜ-HUA-T'AI
CH'I-CH'IAO-WENG
T'OU-KUAN
SHANG-FANG-MEN
TA-SHENG-KUAN
SHAN-CH'IAO
PAN-CH'IAO-CHEN
BASED ON 戴逸：中國近代史稿 & 張其昀：中华民國地圖集


MAP III
HUNG TZU HU
HSÜ-I
HUAI R.
YING-SHANG
SHOU-CHOU
T'IEN-CH'ANG
TING-YUAN
CHENG-YANG KUAN
HO-CH'IU
LAI-AN
CH'U-CHOU
LIU-HO
YANG-CHOU
KU-SHIH
WU-I
I-CHENG
P'U-K'OU
CH'ÜAN-CHIAO
HONAN
LIANG-YUAN
CHIANG-P'U
NANKING
LU-CHOU
LIU-AN
HAN-SHAN
HO-CHOU
CH'AO-HSIEN
CHIAO NU
TUNG-KUAN
SHU-CH'ENG
SAN HO
HO-SHAN
YÜN-TS'AO
CHIN-NIU
TS'ANG-T'OU
WU-WEI
LU-CHIANG
HSING-AN
T'UNG-CH'ENG
KUNG-CH'ENG
LO-T'IEN
YING-SHAN
T'SUNG-YANG
CH'IEN-SHAN
HUANG-NI-KANG
AN-CH'ING
T'AI-HU
SHIH-P'AI
HUPEH
KUANG-CHI
SU-SUNG
HUANG-MEI
CH'I-CHOU
0
50
100 KM



BASED ON 張其昀：中华民國地图集

MAP V



BASED ON 張其昀：中华民國地圖集


MAP VI
YANG-CHOU
I-CHING
KUA-CHOU
CHEN-CHIANG
NANKING
CHIANG-YIN
YANG-SHE
YANGTZE
TAN-YANG
CHŬ-JUNG
CH'ANG-CHOU
CH'ANG-SHU
CHIN-T'AN
WU-HSI
T'AI-TS'ANG
K'UN-SHAN
TUNG-PA
LI-YANG
I-HSING
HU-SHU KUAN
SU-CHOU
CHIA-TING
TAI HU
SHANGHAI
CH'UAN-SHA
CH'ANG-HSING
WU-CHIANG
CH'ING-P'U
KUANG-TE
SUNG-CHIANG
P'ING-WANG
HU-CHOU
CHIA-SHAN
CHIA-HSING
CHIN-SHAN-WEI
P'ING-HU
TE-CH'ING
CHA-P'U
HAI-YEN
0
50KM
HAI-NING
HANG-CHOU
YŬ-HANG
Based on map in
Wilson: The 'Ever-
Victorious Army'.